

stinence by the Japanese from pressing the California-Japanese immigration squabble and foible and—above all—a self-denying ordinance with respect to China. They will have to give China a chance to develop. They will have to abandon their excesses in special privileges and unfair advantages in international trade in China.

Q. Are we likely to be able to persuade them on that last point? A. We shall be greatly helped in persuading them if they find that the friends of peace and of the limiting of armaments in America are clear-sighted and frank-spoken enough to know and to say that the United States cannot permanently disarm in the Pacific as long as Japan exploits China and insists on heedlessly violating our historically legally recognized rights of equal economic opportunity in eastern Asia. We do not propose to intimidate Japan, but we can and should make Japan know that it will be more expensive financially to slam doors on us against our rights than to open them to us in accordance with our rights.

Q. Is not this a rather unpeaceful task for peace-makers? A. There is nothing unpeaceful in telling another nation how to get peace, especially if what is told has been admitted by that other nation in its diplomatic correspondence to be just.

Q. Would the British help us to get the open door in China? A. The British in general habit are the most open door people in the world.

Q. Are they in favor of the fair field for us in China? A. In reply one might ask: Are we in favor of the fair field for them in the Panama Canal and in our ports and on our railways?

Q. Can it be then, that we may have to indicate some slight aptitude for the open door at home in order to be better supported in our enthusiasm for the open door abroad? A. That is a leading question. It leads very far—out of the region with which the Conference can deal. The Conference is going to address itself to questions of naval armament and international trade in the Pacific. It is therefore a Conference with a special chance for good and a special chance for evil. It may and probably will in any event produce for political purposes some temporary and makeshift limiting of armaments. But the reduction of armaments which it accomplishes will form a dubious measure of its success. A more trustworthy measure of its success will consist in the amount of improvement which it can produce in the relations among Japan, Great Britain and the United States. Those relations are embroiled, partly because of the great injustice which for the last thirty years foreign nations have perpetrated in China. They have systematically robbed the Chinese people of ter-

ritory, natural resources and political independence. The European nations began the looting and retain much of the spoils, but of late years Japan has been the chief offender. She has dared to do it, as many Chinamen believe, because she was protected by her alliance with British sea power. The Conference will succeed in improving the relations among Japan, Great Britain and the United States by the repair of this historic injustice and by the consequent transformation of Japan into a nation which looks less formidable and dangerous to her neighbors on the Pacific Coast.

Q. What can the Americans do to make it a success? A. They can give Japan, Great Britain and China every assurance that they themselves do not intend to take over the business of exploiting China and that what they want is an agreement by consent and not as a result of coercion.

Q. Will they succeed? A. That will depend on others as well as ourselves. The Conference may fail to begin the emancipation of China or to lay out the specifications for a settlement in the Pacific. But if it is properly conducted it cannot fail to accomplish the next best thing. It cannot fail to inform and arouse public opinion in Japan, Great Britain and this country as to what the Pacific and the Far Eastern problems are, and why they provoke armaments. It cannot fail, that is, unless it conceals some part of its deliberations and conclusions from the public.

Q. What then should those Americans do who wish the Conference, even if it fails in its immediate object, to succeed in doing away with the obstacles to a future agreement and a future effective limitation of armaments? A. They should insist on full publicity for both the proceedings and the conclusions of the Conference.

WILLIAM HARD.

Metaphysics

There was a man who told me that to draw

A circle in the dust and call it I—

Myself the architect, myself the law—

Made me no freer underneath the sky.

He named me prophets and he named me kings:

"They are; they were; they cease to be," he said.

"Wisdom is in the acceptance of all things,

For even who see the farthest must be led."

"We know not where we go, nor whence we came.

Be docile, rest—the fluttering bird is bruised,

Else falls in flight." But wrapping me like flame

I felt my flesh, imperative, unused!

And then, as in a flash, I understood

That he was old, and found submission good!

LESLIE NELSON JENNINGS.

The Miners as Legislators

AS a legislative body for a great industry, the convention of the United Mine Workers of America this year went more than usually askew.

The legislators were the 2,257 delegates representing 2,356 locals who, in biennial convention assembled, sat in Tomlinson Hall, Indianapolis, from September 20 to October 5th. They met without agenda, as usual, expecting to hear the officers' reports (for a day or two), debate the 619 resolutions already sent in by locals (for a week) and agree on the scale, or conditions of labor to be presented next March as demands (another week's work). Their president John L. Lewis described the meeting as "the greatest deliberative and parliamentary assembly in the world" because any delegate was entitled to speak on any subject; "we have no set program."

There are no labeled parties in the U. M. W. but there are two camps, "administration" and "anti." Delegates in the first upheld leaders who, as Lewis said, stood justified "before the great American public which, after all, desires and accords to every man a square deal." Other delegates were there "to punish Lewis, Murray and Green for dodging jail in the 1919 strike," and to "tie up the leaders solid on the next settlement."

A summary review of the session would run as follows:

At the start a resolution ordering the scale committee to report within ten days was adopted despite the administration. The anti-administration camp intended to allow the officers no liberty of action and then to pass a rule deposing any officer who signed an agreement without ratification by the rank and file.

Next the International officers' reports were taken up and the convention engaged in leadership duels which lasted ten days leaving only two and a half days for all other business.

The first item in Lewis's report demanded that President Farrington of the Illinois miners publish an itemized accounting of \$27,000 used to frustrate a "wildcat" (illegal) strike in 1919. Farrington, a heavy set man with a reputation as a fighter, charged that the \$27,000 was a dead issue raked up by Lewis for political purposes; that the money was honestly though secretly paid to loyal members in order to save the union; that the Illinois miners' convention had ordered him not to itemize it, and it was their money; that the principle of autonomy was involved. "If the autonomy

of locals and of districts is invaded by the International officers then the life of the union is at stake." When a compromise seemed about to end the debate Lewis took the floor, a bulky man with a booming voice and a face as immobile as a mask. He demanded a yes or no decision; cited the union constitution; declared that defiant officers must submit to law; that the question of states' rights had been settled on a larger field long ago. "Shall the union law which fell heavily upon the miners who were in rebellion in the wildcat strike now fall with equal weight on a state organization which is in rebellion?" The previous question was immediately put amid stormy demands for the floor and Lewis was upheld.

Next Lewis's report demanded that President Howat of the Kansas miners order back to work men at two mines whose stoppage was declared to be in violation of contract. Howat, a gray figure swinging a heavy gesture as if he were hewing coal, told the convention that these two cases involving forty men had been dragged up by Lewis for the purpose of "giving Howat a licking"; that the two mines would have been at work long ago except that the operators knew they could take their wails to Lewis and get attention; that the operators had violated the contract first by trying to impose new conditions; that the Kansas Industrial Court, along with the operators and the International officers, was telling the miners to go back to work, "and we're telling the Industrial Court to go to hell"; that next Tuesday he must give a \$9,000 bond to the Industrial Court not to call any more strikes or go to jail.

Lewis began his reply sarcastically: "I shall not undertake to speak through the bars of a jail." He "assumed that the mine workers' union is a business institution"; argued that the union could survive only through its reputation for fulfilling contracts; that Howat's mad course in Kansas was the blot on the union's reputation; that the union's great struggle for a contract in Mingo County, West Virginia, was imperilled; that suits were being brought every day against the union as an unlawful faithless organization. "Do you want another Coronado damage suit or do you want your contracts carried out by all, Howat included?"

As he finished, Howat's party clamored for a vote but the president refused to close debate. A man on the platform handed to Lewis documents which he waved at the convention—legal papers. They were for another suit, just served, filed by