

he can remove. Naturally those who most sympathize with Russia and are most inclined to help her, resent Mr. Hoover's refusal of assistance in the past. It is for Mr. Hoover himself by a frank statement of his change of position to convert his previous attitude into a source of strength rather than weakness. Again, Mr. Hoover's exploits as food dictator in Europe particularly in Hungary, as related by his campaign biographer and his agent Captain Gregory, have aroused suspicion and anger and contempt. Here again it is possible for Mr. Hoover by a frank statement to disarm much of this feeling. We are informed that both Captain Gregory and Miss Rose Wilder Lane have grossly exaggerated the political importance of Mr. Hoover's action. Undoubtedly to the mass of Americans the course ascribed to him in his capacity of relief agent of fighting and betraying a revolutionary government and leaving its territory open to invasion and spoliation, is an altogether commendable exercise of power and guile—but we submit that in this crisis it behooves Mr. Hoover to strip himself of such of his plumes as are borrowed, and deny as much as he can of what the London Herald calls "a despicable story of bounce and brag."

Finally, there is Mr. Hoover's spirit of autocracy and dictatorship as expressed in his letter from President Harding, according to which all American relief was to be concentrated under his direction, and even the American Friends who have borne the burden and heat of the day were to lose the autonomy of their distribution work in Russia. We believe heartily in unity of relief work. The obvious economy in collection, purchasing, transportation and distribution possible under a unified scheme is too obvious to need exposition. But such unity must be achieved by tact and cooperation, not by dictation and a club. With all of Mr. Hoover's flexibility and address, which we hope will be exerted to the utmost, there are many sources of contribution which he cannot reach, which have already found an absolutely trustworthy channel through the Friends. To limit or hamper their work in any way would be incredibly shortsighted. The one thing to be feared is that the duty which rests upon America will be refused, and the opportunity which is before her will be frittered away in idle dispute. Months have already passed since the famine in Russia became acute, and apart from some appropriation of funds and of supplies already in hand America has done nothing. And America will do but little in comparison with her great resources until Mr. Hoover speaks.

## Free Silence

**M**OST people, at least nominally, believe in free speech. They think it has a direct connection with freedom of thought and that freedom of thought is one of the most priceless heritages of the mass of mankind. The extent, however, to which free speech—what professors now call "the language habit"—is utterly disconnected with thought and misleading in every intellectual particular has not been sufficiently scrutinized. It would be extreme and hot-headed to say that the language habit should be completely suppressed. It would also, at least temporarily, be inconvenient. But the sooner people face the fact that the language habit is very dangerous, and that we are all victims of it, the better it will be for the few of us who are the possessors of the real reality and the true truth.

Do human beings think? Ribald cries of "No," "Absurd," "Remove him," "Sit down," usually greet any such inquiry. As a matter of fact, it is one of those large questions to which everybody possesses a secret answer. Everybody believes that he himself thinks, thinks quite acutely and very much to the point; but he is in a state of mind shading from mild doubt to positive conviction regarding the thinking powers of his family, his servants if he has any, his colleagues, allies and associates, his friends, his immediate public, and then that poor dog on which everybody whets his humor or his spleen, "the mass of mankind."

The m. of m., we all may as well agree, do not think. Abraham Lincoln thought they thought; at least he thought you couldn't sell the Versailles Treaty to all of them all of the time. But the current correct intellectual view of the mass of mankind is best indicated with a little shrug of the shoulders. "The mass of mankind," as Matthew Arnold expressed it with his characteristic air of regretfully passing a sentence of Guilty, "the mass of mankind will never have any ardent zeal for seeing things as they are; very inadequate ideas will always satisfy them." Not regarding life as an exercise in political science and consequently giving most of their time to feeding their unattractive faces, the mass of mankind haven't the chance to see "things as they are," viz., as the best people think they are. So, having no ardent zeal for seeing things as they are, the mass of mankind according to Arnold's concept are patriotic when they are told, and take conscription when they are told, and hustle over to France when they are told, and die in the trenches and in the hospitals and in the Ford ambulances and on the ships and in the straw

of stables and mud and manure of outhouses. They haven't any ardent zeal for political science but they swallow the current high-grade propaganda.

Having no time to spare for political, social or economic research, they even believe the information about pirate ships that the State Department picks up out of bottles and hands to the press. It is sad that they should be so gullible, the mass of mankind, but, as Matthew Arnold decided it once and for all, "very inadequate ideas will always satisfy them." And the main political question is, who'll get the four year contract for supplying them with inadequate ideas?

But do the intelligentsia think? Mr. Moissaye J. Olgin's account of the Russian intelligentsia is sound evidence on this point. Until the "people" got into power in Russia, the intelligentsia cherished an ideal of social justice, they worshipped at the shrine of the "people." With the people in power, "rude people, workmen with heavy fists and crude speech, peasants like clods of earth, soldiers savage with passion, an uncouth, unmannered, almost illiterate crowd," the intelligentsia were nobody and nowhere. Hence the people became the peepul and the intelligentsia soon "put up a solid front against the new order." "Under the provisional government the power was in the hands of the intelligentsia which *represented* the various groups and classes, whereas under the Soviet system the mass were in actual possession of power. 'Democracy' vs. Soviet rule meant supremacy of the organized workers and soldiers and peasants. The intelligentsia could not go against their own class interests. This accounts for their hatred, for the cry of intervention, for Merezhkovsky and Filosofov and Gippius, leaders of the intelligentsia par excellence, helping the Polish army against Russia."

