

it suppressed the revolutionary Prussianism of the ruling class in Germany; but if it uses the same methods to exterminate Bolshevism that it used to exterminate Kaiserism, its success will involve the ruin of democracy. Kaiserism was the expression of an inhuman greed for power. Bolshevism is the perverted child of popular distress, political and industrial violence, and individual and social frustration. Organized society cannot suppress it for long, because it thrives on suppression just as Christianity thrived under persecution. All that it can do is honestly to try to accomplish by democratic methods and without violence the revolutionary improvement in the condition of the poor and the dispossessed that Bolshevism is attempting to accomplish by violence. The great enemy and the great danger at present, as Lloyd George declared, is not Bolshevism but reaction, and dissension. In this country it is the reactionaries who are doing their best to create irretrievable dissension and to cultivate a violent popular state of mind which will make impracticable the road to radical but orderly democratic progress. They whose interest it should be to submit all institutions and traditions to the constant test of free and fair public discussion are themselves setting the example of intolerance, impatience and factious intemperance, of abuse and provocation to violence. It is they who are repudiating the liberalism which has hitherto been characteristic of American democracy in all its phases and substituting for it a harsh irreconcilability and obscurantism of spirit, which, if they do not look out, will result in their own ruin.

Jugoslavia

WHAT informed American is there who is not in full sympathy with a free and united Jugo-Slav state? America knows what freedom is worth. She experienced oppression and threw it off by force of arms. That was, however, very mild oppression as compared with the Turkish oppression endured by part of the Jugo-Slavs down to the Balkan wars, and the Austro-Hungarian oppression we confidently expect the peace congress to abolish forever. We know what unity is worth, having fought a bitter war to establish it on a solid foundation. But if our union had been disrupted, we should still have remained two great, rich, populous nations. There are only twelve millions of Jugo-Slavs in all, on a territory not much greater than that of our state of California. If they are split into several states, no fragment of the race can count for much.

Americans are also aware, though perhaps vaguely, what South Slav unity and freedom mean for the future peace and progress of Europe and

of the world. The Jugo-Slav lands have always been a corridor between the East and the West. Across them runs the only practicable road from Central Europe to the Aegean. The best routes from Central Europe to Constantinople and to the Black Sea are also dominated by them. What value modern nations place upon the control of routes is attested by the Great War. The Central Powers meant to seize the routes through the South Slav territories, though their effort should threaten the dissolution of civilization. They failed; but their failure does not bar forever all attempts to engross the routes of trade. A League of Nations will make such attempts extremely perilous. But what would condemn them in advance to futility would be the formation of a powerful and prosperous national state in command of the routes. A united Jugoslavia will very soon develop military resources sufficient to hold the highway to the Orient against any great Power on earth. Out of twelve millions of Jugo-Slavs a million brave soldiers could be recruited; and in the defiles and wooded passes of Jugoslavia a million men would be invincible.

Our deepest national sympathies, our most compelling international interests, command us to give active and intelligent support to the ideal of a united Jugoslavia. If we appear lukewarm and indifferent, that is because we are assuming that, as a matter of course, the nations assembled around the peace table will set up such a state. We have been so completely engrossed with the winning of the war in the west that we have given only the most fleeting attention to the problems that confront the patriots and statesmen of Jugoslavia. But these problems are extremely difficult, full of complexities.

The obstacles to Jugo-Slav union are both internal and external. There are bitter sectional and partisan jealousies and animosities within Jugoslavia itself, and there are territorial aspirations on the part of neighboring states that would prosper if the ideal of Jugo-Slav union failed. And, naturally, sectional strivings and alien intrigue fortify each other. We shall gain a clearer view of the problem if we look at some of the particulars.

