

Committee have busily occupied themselves with the general subject of tariff revision. According to the published statements of Mr. Fordney and other Republican leaders, American industry is depressed and is threatened with further depression because the tariff wall is too low and does not protect American manufacturers against unfair foreign competition. Yet according to the figures furnished by the Department of Commerce the imports into this country during the first eight months of 1921 are smaller in value by some \$2,300,000,000 than they were during the first months of 1920. That is imports into America, in spite of the low tariff wall and the encouragement of dear dollars and cheap pounds, francs and marks have diminished from approximately \$4,000,000,000 to approximately \$1,700,000,000. During the same time exports have diminished only from approximately \$5,500,000,000 to approximately \$3,250,000,000. We are exporting nearly three-fifths as much in value as we were a year ago. We are importing somewhere between three-eighths and a half as much. The so-called balance of trade is only \$50,000,000 less in 1921 than it was in 1920. In both years it amounted to about $2\frac{1}{4}$ billions of dollars and in order to meet it American customers abroad have had to send to the country a half billion in gold. If we are to continue to trade with Europe, we shall need not fewer imports but more of them.

THE New Republic has expressed the fullest appreciation of the possibilities of Mr. Hoover's leadership in the movement for relief of the Russian famine. In recognizing his limitations we have been actuated only by a desire to see his leadership exercised as fruitfully as possible. One condition of this result is cooperation with other agencies in this country working to the same end, and we are glad to print the following communication testifying to such cooperation between the American Relief Administration and the Society of Friends:

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of the Secretary
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1921.

Mr. Rufus Jones,
American Friends Service Committee,
20 South 12th Street,
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Mr. Jones:

In response to your request I beg to say that the effort being made by the Friends Service Committee to secure charitable subscriptions for their work of famine relief in Russia has my fullest support.

I know full well the difficulties of our own people but there are still many who can afford support and others

who will willingly make sacrifices. The need is pathetic beyond description. The effort being made by all American organizations to mitigate this terrible situation is free of purpose in political, religious or racial contention. It is not the sentiment of charity to ask who and why.

None of the organizations cooperating under the Riga and European Relief Council agreements, which you have accepted, are in any way losing their identity or supervision of their own distribution, subject only to coordination for the common good of the Russian people. The sole purpose of these arrangements is to assure protection and efficiency in administration that every cent shall do its utmost in saving life—that the whole effort shall be American in name and ideals.

I trust that you will have the support the cause deserves.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Welfare of China

THE September issue of the Round Table contains an article by an anonymous "American" who advises the British government in the interest of future Anglo-American friendship not to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Round Table does not recommend the acceptance of this advice. "Simply to break the old tie with Japan would," it declares, "considerably increase the risk of another world war, in which the dividing line would this time be color, and the resulting bitterness, thanks to the chasm which already separates East and West, even greater than that which has been left by the last struggle. No one can foretell the future. It lies on the knees of the gods, but its main hope rests, we are convinced, not in the abandonment of such association as already exists, but rather in its adaptation and in its extension to the other great nations whose interests intermingle in the Pacific so that we may all work together for the good of the East and West alike. In particular we feel that the welfare of China depends upon such cooperation being established."

It is hard to understand how anyone who is acquainted with the actual effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance upon the economic and political independence of China and the whole problem of power in the Pacific could have written the foregoing lines. If the British government wishes to promote the welfare of China and to diminish the probability of a future war in the Pacific, it should not adapt and extend the Anglo-Japanese alliance but terminate it and supersede it by an entirely different political understanding or agreement among the Pacific powers. That alliance is a perfect example of the old kind of diplomatic bond between nations which pretends to be defensive and pacific in its object but which in its actual effect

is capable of being exploited by the aggressive partner in the association as the cover for a policy of aggrandizement. It has made for peace in the Far East in much the same sense that before the war the Triple Alliance made for peace in Europe. The formidable military strength of Central Europe en bloc enabled Germany to pursue with impunity an aggressive policy which her neighbors felt to be more and more dangerous to their independence. The alliance, that is, although defensive in language, protected its restless members against the consequences of an aggressive policy. In an analogous way the Anglo-Japanese alliance has protected Japan from the consequences of her aggressive policy in China. It has prevented the British government from discouraging such aggression or from giving diplomatic assistance to other powers who proposed to resist it. In effect the alliance has made British naval power the accomplice of Japanese military and economic imperialism.

The Taft administration discovered this fact to its own cost. In December, 1909, it submitted to the British, French, German, Russian and Japanese governments a plan for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways. As a result of the Russo-Japanese war, the former Russian railroad from Harbin to Port Arthur was divided into two parts. Russia retained the northern part, and Japan took over from Russia the southern part. The grant under which these two roads were built and operated was extorted at a period when all the powers were exploiting China with impunity, and the existence of this alien control of the railway system of the north-eastern provinces impaired the independence of China and violated the principle of equal economic opportunities for all powers in Manchuria. The proposal of the Taft administration to neutralize the Manchurian railways was intended to get rid of danger to China which the alienation of the Manchurian railways had created. It was in its conception an intelligent and praiseworthy attempt to do away with special economic privileges in northern China and so to realize in practice the two principles in which all the powers had nominally acquiesced—the principle of the Open Door and of the territorial integrity and political independence of China.

