

methods and have become weary. Those whom Walter Weyl called "tired radicals" wanted a revolution cheap. Hot agitation turned into personal bitterness. Perhaps they would have found their second wind, if they had connected themselves with the American labor movement in quiet ways and taken out their martyrdom in hard work. After all, clear thinking is the only revolutionary instrument which is fitted to human use. "Economic forces," "revolutionary uprisings," "the march of events," "the historic moment," "the instinctive movement of the masses,"—these catastrophic affairs are as yet a little beyond conscious control. But there is a small unsubmerged area of life, say ten per cent, which can be dealt with by the human intelligence.

Another group (with important exceptions) that has somehow failed to belt itself in with American labor is that of the social workers. There have been an unnecessary isolation and grayness to much of the settlement experiment, for instance. Some of the best teachers have been living in a vacuum and under a censorship which would not exist in a study-group of the United Mine Workers. Liberal journalism would shake off its woolly thinking and feeble writing, if it had direct contact with men strong enough to push forward a program.

This deadness of American liberals comes from their failure to organize around one ruling interest. Their fatigue is not alone the result of hard work. It is in part a sense of futility; a sense of the devastating loneliness of American life for any but the business group. Workers' education elsewhere has broken these blind alleys of middle class idealism into roads to freedom.

Labor has just as big a job in clearing the ground. As long as a twelve-hour day, or a ten-hour day, is permitted in certain industrial groups, the stupefaction of overwork will make classes impossible. There is no use in teasing an old-line craft union to live laborious nights. Until workers have power enough to create the strong economic unit of the industrial union, they will not have the vision to seek knowledge. It is not by chance that the miners of Pennsylvania, already organized in an industrial union, are those who are projecting an educational policy. In the old-time craft and business union, talking wages and grievances, whole reaches of character and intelligence in the youth are left untouched by details of adjustment unresolved into a larger policy.

With the alliance of labor and scholarship in workers' education will come a new unionism, an intelligent journalism, a group of interesting teachers, an American Fabian society. And in the doing

of this, there will be no "national movement." The solutions will be local, regional. They will cease to be aimed at converting a continent. The United States is too large for any but a very low common denominator. Each local experiment will be content with a few groups of fifteen persons each.

The only "national" needs are for a bureau of information, where the pioneers of each section can ask questions and cheer each other up; and for a trade union school or college. This means a place where young men and women can come for one and two years of continuous study. If two hours a week after manual work are good for adults, better yet is an intensive course for youths. Such young men and women after residence would then return to the labor movement as instructed potential teachers and leaders. Their numbers would be few, but their influence would be large. With these two needs, the recent educational conferences dealt.

No big rewards and no newspaper fame await the pioneers of this emancipation. Neither teachers nor students will profit by one penny through their devotion. Workers' education does not say "Come and be comfortable." It can not be dressed in the garments of success. It demands the impossible. It calls for hard and clear thinking, for lonely work, for slow results and unregarded growth. The faithful servant of this calling may read "his victory in his children's eyes," but he will not live to see the day of its advent. He is building for a long future.

ARTHUR GLEASON.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### A Program for Disarmament

**S**IR: To those who have believed that the Treaty of Versailles holds out a promise for peace or of a new order in international relations, the plan mentioned below, which comes from authentic sources in London, will doubtless be of considerable interest. The plan as proposed in London is as follows:

1. President Harding has signified his intention of calling a disarmament conference of the Powers.
2. The British government is now proceeding on the assumption that this intention of President Harding will be translated into fact and is therefore laying plans for its program at such a conference.
3. The Treaty of Versailles gives the Allies powers of disarmament over Germany.
4. The only disarmament visualized so far has been disarmament of navies, of armies, of guns, etc.
5. At the Harding Disarmament Conference the British representatives will call for a new and accurate definition as to what is meant by the word, disarmament. They will demand that disarmament be given a wider meaning than it holds at present.
6. The new definition which it will be sought to have the conference adopt will be one which will embrace primarily the established means of waging war; that is, the means which cannot be created overnight but which re-

quire years of building to create. This would seem at first glance to apply to navies.

