

one of the greatest figures of the war, the one man who by training and experience is most obviously fitted to be President in 1921. He is the candidate of the constructively minded people of America, and the man who stands higher in the estimation of Europe than any other living American. His name is Herbert Hoover. He is not a politician, therefore not a candidate. He is only a statesman of the very first rank.

THE AMERICAN Unitarian Society has published a courageous statement of "the purpose and hopes of the Unitarian Churches of America as they confront their social duties in a time of change and reconstruction." "The claim to a more equitable distribution of the profits of industry," declares the Society's statement, "is not only clamorous but just . . . Already, however, it is obvious that such a scheme, whether of industrial partnership, security of employment, increasing wages, or insurance against the vicissitudes of life, must be the product, not merely of a new mechanism of industry, but of a socialized conscience."

## What about Ireland?

ALL through Europe famine draws in the circle closer and closer and everywhere the skeleton seems to peer out of an injured civilization. Between an acute condition such as Europe reveals and the political condition of Ireland there appears to be no immediate connection. Ireland is prosperous. For the first time in seventy years its population has stopped decreasing. It raises big taxes and meets a big expenditure and has a big surplus for the empire. Superficially, the Irish may be said not to know how well off they are. They have troubles, but those troubles spring, or seem to spring, simply from a state of soul.

For all this, Ireland is a country disturbed to the depths of its being. What is superficial in Ireland is not the troubled spirit of the country but its recent prosperity. This has come accidentally in wartime, chiefly because England could pay and did pay high prices for agricultural produce close at hand. Once before, during the Napoleonic wars, Ireland was similarly prosperous and similarly fecund in population. Then as now the condition was adventitious.

Ireland is diseased. It did not need the recent attempt to kill Lord French to mark its state. No day passes without news from Ireland which indicates that fresh desperation is brewing. For now, as in the past, the people and the government are at swords' points and the government is using its

armed force with promptness and firmness to subdue and to punish the expression of popular will. So far there has been no extreme outrage, reprisal, massacre or "demonstration." All that exists at present is popular inflammation, excited by the suspension of trial by jury, the great extension of arbitrary search and imprisonment, the suppression of newspapers, the legal upholding of such suppression, the nation-wide suppression of national organizations, the forbidding of monthly fairs and farmers' meetings, and the harsh and sometimes brutal handling of persons arrested for these crimes. The popular manifestations are many. The aggressive symptoms range from strikes to the robbery of firearms and ammunition and the killing of policemen who attempt to enforce the law. The condition is bad. It is practically certain to become worse. And the most outspoken and resolute exponent of the policy of small-brain and big-force is the martial viceroy, Lord French.

Why should a people not threatened by famine, not seriously victimized by the war, not grievously burdened by its consequences, be so desperate in persisting against the British Government? Not for a hundred years has this government exhibited in Ireland the wanton force which condemned Austrian rule in Bohemia, White rule in Finland, Turkish rule in Armenia, or the rule of Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Punjab at the present time? Why do the Irish stand out against the government so resolutely?

The explanation is simple. Although there are differences, the condition of Ireland is comparable to the old pathological condition of Finland, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Bohemia and Slesvig. It proves nothing to say that the great proportion of Irishmen do not conceive themselves to be British, though this is an indisputable fact. It even proves nothing to assert that the Irish consider that their government is conquerors' government, that in Ireland the Englishman is a man of dominant bearing and privileged culture who gives to the "natives" a hideous and burning sense of subjection. These are emotional states that may be well or ill founded. But what proves a great deal is the actual governmental feebleness of the Irish people. They do not hold the rudder or man the engine or chart the national course. They do not possess the power to order their own soldiery. They cannot decide on the spending or raising of their own revenue. They have no control over their own judiciary or police. They have the slackest direction over their foreign trade and their trade policy in general. Good as their administration may be, and much as it may have improved in important particulars in the past fifty years, it is still not

democratic administration or self-administration. This is the secret of Ireland's disease. Irish government is ultimately dictated government, with a clamp on popular evolution.

