

ceed on the principle of alienating no one who could possibly be saved.

That, as Mr. Harding and his official colleagues show us, is to be the keynote of the campaign as well. The Republicans are rallying around zero. Those tactics may work successfully. The prize is Republican administration of the country. Politeness of each faction to the other, and of all factions to everybody else, may keep any considerable group of party members from flying off suddenly at a tangent. Of course, with the Republicans in power, Mr. Harding will no longer be able to alienate nobody. Some positive figure, then, will take the place of the present zero—and to official harmony the results will probably be disastrous. But in the meantime, with the "elimination of Wilsonism" as a good negative issue, the Republicans may be able to hold their present place as favorites in the race that ends November 2nd. They are not likely to add new converts to Republicanism. The party reached maximum density just before the convention in Chicago. It has been precipitating ever since. And it will go on losing votes to the Democrats, to the new party and even to the Socialists, right up to the Tuesday after the first Monday in next November.

Very likely it will still have a margin of safety then. But a moderately courageous and unusually lively Democratic campaign might force the Republicans to change their present plans. So might a third party attack with a cohesive platform and a candidate whose record did not confuse the issue. Either of these developments—preferably both—might force the Republicans to scrap their program of negative action and swing to something positive. In default of such exterior pressure no change in present tactics is likely to be made. The official Republican leaders, whatever other traits they show, will continue to be almost painfully polite.

## Delegates

OPINIONS differ as to which convention city harbored the better-looking lot of delegates, Chicago or San Francisco. All opinions agree that in appearance neither the Republicans nor the Democrats were noble specimens of the earth-born and earth-bred. Nobody would think of exporting either outfit to another planet, as samples of the physically best that we can turn out on this. Almost nobody would care to send either set of delegates abroad to show the Europeans what living an American life can do for the human body. In such an exhibition we should all prefer to have the United States represented by younger and less sedentary persons. Pole-vaulters and hammer-throwers from California, Cornell oarsmen cow-

boys, Bill Hart, Babe Ruth, unmarked pugilists, hurdlers, youngish traffic cops—a thousand of these, if we were lucky enough to get a thousand together, and could be sure they were all Americans, we could offer with pride to the inspection of another hemisphere or another planet. But not the thousand who sweated at Chicago. Not the thousand who cooled themselves in the San Francisco breezes. Not the delegates to any party convention within the memory of man.

Our national task would be harder still if we were choosing a thousand to represent not the American body at its most expert and its comeliest, but the American brain at its keenest and most active. Such a thousand would include engineers, corporation lawyers, biologists, architects, labor leaders, financiers, navigators, manufacturers, strike organizers, college professors, explorers, a few of each. It would include a stray clergyman, a Supreme Court judge or so, perhaps even a lonely editor. Notwithstanding the disfavor into which idealism has fallen, one thousand would be un-American if it left all the idealists out. A humorist or two would have to be admitted, the more sentimental and cynical the better. Such a thousand would not resemble, even distantly, even faintly, the San Francisco or the Chicago delegates. An optimist may say these gentry represented something. No optimist in his right mind, if such there be, would say they represented the effectiveness or the variety of the American brain. Even if we were making a narrower choice, if we were picking men and women notable for political common sense, none of us would choose in a lump the delegates to a national convention.

Every delegate is regarded by himself, by his mother or his wife, and possibly by the persons or the person who made him a delegate, as a hundred per cent American. Perhaps their standard of Americanism is low, for the average American would never call the Chicago or the San Francisco delegates worthy to represent their country in anything except a convention. We are one country, to be sure, but it is a biggish country. A lot of parts go to the making of such a whole. Think of the difference between a ledgy New England field and a canyon in Arizona, between a prairie and the everglades, between Santa Catalina and Wiscasset, Maine, between noon in August and an October dusk. Contrast the "ice-brook's temper" of Lake Superior with the tepidity of Buzzard's Bay, or our placidest river of the plains with our "streams made strong by mountain-thaw." Such elements as these cannot be melted down into the gray monotony of a national convention. The Chicago crowd and the San Francisco crowd did not represent our violent American contrasts. They represented the

politics of professionals and of a few amateurs trying to copy the professionals.

