

Once a Petrograd journalist came out here to write of his work, but Sergei Gregorovitch in alarm begged him not to write a word. 'I am not a progressive,' he said, 'but just a plain, simple man in the village doing some things for the love of Christ.'

"He still looked like a beggar man. When he needed money he would go to Petrograd, and kneel and kiss the very feet of the people who could help him. He also earned quite a bit himself by conducting funerals in one of the city graveyards there. He used to joke about it. 'I grab money from the dead,' he said, 'to use it for the living.'

"He never stopped working day or night. He was to be seen at all hours striding about the countryside. If a peasant was dying, the priest was there; if a child was born, the priest was there. So he used up his life in twenty-five years. He came here at twenty-two and died at forty-seven. Meanwhile, a generation had passed, and he had fulfilled his promise. For a new generation had grown up and the life of the district had been changed."

ERNEST POOLE.

Foch's Strategy

(Special Cable from Our London Correspondent)

THE key to an understanding of the military situation is Hindenburg's manifesto on the grave political discontent among the German people and army. He fears that if the present reverses continue both the authority of the civil power and of the military chiefs will be overthrown. Hence the German proposals for peace which have as a primary object the extrication of the German army from a critical situation. Hence also the internal reforms in Germany designed to strengthen the present rulers by making all parties, including the Socialists, their accomplices. It is a common mistake to interpret the military situation without reference to politics. In this case they are inextricably connected. On the map the military situation is grave for the Germans but not yet desperate. They have held up the extreme end of their line fairly well, and their retention of men in the north of Lille is of great military advantage to them.

At the eastern end, in Argonne, American progress is obstinately resisted, because the idea is to make this the pivot of a wheeling movement back to a new line on the Meuse. The greater danger to the enemy is a breakthrough between Cambrai and St. Quentin which threatens German lateral communication from Lille to Hirson. The result of a rupture of this line would be to make all Flanders untenable, and it would probably lead to vast captures of men and material in Lille and the Douai district and also to the cutting off of the retreat of the German center from St. Gobain. That would be a manifold disaster of Sedan, thus saving the destruction and devastation of a prolonged retreat. The German High Command evidently fears this disaster, but they have still room to manoeuvre and might escape complete ruin.

In the meantime their peace proposals are in the nature of a reinsurance policy on an overdue ship. Foch has revealed himself as the greatest general the war has produced. Up to the movements which began in July last, perhaps the most complicated set of operations in the war were those organized by von Falkenhayn against Russia in 1915. But these operations, at any rate in their general outline, had probably been preparing long before. The Russians were holding extemporized defenses, whereas the

enemy that Foch had to meet had spent many years in elaboration of the lines that he held. Foch's ideas like those of all great men of action were exceedingly simple. Their working out was elaborate but never complicated. He owed something to the enemy who in the previous spring had essayed exactly the same task and failed to solve it. Ludendorff's dominating ideas were surprise speed in following up an initial success and rapid change in immediate objective. Foch adopted and improved on every one of them. Ludendorff had rather overdone development of speed, for the extreme confusion into which leapfrog tactics brought his columns contributed not a little to the failure of his attacks. Foch was mindful of this danger, and though he too adopted the German practice of passing reserve divisions rapidly through exhausted front line troops, he relied rather on frequent changes of objective and on an extremely ingenious and comprehensive strategic scheme to accomplish his end.

The scheme has been slow to reveal itself in its entirety, but although all its details are not yet complete, the general outline is unmistakably clear. Foch was not content merely to break the German lines and drive them back from position to position, his aim was much more ambitious, namely, to prevent the enemy getting back at all and if possible to end the war before Christmas. He may have had but faint hopes of achieving his larger object, but he is one of those great generals who set themselves an almost impossibly high standard in full certainty, even if this is not reached, of accomplishing more than could possibly be accomplished by a smaller and less ambitious design. It is characteristic of the vastness of the man's conception that even when he was essaying the greatest military problem ever attempted in history, the reduction of the immense German fortress in France, he should still have found time to include the southern front of Austria within his scope. The defeat and surrender of the Bulgarians no doubt presented itself to his mind as a measure of insurance against the possible failure of his whole plan in the west. It might well be, even if he drove the Germans back to their own frontiers in France, that the next development of our strategy should be to transfer our offensive against Austria, and we find him in the middle of his French campaign making preparations for such a transference should it later appear to be desirable.

If the German forces in France should be not merely defeated but annihilated, the question of the Austrian front would of course not arise. If, on the other hand, they were merely defeated and not annihilated, then his preparations for moving against Austria would be fully made and his perfect freedom of strategic movement assured. There is a genuine Napoleonic quality in a general who could take in his stride a prospective emergency like this of a future campaign against Austria. Recent events have justified those who insisted in season and out of season on the importance of the eastern theatre. Defeats on the west were grave for the Germans but so long as the east held it was always possible for them to contract the front in France and consolidate gains in the east, thus saving the reputation of the government. It is the simultaneous collapse east and west that makes the German situation so hopeless. The west front is difficult to maintain, but with prospects appearing of two new fronts, a new eastern and a new southern front, the situation becomes irreparable. Austria is absolutely indispensable to Germany and the eastern victories have assailed Germany at her most vulnerable political point.

