

country has the right to decide its own policy of immigration. One can sympathize with the attitude of the Pacific Coast upon the matters of the restriction of Oriental immigration, and yet believe that every step taken by a Coast state which involves inequality of treatment for immigrants already in residence involves the danger of an ultimate explosion in the Pacific. Not that Japan would go to war about the Californian issue, but that every move that partakes of racial discrimination strengthens that public opinion which in the last resort is the reliance of the military group in Japan. The rankling sense of injustice is played upon to secure support for a big army and navy.

The indirect outcome is the continuation of a predatory policy in China and Siberia. And it is the latter policy which carries with it the menace of future war. A frank facing of the question of racial equality is good diplomatic tactics. It is the poorest of policies to hand gratuitously a grievance to a potential opponent. But the issue is deeper and broader than that of diplomatic tactics or even strategy. Until the world in general and the United States in particular does the square thing about racial discrimination, the militarists will remain the formative power in Japanese public opinion. Liberal and pacific opinion will be crippled.

JOHN DEWEY.

The British View

ALL sections of British opinion, except perhaps that of the extreme Left, welcome the significance of the official title which has been given to the forthcoming Conference at Washington. It was better to be precise at the outset, and to call it, not a "disarmament" Conference, but one "for the Limitation of Armaments." There may be something to be said for the policy of aiming at the moon to hit the top of a tree, but good marksmen take a different view. What indeed has been the chief fear of practical British statesmen is that the Conference should ride off on platitudes, and spend itself ineffectively. There is serious business to be done. When, therefore, the American Ambassador in London declared that "disarmament" at the present time necessarily means nothing more than the limitation of armaments, we received solid confirmation of what we had always believed to be the case, that the Washington Conference was to be a business-like affair.

I. PROCEDURE

It is a responsive business-like spirit which makes British opinion attach great importance to the question of procedure, and to hold definite views thereon. When it was announced from Washington last month that the agenda would consist (1) of discussions on armament, (2) of the political issues in the Pacific, it was not taken in official quarters here to imply that these main subjects would be dealt with strictly in that order, or even that they would be dealt with separately. Indeed it was assumed that there would be no attempt to disintegrate what is in effect a single whole. So single is the problem awaiting the Conference that to British eyes it is a little difficult to see how any progress can be made towards the limitation

of armaments unless and until an agreement has been reached on the political problems of the Pacific. Granted the latter, the former becomes easy.

2. A POST-WAR EXAMPLE

A frank statement of the British case could not be made without first recording the impression made on British opinion, both official and unofficial, by American policy since the war. The British people are quick to appreciate sportsmanship. By all the rules of international opportunism, as they have traditionally held good, the United States would have been justified in driving home her post-war advantage. She could have decided to build a navy of decisive superiority, and to present the world with a *fait accompli*. She could have done it easily, and would not thereby have transgressed the accepted canons of international form. Instead she chose to organize a conference with the object of arriving at an understanding which would relieve both herself and her possible rivals of the insensate burden of competitive armaments, and by the same token would make good sense, and not brute strength, the arbiter of the future. Such is the true idealism of the United States.

Nor need British appreciation of it be an empty sentiment. We too have practised disarmament. The British army of 1918 no longer exists. Conscription is gone. The Admiralty has consented to abandon the traditional policy of the Two-Power standard, and has already taken the necessary steps to reduce the number of capital ships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines in this sense. If disarmament at the present time means in effect the limitation of armaments, Great Britain may claim a prominent place in the movement. To appreci-

ate this, it must be remembered that the British navy in the past has had more than one duty to perform. It is not only necessary for maintaining the security of the Empire, for maintaining the communications between the British Isles and the Dominions and between the Dominions themselves, but the forty-seven millions who live in the United Kingdom are dependent in the last resort on the British navy for their food. Four-fifths of our bread, and one-half of our meat come from overseas.

3. BRITAIN AND JAPAN

The crux of the Conference is to be the future relations of the United States, Great Britain, Japan and China. It is frankly recognized here that the discussion must centre very largely round the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Before the British attitude to this question can be understood, it is necessary to recall the significance of a recent development in the evolution of the British Empire. In July of this year there met in London a conference of British Empire Prime Ministers. They met as equals in the discussion of a common foreign policy. As Mr. Lloyd George said at the beginning of the conference: "There was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; today the Empire gives orders to Downing Street." That is a fact of importance which has clearly to be kept in mind whenever the question of British foreign policy arises.

At that conference there were three main points of view expressed. The first is what may be called the view of the London government. Mr. Lloyd George himself has since crystallized it in words which are perhaps worth quoting in some detail. On July 11th he said:

In Japan we have an old and proved ally, and the Agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East.

In China there is a very numerous people, with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly and whose interests we on our side desire to assist and advance.

In the United States we see today, as we have always seen, a people closest to our own in aims and ideals, with whom it is for us not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply rooted instinct, to consult and cooperate.

The object of our discussions (at the Empire Conference) was to find a method of combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific, with all the evils which such expenditure entails, and would ensure the development of all legitimate national interests in the Far East.

... The first principle of our policy was friendly

cooperation with the United States, and we were all convinced that upon this more than upon any other single factor depend the peace and well-being of the world. We also desired to maintain our close friendship and cooperation with Japan. We also aimed at preserving the open door in China and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity for peaceful progress and development. In addition to these considerations we desired to safeguard our own vital interests in the Pacific, and to preclude any competition in naval armaments between the Pacific Powers.

These of course are general sentiments which remain to be translated into practical politics. First let us face the difficulties created by the special views of the Canadian and Australian delegations as expressed at the London conference. There was a certain divergence between the two.

Canada was opposed to the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the grounds that (1) it conflicted with our friendship with America; (2) it rendered difficult the problem of Japanese immigration; (3) it had in any case done its work; (4) there was no more call for an Anglo-Japanese alliance than for an alliance with the United States, France or Italy, if its only object was to safeguard friendly relations; (5) that, in general, entangling alliances are in conflict with the new spirit of international relations as expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations; (6) that the renewal of the alliance with Japan would bring with it the crushing burden and the certain disaster of an armaments race with America. In support of her general contention Canada pointed out with great effect that she had a common frontier with the United States of more than five and a half thousand miles, unguarded on both sides; what better proof of the efficacy of mutual confidence as an alternative to military alliances, even from the point of view of security?

Australia on the other hand defended the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the double ground that (1) it was disloyal to throw over a proved friend, and (2) the alliance was the best and most economical means of eliminating possible misunderstandings with Japan, and of safeguarding the security of Australia.

In view of these divergent points of view, what is the composite policy of the British Empire in the Far East?

It should be understood as an axiom that the British Empire, by the very nature of its composition, can admit of no argument based on the color division between East and West. The British Empire is a "piebald" empire. Mr. Srinivasa Sastri, for instance, will attend the Washington Conference as the representative of the Indian section of the British Empire delegation. The Empire is a bridge between East and West. It may be