

and conviction and on the basis of insufficient information, false analysis and considerations of immediate expediency. They are certain in that event to fail as Congress has failed in its railroad legislation. The only way in which they can prepare themselves morally and intellectually for the kind of problems which lie immediately ahead would be to start now a much more drastic and thoroughgoing educational debate about the nature of those problems than any public debate in which they have engaged since before the Civil War.

There is little prospect of such discussion. The pre-convention campaign has not involved any ventilation of issues and has not brought with it any definition of them. The political leaders of both parties will in the interest of party harmony have every inducement to prevent the post-convention campaign also from developing genuine conflicts of opinion. Definite issues and strong convictions are under existing conditions sources of division rather than of union. Politicians are likely, consequently, to emphasize at any cost party performances and possibilities. But by so doing the existing party machines will increase the distrust with which they are regarded by every American with vital convictions. The spectacle will confirm their impression that party organizations have in effect become conspiracies to cheapen American political discussions, to check the movement of political and economic thought and to thwart the constructive application of intelligence to politics. The conventions will not transfigure themselves into the kind of forums for the ventilation of grievances and the revelation of popular fears, scruples, hopes and aspirations which a democracy needs during transitional and critical periods, because such candid revelations and discussions are injurious to the discipline of parties without common convictions. The American people will remember this failure when at a later period they are again involved by their government in a course of behavior for which nothing was done to prepare public opinion.

Presidential Bank Accounts

"DON'T mind me, if I seem grumpy," General Wood's western treasurer told a reporter of the New York World. "The reason is, I am mad. This whole thing is the most damnably outrageous affair I ever heard of."

In the Senate's investigation into campaign expenditures many of Leonard Wood's supporters saw a plot. To them the investigation seemed a last-minute effort to injure Wood's chances. They observe that it was Borah, an avowed enemy of the

Wood candidacy, who got the Senate launched upon its inquiry; and they observe that Senator Kenyon's committee spent as much time on Leonard Wood alone as it gave to all thirteen of his competitors in both parties. This latter fact, however, has an explanation obvious enough. The admitted expenditures of Leonard Wood amount to as much as the admitted expenditures of all thirteen competitors combined. On a basis of dollars the committee was right in spending half its time investigating a single candidacy.

The minor candidates, and those who have been making a noiseless campaign, did not hold the attention of the investigating committee long nor startle the public with the size of their expenditures. With the exception of McAdoo, whose campaign budget is a thing still undiscovered at the time we go to press, the candidates with the smallest pre-convention expenditures are Cox, Edwards, Sutherland and Gerard. No one of these four aspirants spent as much as \$25,000. Cox contested only his own state, where he had an easy time, and the neighboring state of Kentucky. Edwards rode along on what resentment there was against federal prohibition. Sutherland spent practically nothing until, as his manager said, "General Wood came into West Virginia like a circus." "His workers had bands, theatres, special street cars, posters and buttons. They pinned buttons on man, woman and child. And when there was no one to pin them on, they just threw them away." As for Mr. Gerard, he too, in his one brief test of public opinion, learned what it costs to be a competitor of Leonard Wood. Explaining an expenditure of \$14,000, Gerard's manager said: "We sowed seeds of literature in South Dakota and left it to the sunshine and rain. We found it took something more than sunshine and rain to make it grow." And Gerard entered no more primaries.

None of the other candidates kept their expenditures under \$25,000—even those who, like Poindexter and Nicholas Murray Butler, have no better chance for a nomination than Gerard and Sutherland, and certainly not so good a chance as Cox. Butler's campaign cost \$34,000; Poindexter's, \$59,000. Governor Coolidge's managers spent \$68,000; Hoover's, \$66,000—though this figure does not include the cost of the campaign in California, and that was the one state which Hoover's managers contested. The Harding campaign cost \$107,000; and Hiram Johnson, regarded in the office of the New York Times and the G. H. Q. of General Wood as candidate of the Reds, seems nevertheless to have had enough wealthy friends in stock to subscribe \$200,000 in his behalf.