7. The British will, however, present arguments to prove that there can be no real disarmament as long as countries possess chemical plants far in excess of their domestic and proportionate export needs. Also, that aeroplanes capable of being fitted in a short time as war planes capable of transporting poison gas but classed as commercial planes, are a menace to the peace of the world if any one country possesses more of these planes than are actually required for the legitimate development of commercial flying.
8. American chemical experts are to be privately asked to support this British definition of disarmament to include chemical plants and airplanes.
9. The British government has good reason to believe that it will have the support of America in having the conference adopt such a definition, also of France, with Italy doubtful.
10. The hint is given us that the Americans may even, for tactical reasons, initiate the proposal before the Conference; the motion then to be seconded by the British.
11. The decision aimed at would result in the partial disarmament of the German chemical, dye and airplane industry: giving power to the Allies to leave only sufficient chemical works operating in Germany to care for internal needs and to supply the colors needed by the Allies under the dye reparation clauses of the Treaty. Other factories would be dismantled as potential war machines. At the same time the number of airplanes would be limited. In this connection it should be noted that Great Britain has recently lost first place in air development, and has dropped to third, the order being: 1, France; 2, Germany; 3, Great Britain.
12. Such a decision would permit chemical and air disarmament of Germany under the Treaty and would therefore permit of the development of the British and American dye industries for internal needs and for export without the overpowering competition of the German industry, with its low costs, further aggravated by adverse exchanges.

From intimations received in London it is assumed that the American War Department would support this program. The British would prefer it to a protective tariff on dyes and chemicals which would be difficult to put through in Britain because of its powerful Free Trade party. The present British dye licensing act which is permitting the development of the British dye industry remains in operation only for ten years from January 15, 1921. The most important outcome of such a decision by the Powers in so far as it would affect Germany would not be the dismantling of the dye and chemical works themselves, but would be the disintegration of the expert German dye personnel; which would be obliged to seek employment in other countries. It is held that the creation and the maintenance of a dye industry is first of all a matter of personnel and that with this personnel disrupted the industry is itself crippled and cannot be speedily recreated. The decision would give opportunity to limit under legal authority of the Treaty the amount of German dye exports and this last is the point and the crux of the whole matter. It would rob Germany of its potential war-making powers, and at the same time give the Allied nations opportunity to create the first wall of national defense and preparedness.

## The Struggle in North Dakota

**SIR:** It probably is too much to expect that I be permitted to take Mr. Johnson's article on The Struggle in North Dakota in your issue of March 9th and answer it paragraph by paragraph as I would like to do, but may I not be permitted the privilege of answering two or three of his chief arguments, largely on the basis of the information he himself gives?

For example, take the statement in Mr. Johnson's fifth paragraph. He says:

"Most of the public funds deposited with the Bank of North Dakota and redeposited with local banks, had been lent to the farmers. Consequently for the Bank of North Dakota to meet demands of the local treasurers, the Bank must call upon the local banks for its deposits with them, and they in turn, must

call upon the farmers to pay up their loans. This they cannot or will not do. Hence the plight of the Bank of North Dakota, which is in danger of being rendered insolvent by the garnishments of the local treasurers."

The best way of answering that is to take a concrete instance. Let us say that Cass county, in which Fargo is situated, had \$400,000 in public moneys of all kinds on deposit in the Bank of North Dakota. This money was drawing two per cent interest from the Bank of North Dakota and it was redeposited in the local banks which paid four per cent. When the initiated law was adopted, the county treasurer and the various city, township and school board treasurers decided to withdraw their funds from the Bank of North Dakota and deposit them directly in the local banks, getting three or four per cent interest. What should have been necessary to make the transaction? Is anybody so ignorant of banking as to believe that the Bank of North Dakota would send an agent with a suitcase to get the money and turn it over to the treasurers? Wouldn't a mere book entry have cleared the transaction? Why should that cause any hardship to anybody or cause any loans to be called? The county treasurer would simply draw a check on the Bank of North Dakota and deposit it in the local bank and the money would remain exactly where it was.

That is, it should have been done that way, and could have been so handled but for the situation that Mr. Johnson himself discloses in his eighth paragraph, when he says:

"In the meantime the industrial commission has gone on with its program lending some \$3,000,000 to the farmers through its farm loan associations—(it had no association, but merely the bank machinery)—and \$250,000 through its Home-building association. It also incurred obligations to the amount of \$1,000,000 in the construction of a state mill and terminal elevator and an experimental milling plant. These undertakings have been financed primarily (he should have said entirely) by means of advances from the Bank of North Dakota."

Do you not see the significance of that? Not one dollar was raised by taxation for these enterprises, and the bonds authorized for them were not sold. Where did the \$4,250,000 (a very conservative estimate) come from? It came out of the working capital of the state and the various political subdivisions, of course, for that was the only money the Bank of North Dakota had. That explains why this liquidation of the Bank of North Dakota could not proceed by mere book entries as outlined above—that and one other reason which I will mention later. That much money is "frozen" as we call it up here.