Scattered over the United States, at the present moment, there are three or four thousand children who know what they want and know how to ask for it. Some of these girls and boys have a natural turn for the use of words. Some have not. But all of them can make their wishes known by words or other noises. All these three or four thousand are destined to grow up into delegates to some national convention or other. We shall take them and educate them. We shall give them drab minds instead of many-colored minds, caution instead of recklessness, fears instead of the valors of ignorance. We shall teach them how to compromise. We shall teach a few of them to write, and the rest to vote for the adoption of majority reports by committees on resolutions. Now, in their youth, they like to make their meaning plain. Bye and bye, when they have become perfect delegates, they will prefer to place "a number of tall, opaque words, one before another, in a right line," in the hope of offending nobody. That, at any rate, is what the future will be unless it is unlike the present.

## Four Major American Interests

**I**F, in fact, an American government were to define a foreign policy, what would be its larger strategy? Adherence to the League, with Lodge reservations, Hoover reservations, no reservations, and no adherence at all, is not policy, but just machinery. They are different ways of starting, but they offer no suggestion of the road. Phrases like "abandoning our isolation" or "taking part in world politics" are just phrases, until there is some sharper definition of what America is to take part in and what it is to abandon its isolation for. Nor do words like "peace" or the "interests of humanity" or "Americanism" supply the clue to a policy. Somewhere between the ultimate purpose of peace and the immediate protection of legitimate American interest lies an area of decision in which are to be found the controlling aims of a sound foreign policy.

The Monroe Doctrine is an example of such an intermediate aim. It is conceived fundamentally as the reservation of the western hemisphere from the general manipulation of diplomacy. In Europe today as well as yesterday, if something is to be decided about Turkey, something else has to be decided about Africa and the Balkans and the status of Poland and what not, because if Britain secures an advantage in Turkey, France and Italy have to be compensated somewhere else. To open

one contentious European question is to open them all.

That is why the opening of the Balkan question by Vienna in 1914 was the opening of a general European war. The problems of Europe are balanced one against the other, and do not stand on their own feet, and are not decided on the intrinsic facts. The Monroe Doctrine is the insistence of America that the affairs of this hemisphere shall not be compensations, pawns, or factors in the affairs of Europe, Asia and Africa. It is a dogmatic claim that the questions of the Americans shall be decided in this hemisphere.

But out of that can grow two divergent policies. One of them is the doctrine that the affairs of the Americas shall be governed by the United States of North America. The other is the doctrine that they shall be governed jointly by the nations of the Americas. But what are the nations of the Americas? The Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the rest? To be sure. But there is also Canada, and there are the British West Indies. In other words there is Britain. This is a fact of outstanding importance, and of increasing importance. The Pan-American system is in intimate contact with the British Empire.

On the two oceans, American interest touches at once the other sea Powers—British and Japanese. Behind the mercantile and armed fleets of those sea Powers are the peoples who pay for those fleets, who man them, who direct them. An American foreign policy must inevitably have a definite aim in the Far East of Asia and the Far West of Europe. An Oriental policy and a European policy coherently related to a Pan-American policy is the triple basis of American relations to the world. If they are sound, we may look forward securely and go forward courageously in our own domestic problems. If they are unsound, if we go wrong in the long run in respect to the Far East, Britain, and Pan-America, we and our children will live troubled lives, and the promise of America will be jeopardized. Make the wrong decisions, or pursue the right ones without conviction or incompetently, and in the end we shall find ourselves embroiled in catastrophes greater than any which have yet visited America.

How are we to find the right decisions? What are the standards and measure of rightness in so vast a business? They are to be found, we believe, in simplicity and direct apprehension, though the effects of decisions work themselves out in great detail. A simple fact about the Far East, for example, is that the Chinese people are nearly a quarter of the human race. They cannot be satisfied or permanently tranquilized by a people who are