

an innocent attempt to protect American life and property. Senator Norris has a grievance and he has adopted a manly way of submitting it to his own constituency.

THE German Chancellor's recent promise of a radical transformation of the interior policy of Prussia and of the German Empire "in the direction of new and enlarged freedom" has been usually interpreted as a concession extorted by the approaching spectre of domestic revolution. The overthrow of the Russian autocracy had put the fear of God into the hearts of its German prototype. This interpretation is probably wrong. No doubt the German leaders are fully aware of the threat of revolution which is overhanging their government among others as a result of the cataclysm of the war; but they have given many evidences of this consciousness before the Russian revolution broke and they have long been planning measures of domestic reform. In so doing they have merely been true to the traditional policy of the Prussian monarchy. Whenever a crisis, brought on either by internal unrest or foreign war, disclosed the need of measures of economic and political reorganization, the advisers of the monarchy have not usually allowed those measures to be forced upon them but have themselves anticipated the need. During the crisis of the Napoleonic wars the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg emancipated the Prussian people and invigorated their local institutions. The government was caught napping in 1848, but it yielded a sufficient measure of popular representation without allowing the revolution to get out of hand. When the German Empire was formed further concessions, such as universal suffrage, were made to the spirit of the times. Finally between 1871 and 1914 the German government was peculiarly enterprising and intelligent in anticipating the need of social legislation, of an improved and enlightened administrative service, and in popularizing this administration by associating with it a new type of representative institutions.

WHAT reforms the German government will propose at the end of the war can only be guessed; but manifestly its leaders have something far more radical in mind than a revision of the Prussian franchise and the abolition of many relics of feudalism in the Prussian imperial constitution. They will probably, as they have done in the past, seek to retain their political power by drastic measures of economic reorganization. It looks as if they would project a fairly complete system of state socialism, associated with a very large infusion of representation in the management of

industry both by the employers and the employed. They will have to demand enormous sacrifices from all classes of Germans and they will seek to balance these sacrifices by surrendering to all classes a large amount of collective responsibility and power. Shrewd observers anticipate the practical expropriation of the fluid capital of the country by partial repudiation of the war debt, a great expansion of the cartel system under direct government supervision and a strenuous attempt to secure the support of the wage-earners and the small farmers by the proposal of an increasing measure of economic self-control and self-government. If some such plan were worked out and adopted Germany would become more of an economic than a political democracy, which is just the reverse of our condition. They would thus avoid what they consider the incompetence of republican government.

War and Revolution

IN a period like the present, of agony and foreboding, let us be humbly thankful for a great event which is also a great victory. The most corrupt government, the most detestable despotism, which has survived among the nations of the modern world, is by way of perishing; and its death, as befitted its life, looks inane, inglorious and ignoble. That to the end it had slaked its greedy thirst on the lifeblood of Russia did not prevent it from playing the traitor to the apparently helpless mother of bounties. The Russian bureaucracy befouled the political atmosphere of modern Europe. It tainted or revolted every decent human being who was cast within the circle of its influence. It vitiated the credit of every cause with which it was associated. It was as close to utter degeneracy as any human institution can be. As long as it survived, true liberalism, wherever it existed, in America no less than in Europe, could count on one ultimate and uncompromising enemy. Liberals all over the world can now look forward to the future with increasing confidence. No doubt before the account is settled a very heavy price will have to be paid for the extirpation of such a malignant growth. The Old Régime in Russia, like the Old Régime in France, may require for its eradication a generation of revolutionary unrest. Like the Old Régime in France it may infect with its own poisonous virus the institutions and the men by which it is supplanted. But whatever these consequences are, they should be accepted without flinching. The Russian bureaucracy was a sordid conspiracy against the welfare of the Russian people and the progress of the world. The price which has to be paid for its final extinc-

tion can be paid with a whole-hearted sense of value received.