That situation also explains why the bonds are not saleable. They were questioned first because of their unconstitutionality and that question has not been wholly cleared up as yet, some very good attorneys say. But before that question could be settled, the Bank of North Dakota adopted this policy of diversion of funds.

You permit Mr. Johnson to say that two hundred more banks "are in peril of having" to close their doors. That is a vicious and most dangerous untruth, and you are deserving of severe censure for permitting such a statement to appear in your columns. As a matter of fact, the power of the Bank of North Dakota to injure privately owned banks is about exhausted. The Bank of North Dakota is going through an involuntary liquidation process at the rate of about \$1,500,000 a month according to its own reports. It is now little more than a financial cold storage house. It won't "break." It can't break, but it is refusing even now to honor valid checks of its depositors and would have been closed long ago if it had been a private bank.

Let me now discuss very briefly the second reason why the liquidation of the Bank of North Dakota could not have been done by mere book entries and within a very few days. That reason was the policy of favoritism for "league banks." The argument was that "poorer districts" were to be favored with more than their share of public money, and "smaller banks" thus were to be enabled to get assistance. Well, take the case of Cass county again. It originated some \$400,000 of public moneys. It is the richest county in the state and the most populous. It received back more than \$600,000 in public money from the Bank of North Dakota, and of this sum more than \$400,000 was in the Scandinavian American Bank. This bank had been closed sixteen months ago as insolvent. Since then the amount of public money on deposit in it has been increased by \$160,000, and now it is closed again by the same bank examiner who sixteen months ago declared it was in first class condition. It had twice as much public money as all the other banks in the entire county combined.



Perhaps this will make clear that the troubles of the Bank of North Dakota are not due to any "economic warfare" which is probably his term for what leaguers call "efforts of Wall Street to wreck the Bank of North Dakota," but to the fact that our public money has been "frozen" in long time investments of doubtful value, and has been placed in a few favored banks.

J. E. ROCKWELL,  
Editor Fargo Forum.  
Fargo, North Dakota.

**S**IR: Permit me to answer Mr. Rockwell's criticisms briefly:  
1. Mr. Rockwell's hypothetical transfer of funds to the local treasurers by "mere book entry" was not possible—even though one knew a great deal about banking—because the local treasurers did not generally intend to redeposit in the same banks.

2. Mr. Rockwell quotes me to prove that the state industries were financed by loans on the Bank of North Dakota. I do not deny it. Isn't it one of the main functions of banks to loan deposits? The Bank of North Dakota would not have been in trouble for this usual practice if "politics" had not engineered a run on the bank by the local treasurers and hindered the sale of the bonds.

3. My statement of the number of banks in peril was based on current press reports and the opinion of a banking expert who thought that a great many banks were technically in a bad condition. Thirty-five had already closed their doors. Mr. Rockwell does not deny the principle but states his opinion that I have exaggerated. I think I am right, as things were a month ago.

4. I did not deny favoritism for "League banks," but intimated as much in paragraph three of my article. However, as a matter of justice, I would question the implication that the case of the Scandinavian-American Bank of Fargo could be generalized for the whole of North Dakota. This "proving" of a point by the selection of the worst case (assumed by the reader to be typical) is a well known trick of partisan innuendo. It should not pass unchallenged.

5. Mr. Rockwell seeks to discredit my statements regarding economic and political warfare in North Dakota by merely tangential arguments, ignoring the obvious facts regarding that contest which have filled the press and which have produced the bitterest feelings in the northwest. Both sides are using "politics" to forward and defend their economic schemes and interests. As long as this politics is honest and above-board there can be no objection to it; but who imagines it is honest and above-board now?  
C. R. JOHNSON.

## Protection from Germany

**S**IR: "Short of the miraculous, Germany, the modern industrial Germany which has developed in the last half century, is doomed," says Frank H. Simonds in his weekly review of April 3rd. Germany, he declares, has redoubled her "threats of revenge, of the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, of the future destruction of France," and "is rousing her people to new passion and new fury with each day." Consequently Germany, he concludes, must be "destroyed." France "has the power to destroy and every right to exercise that power," he says. He explains that when he "talks of the destruction of Germany, the words have a peculiar and limited meaning. . . . What is meant is that the economic conditions can be so modified that millions of men and women will have to migrate or starve." If the population of Germany, he says, is reduced "to those limits which represent the capacity of the country to support itself, if its mineral resources are alienated by French and Polish occupations, if its foreign trade is eliminated by the destruction of German production, through the abolition of confidence and credit, essential to the present possession by the Germans of the necessary raw materials to keep their machinery working, then we shall have, once for all, the end of the danger which has overhung France for more than half a century."

