

gloom must be maintained at all costs. The New Republic seems to our critic to exhibit almost an obsession for the rank facts at the root of the flow-er of victory. Everybody ought to know that the fortunes of the party in power always ebb mid-way between Presidential elections, especially if economic conditions have been unfavorable. Everybody ought to know that, in the late battle, the forces of liberalism and reaction were so far from being aligned that even the intelligent soldier was not to be blamed for asking: "At what bunch shall I shoot, Captain?" Everybody ought to know that it was the wet issue, rather than an authentic liberalism, that beat Frélinghuysen; that the personal popularity of Smith beat Miller and Calder; that the Germans beat Hitchcock; that honest citizens of every hue joined to beat Newberry's supporter in Michigan; that the bonus accounts for a huge number of the votes cast against the party in power. These things everybody must surely know. Why does the New Republic insist on them? What do they amount to except this: The late election was a victory *for* liberalism, not *by* liberalism? But what is a preposition between friends and journalists?

To return to the analogy of the communiqué. We recall our burst of pride when the St. Mihiel salient, which for four years had festered like a spear-head in the Allied flank, was extracted at one pull by Pershing. The facts were, of course, that the Germans had mostly decamped before Pershing started. The spear-head was loose. Did any communiqué writer insist on the point to the virtual exclusion of the happy results? No indeed. A writer who did that would have been cashiered immediately.

Now, says our critic sternly, that is exactly what the New Republic did about the election. It minimized the results by looking to the facts behind them. Thus it missed a golden opportunity to buck up the morale of the liberals. It broke all the canons of the communiqué writers' art, that is, of journalism. We plead in extenuation that we have on our conscience enough miscalculations made in good faith; that we simply can't—and won't—add to our sins by deliberately extracting from an event an optimistic meaning which we do not believe lies in it. Then, our critic says, you are not journalists. You ought to retire and make way for men who will give the liberal public the communiqués it wants and needs.

Perhaps he is right. But before we accept a conclusion so disconcerting to us, we may be permitted to examine the analogy more closely. For whom, after all, were the war communiqués written? Not for the general staff or the statesmen,

but for the absolute outsider, whose duty it was not to reason why. A general who permitted his spirits to be bucked up by an optimistic communiqué, and proceeded with his military dispositions on the strength of it, deserved to be shot. The outsiders were justified in humoring themselves with roseate communiqués, because they could not have done anything with the bleak facts if they had had them. Somewhere a planning organization was dealing with the facts as they actually were. That was enough.

Now, we should like to know, where is the liberals' general staff, working out a sound plan of campaign on the basis of the facts? If we knew of the existence of such a staff, and had confidence in its wisdom, perhaps we might consent to make George Creels of ourselves and produce naval victories on the eve of the Fourth of July.

But so far as we know there is no liberal general staff except the hundreds of thousands of liberal men and women who are determined that American democracy and civilization shall go forward unimpeded by special interests, traditionalism and political superstition. It is these men and women who have to work out the general plan of the campaign. They know that the future belongs to the liberal democracy. But they also know that a truly democratic program is terribly hard to achieve. It is so easy to conclude that whatever the reactionaries oppose is worth supporting; so easy to follow will o' the wisps into the swamp and leave the field to the enemy. Those upon whom the responsibility for sound policy rests can not afford to indulge themselves in illusions. It is theirs to reason why; therefore they must face the facts.

It is for these men and women that the New Republic is written. That is why, with all respect to the writers of cheering communiqués, we cannot fall in with their technique. We shall present the facts as they appear to us. We know, alas, of no way of insuring ourselves against error, often grave error. But we shall persist in writing truth as we see it.

A French Question and an American Answer

IT is true, as M. André Tardieu says, that M. Clemenceau has captured the attention of a larger American audience than any Frenchman who has ever spoken in this country, but M. Tardieu should not allow this American interest to betray him into great expectations. M. Clemenceau,

by virtue of the popularity of his speeches, is not promoting future political cooperation between France and the United States. On the contrary, he has confirmed American public opinion in its present refusal to assume any political responsibilities in Europe which involve complicity in the national animosities of that distracted continent. He has done nothing to diminish the disesteem with which the ordinary American regards France's behavior since the armistice. He has presented to the American public an attractive and even impressive, but at the same time a somewhat pathetic figure. With his narrow outlook, his inaccurate mind, his obviously failing intellectual powers, his flagrant special pleading and his utter inability to understand how and why the United States entered the war, he has by his very success in capturing American attention, actually injured the cause of Franco-American political cooperation.

Frenchmen, when they watch with dismay and resentment the rising tide of anti-French feeling in this country, attribute it to the machinations of their enemies or to the perfidy, the ignobleness and the selfishness of the American people. They would do better to attribute it to the indefensibility of their own cause. The France which is represented by M. Clemenceau refuses to consider those modifications in French policy and outlook which are necessary to the adjustment of French interests to the interest of the whole of Europe. It refuses to share with other countries the security and the franchise which it claims for itself. The American friends of M. Clemenceau, for instance, besought him when he demanded as a moral right the guarantee by America of the future security of France to come out in favor of making the guarantee reciprocal. But even though he conceded in private the advantage of reciprocity, he found it difficult to commit himself to it in public; and from his point of view he was sincere and consistent in shying away from a public pledge of this kind. He stands by the Treaty of Versailles as the inexorable major premise of the French continental policy; and the Treaty is incompatible with reciprocal guarantees. From the official French point of view its peculiar merit consists in the franchise which it confers on the French government to occupy additional German territory on any one of many legal pretexts. Its essential vice is that it bestows on France the license to wage war on Germany while still preserving the forms of peace. Reciprocal guarantees, in so far as they were effective, would necessarily put an end to the present reign of terror.