There would be more lively interest in an analy-

sis of the way these substantial sums were spent, if it were not for the greater interest centered in the huge expenditures of Wood and Lowden. Up to the middle of last week Governor Lowden's campaign had cost \$415,000, of which the Governor personally had contributed \$379,000. It is an enormous figure. Newspaper reporters, searching for descriptive terms, have talked of a return to Hannaism. Lowden's \$415,000 is not a return to Hannaism. It goes far past Hannaism. It is more than three times what Mark Hanna spent to get William McKinley nominated.

How was this vast sum expended? Lowden's manager was not always clear. In the case of Missouri, Senator Reed's questions brought out the fact that no advertising had been used and that there was no campaign of speechmaking. Yet \$38,000 was expended. "I wonder what you did with that \$38,000," said Senator Reed. "It was used to stir up interest in Governor Lowden's candidacy in the various counties, I suppose," replied the Governor's campaign manager. That is an inadequate explanation, to say the least. How was \$38,000 spent in Missouri, to "stir up" interest in Lowden, if none of the ordinary expenditures for campaign advertising were involved? Lowden's manager did not have an answer ready—though he declared "We have kept an account of every cent that has been received and every cent spent."

Leaving the witness stand and returning to Chicago, the Governor's manager addressed a message to the Senate Committee. "Go the limit," he urged; permit no candidate to "take advantage of any technical subterfuge" to hide the actual sums disbursed in any state. And despite any vagueness in his own statement, this was a request Lowden's manager had earned the right to ask. Without hesitancy he had put on the table what cards he held. And for the amazing expenditures he disclosed, Lowden himself had assumed full responsibility.

What of Leonard Wood?

Mr. Frank Hitchcock, first Wood manager to take the stand, was patently anxious to shirk all the responsibility he could possibly avoid. He did not have any knowledge of specific contributions. He did not know anything about campaigns in the West. He knew that in New York there was a finance committee of eighty to raise Wood funds. He knew there was also a Wood League. But when asked who was at the head of this second fund-raising body he replied, "I just can't recall the gentleman's name, although it has been mentioned to me several times. My activities have all been in different places." He did not know the number of persons employed in the New York and Chicago offices; did not go near these headquar-

ters; and has nothing to do with subordinates or anyone associated with the campaign below the rank of assistant manager. He was, in other words, a campaign manager completely free of managerial responsibility.

Colonel William Cooper Procter, the second Wood manager called to the stand, told the Senate committee that he had personally advanced more than half a million dollars for the Wood bank account and that he had no high hope of its ever being paid back to him. Beyond this Colonel Procter's testimony rivalled Mr. Hitchcock's in its want of any definiteness. "The state organizations," he said, "had been encouraged to raise and handle their own funds." But there was no telling how much they had raised and handled. About that, no one had informed him. Senator Reed raised the question of individual subscriptions. "I do not know definitely about subscriptions," Colonel Procter replied. "The trouble is, men do not like to have their names mentioned in a connection of the kind." In response to further questioning, however, he volunteered: "Well, there's a fellow named Wrigley." But when asked how much Wrigley had contributed, Colonel Procter replied: "Now, I don't know. I've personally done no soliciting, I'm perfectly willing to give this, though it's a little embarrassing, when you will have the full report." Colonel Procter, like Mr. Hitchcock, was ready to accept no unnecessary responsibility. "My place," he said, "was to keep the organization working harmoniously."

The minor managers of the Wood campaign who followed Colonel Procter on the stand were sometimes correspondingly indefinite in their fields of local action. Thus Major Edwin Morgan, treasurer in Ohio, declared that Chicago headquarters had sent \$25,000 to Ohio and that not a cent had been raised by the state organization as such. It developed, however, that in Ohio the largest vote in the primaries was cast in the counties containing Cleveland, Cincinnati and Columbus. And here, Major Morgan testified, the Wood campaign was financed locally. How much was contributed in that way, he did not know. The Senate Committee got little definite information concerning General Wood's finances until Hitchcock, Procter and the local managers had left the stand, and Mr. A. A. Sprague had supplanted them. Mr. Sprague spoke in the capacity of western treasurer, and (in the absence of Mr. Stebbins, fishing in Canada) of eastern treasurer, too.