The element of dictation is serious even in the most benign imperialism. All government involves force, but it makes a vast difference whether the force is self-determined or from outside. Force is a poison which self-determination alone can make medicinal. The American colonies, after the pinprick of the Boston massacre, mitigated the poison at the cost of a tedious revolutionary war. Canada mitigated it, and by rebellion. South Africa mitigated it by the establishment of a constitution that gave South Africa a will of its own. But the force of the state in Ireland, in India, in Egypt, still is directed from outside and protects privilege against popular will. For this reason a great wound is suppurating within the British empire today.

It is an infection with which the whole world was threatened by Germany. Consequently the greatest principle developed by the World War was this, that no state could with impunity apply the rule of force to an inoffensive neighbor, once the neighbor had established its self-determination. The acceptance of this principle does not rule out force in government, but it rules out force applied to those who have no voice in its application. Hence every small and troubled state took refuge in this marvelous political principle — which gives illimitable status to the tiniest island or to the cheapest bit of cotton bunting that calls itself a nation's flag. And hence also the principle is dear in proportion as force is arbitrarily exercised: as, in the present instance, in Ireland.

It is only by pondering this fact of outside force that Americans can comprehend the passionate importance to Irish nationalists of the recent trend of Irish history. The Irish nationalist has found his demand for self-determination opposed by outside force at every turn. In 1914 he saw the high command of the British army refuse to support the Constitution against Ulster. He saw Ulster given immunity in importing arms and Dublin citizens slaughtered after the importation of arms. He saw a rebellion fomented, and then the remorseless execution of the Southern rebels. He saw the plans for conscription with the rule of force nakedly proclaimed by Lloyd George regardless of the issue of self-determination. By the end of 1918 he saw in Ireland 111,000 British troops, on a war footing, later reduced, but still an exhibition of sheer physical domination. This perpetual reminder of his subserviency to the outsider is the thing that makes of subserviency a disease in the nationalist and inflames the will of Ireland.

It may be said, and with point, that there are two sides to every incident enumerated in this list. What about the interests of Britain? What about Ulster and the possible imposition of nationalist outside force? What about the juncture at which the rebellion occurred? What about Casement? These are all worthy considerations and have their place in the perspective of an Irish settlement. But what fact should set the perspective of that settlement? Surely the genuine and unsatisfied claim for self-determination. An Irish settlement, as the *New Statesman* recently suggested, can be botched and muddled and aborted without injuring the empire immediately. But "Irish settlement is vital to Ireland." This is the political fact. It is also the human fact. It is the fact of which most Americans are now convinced.

Granted the claim, what has Britain done to meet it in the past six years? Chance after chance was presented by Ireland to English or British statesmanship, and for one reason or another these golden opportunities have been wasted. It is fair to say that Lloyd George's predecessor held the solution in his hand. In 1914, given sincerity and imagination and courage, Mr. Asquith could have put through an agreement that might have held and fused England and Ireland in the war. That would have been a cheap solution, so far as an Irish acceptance of compromise was concerned. But Mr. Asquith did not possess the requisite sincerity and imagination and courage. When the iron was hot he was cold; and he was not hot until the iron was cold. In the absence of an understanding, it is important to remember, the European war acted as a ferment in the Irish mind and will. It strengthened in Ireland precisely that sense of differences which it was the business of the British Liberal to forestall. Men like Lord Kitchener were allowed to accentuate those differences in the matter of recruiting, and the activity of the government in discriminating against the Southern volunteers unfailingly ripened the rebellion of 1916. Here again, after the rebellion, there was another opportunity to mark sameness, not difference, between the people in Ireland and the people in Britain. But the military tribunals demanded blood and Mr. Asquith was too weak to refuse them. Then, too late, he grasped the nationalistic importance of the executions. He made way for Lloyd George only after he had given the national will of Ireland a most powerful impetus. It was obvious under such circumstances that it was idle to ask Irish nationalists to enlist in a European war for self-determination. The new premier determined, therefore, to "solve" the Irish question. His method, as we know, was to appoint a "national" convention—ignoring the

Sinn Fein, on the one hand, and, on the other, pledging himself not to force Ulster. Did this program offer a solution? We know that before the outcome of the convention was even considered Lloyd George asked the House of Commons to enforce Irish conscription—a proposal which perfected the solidarity of Irish national will. In the general election of December, 1918, the Irish people showed the evolution of their demands by electing 73 members to the British parliament whose open program it was to disregard the British constitution altogether, to remain in Ireland, to organize a provisional government and so strive to create a *de facto* republic. This body, as we may remember, was soon suppressed, and the government of Ireland has since become in effect the government of a militarily "occupied" country. Meanwhile Lloyd George has devoted his energies to a plan for the amelioration of this terrible and hysterical condition, and this plan he has now placed before the world.

