

of atrocities in Santo Domingo, but he is unwilling even to contemplate that the unproved ones in Haiti may have a basis in fact. Atrocious charges! By the time he reaches Santo Domingo City, the Senator has acquired a certain suavity, but at the last he winds up with the perfect politician's burst of golden oratory, finger pointing toward heaven, "We are here to learn the truth, the whole truth, and *nothing* but the truth!" That emphasized "*nothing*" means that he might just as well have stayed at home.

The chairman of the committee is the only one of the four who does not come from Main Street, he is the only one, too, who speaks or understands French and Spanish. But the Senator from Illinois is the saddest spectacle of all—he so nearly misses being a great man. One has to like him for his delicious sense of humor, his sophisticated point of view and cosmopolitan experience, his charm and intelligence. He is like the friends whom all of us enjoy the most and count on the least, amusing, incorrigible, not overburdened with "honest worth." And he is essentially the man of the world in the somewhat studied carelessness of his clothes, the cynical droop of his eyelid, the whole efficient compactness and reserve of his person. Travelled, educated, keen, capable, a thinker and a liberal,—"*L'homme fort*," the Haitians say, a man to move mountains if he should so choose, but the Senator's sense of the ridiculous appearance he would present when moving a mountain, will always stop him just short of doing the biggest things in life. His sophistication is the ever pres-

ent drag against his idealism. Though to his credit, he is not a "reliable" Republican, he belongs to the fundamentally pragmatic, don't-fool-yourself, neo-Rooseveltian school of political theory, of materialistic yet liberal imperialism. The Senator from Illinois is to a certain degree noted for his opposition to "the British Empire," yet he is just another American Anti-Britisher who winks at the methods used to extend the Empire of the United States. To listen to the Senator discourse on the Stillman case or the table manners of the Filipino élite, to watch him flatter a navy wife or cut short a long-winded lawyer, to hear him compliment a Dominican Chamber of Commerce or deliver an after-dinner speech of greeting in French, is to lose oneself in admiration of his technique. But, alas for us simple-minded ones, will the Senator from Illinois ever go further than to initiate liberal and safe legislation or conduct hearings with consummate skill and courtesousness? Will he ever make the large gesture, the great-minded judgment which will at the same time disprove this estimate and make him a great man?

A select committee, the average, no better and no worse, though containing perhaps no such dissimilar high lights as a Borah or a Lodge, yet the average. The Senate in microcosm, here merely giving the final Senatorial sanction to our policy of naval aggression in the Caribbean.

X. Y.

## Benedict XV and the New Age

THE expert in diplomacy may most admire in Benedict XV the skill with which he piloted the Church through the rocks and shoals of a perilous neutrality in the Great War. In a strictly ecclesiastical field his handling of the schismatic tendencies in the emancipated nationalisms of Central Europe and the Near East may prove to be the outstanding feature of his pontificate. But his most decisive success, the effort which best reveals the suppleness and foresight of his statesmanship, was the settlement of the political problem in Italy in terms which give the Church a working political program for the whole world. In the last three years the new papal policy has shown its tendencies most clearly in the workings of the "Italian Popular Party." It has attracted little attention abroad because of this association, superficially, with the fortunes of a minority in Italian politics. It is more farreaching

than that, however; as becomes apparent when Benedict's "domestic" platform is contrasted with that of Leo XIII and Pius X.

Leo XIII approached the "Roman Question" from the angle of diplomatic ritual. The young Italian nation had burst through the gates of Rome and abolished temporal power. Leo XIII, like his predecessor, "refused to recognize" the established fact. He chose to regard the whole business as an affair of the House of Savoy, turning himself into the "prisoner of the Vatican," socially boycotting the Italian monarchs, and forcing good Italian Catholics to adopt the pose of his own "splendid isolation."