There are several faults to be found in the analysis of Mr. Simonds. One is that the simple statement that Germany is

seeking the destruction of France is not convincing. Even so keen an observer as Mr. Simonds needs to produce evidence. History does not invariably repeat itself, and the fact that Germany attacked France in 1870 and again in 1914 does not make it certain that she is now planning to try it again. The fact that Germany is seeking to escape paying what the Allies demand is not proof that she engaged in a "campaign of threat and menace to France." The fact that "she is openly challenging the responsibility for the war," does not necessarily mean that her supreme purpose is "a new assault upon France."

In an article of more than a year ago, February 1, 1920, Mr. Simonds said: "As for the Germans, the outcome of the war, the terms of peace, have convinced them that British commercial jealousy provoked the war, that Britain attacked Germany in order to destroy a dangerous rival. This is nonsense in one respect, but it is nonsense which will be accepted because the outcome of the war was to destroy Germany as a commercial rival of the British, and the terms of peace are enduring evidence of this fact." In a later article he declared that as a result of the Versailles Treaty the German choice was "between a generation of economic servitude to the West and a dangerous experiment in eastern revolution." The question inevitably arises: Is it reasonable to expect Germany to believe herself responsible for the war, when the results of the war are virtually what they would have been if she had actually fought to defend herself from attack? Furthermore, will not a Germany convinced of her crime be of infinitely more value to France than a Germany "destroyed" because she refused to accept "a generation of economic servitude"?

Mr. Simonds says that with the German population reduced, the menace to France will be ended "once for all." But if Germany is revengeful now, what will she be after the proposed destruction? Whence comes the assurance that the danger will be ended "once for all"?

"France is fiscally ruined," says Mr. Simonds, "if Germany does not pay, but fiscal ruin and national ruin are quite different things, and France is better adapted than any other European nation to endure the general collapse of the existing economic system. . . . France is a self-contained country, with a comparatively low density of population, France can feed herself, she can practically meet all her requirements within her own home and colonial area." Now, if France can afford the adventure of a new war with Germany, with no repayment for the injuries of the past one, merely for "protection" against future attack, she can afford to cut down her reparation demands. Thus is the conclusion reached that the only reason for a French invasion of Germany is French fear. The only way to remove that fear is so to revise the Treaty that Germany can have no just cause for seeking revenge. The United States should tell France in unmistakable terms that it will not support her in her present wild policy, that it will assume no responsibility for the consequences of a new war. In addition, as proof of our friendship, we should cancel the French war debt. But unfortunately what should be done will not be done.  
MYRON M. JOHNSON.

Hartford, Connecticut.

## Hosea and Harding

**S**IR: The passage from Hosea which you used as a text to illumine President Harding's inaugural filled me with a great and abiding joy, but why, oh why, did you not use the balance of the verse?

His election was the result of a propaganda of misrepresentation unparalleled in our political history, and the words of the Prophet Hosea that follow are no less apropos than the first line that you use with such telling effect:

"Ephraim feedeth on wind, and followeth after the east wind: he daily increaseth lies and desolation."

The clause following may have been prophetic of the discarded separate peace with Germany. I don't know, not being a theologian. It reads:

"and they do make a covenant with the Assyrians, and oil is carried into Egypt."

Schenectady, New York.

CARLTON CHAMBERLAYNE.

## Books and Things

**H**OW often I wish I were living in the France of the eighteenth century,—before the Revolution! I could then have had all the exhilaration of advocating democracy, without any of the disadvantages of living in a democratic society. It must be almost ideal to plead the cause of liberty and equality against an aristocratic background.

Not, of course, that even in the eighteenth century one did not have to pay for enlightenment. If one publicly denounced the King or the Government or God, one was likely to be thrown into jail or tortured or hanged. By the time Voltaire had published to the world his opinions on religion and society, he had found that there was not a country in Europe where he could live without fear of persecution and he was obliged to take refuge near Geneva at the juncture of four jurisdictions so that he could flee from one to the other at a moment's notice. Yes; in the harsh suppression of free speech and the hatred of unorthodox views, the France of the eighteenth century was sometimes quite as violent as the America of today.

