

never raised in Congress the question of repudiating the pledge made by the President of American participation in the League. They were satisfied with suppressing their own fears, scruples and convictions, and with abusing those of the President's supporters who emphasized the need of associating the winning of the war with the formation of a League of Nations. Yet now in spite of the unqualified nature of the President's pledge, the extent to which it is believed by the plain people in all countries and the suppression hitherto of overt opposition, his enemies are now planning to defeat it. If they succeed, the American citizens and the citizens of other countries who accepted the President's pledge at its face value would be tempted not without reason to charge the American government with being perfidious.

It is these opponents of the League of Nations who are the genuine defeatists. If the vindictive passions which they incarnate dominate the work of the peace conference, democracy will have fought the war in vain. For no sooner is military victory assured than the opponents of democratic internationalism proclaimed the moral and political ineffectuality of what the armies have achieved. We must treat the Germans, although defeated, just as if they were not defeated. We must fear them just as much, and we must take just as many precautions against them. And because we fear them we must use our victory over them chiefly to make them fear us. We must treat them, that is, much as they would have treated us and neutralize the necessary lack of impartial justice in our policy by a preponderance of power. In fine, we must ourselves adopt permanently a politics based on power as a safeguard against the possibility of German recovery. We must ourselves organize into an international system the Prussian "macht-politik" as a precaution against its use by the Prussians. They are ready to have Prussianism conquer us just at the moment of our victory over Prussia. It is from this fate that the President has sought and still seeks to save the western democracies by organizing the League of Free Nations. If we needed any further proof that there was no other way, the arguments and the alternative policy of his critics would supply it. They postulate the impossibility of any change in the disposition of the German people as the reason for a permanent system of international discrimination against Germany which would itself act as an insuperable barrier to any such change. The Germans would be offered a choice between being the victims of the new world order or its conquerors. If the counsel of these men is followed, the Allies will be apotheosizing

force and perpetuating war as the best method of securing the fruits of a military victory won by the proclaimed guardians of democratic liberty.

For Whom Will They Speak?

THE most widely read of all Lord Northcliffe's newspapers indicates that among the conditions which must be imposed upon Germany is the surrender of certain military and other criminals, who are named. The list includes Lenin and Trotsky. The paper does not indicate how the German government is to deliver the bodies of its Russian protégés—whether we are to authorize a German expedition to Petrograd or Moscow for the purpose of their arrest—but the proposal reminds us very vividly of the fact which sooner or later we must face, namely, that when we come to make peace the enemy governments are not the only governments whose credentials we shall be compelled to scrutinize, of whom we shall be compelled to ask: "For whom do you speak?" While our trouble with Germany is that the government is not sufficiently revolutionary, with Russia it is that it is too revolutionary. Mr. Roosevelt has indeed reminded us that "Russia" is as little to be trusted as "Germany."

The matter is fundamental, not alone in the sense that it touches one of the great difficulties of self-determination and a democratic diplomacy, but also in the sense that the course of Russian development during the next decade or two will bear decisively on the future of German power and militarism. If the reaction from chaos in Russia is virtual absolutism, which well it might be, we shall be faced with a combined Russo-Prussian revival of militarism, looking it may be for support towards the east ("one of Russia's two faces is turned to the east") as a counter balance to the forces of the west. Nor indeed does the difficulty end there, for the situation we face in Russia in an acute and developed form, we are likely to face in lesser degree in the case of most of the belligerent states during the period of political reconstruction. If it be true that the Bolshevik government in no sense represents Russia can we say that governments in Britain, France and Italy to which the immense bulk of the labor and radical forces are bitterly hostile can adequately represent those countries?

We are likely shortly to run into a situation in which we shall discover that we have not really faced the question of method of democratic representation and control in the field of international politics. How far the reaction against the older ideas both political and economic for which the present governments of the European Allies stand

has gone we do not know. We do know that there is today a profound "ferment of Revolution," as the London Times has called it, going on in all the western states of Europe, a ferment which as President Wilson himself on more than one occasion has implied, separates great masses of the people from their governments. That great fact we intend at the peace, presumably, to ignore. At any rate there is so far no indication that we have provided for it in our machinery of representation.

Let us note some of the circumstances with which we shall have to deal in this connection. If and when an armistice or surrender is arranged with Germany and her Allies, we shall still presumably maintain our military operations against the Russian Soviet government. Assume that those operations are successful and that the Bolshevik regime comes to an end. What shall we accept as a true Russian government? Certain experiences of the Allies heretofore have not been very happy.

The Russian government set up by the Allies as successors to the Bolsheviks in the northern Territory provoked so much hostility among other Russian parties that the Allied Expedition was compelled to establish a provisional government of its own. Such a course may be followed in Great Russia on the fall of the Bolsheviks. For though we learn that all Russian parties are now united against the Bolsheviks, it is probably the only thing upon which they are united. No one believes that when it comes actually to forming a government, revolutionary socialists will be able to cooperate with monarchists or bourgeois liberals. So even though a Russian government formed by the Allies works better than at present any purely native Russian government could do, how is "Russia" to be represented at the peace conference? Will the Allies obtain sanction for their government by a general plebiscite? Then it is not at all impossible that in certain large districts—where the poorer peasants predominate, the Bolsheviks, though they may not have an absolute majority, will be numerically larger than any other one party. Much of Russia will still be represented by a minority.

The difficulty is expressed in another way by Allied experience in the Ukraine. The Allies espoused the cause of the Rada party; lent money to the Ukraine government formed on the basis of the Rada, to find that that body was in fact completely subservient to the Germans. In many of the border states, as in Finland, the anti-Bolshevik parties are pro-German. The complete and solid establishment of the government on the basis of the parties of "law and order and private

property" may mean creating states that in the political flux of the next decade or two may well drift towards Germany, and finally be used as pawns in German intrigue.