As the servants of their own class interests the intelligentsia cannot be accused of disinterested or rarified thought. Who, then, does think? Do army men think, or bankers, or clergy, or endowed professors, or endowed editors, or big-circulation editors not endowed and free to give the public what it wants? Do engineers think? Do manufacturers think? Do Chambers of Commerce think? Or women's clubs? Or the Elks? Or the Ku Klux Klan? As one looks over the list, the possibilities of human thought visibly narrow down, and it becomes definite and certain that the only people who think are those two admirable stand-bys—you and I.

To strengthen this important conclusion we may take Bertrand Russell's recent version of the be-

haviorists. "In their observation of the behavior of human things," he says, "they have not so far found any evidence of thought. True, we talk a great deal, and imagine that in so doing we are showing that we think; but behaviorists say that the talk they have to listen to can be explained without supposing that people think. Where you might expect a chapter on 'thought processes' you come instead upon a chapter on 'The Language Habit.' It is humiliating to find how terribly adequate this hypothesis turns out to be."

This throws a new, and we hope illuminating, light on the most popular of human habits. Many have long suspected that between the use of language and the use of the mind there was, as yet, no clearly established connection. But few had ever, even in the case of certain editorial writers, gone so far as to believe that human utterance, especially political utterance, could be wholly explained without bringing in the question of thought at all. It is not yet clear, of course, how, if thinking cannot be proved by the behavioristic method, we can be sure that the behaviorists are themselves thinking. How do we know that *their* processes are thought processes? And if their processes are not thought processes, if it in turn is simply an indulgence in the language habit, must we take it seriously?

We confess we don't know. But, surrounded by the ignorant mass of mankind, the befuddled intelligentsia, the tired and tiresome business man, and the dog-fancying behaviorist, we feel that the language habit is proved to be manifestly dangerous. Perhaps a federal amendment might be attempted prohibiting it, except in case of sickness and on medical prescription.

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# Dante's Political Philosophy

**D**ANTE'S *De Monarchia* is usually treated by the commentators as a mere footnote to the *Commedia*; and this subordination is justifiable because the poet in Dante overwhelms all other expressions of his genius and also because the *Commedia* contains much political philosophy, some of which the *De Monarchia* elucidates. But *De Monarchia*, considered by itself, is a work of great importance. Even if by some unthinkable accident the *Commedia* had been lost and the *De Monarchia* had survived, it would remain a significant treatise on the state and the papacy and would deserve to be regarded as we regard the political writings of philosophers from Plato to Hobbes. To be sure, the chief interest of the work for us lies in the fact that Dante wrote it, and it would lose some of its value if it were isolated from the rest of his thought; the amazing unity of his mind and the coherence of his purpose make a piecemeal view of any part of him essentially false. His vision of earth and heaven has a thousand aspects but no fragments. Even the unfinished works, *Il Convivio* and *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, are not fragments but are rather to be read as partial manifestations of a singular and consistent plan.

*De Monarchia* is a vision of earthly well-being. It is an argument, prosaic and heavy in the English translations and very difficult in the original, I should suppose, even to an excellent Latin scholar. But the argument embodies a dream of the greatest of dreamers. The first part sets forth the necessity of empire. Only under a single world-governing monarch are possible the solidarity of mankind and the fullest possible development of the human spirit. In unity man can find peace and justice. Man is made in the image of God, and God is one; wherefore Man in imitation of God must make the secular world conform to the universe and set up a unique earthly dominion. In the nature of things empire is divinely ordained, and this is further proved by the fact that Christ willed to be born under the Emperor Augustus.

The second part seeks to show that the Roman empire was appointed by God to rule the world. It was established by the aid of miracles, which confirm it as especially created by the will of God. Christ died under the empire; if the empire had not been the rightful temporal authority, Christ would have been punished by the agent of an unjust power, his suffering would have been unlawful and therefore the sin of Adam would not have

been duly expiated. Rome was born to command, because it did, in point of fact, conquer the world, and also because the histories of its many heroes and patriots show that the Roman citizen loved right and justice.

The third part is an argument for the separation of church and state, which are independent authorities both deriving directly from God. Many false arguments for the temporal power of the church are refuted. Though the emperor, as a man, is the first son of the church and should obey it like other Christians, yet as emperor he owes allegiance only to God, whom he represents on earth in temporal matters as the pope represents God in spiritual matters. The very nature of the church, its essential spiritual function, forbids it the possession of temporal power.

Have we here, then, nothing but a defence of an empire that has been dust these many centuries, and stale scholastic arguments for the separation of church and state, a long settled question in theoretic politics and practically settled in most countries? There is much more than that in *De Monarchia* even for the most confident modern democrat, who may regard emperor and pope as twin tyrants and for whom the word "mediaeval" has derogatory connotations. It is true that the empire under which Dante actually lived is dead as the empire of the Caesars and that the empire of Dante's dream was never realized in the workaday world. As a political pamphlet *De Monarchia* is obsolete without even the persistent contemporaneity of some eighteenth century tracts. In a sense Dante's treatise died at birth. Bryce, who gives an excellent summary of it in his *Holy Roman Empire*, shows that this plea for empire, conceived by the supreme mind of the age, was the epitaph of the existing empire. It was, indeed, a swan-song, not of the author, who was still to take us to Paradise and put his dream in lovelier form, but of empire in the Catholic Christian sense of "holy." The empire that persisted after the thirteenth century grew further and further away not only from a poet's dream but from any practical possibility of united political authority. The solidarity of mankind was not to be achieved through Rome or Christ, and Dante was not, as he thought, announcing a new era, but summing up a passing era.

But the truth of a dream inheres in the dream itself and is measured only in a secondary way by the course of events. *De Monarchia* has for us at