

legislature and executive, partly of his own courage, honesty, disinterestedness. Every generous cause, every liberal movement finds hope in his support. Recognition of the government of Russia, withdrawal from Haiti, amnesty for political prisoners, surrender of claims against Europe in return for disarmament, settlement of the coal strike by honest conference after thorough investigation—all these measures find a spokesman in Borah. He is the point of the spear. It is natural in these circumstances that he should be thought of as a leader around whom a new liberal or progressive party could rally. The causes of which he is champion together provide him with a platform to which every liberal will subscribe.

NO two members of the Senate are objects of more sincere hatred to Wilsonians than Reed, the Democrat, and Lodge, the Republican. Both are fighting for their political lives in the present campaign, and the scalps of both are sought as appeasing sacrifices to the manes of the leader whom they defied and destroyed. In Missouri, Reed was opposed in the primaries by Breckenridge Long, one of Wilson's special group of gentlemanly ineffectives, and the battle was largely fought on the issue of Reed's attitude toward Wilson and the League of Nations. Reed's victory may have been achieved by the aid of Republican votes in the Democratic primary. At all events his margin is too small to make the result one of decisive importance.

CRAFTY Orientals ought to be kept out of diplomatic conferences. The London Conference laughed it off, but inwardly the trained European diplomats must have groaned over Baron Hayaishi's remark that, after all, the object of all the Allies was simply to get as much money as they could out of Germany. Truth in diplomacy is like a counterfeit dollar in finance. To circulate it is crooked business. Justice, peace, international unity, dealt out with fingers crossed are the true currency of diplomacy.

GREEK pressure for permission to seize Constantinople dates from the first days of the Armistice of Mudros, by which the war with Turkey was ended. The city since a year ago has been under British occupation, in which French and Italian forces have participated. Athens tried throughout the previous Allied occupation to realize by hook or by crook the old Venezelist ambition for the seat of the Caliphate. The British government quite insincerely supported the plan this spring, when Angora refused the latest attempt to bring

peace between the Turkish Nationalists and the Greeks of the peninsula. This was done as a club to bring to terms the Turks of all factions who have long been united. The threat has failed. The Greek population of Constantinople is about 200,000 out of a million odd. The city was given to Russia in a secret wartime agreement. A Greek occupation could at most serve as a temporary move in the larger, and at present seemingly hopeless, Near Eastern problem; yet it is hard to see how the measure could avoid greater embarrassments in other quarters, such as Syria and Palestine, where jealousies among the Allies themselves are now at fever heat over concessions under the League of Nations mandates. France and Italy most strongly oppose the plan. In the long run nothing could be more disastrous to British imperial policy in the East than so superlative a flouting of Moslem sensibilities. No man would consent to evacuation more reluctantly than General Harington, Commander-in-Chief of the small British force on the Bosphorus.

A SUMMER school of liberal opinion will be held at Siasconset, Nantucket Island, September 3rd to 24th. A number of educators, publicists, writers of a liberal turn of mind will give informal lectures or lead round table discussions, on history, economics, labor, art, literature, with the aim of stimulating thought rather than imparting information, and encouraging the asking of questions rather than answering them. Among the lecturers are James Harvey Robinson, Albert Jay Nock, E. E. Slosson, William Bullitt, Everett Dean Martin, Dr. and Mrs. James P. Warbasse, Frank P. Walsh, Harry W. Laidler, and Miss Louise Brown. People who are attracted by such a summer school—and they should be many—are asked to write to Mr. Frederick C. Howe (Siasconset, Massachusetts), to whom belongs the greater share of the credit for organizing it.

What Seniority Means

THE seniority rights which the railroad executives are refusing to the striking shopmen concern pensions, preference of jobs, and security of tenure. Pensions are offered by many roads to superannuated employees, not merely in order to provide against old age, but also for the purpose of keeping down labor turnover and holding together a force of experienced and competent men. The pension right is not one which involves precedence of one man over another, but depends solely on the date of entering service. Seniority in preference does not mean what it means in the

army—that there is a regular line of promotion up to the first rank along which the men of longest service proceed automatically. It means that when a preferable job is open within a certain class of mechanics such as that on a day shift, or that of a petty foreman, out of the men who apply for the transfer, the man of longest service receives preference. If a man applies for promotion to a position for which his training and experience do not fit him, seniority avails him nothing. In the matter of tenure, seniority means that when men are laid off, the latest comers to the shop are laid off first.

The railroads would lose rather than gain in operating efficiency by abrogation of the strikers' seniority rights. These rights aim at a contented working force in which the men of longest experience and stability hold the most important jobs. The executives claim to be actuated rather by their sense of honor in keeping promises made to non-strikers.

The men now at work in the shops may be divided into three classes—those who did not strike in the first place, those who struck but subsequently went back to work either for their former employers or for other roads, and new employees. The percentage of men who did not strike at all is very small. Most of them were already high on the seniority lists—many of them were in fact within a few weeks or months of retirement and were permitted to remain at work for that reason by the unions themselves. The number of men in this class who would gain anything by the loss of the strikers' seniority rights is therefore entirely negligible. The number of men who struck but subsequently went back to work—most of them for new employers—is stated by the executives to be large, and by the unions to be less than one per cent. However numerous they may be, the maintenance of seniority rights by the strikers would bring most of these deserters back to work at their old places, with the seniority to which their previous experience had entitled them. They would lose exactly nothing in the matter of pensions—the most important of the rights to the men. They would be in no danger of being laid off, since shop forces were almost at a minimum when the strike started and will have to be greatly augmented for months to come. They would lose little in chances of preference, since this is a strictly limited right.