For forty-eight years Italian affairs presented the interesting example of an abstraction at war with a reality, with consequences all but disastrous to both. Here was the most Catholic nation in Europe, invited to stand aloof from the

management of its own affairs in the interests of a scholastic quibble as to whether a spiritual power can exist without the assistance of a material body to express it. Though Leo XIII late in his reign showed a disposition to compromise with the modern democratic exigencies of Italy, his long pontificate was essentially the period of Catholic "intransigence." During this epoch, papal diplomacy found its chief outlet in intrigues with the Austrian aristocracy, the Pope hoping to attain his Italian objectives by bringing pressure to bear upon the Quirinal through Vienna and Berlin. In Italy the Clericals did all they could to hamper the consolidation of the new nation, aligning themselves with the "anti-constitutional" parties, Republicans, Socialists and Anarchists. In 1898, when the social revolution all but became a fact in Italy, the Catholics fought shoulder to shoulder with the Socialists. The two conspicuous victims of the free-speech embargo were Turati, of the *Critica Sociale*, and Don Albertaric, editor of the official organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Catholico*.

These tactics of Leo came to grief very shortly. The moment socialism began to make headway among the agrarian workers, the old feudal proprietors of Italy, who constituted the main strength of the Clericals, became alarmed. Under the leadership of Cardinals Rampolla and Svampa and of Don Romolo Murri, the demand was made on the Vatican that Catholics be allowed freely to vote in Italian elections. Leo died in August, 1903. In September of the following year, with Pius X on the throne, a new industrial and agrarian crisis caused a stampede of conservative Catholics to the polls in a rally to defeat the imminent triumph of socialism.

The Vatican winked at this situation. For nine years the "Conservative Alliance" had a strong Clerical contingent under Don Romolo Murri. In 1913, during the unrest resulting from the Tripolitan war, the wily Giolitti manoeuvred an open compromise. In exchange for a promise to discontinue liberal and anti-clerical raids upon Church properties, privileges and educational institutions, the Clericals agreed to participate normally in Italian constitutional politics. The "Gentiloni pact," as Giolitti's bargain is called, brought Italian Catholics back into the "Italian family." Henceforth they voted freely, and sang the national anthem. Cardinals were allowed to take tea with the royal family. There were Clericals in the national, provincial, and city governments.

Benedict XV not only broke with all this diplomatic jockeying, but approached the "Roman Question" from the direction of most up-to-date

realities. Such popular support as the old policy had sought came from the landed aristocracy and the propertied classes, who, it was hoped, would be strong enough to keep their dependent proletariat in line. Benedict was courageous enough to seek an establishment of the Church's influence on the whole vast population of Catholic workmen and peasants. The corollaries of the two policies are equally in contrast. The old Clericalism came to be associated with all the tactics the preservation of a passive servile proletariat requires. The new policy presupposes an active, intelligent, self-conscious populace, throwing its strength toward Catholic ideals because it believes in them and defending these ideals at the polls and in public debate in an honest open struggle with opposing concepts of life.

How far Benedict was willing to go in accepting the consequences of this truly democratic vision of Catholic possibilities, may be seen from studying the development of the "Italian Popular Party." Formally organized in January, 1919, —the plan was ready in August, 1918, and "launched" in November—the party, after a brief existence of three years, is the most powerful single group in Italian politics, and is already reaching out to become a "White International." Its "leader" is Don Luigi Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, who has become the foremost Catholic "organizer" in Europe. Associated with Don Luigi, curiously enough, are men from the old reactionary clerical groups, now engaged in the interesting attempt to formulate and apply the principles of "Christian democracy."

Now, in 1918-19, with Europe hanging on the brink of a Bolshevik, or Communist, revolution, the "Italian Popular Party" announced a program on the extreme Left: unlimited rights of workers to organize and to strike; abolition of the (plutocratic) Senate, and a syndicalistic parliament; free speech and "free education"; decentralization of the bureaucracy with local autonomy; universal suffrage (i. e. votes for women). The party even harbored a goodly number of Catholic Bolsheviks—believers in an immediate violent revolution, with a dictatorship of the (Catholic) proletariat. In the electoral campaigns of 1919-20, the soap-boxers of the "Popolari" outdid the Socialist agitators in the violence and virulence of their attacks on the middle classes. In fact, the "Italian Popular Party" stole all the thunder of the Socialists, except for one or two essential differences: it advocated the "brotherhood of man," in place of the class struggle; the creation of small holdings in land, instead of land nationalization, and the preservation of the family against divorce—

Socialists often refuse to recognize sanction of marriage by the existing Italian state.