The Taft administration in submitting this proposal to the powers expected to encounter opposition from Japan, but it planned to overcome this opposition by means of British assistance. It approached the British government, before it approached the governments of the other powers, in a most friendly and confidential spirit and it received from the British Foreign Office an

approval in principle of the proposal, but a warning against pressing it at the moment and against going ahead without placating Japanese opposition. The American State Department jumped at the approval "in principle" and overlooked the intrenchments which the Foreign Office had thrown up around its acquiescence. Secretary Knox plunged boldly ahead, submitted his proposal to the powers and was promptly slapped in the face for his pains. He was unequivocally and even irascibly rebuffed by Japan and Russia and he was obliged in the end ignominiously to abandon his proposal. In its hour of need the American received no diplomatic aid from the British government. The former had calculated falsely in expecting any action on the part of Great Britain in support of a policy which sought to give reality to the independence of China and to the principle of the "Open Door" at the expense of exclusive Japanese interests in China.

We do not wish for one moment to suggest that the Taft administration had not earned this diplomatic rebuff. It launched its proposal without closely calculating upon the number and strength of its opponents and upon the most promising means of overcoming them. The British Foreign Office did not deceive the State Department. Its reply should have warned the American government to tread softly rather than to shuffle clumsily and boldly ahead. Neither do we claim that under the circumstances the British government was not justified in standing by its Japanese ally and in preferring the solid advantages of a definite naval partnership to a precarious comradeship with America in what then looked like Quixotic internationalism. The Japanese alliance was at that time one of the foundation walls of British foreign policy. It enabled the British empire to meet the German menace by concentrating its fleet in the North Sea and practically to retire from the waters of the Far East without endangering its possessions and its prestige in that region. The British government considered itself obliged to subordinate its position in the Far East to its position in Europe, and Americans have no sufficient reason now to question its decision. Ex-President Wilson pursued the same course for similar reasons in Paris. But we are justified in pointing out that the British empire as a consequence of this policy possesses a clear responsibility for the success of Japanese aggression in China.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance is not, as the Round Table assumes, the preparation for a concert of local powers in the interest of future peace in the Pacific. It is the chief obstacle to the formation of such a concert. In spite of the fact

that it explicitly guarantees the political independence and the territorial integrity of China, Japan has during the twenty odd years of her existence, enclosed Peking with a partial cordon of occupied and controlled provinces so that any Chinese government situated in that city is as independent as France would be with a German army in occupation of Metz, Brussels and Calais. Japan has during these twenty years become a great continental Asiatic power. She has annexed Korea, occupied part of Siberia, dominated Manchuria and Mongolia, and settled down in Shantung. Is it any wonder that the Chinese regard the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a somewhat doubtful expedient for contributing to the welfare of China? Is it any wonder that the American friends of China advise the termination rather than the extension of the alliance as an essential condition of a concert of the Pacific powers? There can be in the Pacific no concert which includes China and the United States, unless Japan not only abandons the policy of seeking to dominate China but is willing to unite with the other powers in building up the economic and political independence of that great nation.

British public opinion has hitherto refused to face the consequences of renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance without first curing its partial responsibility for the success of Japanese aggression in China. We have read scores of articles which were published in England during the discussion last summer over the renewal of the treaty and almost all of them evaded or ignored the real issue. They evaded it, as the Round Table evades it, by assuming with an air of perfect innocence that the alliance was an impeccable political contrivance to which neither China nor the United States could urge any reasonable objection. If it is to be extended to include the United States and China, it will have to undergo radical modifications. The British government will have to adopt adequate precautions against the use in the future of British sea power for the protection of Japanese military imperialism; and these precautions it will have to take in spite of the opposition of its Japanese ally.

The government of Great Britain has, according to British publicists, always thrown British naval power into the balance against military aggression. So far as the continent of Europe is concerned they can put up a strong argument in favor of the claim. British power was the effective force of the coalition against Louis XIV, against Napoleon and against Germany. But in the Far East Great Britain has allied herself with another strong naval power, which possesses, as

Great Britain has never possessed, a conquering army. Sheltered by British sea power Japan has adopted a continental policy and fought and intrigued to become the dominant power in Eastern Asia. Japan will in one way or another continue this policy as long as she feels sure of being able to transport her armies and her goods to and from the mainland. How can she be deprived of this assurance? Only in one of two ways: Either by the expansion of the American navy or by the knowledge that if she continues an aggressive policy and gets into trouble in China she will have to reckon with the British as well as the American navy. The first alternative is wholly undesirable. An exclusively American naval armament which was strong enough to defend China would also be strong enough to attack Japan and threaten the security of the Japanese nation. If the United States alone prepared to defend China it would embark on a costly enterprise for which in a selfish moment it might seek compensation at the expense of its opponent and ward. The second alternative is much to be preferred. It would accomplish an equally beneficial result without the expense or the threat of war. But it seems remote as long as intelligent and high minded British publications, like the Round Table, ignore in their discussion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance its plain political and economic tendency, and interpret it as a pacifying influence in Far Eastern politics.

The Mine Operators Explain

PEACE has been again restored in West Virginia. The army of miners and their sympathizers has been dispersed. Some have surrendered their arms and some have gone to their homes. Federal troops still remain at the scene of battle but in fewer numbers. Governor Morgan is busy with the organization of a national guard for the state whose integrity and dignity he is sworn to defend. As in Europe, so in West Virginia, submission to the mandates of the authorities is the order of the day. The terms of obedience seem to matter little. The letter of the law is supreme. General Bandholtz, whose business is the maintenance of law and order, found that "the withdrawal of the invaders as promised by Keeney and Mooney would have been satisfactorily achieved but for the ill advised and ill timed advance movements of state constabulary on the night of August 27th, resulting in bloodshed." On this matter Governor Morgan either disagrees with the General or he hopes for a level of self-restraint and reasoned judgment in the newly or-