

contributory system of unemployment insurance, if such insurance becomes necessary. We no longer have the time to work out such systems.

One plan, however, might be adopted, the granting of industrial furloughs. If it becomes evident that our demobilization is causing wide-spread unemployment it will be possible, instead of dismissing further hundreds of thousands to destitution, to grant a furlough to soldiers to enable them to seek occupations. Until the man actually secured a position, or one was secured for him, he would remain in the army. To carry out such a plan, however, our system of Federal Employment Exchanges would have to be raised to a far higher level of efficiency.

To sum up the situation we are running new risks simply because we have not studied the problem or realized that there was a problem. We are like the statesman who believed that an army could be created overnight by a million men springing to arms. He thought of mobilization as an adventitious gathering of a million freemen, each with his fowling piece. We are still thinking of demobilization in loose terms. But demobilization is a highly technical process; military demobilization means industrial mobilization. It is primarily a civil or industrial, not a military task; it is a scientific task, requiring order, discipline and synchronization, and, above all, forethought.

WALTER WEYL.

Reenter, China

FOR some time it has been evident to those whose minds were not wholly engrossed by the problems of world war and peace that the period of reconstruction would bring sharply to the fore the question not only of Russia but also of China. The intrinsic issues of the Far East as well as those of Russia have been generally subordinated to the relationship of these nations to the war, while many pressing phases of the situation have been pushed aside as so much unfinished business. A vital significance, therefore, attaches to the informal presentation to the Chinese foreign office by the British minister to China with the concurrence of the other Allied representatives in Peking of a memorandum concerning matters in which China is alleged to have been remiss as an ally. Ostensibly, this action is just another step in the subordination of the domestic issue to the subject of China's participation in the war. With the coming of peace, though, it takes on a new aspect which demands the attention of the United States as an acknowledged guardian of the Chinese Republic.

The memorandum of the Allied ministers in Peking has all the appearance of a first gesture indicating a returning interest in the intrinsic problems of China. Its implications lead not only into the past but also toward the future. If such a complaint had come last spring when the war was going badly for the Allies, then the recent memorandum would have appeared only as an effort to make China's participation in the war more effective. Just now, though, there is no escaping the impression that the Allies are doing a little preliminary book-keeping prior to the final settlement for China's services in the war. A heedless boy is being reminded that his conduct may affect his chances to go to the circus next month.

A consideration of the individual instances of China's alleged dereliction will elicit the conclusion that the charges have some foundation in fact. If we stop at this point in the investigation, however, we ourselves shall be remiss in our obligations to a free China. We must seek out the underlying cause of China's neglect, and if it is due to carelessness and to the inefficiency of a strange form of government in the process of a struggle to find itself, rather than to a conscious difference of motive, then we shall have to be patient and on the alert against the selfish interests in our own and other countries which would capitalize and exploit China's errors.

The first item in the memorandum as reported in the press dispatches charges "the wasting in party quarrels of the Boxer indemnity remitted for the purpose of fostering industries to enable participation in the war." Default in this direction was evident before I left Peking last summer on my way home from Russia. Party quarrels and intrigues were common rumor together with the melting away of public funds in the factional strife. Even the American indemnity to which special conditions were attached was being applied less effectively than before. In the decade since 1908, when our government decided to return to China almost half of the original sum stipulated after the Boxer uprising, the payments have been remitted to China with the definite understanding that the same sum was to be applied to the founding and the upkeep of Tsing Hua College and to the support of the Chinese students sent annually to our universities. The other nations signatory to the Boxer protocol did not remit payment of the indemnity until that proposition was ratified as a part of China's agreement to enter the war on the side of the Allies. By that same agreement, the United States was bound

to forego the strict supervision of the remitted indemnity by which American officials had directed the wise and honest expenditure of the annual funds. China, however, promised to devote an equal sum to the support of Tsing Hua, but since she entered the war the money has passed through Chinese hands with the result that much of it is disappearing after the manner of all Oriental financial transactions. Tsing Hua has not yet been seriously affected, but its future is a matter of some concern to Americans in China.