Perhaps the circumstances of Poland, the social and political influence of the large landholders and bourgeoisie, the general support obtained among them, as well as from other parties, for the Austrian solution, offer the best field of all for such intrigues.

How real this danger is actual experience in the Ukraine illustrates.

Imagine that peace had come shortly after the Russian revolution and that the Allies instead of advancing funds to the Ukrainian government had asked it to send delegates to the Conference—to find that those delegates were in fact German agents! How would the situation have been regularized? Or another circumstance: a Russian, Polish, or Finnish government sends delegates and is then faced by the successful revolution of a rival party (and it is just such situations which have arisen one after another in the relations of the Allies to Great Russia). The particular state in that case is represented in the world conference by its political enemies.

But imagine an analogous situation in the case of one of the great powers. Mr. Lloyd George, having been captured say by the party which is now exploiting Mr. Hughes of Australia for a British policy of imperial preference and protection, sends representatives pledged to oppose any form of a League of Nations which might embarrass the future adoption of imperial preference. Then just after the Conference a general election gives an overwhelming majority to the Labor party and Liberals, proving that its war government was not representative. (It would be a repetition of British experience in dealing with the Boer Republics). Yet that unrepresentative government may well have committed the country to a policy which the great mass of the people by its suffrages repudiates.

These are not fantastic contingencies. All of them—the difficulty of determining which Russian government really represents the Russian people, which government of Poland the Polish, and so through a dozen states; what is the real influence of parties, like the British Labor party, opposing the policy of governments represented at the Conference—all these are contingencies similar to those with which we have actually had to deal during the last year or two. The pressure of war has assured to the government in Britain, France and Italy support which will be withdrawn as soon as the pressure is released, so that the difficulty will become greater.

There is only one democratic way out of this difficulty and that is the representation, by some means, of the opposition parties of the constituent states at the Conference itself. If this is not provided for in the official method of representation, we know beforehand what will happen. There will sit, concurrently with the official conference, an extra-governmental international conference of Labor, Socialist and Radical parties. A suggestion to that effect was made by Mr. Gompers to the British trade unionists a year or two ago. The implication underlying the suggestion of Mr. Gompers to British Labor was that the British Labor elements could not be considered as represented adequately by the British government.

Note the factor of disruption which such a situation would constitute in the non-German world. It is very generally assumed—particularly at present—that German socialism is the tool of Prussianism: that German socialism does not really stand opposed to the German government. Accept the assumption as sound. No one pretends however that the hostility to their respective governments expressed by French and British Labor men and Socialists is anything but genuine. Thus, while the non-German nations would be split by allegiance to the International the German world would not be.

But the matter goes deeper than that. The alliance of the non-German world is made up of a large number of very distinct nationalisms, nations of diverse characteristics, historical traditions, ambitions and interests. The German world is much more homogeneous in every sense. The intensification of nationalism is an element of strength for the Teutonic world, of weakness for the non-Teutonic. But there is a force progressively replacing the more separatist form of nationalism which might be a unifying force in the non-German world. It is precisely the force represented by international labor.

Two policies are available in handling these new social forces. We may flout it, and, disregarding the new undercurrents that have made themselves felt in the last few years among the mass in Europe, say that since the Labor and Socialist elements have not captured governmental authority we shall ignore them, that we can deal only with government; or, we may break with older conceptions sufficiently to face facts and admit that minority parties—or parties that have not yet captured governmental power—are indeed part of a nation and should have a voice in decisions that will determine the life of nations for, it may be generations, and long after existing governments have been succeeded by others.

This means that the coming Peace Conference—

of at least twenty-five or thirty states be it remembered—will be much more in the nature of an international parliament or legislature than of a meeting of ambassadors. But if, as President Wilson has warned us must be the case, the formation of the League of Nations is itself to be an integral part of the settlement, then the Conference of the settlement must be in fact an international legislature. No democratic League of Nations could be founded on a meeting of ambassadors appointed by European war governments.

The mere inclusion in the respective governmental delegations of a minority representative would not suffice. The "German people" might in that case be represented by one tame Socialist in a cohort of generals, princes and diplomats. The Conference should be in fact and feeling a legislature where the more unifying social forces of modern Europe can create a solid bloc to resist the disruptive influence of nationalist and imperialist tendencies.

After all, what is the essence of Mr. Wilson's policy in dealing with Germany, as well as with some of his associates? It is to appeal over the heads of the governments to the masses of the people. It was the note of his Liberty Loan speech. But heretofore we have had no effective machinery for giving effect to democratic forces in the practical management of international affairs; we have had nothing in the shape of a democratic legislature of the peoples for handling what is at this moment the most vital of all legislation. If our rhetorical homage to democracy as our ideal be in fact sincere, is it not time that we considered how that ideal can be applied practically to the handling of concrete problems in the international field?

Empires at the Bar of Judgment

MOMENTOUS events are visibly drawing near. This is the plain message of the German note of October 12th. Germany is on the road to surrender, with no conditions except those by which we have proclaimed that we would be governed, as victors. True, her army has not been destroyed, her territories have not been invaded and laid waste. But her nerve has been shattered, and except we restore it by throwing our moral case to the winds in a frenzy of vengeance, Germany can not oppose the peace terms America and her Allies have decided to impose. Fortunately, we have little reason for fearing that our moral case will be abandoned, now that victory is within our grasp. Our cause is in strong hands. When the time comes for the peace conference to