The projected union of the Jugo-Slavs involves three peoples, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, who are of one stock and one temperament, but differ slightly in language, and more markedly in culture and in historical traditions. We may regard the barrier of language as relatively unimportant. The extreme of variation between the Slovene of Istria and the Serb of Macedonia is not so great as the extreme of variation between the Italian of Sicily and the Italian of the Po valley. The literary development that is sure to follow uni-

fication will quickly iron out such linguistic differences as might act as a barrier to intercourse. More serious are the religious differences. By an accident of history, the Serbian lands became Orthodox, the Croatian and the Slovene lands Roman Catholic. Further, the Croats and Slovenes, under the Hapsburg monarchy, shared perhaps more generally in the western current of education and of modern ideas than the Serbs of the Monarchy; certainly than the Serbs of Macedonia, only recently released from Turkish slavery. Finally, the events of the war have worked in some respects toward disunion. Croats and Slovenes served in the Austrian armies that invaded Serbia and wasted her lands and destroyed her towns and cities. Many served unwillingly; some went over to the Allies and fought by the side of their brother Serbs. But it would be sheer propaganda to assert that none of the Croats and Slovenes were loyal to the cause of Austria-Hungary. There is too much evidence at hand that some of the Dual Empire's most capable officers and bravest regiments were Jugo-Slavs.

Accordingly, when the peoples of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia are urged to form a united state, much is required of them. They are required to forget that they fought on opposing sides in the most atrocious of all wars. They are required to disregard the fact that in Balkan experience the Church is a politico-economic rather than a religious organization, and that the difference between Orthodox and Roman Catholic is not wholly disposed of by constitutional provisions safeguarding religious freedom. They are required to sink their particular cultural aspirations in the hope that the common culture will rise to the highest, not fall to the lowest level. What wonder is it that many Jugo-Slavs would prefer a tripartite autonomy to unification, and that many more would not care to see unification proceed beyond the limits of federation?

There is still another complication in the problem. In its inception the Jugo-Slav movement drew most of its impetus from Serbia. It was what we should call a Greater Serbian movement, and aimed particularly at the adoption into the monarchy of the Serbs of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Banat of Temesvar. In the extension of the idea to include Croatia and Slovenia, the original conception of a Greater Serbia was merely attenuated. The union contemplated in the Declaration of Corfu was styled the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Under the Serbian dynasty, the three parts of the South Slav race were to determine their own constitution. But the premise of a dynasty was a large reservation. What ground was there for assuming that the Croats and Slovenes, many of whom are republicans by in-

stinct, would willingly become subjects of the House of Black George, for which in the past they had not always shown great esteem? Nor was it to be expected that the Serbs would sacrifice their king, who had exhibited a decidedly royal quality in the dark days when Austria and Bulgaria boasted that Serbia no longer existed. King Peter, undaunted, was a symbol that the boast was hollow. Therefore the Serbs mean to save him from the general wreck of kings and extend his sway. That is natural, just as the reluctance of Croatian and Slovene republicans to come in under a dynasty is perfectly natural.

If the Jugo-Slavs could be let alone through a few decades, the obstacles to union might be expected to smooth themselves out. But they will not be let alone. The territorial aspirations of the neighboring peoples will not remain quiescent. We may assume that the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia will not be pushed at the peace congress. Bulgaria's cue is not to be grasping. But Rumania, which has merited well in Allied eyes, wants the greater part of the Banat of Temesvar, the richest territory claimed by the Jugo-Slavs. Italy plainly intends to claim the whole of Istria, most of which is peopled by Slavs, and probably Dalmatia also. Nor is this all. Italy's claims in Epirus, the Dodecanese and the Greek mainland of Asia Minor, would tend to force Greece to seek expansion outside of the lands that are unquestionably Greek. There is an old claim of Greece to part of Macedonia which could be validated only at the expense of the Jugo-Slavs. But Greece might prefer to let Jugo-Slav territory alone and push for Turkish Thrace and the Bulgarian lands south of the Rhodope. Such an arrangement would result in perennial discontent in Bulgaria, and eventually to schemes of expansion into Macedonia, the least defensible land within Bulgaria's reach. Nor need we suppose that the Magyar state will sit by quietly while Jugoslavia and Rumania quarrel over the Banat.

If the spiritual union of the Jugo-Slavs had already been solidly established, the machinations of the neighboring states would count for little. But that union is still an aspiration. There are sectional and partisan sentiments within Jugoslavia upon which alien intrigue can play. Let us remember we are dealing with a problem of the Balkans, where intrigue enters into every equation. And while alien intrigue may appear to advance now one interest, now another, among those struggling for the mastery in Jugoslavia, its ultimate effect is bound to be the spoliation of every interest, every party. That is why a prompt and complete unification is imperative. Under other conditions a loose federation might be the wisest plan, but, as matters stand, federation, with its concomitant sectional

jealousies, would leave the door open to alien designs.