It seems fairly clear to Americans that the test of this plan should be the sincerity of its effort to meet the problem of Irish self-determination. It is not a hurried plan, intended to placate the Irish terrorist. The Britain "that destroyed the greatest military empire in the world, largely through its own power," is conceding nothing through fear, as Lloyd George says. His is a cool and deliberate scheme, especially intended for those who base their impatience with Irish agitation on the ultimate decency and goodwill of Britain. No one is in any doubt as to the round claims of nationalist Ireland. How far does England go to meet them?

Not very far. Remembering the *nationalistic* demands of Ireland, the Lloyd George measure falls seriously short. It decrees that customs and excise are to be controlled by the imperial parliament, as well as the income tax and excess taxes. It decrees that the higher judiciary is also to be appointed from Britain. The army and navy, of course, are to be under the imperial parliament; also the post-office; and Ireland is to contribute a fixed sum to the imperial services. To these limitations on self-government the nationalistic Irish have expressed profound objection. Even greater objection is expressed to the idea of Westminster's decreeing the division of Ireland into two legislative "states" with a consultative council between them. Such a compromise might solve the Ulster difficulty, if it could secure the consent of Ireland; but so much of the Ulster difficulty has been fomented in Britain and been used by British Tories to destroy Irish nationalism, that the consent of nationalists—who form 75 per cent of the population—cannot be secured. The nationalists assert

that Ulster is a typical national minority of the sort that has been created and at the same time safeguarded and guaranteed in the case of half a dozen new states sanctioned by the Peace Conference. To limit the powers of a self-governing Ireland, as Lloyd George proposes, seems less egregious than to decide from outside how the national minority is to legislate for Ireland. This is the main tenor of the nationalistic criticism, with Ulster silent.

It is characteristic of Lloyd George that in outlining this scheme he should have taken occasion to direct some amiable and flattering attention to the United States. This settlement, he explained, was to "compose an old family quarrel." It was to confer on Ireland two legislatures that would have powers like the states in the Union. It was to avert any attempt at secession. "Any attempt at secession will be fought with the same determination, with the same resources and the same resolve as the Northern States of America put into the fight with the Southern States. It is important that that should be known not merely throughout the world but in Ireland itself." A free Ireland in the late war, he reminds Americans, might have been hostile, and "Britain and her allies might have been cut off from the dominions and from the United States."

Perhaps it is because of these friendly references, so humorously received in Ireland, that Mr. George's new plan has had such a good reception in American newspapers. A broad and liberal plan, the *New York Times* declares, and so declare a general chorus of editorials. But pleasant as it is to have the American model followed and the American principle vindicated the whole question goes deeper. The thing that is needed is real friendliness; the friendliness of the recognition of a common principle.

The naked fact about Lloyd George's proposal for Ireland would seem to be this: it has nothing to do with self-determination. Lloyd George is not a Home Ruler. "He never believed in Gladstonian Home Rule," as Mr. Herbert Sidebotham declared in his *Appreciation* in the November *Atlantic*, "or in any sort of Home Rule for Ireland that would not apply equally well to Wales." He has no real sympathy with the essential nationalistic character of Home Rule. He is a British statesman whose "Irish views approximate to those of Chamberlain," who fears Sir Edward Carson, who believes that Ulster may be utilized federally, who sees his way out by the forcing of "devolution" all round. Heretofore the British parliament has tried to manage the affairs of the British Isles while wearing a unitary mitten. Now two fingers are to be poked through the mitten; one Ulster, the other



Southern Ireland. Later on Scotland and Wales and England will find themselves with similar parliaments, the five legislative fingers of the original Westminster hand. This present plan is put forward without any suggestion of the whole mature program. But there is nothing in the plan to handicap or qualify any such program. On the contrary, this devolvement of powers on two local legislatures in Ireland will pave the way for an admirable legislative and administrative readjustment in the British Isles.

