

tion of the reparations question through the successive conferences to the London settlement which still rules the relations between Germany and the Allies, a settlement whose unreasonableness has often been pointed out, but nowhere so clearly as in the pages of Keynes. The settlement granted Germany a breathing space until the end of 1921; how impossible it is of fulfillment in the future has been made clear by the recent negotiations between the Allies and the Germans. To meet her liabilities under the settlement Germany "would have had to raise her exports to double what they were in 1920 and 1921 without increasing her imports at all." The Allies are still dealing in impossibilities.

Must it, then, be assumed that it is impossible for the Allies to collect their just claims against Germany? In *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Mr. Keynes contended that the sums demanded of Germany were not only vastly greater than any she could pay but were also vastly greater than any she could legitimately be required to pay, under the armistice agreement. As to the first point, every well informed person has already come around to the position of Mr. Keynes. Germany cannot pay the \$32,500,000,000 fixed as her total liability in the London agreement. She might possibly pay the \$12,500,000,000 represented by the Class A and Class B bonds, although even this is excessive. As to the second point, however, American public opinion is not yet ready perhaps to accept the view of Keynes.

But it will eventually have to accept it. There is no escape, except by a sentimental blinking of the facts, from the demonstration Mr. Keynes offers that the items of material damage are grossly inflated. Take for example the item of houses destroyed. 293,733 were wholly destroyed, 296,502 partially destroyed. Assume that the latter were half destroyed, the total would be equivalent 442,000 houses wholly destroyed. For that the French government claimed \$4,192,000,000 or \$9,480 per house. These were chiefly peasants' and miners' cottages, which cost perhaps \$1,000 in gold before the war and might cost three times as much after the war. The Belgian claim, apart from pensions and allowances amounted to 34,254,000,000 Belgian francs, while the aggregate wealth of Belgium in 1913, according to official estimates, was 29,525,000,000 Belgian francs.

But inflation of the material items is not the worst moral defect in the claim upon Germany. The inclusion of pensions and separation allowances is much worse. That honest men still defend the inclusion of these items can only be explained, as Mr. Keynes suggests that it must be explained, on the ground that "international politics is a scoundrel's game and always has been, and the private citizen can hardly hold himself personally responsible." Whether one feels personally responsible for the crooked dealing that thrust these items into the reparations bill, one can hardly escape the conviction that the dealing was crooked, after reading Mr. Keynes's exposition of the subject.

The conquerors are trying to make Germany pay sums she cannot pay, under claims which have no moral validity. Can Germany pay what she could be required to pay if her liabilities were fixed at an honest figure?

Mr. Keynes estimates that if the excessive French valuations were shorn down the total reparations bill, including pensions and separation allowances, would be 110 billion gold marks, instead of the 138 billions assessed by the Reparations Commission. Of the 110 billions 74, he esti-

mates, are for pensions and allowances and ought to be eliminated. That leaves 36 billion gold marks, or 9 billion dollars that Germany can honorably be required to pay. She could probably pay it.

Of this amount Mr. Keynes estimates that 11 billion would fall to the British Empire, 18 billion to France. He would have the British cancel their claim, except for one billion marks, to be applied to the relief of Austria and Poland. Germany would be left with a charge of six and a half billion dollars, which she could certainly pay. This would represent a great abatement in the paper claims of France, but she would get real money instead of unrealizable hopes, as at present. But as a further inducement to France, Mr. Keynes urges England and the United States to cancel their claims against France and Italy. Like the excesses of the indemnity, these claims are bogus assets. They will never be paid. They are only an obstacle to recovery. If their cancellation can remove the obstacle of the excessive reparations as well, could any better business stroke be conceived? For American prosperity, like that of England, must wait upon the recovery of Europe.

But as Mr. Vanderlip's book reminds us, the removal of obstacles is not all that is needed to restore Europe. The war produced an exacerbation of nationalism throughout the continent. It produced two boundaries or three or four where there was one before. That in effect was to cut communications vital to the prosperity of every country in Europe, and of America as well. Some sort of federal organization is necessary if Europe is to make use of her magnificent economic opportunities. And while the time is not ripe for political federalism, some steps towards it might be taken by finance. Mr. Vanderlip republishes here his plan of employing the Allied debts as a fund for European reconstruction, and his plan for a federal reserve bank of Europe.

Why not? It is clear enough, after reading Keynes, that it is futile to undertake any constructive plan of European reorganization while the economic clauses of the Paris treaties stand. But when those clauses are revised there will still be much work to be done. Is that America's business? Mr. Vanderlip thinks it is. "If we concentrated our wealth and our efforts on America alone and were utterly careless of the fate of the rest of the world I believe we would lose our soul. I believe that with that loss there would ultimately come a loss of our material advantages."

ALVIN JOHNSON.