We have then to consider principally the interests of the strikebreakers proper. Not many of these are competent railroad mechanics. A large proportion of them will have to be dispensed with in the interests of pure efficiency the moment the labor of the strikers again becomes available. The

executives have not obligated themselves to retain the incompetent, in spite of any seniority pledge. As many of the new men as are competent will have to be retained in any case on account of the abnormally heavy percentage of bad-order cars and the demands of traffic. These men could not benefit in pension rights at the expense of the strikers, because pensions depend only on the date of entering service. If the strikers returned without seniority, the strikebreakers would gain merely in the limited right of preference for positions for which their experience does not fit them. How sacred the executives would be likely to regard such a seniority right, once the strike is settled, the reader may guess.

The sacredness of pledges to non-strikers is, therefore, a slender reason for the executives to advance in refusing to settle the strike on the President's terms. But if seniority means little to the strikebreakers, is it so vital to the strikers that they might not compromise on it?

If the strikers surrendered on this point they would lose their valuable pension rights—which, be it noted, the non-strikers would not gain. More important than this, however, they would lose security of tenure, and would thus permit the executives to cripple the unions and penalize the leaders by not permitting the key men to return to service. Any union which ends a strike without insisting on the reinstatement of all members without prejudice admits defeat and faces annihilation.

The tactics of the railroad executives are thus made clear. By rejecting the President's terms in the matter of seniority, they are, in the main, putting on a bold front from which people may infer that they expect to win a complete victory. This front is calculated to impress the public, but still more the strikers. If the strikers believe the railroads can win, they may drift back to work and thus cause the railroads to win. So far, the indications are that this bluff has had its effect upon the newspapers, but not upon the strikers.

If the railroads did win on these terms, their victory would not be to the advantage of the strikebreakers or to railroad service. It would amount to "disciplining" the unions by annihilation. This discipline would be applied as a punishment for refusal to accept a decision of the Railroad Labor Board. It would not be applied by the Board or by the government, both of which have been willing to forego punishment, presumably in recognition of the fact that the strike was legal and had strong justification. It would be applied by executives who have themselves committed the first and most flagrant violations of the Board's decisions.

The Backwash of Unemployment

UNEMPLOYMENT in its passive form, which was the salient feature of the maladjustment between labor and capital a year ago, has given place in public interest to more acute industrial difficulties. The last government reports on the situation, before it was complicated by the coal and railroad strikes, were optimistic. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that once these strikes are settled the employment situation will revert to normalcy and need give us no more concern. While it is true that according to official reports the number of men seeking jobs has diminished, we have no means of knowing how many of these men have returned to permanent employment, how many have fallen into the class of migratory and seasonal workers, how many have dropped out of the industrial army altogether. The economic loss which the country sustains owing to the idleness of its workers can be calculated; the moral loss through deterioration of the workers can never be ascertained.

The first resort of the worker out of a job is the employment office. Early last fall the public placing agencies were thronged. At the present time there is a notable diminution in registration, but to what extent this is due to the success of the agencies in placing men and to what extent to their failure, and the consequent indifference of their patrons, cannot be precisely determined. In some cases, noted by a recent investigator, the agencies which used to afford a place to sit, smoke and talk have banished benches, forbidden pipes, and enforced silence, so that frequentation is discouraged. Whatever success may have attended the appeal of the President's Conference to local authorities to develop opportunities for employment, it is obvious that the occasion to establish a national system of labor registration, information, and exchange was lost; and the next unemployment crisis will find the country as unprepared as the last.

The second resort of the unemployed is mendicancy. The extent to which this evil increased last winter was startling, and still more the change in attitude on the part of the beggars. For men out of work without fault on their part felt naturally that the blame rested upon society; and they put a conscious truculence into their demand upon society for the means of life. Panhandling became warfare. Possibly because so many of the unemployed had been in service, they organized mendicancy in a fashion which we associate only with the Orient. An observer found a group of

men in Detroit numbering at times sixty, who cooperated in the support of an establishment, each giving two days a week to the panhandling for the common stock. Clothes, food, blankets, utensils, all were collected as tribute from a society which denied their elementary right to a livelihood.

The third resort of the man out of work is crime. In the twilight of the saloon the homeless and jobless are thrown back upon the pool room, and other resorts where the influences are worse, where without the compensation of liquor men tend to see red. After all, between panhandling in a spirit of aggression and holding up by a threat of violence, the dividing line is easily crossed. The difference between assaulting a number of people for small sums, and one person for a large one becomes morally indistinguishable, especially with a tutor in crime at hand to point out that the result accomplished by the beggar in a week could be achieved by the thief in an hour. The crime waves reported from nearly all large cities in the past winter were due to the great amount of material in the raw, lying ready to hand for the professional criminals. The novices furnished a large percentage of the captured who have filled prisons to overflowing. It was recognition of this fact that led Governor Blaine of Wisconsin to offer pardon out-of-hand to those prisoners who had been in military service.

A fact which struck anyone in contact with the unemployed last autumn was the large number of ex-service men among them, and the further fact that these men had grounds for believing themselves discriminated against in the assignment of work. The explanation, which was easily verified from the employers' side, was that the ex-soldiers were thought to have too much independence and initiative. Similarly it is reported that among the residue of the army of the unemployed at present there is an astonishingly large proportion of Americans, and for the same reason. Much of the work provided under the stimulus of the appeal of the Conference could necessarily be offered only at low wages and under difficult conditions. Many contracts for road-building and other public enterprises were let at such figures as to compel the exploitation of labor. Not only were wages low, but food was poor and charged for at war prices, and shovels were large and bosses exigent. In short, conditions were such that the jobs provided fell largely to foreigners, as more patient and docile than Americans; and on the other hand Americans in many cases refused, as a matter of loyalty, to accept work offered at wages under conditions which amounted to a degradation of labor.

Owing to this sifting of the army of the unem-