But even if this comment be true, is it sufficient? M. Clemenceau came to this country to ask Amer-

ican public opinion what under the circumstances the United States proposed to do for the appeasement and amelioration of Europe. The New York World repeats the question. "This country," it says, "helped to create the conditions in Europe with which the people over there are blindly struggling. It intervened at a critical time in European affairs. It made the victory over Germany complete. Does it insist that it has no responsibility for what it did and that Europe alone must work out the consequences of American interference?" This is a pertinent question and it deserves a considerate as well as a frank answer. The United States did by intervening in the European war with decisive military strength incur a responsibility which it cannot evade. It incurred the responsibility of continuing to promote the object of public policy which had prompted its intervention. But it did not incur any obligation to promote its declared object by the continued adoption of the same means. At present the way in which it can most effectively fulfill its responsibility is by means of political non-cooperation. A policy of non-cooperation does not evade an answer to M. Clemenceau's question. It merely returns an answer which M. Clemenceau does not like.

When the United States entered the Great War, it intervened for the declared purpose of contributing by the use of economic and military power to the permanent appeasement of Europe. Its intervention and the resulting victory, did not accomplish this result. There is more suspicion, recrimination, insecurity and hatred in the world today than there was in 1913. The United States could undoubtedly do something to bring temporary peace to Europe by intervening again, but if it proposed to throw its military power once again into the balance, it would in the interest of immediate pacification act differently from the way in which it acted in 1917. It would use its force to protect Germany against dismemberment. For the present the peace of Europe is threatened, not by what disarmed Germany can and will do to France, but by what France, armed to the teeth, can and will do to Germany. Granted that the American nation has incurred an obligation for the pacification of Europe which it can redeem only by constant interference in European affairs, then the foregoing conclusion seems to us inevitable. It would mean for the United States a prolonged series of interventions in European politics, on the side of one faction or the other, for the purpose of imposing peace on a group of nations, who themselves were acting in ways that tended to provoke war.

Inevitable as the foregoing conclusion may be, it is also impossible. The American people is done

with the suicidal policy of protecting by military force or the threat of military force one European people against other European peoples. That method of contributing to the appeasement of Europe is clearly a failure, and it is the beginning of wisdom in American foreign policy to recognize its failure. It is a method which makes the United States the accomplice of its temporary European associates rather than the guardian and promoter of European peace. It is a method which by erecting American intervention into a substitute for European self-pacification delays the process of conciliation and makes it appear superfluous. The European peoples cannot fairly ask the United States to protect them against one another until they abandon the practices of terrorizing one another and inflicting just grievances on one another. As long as they continue these practices, it would be fatal for the United States to resume active political intervention in Europe. It can best redeem any responsibility it has incurred for the peace of Europe by informing Europe in effect that European peace must rest, not on the protection and armed force of America, but on the sincere willingness and the ability of the European nations to attach as much importance to the security of their neighbors as they do to their own security.

Helping Out the Government

ONE of the most obvious political phenomena of the day is loss of confidence in representative government. Everywhere is observed a slowing up or a breaking down of administrative procedure under the multitude and complexity of its tasks. Impatience with its slow processes and lack of confidence in its methods and results are shown in an increasing tendency of citizens to organize themselves to persuade or correct or supplement it in fulfilling its functions. It is felt that the problem of self-government is no longer to be solved by the simple device of the suffrage with its exercise limited to an occasional election day. Only constant watchfulness will prevent abuses; only constant pressure will secure necessary progress. Undoubtedly there is danger in this intervention of organized citizenship. We are witnessing in Italy the success of such a movement which by a manifestation of force has taken complete possession of the government. In the United States we had something of fascismo during the war, and its legacy is still with us. Faced by the staggering task of administration thrown upon it, the government invited citizens to organize for various auxiliary services of relief and finance, and in the effort to consolidate the influential classes in support of the war, it

accepted the assistance of volunteer organizations in spying upon and coercing their fellow citizens. Naturally the enthusiasm of such organizations outran official discretion, which had, however, too much the better part of valor to interfere. Not only this but under the pressure of the enthusiasm, legislators, executives, and judges yielded their consciences to the mob and enacted laws, countenanced violence and perjury, and passed sentences with the object of proving themselves full partakers in the current insanity. After the war the habit of government still remained strong upon the unofficial governing classes. New associations were formed to defend the present social order, and existing ones such as Chambers of Commerce and Civic Federations increased their pressure to the same end. The organizations of returning soldiers were directed to purposes of miscellaneous control. A more comprehensive and violent assumption of the police powers of the government was undertaken by the Ku Klux Klan. Other organizations were called into existence to meet these abuses of legal or extra-legal power, and to protect citizens against them. In view of the number of bodies intent upon reenforcing or correcting the activity of government it is worth while to consider within what limits such organization of citizenship is necessary or useful.

In the first place it may be said without fear of contradiction that the extension of the functions of government by non-official organizations is intolerable. The making of rules and the setting up of tests for the morality, religion, or patriotism of a community by the Ku Klux Klan or the American Legion is an unmitigated evil. In the second place, it may be said that the assumption of official responsibility by private enterprise is dangerous. For example, the entrusting of public order and protection of property to guards employed by and responsible to private employers leads to atrophy of government and its decay. A notable instance of the evil of the replacing of official by non-official action is found in the payment of the expenses of the investigation and prosecution of the murders at Herrin by the Illinois Chamber of Commerce. In such circumstances it is impossible that public officials should not appear in the light of partisan agents, and the pursuit of justice as a private feud.

On the other hand there are certain aspects of representative government and of the shifting bureaucracy into which it tends to sink, which are a constant challenge to the attention of good citizenship. To neglect them would be to deny its birthright. One of these is the apathy and sluggishness of the government in the performance of its regulative functions in the face of selfish inter-