But the great thing about the eighteenth century, as I have already pointed out, was the graceful and aristocratic setting which it provided for its philosophers. The Enlightenment was a gentleman's game, as much as Toryism. Aristocrats like Condorcet and Turgot; fashionable dramatists like Beaumarchais; polished and erudite literary men like Montesquieu and Voltaire were its most conspicuous champions. So sophisticated and so learned was that extraordinary company that Rousseau, with his humiliating record and his passionate and clumsy inspirations, appeared to many of them a rustic and an ignoramus; whereas it is lamentably clear that in the America of today Rousseau would seem by comparison even with many intellectuals a man of education and a man of the world.

The new ideas in religion and politics and science were presented with a sound culture and an exquisite urbanity. For, in those days, philosophy and science were still regarded as forms of literature and the savants were not so overpowered by the gravity of their ideas that they were unwilling to put them clearly and wittily in ten pages of a brisk dialogue rather than bury them in five hundred of a cumbrous and unreadable volume. In the salons of the clever people, the superstitions and prejudices of humanity were examined with a relentless keenness and a highly civilized gaiety. They laughed away the current creeds and the current moralities and, what is perhaps even more important, they lived up to their heresies. For, in the America of the twentieth century, it is no uncommon thing to find people like the intelligent gentleman in Mrs. Wharton's *The Reef*, who profess the outrageous convictions and yet live the respectable life,—who applaud Bernard Shaw and agree with H. L. Mencken and yet lead existences deader than those of their own chauffeurs.

They little knew, those philosophers and wits, what sorrows were in store for humanity. They believed that, when "the last king had been strangled with the bowels of the last priest," the world would forthwith commence to enjoy the reign of liberty and reason. They could not know that the people, whose rights they were struggling to establish and about whose natural virtues they had become so confidently rhetorical, were to prove indifferent to their rights and disappointing as to their virtues. The

fathers of representative government could not foresee the representatives which the people were some day to choose; they could not imagine that the people would scarcely bother to choose at all and that the final product of the thrilling cry of "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité" would some day be the corrupt mediocrity of the Third Republic.

Above all, they were unable to foresee that the curious mechanical devices in which they took a slightly condescending but intelligent interest would some day assume the proportions of enormous and cruel traps in which the whole of the western world would find itself taken,—that the bourgeoisie, released from the tyranny of the aristocracy, would seize on these interesting toys and expand them into monstrous prisons with which to crowd out the millennium of reason and dominate the world.

Voltaire and Dr. Franklin, when they experimented with physics, could not know that the movement which was beginning in a spirit of philosophic science would bear its latest fruits in the steel works and the breakfast food factory. I do not suppose it ever occurred to them that a liberated middle class would take advantage of the discoveries of science, not for the advancement of humanity, but for their own enrichment and power. At any rate, that was what happened: industry and commerce swallowed everything, including the enlightened constitutions which the statesmen and philosophers had provided,—and the people, instead of becoming politically educated and more and more keen for the privileges of a free society, as soon as the novelty of voting and being represented had worn off, relapsed into the profoundest apathy about the administration of their affairs and allowed themselves to be cheated and enslaved with very little resistance.

And, as the world gave itself up to commerce, the standard of taste declined; the dominating ideals were bourgeois. The exactions of industry became so harsh that the proletariat revolted. In a world of ugliness and dreariness, the class war arrived; and the democratic battle had to be fought all over again, but this time not in the salons of the eighteenth century, but from the committee meeting of the Socialist and the soap-box of the I. W. W.

And that is why I long so wistfully to have lived in the eighteenth century. It is not that I wish that the French or American or Russian Revolutions had never happened at all. They were inevitable and right: I am glad that they succeeded. But I wish I had been fated to advocate ideals of justice and humanity in the comparative calm and elegance of the eighteenth century.

I picture myself as the master of some old and gracious château, which I share with some such lady philosopher as Voltaire's *Madame du Châtelet* or Rousseau's *Madame de Warens*. All the gens d'esprit of the Enlightenment would come to visit us there: the urbane and free-thinking abbé, the witty encyclopaedist, the aristocrat moqueur de tout, the spirituelle blue-stocking. In high bright rooms with long windows that open on geometric gardens, where green walls of box are guarded by white complacent goddesses; at prolonged and vivacious dinners, enlivened by admirable wines and eaten from daintily flowered plates but lately brought over from China, we deride the superstitions of the people with profound and exquisite bon mots. . . . On dit que M. Buffon a conçu une théorie originaire et fort intéressante: il prétend que les espèces animales sont quelquefois faites et défaits par les climats. . . . Dites, monsieur l'abbé, qu'est-ce qui est arrivé