As a proposition in regard to British devolution, then, this scheme of Lloyd George's is to be taken seriously. Is it to be taken seriously in regard to the rights and claims of Irishmen? Can the Irish problem be reduced to a problem of municipal machinery? Is it simply a problem of decentralization? Or is it rather a problem of self-determination, with many imponderable as well as ponderable elements? Lloyd George does not side-step this issue. He is cool enough and ingenious enough to admit it. He seeks to eliminate it in this fashion: "Ireland has never been so alienated from British rule as it is today. Therefore the grievance, such as it is, is not material. Irishmen claim the right to control their own *domestic* concerns without interference from Englishmen, Scotsmen or Welshmen. That is a fundamental fact. They have fought for it for hundreds of years. They have never held it so tenaciously as they do today." The questionableness here is with the word "domestic." It repeats the original weasel device of calling the "quarrel" between England and Ireland "an old family quarrel"—except insofar as the two peoples are both members of the human family. It is true that for hundreds of years on and off the Irish have fought the English. They have fought them for precisely the same reasons that any invaded people has fought the invader—in about the same "family spirit." To present this question as a family question, a question of gas inspectors and dog licenses, is dishonest.

This does not mean that Irishmen scorn full control over education, transportation, land, agriculture, roads and bridges, old age pensions, insurance, magistrates, hospitals, lunatic asylums and graveyards. It does not even mean that the partition of these responsibilities between Ulster and the South of Ireland, as proposed by the bill, is unthinkable to Irishmen. But it does surely mean that such a proposal is not a settlement of the Irish question.

How does this appear in the event? The Sinn Fein have laughed at the scheme. So has organized labor in Ireland ("the plan is unworthy of serious consideration. It is manifestly for export

only"). But more damaging and more relevant is the criticism of such men as George Russell and Sir Horace Plunkett. These two men, the best friends that the United Kingdom has in Ireland, are guarded against criticizing Lloyd George, but they nevertheless handle his scheme with destructive candor.

Says George Russell, the leading Irish economist, "There is nothing in the proposals calculated to produce reconciliation, and there is no reason why the Sinn Fein should cease working for the destruction of the British empire. Under Lloyd George's proposals Great Britain would retain complete control over taxation and the trade policy and economic development of Ireland, which means that Ireland would be given, not self-government, but certain administrative powers."

Sir Horace Plunkett's weekly adumbrated the scheme some weeks ago, pointing out that "Westminster is not the proper place to arrange the internal constitution of Ireland, the safeguarding of minorities, the soothing of Ulster fears." It stigmatized the Council that is to link the two legislatures as "intended to be the creature and puppet of the Castle," "an object fit only for an expeditious burial."

Somewhat later Sir Horace Plunkett sent a message to America: "We are promised in a few days," he said, "the announcement of a bill to provide self-government for Ireland. The Irish people have had no hand or part in framing the government they are to work. They have not the faintest notion what it is going to be. One minister in the secret has publicly disclosed that they [the Irish] will unanimously denounce it when its terms are known. We may therefore confidently assert that this is at best merely marking time, at worst a device of political opportunism in lieu of statesmanship."

To call such a measure "liberal and broad" is possible only to easy ignorant journalism. It is, on the contrary, a measure ludicrously inapplicable to the present situation of Ireland.

With Sinn Fein in command of Ireland, Britain has for some time been faced with the necessity of bidding powerfully and intelligently for the backing of a large body of Irishmen. Sir Horace Plunkett proposes the status of a dominion. This status, adapted to the needs of Ireland by a popularly elected constituent assembly, might conceivably be tolerated, at least tentatively, by all except the more inflexible Sinn Fein. A dominion is not a republic but, granted the resistance of Britain to a republic, many of the moderate Sinn Fein might be found ready to accept such a dominion and willing to regard it as provisional self-determination.