"Lack of results by the Chinese War Participation Bureau and the diversion of Chinese troops to civil warfare in the south," is the second count in the indictment. Here, too, there can be little doubt of the truth of the charge, little hesitancy over the justice of the complaint. But it must be remembered that China is still in the throes of revolution—political revolution, it is true, with none of the fundamental disturbances of all the phases of civilized life which follow in the wake of social revolution, but revolution nevertheless. The southern rebels have not been recognized by other governments any more than the Bolsheviks in Russia, but they have not yet been conquered or reconciled, and the Peking government is loath to send troops out of the country which it may need to protect its own existence. Moreover, if the British minister has any sense of humor he must have smiled as he composed this paragraph at a time when his own government was diverting soldiers and guns from the front in France in order to keep the Irish situation in hand.

The third and seventh items of the memorandum are probably the outcome of Chinese aloofness, although the particular circumstances in the situation may shed more light on the cause when they are explained more fully. Complaint is made in these items of "the appointment of a papal minister without consultation, creating an impression of friendship with the enemy," and also of "failure to permit Allied consuls to witness the trials of arrested spies."

The problems set out in the fourth and sixth counts have been the subject of previous negotiations last spring and summer. As stated now, there has been "failure to confiscate enemy property, to impose restrictions on enemy enterprises and to impose penalties for trading with enemy subjects" as well as "failure to imprison intriguing enemy subjects." While I was in Peking the controversy over the proposed deportation of German and Austrian aliens from China to Australia was at its height. The pressing military necessity for such action was at least doubtful. Certainly it would have worked disproportionate injustice to many harmless men and women and children. And I

heard the proposal advocated most warmly by small tradesmen for purely selfish reasons so that they might have the field all to themselves. Nevertheless, the Orient is a large playground, and without something stricter than Oriental methods of surveillance, enemy agents could easily ply their craft. Constant pressure from without is probably the only means of counteracting the easy-going attitude of the Chinese toward such matters.

Most eloquent of all the charges in its revelation of Chinese character is the fifth which objects to the retention in office of the governor general of a northern province who has supported "the enemy and the Bolsheviks in spite of the protests of the Allies." Herein may be seen not only the impotence of the central authority in dealing with the military rulers of the outlying districts but also the fatalism and the indifference and indulgence of the Chinese mind. Removal of the offending governor might extend the difficulties of the Peking government. And so long as the German and Bolshevik "guests" of the governor do not menace the Peking government directly, they are likely to be ignored even in the face of foreign protest, until that protest becomes more dangerous than the uninvited visitors.

I recall in connection with this charge the story I heard while our train was stalled for a day in Irkutsk. General Semyonoff and his Cossack-Buriat band had cut the main line of the Trans-Siberian railroad and were operating on the Russian border into Manchuria. The general and his staff made frequent trips to Harbin over Chinese rails and otherwise made free with Chinese privileges. Bolshevik representatives from Irkutsk waited upon the Chinese officials and protested against their action in harboring a counter-revolutionist.

"But what proof have we that you represent Russia and that General Semyonoff does not?" asked the Chinese. "The general has told us that he represents Russia. He is our guest. We must believe what he says or offend him."

And so the situation remained unchanged. I could not avoid the conclusion that China had found it to her advantage to have her frontier into Bolshevik Russia closed, and adopted this easy and inexpensive method of accomplishing her end. The tolerance today of the opposite faction may have a similarly fantastic motive to avoid unpleasant decisions.

