

possessed of purchasing power proportionately greater.

Ah, but in five years we shall be a more populous and a richer nation, and hence better able to bear our public burdens. That is the classical argument for postponing indefinitely the payment of public debts. It is the argument which kept alive the British debt contracted in the war against Napoleon until it became merged in the debt contracted in the war against the Kaiser. It is based on the assumption that the richer and the more populous a state becomes, the easier it is to meet current expenses and set aside a surplus for the payment of debt. And that assumption is challenged by the history of every great modern state. For as population and wealth increase, the expenditures of government increase in greater proportion.

America does not desire a perpetual public debt. The war loans will be paid. Shall they be paid, so far as it is at all practicable, now when the payment is relatively easy, or shall they be postponed for a few years until the payment is relatively hard? Those are the practical alternatives before us.

## Must The Turk Remain?

**T**HE Turk is to remain in Europe, after all, unless the western democracies can somehow force a revision of policy upon the diplomats. Constantinople must continue to be the foul nest of the schemers and robbers and cut-throats that make up the physical embodiment of the moribund "Turkish Empire." That ancient capital of the Levant, after five centuries of monstrous misuse and barbaric oppression, had at last fallen in trust into the hands of the enlightened statesmen of England, France and Italy. What was the best possible disposition of it? The best they have been able to conceive of is to turn it back to the Turk, diseased to the bone with his own wickedness.

Why? Not because the Turk has a shadow of an ethical claim to rule over Constantinople, or in fact over any part of his forfeited empire except the real Turkish homeland on the Anatolian plateau west of the Cilician Gates. There are plenty of Turks in Constantinople, to be sure. They are almost as numerous as the Greeks of the city. Why should they not be? All the blood sucked by the Sultanate from Asia Minor and Thrace inevitably bred up a swarm of parasites in Constantinople; soldiers, so-called civil service officials, contractors, absentee landlords, petty grafters and beggars. There are, no doubt, Constantinopolitan Turks who subserve a useful function and earn an honest living, but it would perplex a Turcophile seriously to

tell just what they do. Produce food for the city? That is done mostly by the Bulgarians. Conduct the trade? That is in the hands of the Greeks and Armenians and Jews. Exercise the handicrafts? No; the Turk is a shadowy minority among those who are in any way engaged in wealth production. He is specialized to the governing business. And in that business he conducts himself at best something like Tammany at its worst and something like the old Camorra of the Italian south. But personally the Turk of Constantinople is an agreeable gentleman, say the travellers who thirst for the interest excited by paradox. Of course he is. Every brigand chief will behave toward you like a gentleman, if you are manifestly eager to condone his crimes.

Not for his merits or deserts is the Turk to receive an extension of his charter of mishandling Constantinople and perpetuating a den of iniquity on the site where a really democratic world would establish one of the richest and happiest of cities. He is to receive such an extension for two reasons, both abominable, of which we are not prepared to say which is the worst. The first is that the western nations, just emerging from the great international enterprise of a desperate war, are so jealous of one another that each fears that a disturbance of the status quo might advantage the others. The city of Zara and its ten thousand people can be made into a free state under the protection of the League of Nations because there is no international interest in Zara worth mentioning. But Constantinople, which could easily become the greatest international entrepot in the world, the distributor of western products for Bulgaria and Rumania and Russia and for the Turkish and Armenian Black Sea littoral, is to be left under Turkish imperialism. Vessels bearing the greater part of the world's export wheat and petroleum, and, sooner or later, of the world's cotton and meat are still to salute the Turkish Crescent as they steam through the Bosphorus; the western peoples are still to watch uneasily the manoeuvres of the great powers, directed toward the ultimate seizure of this vital key to the international treasure house. Nobody can be so unlearned in the lessons of the war as to look with complacency upon the postponement of the solution of the Constantinople problem. The city will not forever remain in the power of the Turks. A rational disposition of it could be made now without a relapse into world war. It can not certainly be made peacefully a generation hence.

The jealousies of the western nations: that is the first reason for leaving the Turk to his evil doing. The sensitiveness of the British and French imperialists to Mohammedan public opinion is the other reason. In India, Mesopotamia, Arabia,

Egypt, Algiers and Morocco are hundreds of millions of Mohammedans, many of whom are chronically restive under British and French rule. Expulsion of the Caliph from Constantinople would, so it is said, shock them into still greater restiveness. It might, even though a great proportion of those Mohammedans do not recognize the Sultan's pretensions to the Caliphate, and even though they have always hated and despised the Turks as a ruling race. The imperialistic record of the Christian powers is such that any action against a non-Christian state would inevitably arouse suspicion. It would have to be made clear that the expulsion of the Sultan was not a final stage in the struggle of Cross and Crescent, with the profits of exploitation going with the Cross.

And even if this were made clear justice could not be done to Constantinople and the Sultan without a price. In Egypt the nationalist movement is almost wholly Mohammedan, and in India the Mohammedans are actively cooperating with the Hindus in the agitation for national autonomy. Leaving the Sultan in Constantinople would not quell those nationalistic movements, but expelling him would present a good talking point for anti-British propaganda. So much we must grant. No doubt the liberation of Armenia from Turkish rule would furnish another arm for nationalist propaganda.

What then? Because Egyptian and Indian nationalists are looking for propaganda material must the Sultan and the bloodthirsty gang surrounding him be given amnesty for their past crimes? Then they will know that they may engage in further massacres with impunity. For the nationalistic movement will grow stronger, whatever happens to the Sultan and Constantinople. Mohammedan politicians will be on the lookout for propaganda material, and if the Sultan is threatened or restrained, in whatever enterprise he undertakes, an insult to his co-religionists can be made out of it.