The great war has been subjecting the political fabrics of all the fighting nations to a terrific strain. Institutions which might have survived indefinitely and been slowly modified into something better are being shivered by the concussion of the storm of high explosives. The Russian bureaucracy, as the most incompetent as well as the most degenerate of modern governments, is the first to be shattered, but other institutions, economic as well as political, in so-called liberal as well as in so-called reactionary countries, scarcely succeed in concealing their quaking and distress. The war is putting to them, with an emphasis which cannot be ignored, the very questions which their supporters have ignored so completely when propounded by radical critics and agitators. A world war itself has in fact been proved to be the most remorseless conceivable critic, the most violent and fanatical agitator. Before its effects are spent the Romanoffs will not be the only dynasty which will have to abdicate, the Russian bureaucracy will not be the only band of exploiters who will have to surrender power and disgorge, the Russian peasant will not be the only class who will be called to participate in counsels and partake of feasts from which they have been hitherto excluded. Revolution is pursuing the present war and fast overtaking it.

The relation between revolution and war is usually misunderstood. "I believe," said a speaker at a recent meeting of the Emergency Peace Federation in New York City, "in revolution but not in war." He might as well have proclaimed his belief in day but not in night. Nations which are unable to accomplish needed internal changes without revolutionary violence, will usually be unable to accomplish the needed changes in their relations one to another without war. Nations which are unable to settle their foreign controversies without war cannot expect in the long run to accomplish their more radical domestic reforms without revolutionary violence. If war and revolution are not closely enough connected to be properly compared to the opposite sides of the same shield, they are at least the likely children of the same parents. Conditions which gave birth to one can under ordinary circumstances no more be stopped from giving birth to the other than parents who give birth to females can be stopped from giving birth to males.

This truth is usually obscured, because in the same community the class which looks favorably on revolution is different from the class which looks favorably on war. Revolutionists are for the most part radical agitators who allow the wanton injustice of the social establishment to provoke them

to a similarly violent protest. They condemn war because it seeks to impose an artificial unity upon a social organization which in their opinion cannot be harmonized without being purged of its stupidity, callousness, inertia and greed. On the other hand, people who believe in war as an instrument of national policy are usually conservatives, who welcome it as a preventive of internal dissensions and who seek a patriotic sanction for their machinery of domestic and foreign exploitation. The hostility between these two classes, which runs very deep, obscures the underlying truth of the relationship between their respective interests and methods. A social system whose purposes need to be promoted by aggressive wars and to be harmonized by military preparation is bound eventually to breed internal violence; and as long as internal violence exists, either in actual fact or as a serious threat, the course of internal reorganization is likely to be checked or perverted by armed interference from other nations. Radicals who expect to accomplish by means of violence revolutionary internal changes and at the same time to avoid war with other nations are the victims of their own not very creditable illusions. Equally erroneous and far more serious in its probable effects is the corresponding error of the patriotic militarists who are looking forward as a consequence of the present reign of violence in international affairs to a period of beneficent and peaceful domestic recuperation. The imperial architects of the Holy Alliance knew better when at the end of the Napoleonic Wars they planned to suppress revolution by means of the same mechanism with which they suppressed war.

The psychology which has been fostered among the European peoples as a result of the war will not disappear without demanding for its satisfaction drastic and probably violent agitation against existing political and social institutions and equally violent preparations for their defense. At present the majority of the peoples of Europe, including the governing classes, are allowing their emotions to be dominated by hate, their wills by fear, their thinking by unscientific dogmatism, and their purposes by an impatient and importunate exclusiveness. As long as the war lasts the benefit of these states of mind will be reserved chiefly for the enemy, but after it is over the same dispositions will at least in part survive and will poison the relations of the peoples of Europe with their fellow-countrymen. In dealing with their ugly domestic controversies the several classes within a nation will, unless they recover quickly, be disposed to flush with apprehension and resentment, to shriek that without their own victory there can be no peace, to be inflexible in their demands,

rigid in their classifications, intolerant of opposition and impatient of compromise. Confronted as they will be with an accumulation of economic, social and political problems, more acute, more searching and more dangerous than have ever before pressed for solution at any one time, they will need, in case revolutions are to be avoided, a new and a different psychology. No handling of these problems will make for national cohesion rather than national disintegration which fails to call to its aid not suspicion and hatred but faith in the ability of humanity to respond to better opportunities, not feverish dogmatism but the spirit and method of experimental investigation, not exclusiveness but an imaginative inclusiveness of purpose.