The cause of Yugoslavia is, then, not by any means won. It has the latent sympathies of the western democracies, which if aroused to the necessity would set themselves resolutely against the sacrifice of Jugo-Slav soil for the benefit of any neighboring state. But the western democracies have not been aroused. This is in part the fault of the Jugo-Slav spokesmen themselves. For effectiveness of propaganda they have let us believe that all was harmony within; that all Yugoslavia was eager to be unified under the House of Karageorgevitch. If that were true, there would be no reason why the western democracies should be concerned about the matter. The peacemakers would no more think of taking any Jugo-Slav territory for the benefit of other nations of the Allied group than they would think of taking away, say, Italian territory for the benefit of France.

It is time for Jugo-Slav propaganda to end, and for the Jugo-Slav patriots to come out into the open and speak as democrats to democrats. "We have a great and worthy cause, national unity and independence. We have our personal preferences as to the constitution to be formed under union; perhaps we are royalists, perhaps we are republicans; we may desire Serbian influence to be paramount or we may be bitterly opposed to it; we may favor the Orthodox or we may favor the Roman Church. Those are quarrels within the family which we can settle later; we are ready to abide by any decision the bulk of our people prefer. On only one thing are we unalterably determined, unity within our natural frontiers; frontiers not determined by moldy records of the time of Stephan Dushan or the Venetian republic, but by the living will of living populations." Would America respond to such an appeal? Most certainly.

The Outlook for Protectionism

HIGH protection is again to come into its own in America: so its apostles are confidently asserting. For the next two years, to be sure, no significant change in American tariff policy can be expected. There is not sufficient protectionist strength in Congress to override a veto: accordingly almost all that can be done is to conduct an agitation. But if history repeats itself, the agitation will sail with a favoring wind. Every war in the past has produced an intensification of the national consciousness. After a war we are more keenly alive to the fact that we are Americans; something different from anything else in the world, and superior. The incantation, American goods made by American labor out of American materials, sounds more

compelling in our ears. And, emotional considerations apart, there are practical considerations without end that enlist one group of employers and laborers here, another there, to the passionate support of protection. There are the new industries, like the manufacture of aniline dyes, that owe their existence to the cutting off of foreign competition by the war. Shall their invested capital, and the newly acquired skill of their personnel, fall victim to peace? What is more important, almost every industry which was able to hold its own against foreign competition before 1914 has since undergone a growth that took no exact account of costs. Almost every industry has its fringe of concerns that would produce at a loss if prices were to return to anything near the pre-war level. And this means that in the aggregate large numbers of employers and multitudes of workmen will face hard times unless protectionism succeeds to the trade-restricting function of war.

Another thing the protectionists are counting on is the fiscal condition of the country. Interest on the war debt, pensions, the support of institutions for the rehabilitation of maimed soldiers, reconstruction charges, and probably a permanently increased military and naval establishment will represent heavy drains upon the revenue. We cannot maintain income, inheritance and profits taxes at the war level without arousing bitter discontent among the classes which bear those taxes. They are a minority, but an uncommonly active and vociferous minority. They are a rich source of campaign funds and masters of propaganda. Add their influence to that of the industries directly interested in higher duties, and we have a powerful combination behind the protectionist ideal.

Certainly the protectionists might expect to have their own way two years hence if this had been an ordinary war, leading in its train only the conventional consequences of wars. Or even with a war so unlike all earlier struggles, if the Presidential election were to come off next spring, before the people of America have had time to perceive the essential differences, the path before protectionism would lie unobstructed. As matters stand, the protectionists have reason to hold their boasting until their battle is won. Much new light will gleam through in two years.

In the first place, it is not only probable that some sort of international organization reducing the chance of war will have been formed, but there will probably be a popular overestimate rather than an underestimate of its efficacy. Even after a bad peace, a peace containing within it the seeds of future war, a war-weary people has always acted as if it utterly disbelieved in a repetition of the horror. Never does the emotional type of pacifist