But if British rule over India and Egypt could be maintained only at the price of chartered massacres ordered from Constantinople, then every friend of humanity and of England must desire British rule to end at once. The imperialism even of the most liberal nation in the world would be an intolerable thing at the price. But British rule can find for itself other props than the favor of the Sultan. It will have to find such props, anyway, if it is to endure. And the one prop that the spirit of the times recommends is the granting of the maximum practicable concessions to the spirit of nationality.

The Turk ought to be ousted from Constantinople forthwith. It is his only hope, as well as the

only hope for happiness for Constantinople and peace for the Levant. There can be no healthy Turkish nationalism until Turkish imperialism has been destroyed and all the abilities of the race are diverted from misgoverning other people to making something out of themselves, in their own homeland of central Asia Minor. As for Constantinople and the European and Asiatic districts essential to the defense of the straits, there is not the least reason why they could not be organized into a free state under international control. That is not an ultimately perfect solution. In the end Constantinople ought to fall to the people whose genius created it and who, in spite of all oppression, have kept it from falling into complete decay, the Greeks. Constantinople is the keystone of the arch of Greek nationality. Possessing it, the Greek communities on both sides of the Aegean would become a unified national domain of modern proportions. The basis would be laid for a genuine renaissance of Greek life.

It will be said that Greece has not the political competence to undertake so great a responsibility as the control of Constantinople. It would be miraculous if she had, with a majority of her people only just now liberated from Turkish slavery. The greatest statesman of antiquity, Themistocles, admitted that he could not have become great without Athens for a stage. The Greeks of today have lacked a stage appropriate to greatness, yet they have known how to appraise *Venezelos*. Give them the hope of future greatness that a free state of Constantinople would signify. If the national genius then fails to awaken, it is dead. But what will be lost by the experiment? Some other final disposition of Constantinople will have to be made, not an ideal one perhaps, but none could be so abominable as leaving it to the Turk.

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# Enforcing The Treaty

**E**VEN a cautious observer of British public opinion would say with confidence that, so far as this country is concerned, the Treaty of Versailles is already morally dead. The Labor party declared for its revision long before it had been signed. Our Liberal leaders are not pioneers of thought, and for nearly a year they kept their council. The timid silence has been broken with pent-up vehemence during the historic Paisley election. Mr. Asquith and Sir John Simon have both been reading the epoch-making book of Mr. Maynard Keynes, and in their speeches it has served them as a brief. Lord Robert Cecil, by far the ablest and sincerest mind outside the Labor party in our politics today, was prompter than the Liberal leaders in his declarations, and no less bold.

To complete this map of English opinion, we need only cite the sudden, official lapse into candor of the Foreign Secretary himself. Lord Curzon told the Peers, before Paisley polled, that there is much in the Treaty which must be revised. But indeed this movement of thought is by no means insular. While the Paisley election has served to focus British opinion, we have from Mr. Secretary Glass a decided expression of opinion in favor of moderation in fixing the indemnity, while Signor Nitti in the Italian Chamber has made an appeal for appeasement and reconciliation in Europe, which ranges official Italy in the same camp. The distant prospect begins to brighten for Europe. The brief moment of elation and insolence which followed the armistice is over. In every Allied country, save France, the experience of our own economic trials has brought a certain comprehension of the infinitely graver plight of Central Europe, and a longing for a genuine peace which begins to resemble the chastened wisdom of the dark months that preceded victory.

The prospect of attaining a durable peace some years hence, when it may be possible for the League of Nations to undertake the revision of the Treaty, has always seemed to me but moderately reassuring. It is the next two years which will be critical for Europe. If it can survive the present inferno for so long, if it can live unaided even for two years, within the framework of these Treaties, then either its vitality is sounder, or the Treaties are less deadly than most of us suppose. One cannot conceive the initial miracle of restarting industry and restoring currency under the handicap of these fantastic indemnities, these hampering

tributes of coal, these uncounted mortgages, which paralyze energy and ruin credit. I have vivid personal memories of last winter in Vienna, and its present plight is worse than anything that I saw. One or two more such winters might ease the problem of rescue, but only because there would be little left to save. It is, moreover, during the first year of peace that the total amount of the German indemnity must be fixed by the Reparation Commission, and, by some magic of which the secret is still locked in the bosoms of the Supreme Four, the impossible sum of 20,000 million golden marks (\$4,000,000,000) must somehow be extracted by May, 1921, from a nation which can barely provide siege rations of food and fuel for its own urgent needs. The leisurely revision will come too late.

While public opinion slowly ripens to sanity, the inexorable time table of the Treaty is forcing upon us a crisis which may lead us to prompt decisions. The demand for the surrender of the "war-criminals," while it sharpened the latent conflict between British and French policy, also gave to Herr Noske and the old military party an ascendancy in Germany itself, which they would have lost forever had the Treaty been a less intolerable instrument of strangulation. Grave as it is, this issue was only one of several which await us. Will the armed forces of Germany, raised to cope with Spartacus and maintained to meet the risk of social revolution, be reduced to the low minimum of 100,000 for which the Treaty provided? Will the spirit of resistance, which accumulates under the sharp spur of these two demands, remain passive, if Upper Silesia should fall, under the plebiscite, to Poland? If the Allies yield, and modify demands which ought never to have been framed, can they retain the prestige and the solidarity to enforce the rest of the Treaty? Had they originally drafted their Treaty in the spirit of the Fourteen Points, they would have given to the progressive and democratic forces in Germany an assured lease of life. If they yield now to a resistance, which, however reasonable it may be, inevitably gathers round the personalities of Noske and Ludendorff, they concede a success to the least desirable element in Germany.

The history of the demand for the surrender of the generals makes a curious study in national character. The original author of this policy was Mr. Lloyd George. No British statesman of the first rank has ever had his sure instinct for divining