Socialists who discover a prophecy of political and social revolution in the economic dislocation, in the rise and fall of classes, and in the prevailing psychology brought about by the war, are probably right. The Russian revolution is magnificent, but it is portentous. Sooner or later analogous causes will provoke analogous effects, not only in the pseudo-despotisms where they are expected but in the pseudo-democracies where they are not expected. Such a colossal error as the present war demands an equally colossal expiation. During the next twenty-five years the heart of western civilization will be searched, its shams exposed, and its final integrity tested. If there has been a real need, as so many patriots have proclaimed, of the purification by war, there will be no less a need of purification by revolution. Admitting that war has temporarily purged the fighting nations of sloth, inattention, frivolity, inefficiency and a selfish love of comfort and safety, has it evoked in their midst equally questionable substitutes? Overspeeding is a doubtful cure for sloth; concentration on the gigantic irrelevance of war is a perilous alternative to inattention and frivolity. The grossest inefficiency of peace is less wasteful than the maximum efficiency of war.

Men and women deprived so long of their accustomed comfort and safety will resume them with a deeper satisfaction and will not give them up as long as the organization of society permits these benefits to be obtained at the expense of others. Unless a second purification follows, the restoration of peace will mean a renewal, perhaps even an intensification, of the former moral and social congestion. How far purification by revolution will have to go will depend in part at least upon the duration of the war and the nature of the peace. If the war is fought to a bitter end and the economic and moral dislocation pushed to the breaking point the ensuing revolution will be correspondingly drastic and dangerous. But if peace

supervenes before utter exhaustion sets in and without too much victory, if the governing classes of Europe are capable of acquiring moderation even under constraint and permit the terms of peace to be molded by creative political intelligence rather than by the Jacobinism of war, revolution will not be averted, but it may well be revolution tempered by law and healing in its ultimate effect. Modern civilization is divided against itself. The division finds expression sometimes in war and sometimes in revolution. It is the business of those who are working for a higher level of civilization to mitigate the schism. But for the present they cannot do so by outlawing either war or revolution. They cannot get rid of either without getting rid of both and of the causes of both.

Liberal Russia and the Peace of the World

ENTHUSIASTIC as all liberals must be over the downfall of the Russian autocracy, yet it is impossible to rejoice at ease while grave questions as to the probable trend of Russian foreign policy lie unanalyzed just beneath the threshold of consciousness. The old Russia loomed gigantic, in the popular imagination, as the champion of the orient, the terror of western Europe. An autocracy chiefly of German origin, a bureaucracy permeated by German influence, held the Russian giant bound and blindfold. But now the giant is free. Will he not gather forces that will be capable of bursting any barrier that Germany can erect for the defense of the west? Will he not sweep down from eastern Siberia and reduce China to his sway and Japan to vassalage? Are the Himalayas a sufficiently lofty wall to protect India against a regenerated Russia? These are questions that deserve at least a reasoned negative before we conclude that the Russian revolution can result only in good.

Let us not confuse immediate with ultimate issues. Liberal Russia is likely to develop vastly greater force in its present struggle with Germany than autocratic Russia, even acting in good faith, was capable of. This is a condition of existence for Russian liberalism. The autocracy was in a sense a German party, though for the moment disloyal to Germany. In post-bellum struggles with the people, Czardom would certainly have been forced to lean upon Prussian support. The fight against Germany is therefore an integral part of the fight for internal freedom. The Russian liberal state may well prove more pertinacious in its attempts to win Constantinople than autocratic Russia ever was. Constantinople is a popular