

regard its audience as one of Hungarian immigrants, living a ghetto-like existence apart from American life, it will not cater to a particularist sentiment, but will instead be "an American Weekly . . . printed in the Magyar language." The New Age's ideas on Americanization are sensible: "We are uncompromisingly opposed to any idea of Americanization involving kneading the immigrant into static moulds or compelling him to conform to arbitrarily set standards of thought and conduct." For this liberal spirit, we wish success to the New Age, and to its editor, Mr. Eugene S. Bagger.

## The Borah Resolution

THE question of disarmament has resolved itself for the moment into a question of the Borah Resolution. By that measure "the President is authorized and requested" to invite the governments of Great Britain and Japan to a conference to discuss the annual reduction of naval building during the next five years. The resolution passed the Senate by a majority of 74 to 0. It is waiting upon the will of the President in the House.

A number of causes unite to make this modest proposal a practical one of immediate application. In the first place all three nations are staggering beneath the load of taxation. Economy is for the moment the desperate need of all three, even for the United States, for as Senator Martin says "We have the world to feed." Again, in the progress of the science of naval warfare no nation can know in what direction expenditure can profitably be directed. The super-dreadnaughts whose keels are now being laid may be obsolete before their turrets are erected. And, further, it happens that the whole question of warfare at sea for the present, and so far as can be seen for the future, rests with these three nations, and they are so linked together that no one can apparently profit by the use of its armament. Great Britain and Japan are allies, but not against the United States. Great Britain and the United States are in close relations, but certainly not to the prejudice of Japan. The United States and Japan are in opposition on matters of which the seriousness consists in the danger of a war which would be madness for both. Nothing could so conduce to a settlement as a mutual agreement to cease preparation, and therefore to exclude the appeal to arms.

On the other hand, there is danger that a number of causes may unite to put this opportunity, so temptingly near, out of our reach forever.

There are those who from a sincere and noble view of world politics wish to use the present opportunity for larger results, who would play for higher stakes. Why not a general conference for universal disarmament by land and sea? Undoubtedly such a program affords a magnificent opening for discussion, out of which might grow a real association of nations, an economic settlement of the world with readjustment of tariffs, debts, and reparations, the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, the freedom of Ireland, Egypt and India, the renunciation of mandatories, and the self-determination of backward peoples. Whatever may be the scope of the Harding-Hughes conception of foreign policy it is clear that disarmament is an advantageous prelude to it, and they may well wish to postpone the overture until the stage is set behind the curtain. Again, there are those who regard the Borah Resolution as essentially futile. They point out the fact that it leaves all initiative in the hands of the President, who is indifferent or hostile to it; that it does not represent the real sentiment of the Senate which voted it and immediately increased the Naval Appropriation bill, as passed in the House, by \$100,000,000; that it is a mere pretence of yielding to the popular demand for real disarmament, the essential dishonesty of which is shown by such speeches as that of Mr. Kelley, of the House Appropriations Committee:

With this program [that of 1916] we can enter into an agreement to effect a reduction in naval strength throughout the world of 25 per cent or 40 per cent without danger to our national defence, because our relative defence will not diminish, and because when the reduction is made we will still be the equal of any nation in the world in sea power.

To these must be added the business interests to which the continuation of the 1916 program means large profits. And finally there are the strict constructionists who inquire whether the Executive should submit to be advised, urged, authorized or requested by Congress in a matter of foreign affairs.

These objections are answerable singly, and are all beside the real point at issue. The conference of three Powers on limitation of armament does not involve in any sense a sacrifice of a larger policy. Indeed, it is a question whether a single step definitely taken now may not be the most effective initiation of such a policy. The Borah Resolution may be futile in stopping the 1916 program, in the face of the insistence of President, Senate, House, and Invisible Government that this program shall go through, but at least it will bring

the situation to a focus. By the passage of the Borah Resolution the United States accepts a responsibility which will force even our government to recognize the continuation of the 1916 program for what other nations have already recognized it—an act of bad faith. The immediate loss to American industry through the cessation of the 1916 program will be heavy, but labor in the face of the most calamitous year it has recently known is willing to bear its share. Approval of disarmament is the one measure sure to pass the Convention of the A. F. of L. at Denver. And as for executive ambition and prerogative—surely we can charge the President to fling them away. By that sin fell the angels!

The essential fact is that the Borah Resolution represents the will of the people of the United States. Does anyone imagine that if the Senate were not thoroughly aware of this it would have accepted the Resolution without a dissenting vote? It is a limited, feeble, timid gesture toward world peace, with all the self-consciousness and awkwardness that accompany a first attempt. It may become an attitude, a movement, the first step in a pilgrimage. It is easy to arouse a people's will to war; often a threatening motion far less significant than this of the Borah Resolution has opened the way to combat. Today, for a moment only perhaps, as a resultant of many forces, the people's will is for peace. Shall that will be defeated by the machinery which has been set up to execute it? If so, then once more the people will have been betrayed by their rulers, and the government of the people will have given a reason why it should perish from the earth.

## Mexico: Property First?

**T**HE fundamental question which confronts the government of the United States in considering its relations with Mexico is the safeguarding of property rights against confiscation." That is the view of Secretary Hughes, widely applauded by the press. It is probably approved by a great part of the American public. Whether Mexico becomes an autocracy as under Diaz or a democracy; whether the masses of the population live in comfort and freedom or suffer under exploitation and peonage; whether Mexican civilization is rising toward a higher level or whether the country is sinking back into barbarism: these are questions that do not concern us. But what Mexico does to Doheny's oil titles or Hearst's ranches concerns us vitally.

This, it is worth noting, is a long considered view

of Mr. Hughes's. It is practically identical with the view he evolved over four years ago, when he was seeking to define a Mexican policy which should be the antithesis of President Wilson's. That it is long considered, however, does not necessarily make it profound or wise. We venture to assert that if Mr. Hughes had ever reconsidered it he would have found it superficial. There must be something more important in the relations between neighboring states than the property relations involved, or even the commercial relations that are bound up with them. Conceive two alternatives: Mexico orderly, prosperous, working out the unique contribution to civilization that her ethnic character and geographical position promise, or Mexico a welter of anarchy, exploitation, slavery and misery. Should we not choose the former, even if there were not a dollar in it for us? Perhaps we'd choose the former and the dollar too. That is common sense, but putting the dollar first is not the road to what is of paramount value.

But this, it may be said, is preferring ideals to practical interests. Not at all. We have a practical interest of the first importance in the peace and happiness of Mexico. For it is our settled policy that within reach of our arm there shall be orderly government. If Mexico cannot be properly governed by Mexicans, the United States will govern Mexico sooner or later. We are not urging that the United States should undertake the job. We see nothing in the way of lasting benefits from our intervention in Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo that would clearly justify the United States in undertaking new enterprises of the kind. All that we suggest is that since the character of the American people is what it is, a prolonged period of chaos in Mexico will produce intervention as surely as a properly aimed gunshot will produce wounds.

Now, we do not believe that there are many Americans so blind to what is going on in the world as to fail to recognize that American rule in Mexico would be attended by grave costs and inconveniences. We might give Mexico an honest and able administration. Under our benevolent rule poverty and illiteracy might be abolished, typhus and other subtropical diseases eliminated, the arts might be encouraged and the cities beautified, yet the Mexicans would hate us, and make our problem of government difficult. The Poles of Posen were more efficiently governed by Prussia than any subject people are likely to be by us. The Croats of the old Dual Empire were lifted to a higher plane of culture and prosperity than that of the Jugoslavs under Serbia. A lot of good intentions have gone into the British rule of Ireland. But in none of these cases have the difficulties of