Mr. Sprague testified that more than a million dollars had been raised for the Wood campaign. Of this staggering sum Colonel Procter had borne the major burden. For in addition to \$10,000

given to the fund, he had made advances of \$521,000 and had indorsed two notes upon Chicago banks totalling \$200,000. Other contributors included Mr. Rockefeller, Jr., \$25,000; Ambrose Monell, New York, \$20,000; a Mr. Smathers, New York, \$20,000; H. M. Billesby, Chicago, \$15,000; William Wrigley, Jr., Chicago, \$10,000; and C. D. Shaffer, Chicago, \$10,000. From William Loeb, Jr., New York, Mr. Sprague said he had received a total of \$225,000. But who contributed to this fund, and in what amounts, he did not know.

In the history of political campaigns in America there is nothing more shocking than the note upon which the Senate's investigation of Wood's finances ended. Here were expenditures of more than a million dollars, expenditures nearly ten times as great as the sum Hanna spent to nominate McKinley, expenditures in behalf of a candidate supporting in theory the principle of responsible government. What responsibility did this candidate accept for the management of his own campaign?

Mr. Sprague testified that money was paid out from headquarters "on order from Colonel Procter of W. B. Burtt."

"Did General Wood know anything about this?" asked Senator Reed.

"He did not."

"Did he know Colonel Procter had advanced over \$500,000?"

"I don't think he knew anything about it."

"Did he ever ask you about the financing of the campaign?" asked Senator Pomerene.

"He never did."

"And you never told him?"

"I did not, though he has probably read the papers by this time."

There you have the essential quality of the Wood campaign: a candidate touring the country in the interests of strong government, advertising the executive who knows how to surround himself with able men and to hold them responsible; and yet, in his own campaign, completely ignorant of the activities of the group of wealthy men supporting him, imposing no responsibility whatever upon their methods of raising and expending the greatest pre-convention fund in the history of American politics. "I have no personal cognizance of the financial details of my campaign," declared General Wood, when his managers had finished testifying. "I left all of that to Colonel Procter. I have confidence in him, as has everybody who knows him."

However unnecessary the Wood managers found a Congressional investigation of campaign funds, there can be no doubt about its use to the public.

We have an approximate idea, now, of the expenditures of the different candidates, and of the responsibility which each candidate is ready to assume for those expenditures. The evil of the vast pre-convention expenditure is not necessarily that funds are spent corruptly, but that in such amounts they are spent at all. A Congressional investigation on the eve of the conventions is not a plot against one candidate or another, but a necessary protection for the public. Such an investigation should be made a standing practice in American politics, coupled with a penalty for failure on the part of any individual to file with some public official a statement of his contribution. Only with the aid of some such practice can we feel certain of protection against that danger which the present campaign has shown to be so startlingly real: the danger that the Presidency of the United States will go to him who spends most money.

Politics and the H. C. of L.

THERE exists in this country at present a strange and significant anomaly with respect to the working of its democratic institutions. A democratic state is supposed to provide for its citizens a serviceable political machinery for the discussion and the definition of pressing political and economic issues and for the reaching of some decision upon them. Yet the American political machinery instead of at present helping the American people to discuss, define and satisfactorily pass judgment on the issues in which they are most absorbingly interested, is hindering them from doing so. Any group of our fellow-country-men who happen to engage in serious conversation are certain to talk either about the labor question, prohibition or the high cost of living. Their interest in these questions amounts almost to an obsession and explains in part their indifference to what is happening in Mexico, in Europe or in what the Senate does to the Treaty.

Yet in spite of the fact that we are entering upon a Presidential campaign, there is practically no educational friction of opinion between the parties or among leaders within the parties about labor, prohibition, or the high cost of living. If candidates who are competing for the Republican or Democratic nomination refer to them, they do so for the purpose of making evasive, ambiguous or general statements with which the voter cannot sharply agree or disagree and from which he can learn little or nothing. The state platforms of both parties deal with these issues also for the purpose of avoiding or smothering them. The political leaders of the country, with one or two exceptions,