What Lloyd George has done to meet this state of affairs is to approach Ireland with a municipal proposal, supported by troops and guns. This is a policy with which we cannot sympathize. His proposal treats a problem of self-determination in a spirit contrary to the spirit professed by the Allies in the war. Out of such manipulation the Irish question can manifestly never be settled. The disease of Ireland is too real, the remedies too obvious. The United States has not yet shown any likelihood of recognizing the Sinn Fein Republic, Lloyd George's solemn warning notwithstanding. But it is easier to contemplate recognizing a Sinn Fein Republic than welcoming this policy. The issue of Irish self-determination is a real one. It has not been faced. It can be faced.

## Medals and Demotions

FOR an officer in the regular army the return of peace is a good deal what life would have been to Cinderella if no prince had fallen in love with her, and she had had to go back to the kitchen after the ball. To be a captain after you have been a general, a first lieutenant after you have been a colonel is not a pleasant experience measured either in income or in dignity. The predicament of the regular officer is a real one. He knows that in the career for which he has fitted himself, for which he has sacrificed money and ease and comfort, he can never be so great as he has already been. That glorious future is behind him. No wonder he cares enormously about medals and rank. Cinderella returning to the kitchen would also have liked to preserve some souvenir of the one great affair of her life.

The ethics of the service does not provide the normal rewards of a business career. In the first place to be a regular officer is, in the absence of a rich wife or an inheritance, to be a poor man. The pay of lieutenants is below that which the Department of Labor regards as a living wage. The pay of captains and majors allows little elbow room. Even a general's pay under present prices provides little above the standard of life marked by the ownership of a Ford. The half dozen most successful army officers are nothing but poor relations compared to the more insignificant railroad presidents. Here there is a profession requiring great knowledge and great devotion where the rewards must come from a source that is not economic.

They come in part from the interest of the work itself. Some men enjoy command, organization, precision and the fellowship of army life. They are engrossed by the military tradition, they are

conscious of the fact that mankind, for good or for evil, is more impressed by its soldiers than by its saints. All these are incentives to carry on. And yet as incentives they tend to fail unless there is some visible token. Hence, all rationalization about discipline aside, the appetite for insignia, for caste distinction, for the prerogatives of rank, for medals. The instinct of workmanship in almost all men needs to be supplemented by some kind of public honor before it is effective. Even the most solitary higher mathematician, scorning the curiosity of the Sunday newspaper reader is provoked by the thought of an invisible Parthenon where he will sit.

Aristotle's list of the elements of honor was as follows: "sacrifices; records in verse or prose; privileges; grants of domain; chief seats; public funerals; statues; maintenance at the public cost; barbaric homage." Of the funerals the demoted officer hardly wishes to think; of the statues he cannot bear to think; of the chief seat there is only one who is actively thinking; the privileges are few; the records in verse or prose, except those of Mr. Isaac Marcossou, perversely anonymous; the grants nil; the maintenance poor. There remain medals. And here a conflict has arisen between Admiral Sims who is thinking of the efficiency of the service and Secretary Daniels who has a nose for news. For at bottom the difference between them is philosophical. Admiral Sims wishes to reward work that was inconspicuous because it was successful; Mr. Daniels has tried to decorate work that was conspicuous when it was not discreditable.

If Congress undertakes an investigation it might add to the gaiety of the League of Nations by turning up the whole question of medals and ribbons whenever Americans are involved. It might find out, casually, about the great art of wangling as a result of which one gentleman was decorated for his excellent translation of a French document, and another for riding on the train with some Serbs, and a third for writing such impartial news accounts of the Peace Conference, and a fourth for having the right views on the disposition of Syria, and a fifth for living at the Crillon Hotel, and a sixth for selling chocolate to a small nationality, and a seventh for going to dances at Paris with a colonel, and so on down the list of those who were decorated by mistake because the smaller nationalities did not realize that there was more than one Jones in America. And when the whole thing was known Congress, sustained by an amused public opinion, might make it illegal for any American citizen to accept a decoration from any foreign government except for bravery in the face of the enemy in a legally declared war.