By the time the party's forces became coordinated in the elections of 1919, the "direction" of its policy sensibly changed with changes in the drift of public opinion. In its three congresses it succeeded in taming the Catholic Bolsheviks—led by a curious type, a certain Speranzini—whom it excluded from the party and left in a position parallel to that of the seceding Communists of the Socialist party. Now with a solid block of a hundred deputies in parliament, it occupies the territory of advanced radicalism: its principal achievement is the passage, under the Clerical minister Meda, of a radical taxation law. In its correlated industrial and agrarian organizations of workingmen it holds out for an advanced type of cooperation between capital and labor, and for collective control of production. In Parliament the party holds the key position: no ministry can govern without consulting it. On the one hand it has checkmated the aggressive Socialist minority, forcing upon the latter the alternative of impotence or combination with the liberal Right. On the other, it has prevented the outbreak of any form of extreme legalized reaction. It is not strong enough, however, to take control itself: its "free education" bill was beaten by a coalition of all the non-clerical parties including the Socialists. Its immediate efficacy, in general, has been to force a clearer differentiation of parties in the country: the old liberal groups have had to combine to retain any power at all.

The first open step to carry this policy to nations outside of Italy was taken a few weeks ago when Don Luigi Sturzo was sent to Germany to coordinate the Catholic movement there with that in Italy. Exactly what was accomplished on that mission has not been announced, except that Don Luigi in a speech and in interviews "launched" the idea of the "White International," a world organization of Roman Catholics to uphold the doctrine of "Christian brotherhood" against the class struggle of the Third, the Red International, of Moscow.

It is clear that Benedict XV inclined toward caution in extending the experiment he carried out with such brilliant results in Italy. In France he was content with the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the activities of the Action Française already existing. In Spain he did not disturb the coalition of clergy, army and conservatives. A papal emissary brought the new program to the United States late in 1918 but found us in the midst of an anti-Bolshevist panic, and in no disposition generally to welcome what,

under American conditions, must be a sectarian party. The program here simmered down to a liberal manifesto of the Catholic bishops.

The significance of Benedict's revolutionary outlook on politics may be measured by a further contrast with Pius IX. That pope, in the crisis growing out of the French Revolution, failed to appreciate the imminence of the shift of power from land to industry, from titled nobility to business and finance. His siding with absolutism created a problem for his successors which remained a problem down to the Great War. Benedict XV was a much more subtle statesman. Had Europe collapsed into Bolshevism in 1919, the Church would have had all the machinery ready to initiate the era of Christian communism and assume spiritual leadership in a Bolshevik age. As the event turns out, Benedict leaves to the popes who follow him a political policy wholly reconciled with modern democracy and grounded on the support of far more numerous popular elements than was ever the case before.

And the "Roman Question," meanwhile, takes care of itself. The Italian monarchy is about ready to force a slice of Roman territory upon the Vatican—just to get rid of a question that was never really of any importance.

ARTHUR LIVINGSTON.

## Lincoln's "Pass-Key to Hearts"

**M**ORE than one clue must be unravelled to reach an understanding of Abraham Lincoln. Among them there surely must be reckoned his capacity for companionship. None more catholic in his selections ever lived. All men were his fellows. He went unerringly and unconsciously for the most part, to the meeting place that awaited him in each man's nature. There might be a wall, often there was; but he knew, no one better, that there is always a secret door in human walls. Sooner or later he discovered it, put his finger on its spring, passed through and settled into the place behind that was his.

His life was rich in companionships with unlikely people, often people who began by contempt or semi-contempt of him. There was the town bully of his youth, whom he soundly thrashed for trying a foul in a wrestling match, and who rose from the dust to proclaim Lincoln the best man who ever broke into camp; thirty years later there was his own Secretary of State, with his self-complacent assumption of the President's unfitness for leadership and of his own call to direct the nation, put gently but firmly in his place and soon frankly and nobly declaring, "He's the best of us all."