The memorandum as a whole, therefore, is apparently called forth by awkward and unpleasant developments due to the weak position of the Peking government and to certain traits of Chinese character. If it is used strictly as a form of pressure to impart force to the authority of the republic,

it will serve a constructive end. On the other hand, there is danger that individuals or even governments may be tempted to turn the recital of China's remissness into a new lever to extract concessions and exploit her and her people in the manner of the shady past. Japan will seek every opening to demand the continuation of her temporary tenure of Tsing Tao, instead of turning it back to China or making it an international free port. Other foreign business interests will seize every opportunity to improve their grasp of China's resources regardless of China's own welfare, and their governments may be persuaded to back them up in their demands or at least to wink at their action. The United States can not fulfil a traditional obligation by merely keeping its own record clean. We must take the time from our consideration of the other world problems into which we are plunged for a thorough study of China as she reenters the world forum. Ever since John Hay formulated our attitude of the open door and territorial integrity for China, that nation has turned instinctively to America as her international guardian. The world can not be made safe for democracy if we forget even temporarily one of the newest and the most populous of the free nations.

OLIVER M. SAYLER.

Their Majesties

SCENE: A room in Buckingham Palace on a bleak morning in November. King George and Queen Mary seated in front of a Welsh-coal fire. King George has a newspaper in his hand.

KING GEORGE.—I see that William has gone to Holland.

QUEEN MARY.—Yes, and so has the Crown Prince. I wonder how Wilhelmina will like it.

KING GEORGE.—How will the Dutch people like it, you mean, my dear.

QUEEN MARY.—Karl is going to Switzerland.

KING GEORGE.—And Ferdinand is already there.

QUEEN MARY.—So is Constantine.

KING GEORGE.—Frederick of Mecklenburg and Charles Edward of Saxe-Coburg have resigned.

QUEEN MARY.—So has Ludwig of Bavaria.

KING GEORGE.—Saxe-Meiningen has been declared a republic.

QUEEN MARY.—So has Baden.

KING GEORGE.—Thank God grandma wasn't here to see the end of everything.

QUEEN MARY.—It is dreadful, George, isn't it? We ought to be thankful we live in democratic England.

KING GEORGE.—Yes, indeed. Yet, do you

know, sometimes I think——

QUEEN MARY.—You think what, George?

KING GEORGE.—I think sometimes that it might be a good thing if—er—I——

QUEEN MARY.—If you what, George?

KING GEORGE.—If I were to—er—resign—er——

QUEEN MARY.—Do you mean abdicate?

KING GEORGE.—Yes.

QUEEN MARY.—George, don't be blasphemous! Where would the country go? It's ridiculous. It's worse. It's sacrilegious.

KING GEORGE.—I hardly think so, dear. Every one knows I'm a figurehead, a harmless anachronism, a mere decoration.

QUEEN MARY.—But look how popular you are.

KING GEORGE.—That's just it. I'm popular because I'm not allowed to do anything to risk unpopularity. I'm merely a sort of social cement used to keep the court together.

QUEEN MARY.—What about our titular aristocracy? If you went, *it* would have to go.

KING GEORGE.—Our titled persons wouldn't be missed much. They're mostly brewers or political contributors nowadays.

QUEEN MARY.—I can't think where you get your ideas from.

KING GEORGE.—From the war, I think.

QUEEN MARY.—The war?

KING GEORGE.—Yes. The war has shown me horribly clearly that hereditary rights aren't really rights. That an accident of birth made me a king when I'd much rather be a farmer. Kings are passé, my dear.

QUEEN MARY.—What about Albert?

KING GEORGE.—Oh! he's the exception that proves it. If he resigned tomorrow and Belgium became a republic, he'd be unanimously elected President. His people love him for what he is and has done, *not* because he is a king.

QUEEN MARY.—And I'm sure our people would elect *you* as their first President, if you resigned. You're much too modest.

KING GEORGE.—I wonder——

QUEEN MARY.—You wonder what?

KING GEORGE.—I wonder if they *would* elect me if I resigned?

QUEEN MARY.—I'm sure they would.

KING GEORGE.—You know I'd so much like to go before Parliament and say something like this, "Gentlemen, my being King is a joke. All the trappings and ceremonies attached to my rule are utter nonsense. I want to be a free agent and live my own life. You may not believe it, but I really have a sense of humor—sadly undeveloped, I fear—but still a sense of humor. It forbids me to continue to receive orders from Lloyd George, digest