

served. Detailed rules as to jettison were simply worthless in the emergency of storm. War is a seething storm.

This does not mean that codes of war law, so called, have no place or function. In the manuals which governments issue to their armies and navies, such codes form a useful part of the equipment of the professional soldier. They are an aid in preserving discipline and a safeguard against some of the more brutal forms of retaliation. They help to maintain a healthy tradition in the service by conserving something of the old chivalry. By whatever emphasis they may place upon considerations of humanity, they contribute to save the inherent brutalities of warfare from degenerating into unmitigated savagery. There may even be advantages in working for a degree of uniformity among the manuals as they are issued in the different countries. If undertaken, however, such a task ought to be referred to a conference in which both first and second rank powers are

widely represented and also one which can command the talents both of professional soldiers and of publicists who have made the conduct of warfare a special study. And when the work is done there should be no illusions about its significance.

The Conference of Washington should spend no precious effort upon such a task as this. Not only is it ill-fitted for such work by its constitution, but it has vastly more important business to attend. The intended "rules for control of new agencies of warfare" have no real relation to the tremendous problems of the Pacific and the Far East, nor are they more than superficially relevant to the problem of armaments. Within the scope of these major topics there is enough of opportunity as well as responsibility. There will be no real disappointment if the Conference should contribute nothing to the code which Richard Hooker long ago described as "the laws of arms, which yet are better known than kept."

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A Baedeker to the Conference

THE grand trunk highway to the Disarmament camp-meeting in Washington, as some who have watched bandwagon after bandwagon roll by have seen, is not without curves and grades. In the five months since Senator Borah first opened the road to disarmament with his "naval holiday" amendment to the navy appropriation bill, they have seen the American bandwagon rollicking both downgrade and upgrade, the Japanese speeding up to keep pace, the British veering off toward a lesser camp, but winding around eventually to the middle of the broad road.

That Borah "naval holiday" resolution, if it deserves a place among the milestones to Camp Disarmament, does so because it was the first brief sign to catch the public's eye. The administration claims its intentions antedated the Borah idea, but the administration was weak in signs. The first milestone to catch the public eye was the Borah resolution, simple, sans Pacific problems, or other accoutrements, through which Congress declared:

The President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval programs of each of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding and agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval.

That brief reminder from Congress to the President focussed attention upon naval disarmament. It was followed by a State Department announcement that "the President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of powers here-

tofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon."

If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference will be issued. It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned and China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems.

Obviously, that milestone greatly enlarged upon the mere "naval holiday" idea. As a competent government spokesman amplified this formal statement, "the administration looked out over all horizons and the only international situation which threatened war of importance in the next forty years was that in the Far East. We resolved, if possible, to remove the causes of friction between the nations out there on the Pacific." The reaction to this step was magnetic. As expressed by the press and letters to the White House, the public looked forward to successful accomplishment at Washington of everything undertaken, but only partially done by the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations and the Hague Tribunal. This was one of the curves on the highway to Camp Disarmament, which the President and the Secretary of State look back upon as most dangerous. They felt and still feel that the American nation expected too much from the Conference. Another dangerous curve was that round-

ed when the British proposal to hold an advance conference with the United States and possibly with Japan was headed off without loss of amity. Yet another is revealed in the State Department memorandum to the Imperial Japanese government forestalling efforts to limit the scope and tie the hands of the Conference, almost before it was called. That memorandum follows:

The Government of the United States deeply appreciates the readiness of the Imperial Japanese Government to accept the invitation to attend the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.

The Secretary of State of the United States in the course of informal conversations with His Excellency, the Imperial Japanese Ambassador at Washington, has expressed the hope that the Imperial Japanese Government would not press its inquiry as to the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems to be discussed at the proposed conference in view of the fact that it is desirable that the full acceptance of the invitation of the American government leave this matter open for adjustment in the precise agenda to be arrived at later.

The Secretary of State is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference. He considers it inadvisable, however, at the present moment to hamper the program and in particular to delay the arrangements for the conference pending an agreement regarding this matter.

That was on July 23rd, and a few days later, the Japanese government replied by unconditionally agreeing to accept an American invitation to a conference, the agenda of which, it was suggested, should be outlined in advance. The Japanese reply was:

It has been brought to the knowledge of the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference and that it considers it advisable to adjust in that agenda the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions to be discussed at the proposed conference. The Japanese Government, on that understanding, are happy to be able to inform the American Government that it is their intention gladly to accept an invitation for a conference which shall embrace the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

The Japanese Government have been made aware through the communications and published statement of the American Government and the conversations between the Secretary of State and Baron Shidehara that the proposition of the American Government to discuss the Pacific and Far Eastern problems is based on the close bearing they have on the question of limitation of armaments which is the original and principal aim of the conference, and that therefore, the main object of discussing these problems is to reach a common understanding in regard to general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East. Desiring, as they do, to contribute to the establishment of an enduring peace and to the advancement of human welfare, the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the proposed conference may attain the expected results and their ideals may be thereby brought nearer to realization.

In order to ensure the success of the conference, the Japanese Government deem it advisable that the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided.

A month after the calling of the Conference had been officially announced, informal negotiations had brought the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to general agreement on agenda, purpose of the meeting, and the date for opening the Conference in Washington, Armistice Day, November 11th, enabling the President, on August 11th, to issue the formal invitations. The texts, one of which follows, plainly revealed that the disarmament idea had grown to proportions where, despite the alarm of Senator Borah over the enlargement of the purpose of the Conference, the President and Secretary Hughes could see almost limitless possibilities in the Conference they were to guide, though, as the invitation said, "the question of naval armament may naturally have first place." The text of the invitations to Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy, which were identical, follows:

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armaments, in connection with which the Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.

Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification, but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the Powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these Powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by the conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the impor-