H. SIDEBOTHAM.

CORRESPONDENCE

Alsace-Lorraine

SIR: Permit me to thank you for publishing in your issue of September 28th the very cogent letter of Mr. Arthur O. Lovejoy apropos of the Alsace-Lorraine issue as a factor in making peace. It has been my fortune to turn over a great mass of recent literature written with the object of promoting a "peace by conciliation." It is very hard to praise the courage and effectiveness of the larger part of these writings, in view of their almost studied effort to evade one of the main questions in the great debate between Germany and a nation to which Americans are incalculably beholden.

Is it really possible to end this war, considering the fearful acts of physical iniquity committed, on terms that will imply "general content" for the Teutons as well as for their adversaries? How many absolutely just verdicts by civil tribunals leave the defeated litigant praising the decision of the jury? Are we advancing the cause of lasting peace by deliberately shunting aside the very specific Alsace-Lorraine issue, in favor of general discussions as to a new system of international relationships? And if we are to "content" Germany, pray, in the name of all that is honest, are we not under somewhat greater obligations to "content" France?

No cause was ever advanced by wilfully ignoring a cardinal issue. Until certain clever friends of the schemes for a new world order will come forward manfully, shake hands with this specific question, and offer a definite solution which offers justice to France which will be entirely satisfying to the French people, with whom we are today joined in a great blood sacrament, they will find that their other arguments leave some of us very cold.

WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS.

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

The Impious Mr. Wells

SIR: I am instructed to say that the attention of this Order [Imperial Order, Sons of the Empire] has been directed to an advertisement appearing in a recent issue of your journal in which announcement Mr. H. G. Wells sees fit to express his approval of the new publication by damning all empires including the British.

One would have thought that Mr. Wells would have shown more discretion and better taste, and if he wished to earn the thanks of the proprietors of the New Journal, express his appreciation of it without denouncing the British Empire.

We have been informed that a reply to this senseless outburst of Mr. Wells's was sent you by Mr. Bernard Rose of this city. His letter was returned on the plea that though you would like to publish it you were prevented by want of space.

I presume that you are anxious to earn the good opinion of readers in this country, the number of which you would doubtless like to increase. If my assumption is correct I trust, speaking in the name of this Order, that when communications are sent you in matters of this kind that you will give them the consideration they deserve.

The United States and Great Britain are drawing closer together. They have too much in common both present

and future to quarrel. When some individual of the Wells type seeks, without any provocation or justice, to attack the land and empire that has done so much for him, it is incumbent upon those who are proud of being Britishers and appreciate the privilege of living within the confines of the empire promptly and indignantly to repudiate the foolish and uncalled-for opinions expressed by Mr. Wells and others.

J. McNAUGHTON.

Montreal, Canada.

Wardrobes and Wages

SIR: I have been recently asked, along with several other social workers, to make out a budget for a working girl. This occupation is one of the regular avocations of almost every branch of our profession, so there was nothing unexpected about the request, except the source of it. We were ordered to be very specific and to give the exact number of every wearable needed for a year. We inquired what this was to shed light upon and were told that the intention was to establish a scale of wages for the women workers in the munition factory. The women, it was said, had replaced the men at the same wages, and this arrangement was to be changed.

The reason for the change is one of those reasonless survivals of devotion to precedent that are so difficult to combat, because, like superstition, they are founded on the beliefs of our ancestors, and so are exempt from the claims of reason. The agreement was that women should do the same work for the same pay. The work was all piece work. Did the women receive a higher rate per piece? No. Was the labor turn-over greater? No, much less. Was the women's output less so that the overhead was increased? No; shift for shift, the women generally excelled the men. Were men's wages to be similarly scaled? Of course not; the idea was that women were not to be paid the same as men. Why? But the member of the logical sex only answered me, "Why should they be?" and, like Pilate of old, did not stay for answer.

It seems to some of us that a government that is fighting for world democracy might set an example by applying the democratic principle to the women it employs to make the ammunition for that fight. There is no justice in the family wage for men and the individual wage for women. The bachelor's pay is not reduced because he has no family to support, and anyone who has studied the wage-earning family knows that it is the daughter who assumes the responsibility of household expenses, three times out of five. Recently we read with pleasure that three men working at the shipyards received \$128 for a single day's pay. There was no mention of a committee's waiting on them to ask how many pairs of socks they bought each year. They were paid for the work they did, and its value, not their wardrobe, determined their wages. Does our government, pledged to uphold the rights of the small nations, intend to say to half its workers: "If you earn more than a bare living I will take it from you. I expect you to buy bonds and support the Red Cross in the same proportion as working men, but you must not expect to be paid according to your work, but according to your sex." Women have not devised the industrial and economic system which requires them to be wage-earners, but men seem to feel that they