## Readings in Evolution

*Readings in Evolution, Genetics and Eugenics, by Horatio Hackett Newman. The University of Chicago Press. \$3.75 net.*

IN history and sociology source-books have long been popular, and the success of Professor W. I. Thomas's venture in the latter field has stimulated the quite recent efforts of Professors R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, as well as the slightly older volume compiled by Professors A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman for the anthropological student. In the new sheaf of Readings here presented, Professor Newman supplies a corresponding desideratum in biological teaching. Such a work may conform to either of two types: its author may strive to weld his

heterogeneous materials into a unified text by connective and interpretative sections of his own; or he may content himself with letting the authors speak for themselves. The latter plan is the one followed by the anthropologists cited, who make their Source-Book subsidiary to a parallel course of lectures systematically covering the subject, while the selected passages, sometimes by no means representative of modern opinion, are exercises for the students' critical faculty. Professor Newman conforms rather to the pattern set by Professor Thomas, with a result distinctly advantageous for the general reader, who is here enabled to survey within the compass of a single work the rise of evolutionary philosophy and the later ramifications of biological thought.

Naturally no two scientists can be expected to agree as regards a proper selection of short readings. Suffice it to say that many of Professor Newman's will be generally recognized as chosen with excellent judgment and that there can be no doubt as to their joint comprehensiveness. Personally, I should prefer fewer passages from text-books and more passages from recent addresses of the character of Professor Nutting's paper on Mendelism, and the mutation theory (p. 258). It also seems to me that a few articles by biologists outside the Anglo-Saxon pale would have added a desirable flavor of internationalism.

The spirit in which the compiler has assembled arguments on both sides of a moot-problem and summarized his individual interpretation merits praise for its almost uniform fairness. Even the inheritance of acquired characters is labeled as "not a closed question" (p. 323), and sanely enough we are told that "our knowledge of what actually causes mutations is almost nothing" (p. 364). On the other hand, there is some evidence of deficient historical-mindedness in the brief reference to Haeckel. His popular writings bear the marks of his pugnacious propagandist ardor, but it is not true that "they did more harm than good to Darwinism" (p. 30). After all, Darwin, Huxley and Gegenbaur were not altogether fools in their judgment on contemporary scientists and Huxley certainly could never have been suborned into approval and admiration by mere comradeship in arms.

One wonders whether this manifestation of bias has any connection with a somewhat apologetic trend noticeable in the book and explicitly avowed in the Preface: "The present writer has been at some pains to make it clear that evolution and religion are strictly compatible. We teachers of evolution in the colleges have no sinister designs upon the religious faith of our students" (VIII). The point itself is in abstract logic unassailable, and the best practical demonstration lies in the patent fact that deeply religious men have combined an abiding faith in Christianity with the acceptance of evolutionary doctrines. But it is wrong to be "at some pains" to establish this conclusion, for such effort is bound to distort the true situation of the case. Human individuals are differently constituted and each has his own way of solving an intellectual dilemma: an Obermaier can reconcile Genesis with Palaeolithic research, while the callowest freshman often feels an unbridgeable chasm when a divinely inspired book proves to be, humanly speaking, at fault. We have no right to lull our wards into fancied security. Let us speak to them ingenuously, if at all: "Evolution and religion are strictly compatible—for some minds. We do not seek to undermine your faith; but we shall teach you science, whether it undermines your faith or not."

ROBERT H. LOWIE.

## A Virgin Heart

*A Virgin Heart*, by Remy de Gourmont (authorized translation by Aldous Huxley). New York: Nicholas L. Brown. \$2.00.

IT is obvious that Remy de Gourmont's Rose would be no sister to Meredith's Lucy Feverel. Or rather, since sisters, like brothers, make it a habit to be as unlike one another as possible, one may with equal dogmatism say that they *are* sisters, with every possible difference. For Lucy's exquisite simplicity Rose offers an instinctive sophistication which at times drags her to the verge of unreality. Lucy's delicate English beauty becomes in her sister a thing of voluptuousness, and whereas Lucy was wistfully dazed by the impetuosity of her youthful Richard, Rose, when her forty-year-old M. Hervart declares his love for her, says calmly: "I hope you do." For all of which, one supposes, warning was given by the author's statement in his preface that he "attempted, by an analysis that knows no scruples, to reveal . . . what may be called the seamy side of a virgin heart."

A knowledge of all of de Gourmont's other writing would not be necessary in order to conclude that this book is not, as the publisher announces, his masterpiece. In plot and structure it is flatly commonplace: A middle-aged man awakens the first love of a virgin heart, the girl discovers that he has had a mistress and within the last ten pages or so of the book marries a young man who has hardly mentioned love to her. There is so little characterization that the reader is at times literally confused, he cannot be sure which of the two undistinguished lovers occupies the scene; both of them indulge on almost every page in identical soliloquies on love in general and their particular brand of it. And the analysis of a virgin heart which is presented to a waiting world, while always interesting and sometimes brilliantly penetrating bears so heavy a burden of unilluminated description and dull conversation that it dies; an anaemic wreck, long before the end of the novel.

Aldous Huxley's translation, as one would expect from the author of *Limbo* and *Leda*, is smoothly satisfactory. Is it, therefore, the reaction of a purist to ask him why he permits himself that most annoying of constructions: "To try and do a thing"?

B. I. KINNE.

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