After enumerating the objections to participation in the war raised by Quakers, Socialists, and Norman-Angellites respectively, he says:

> These are all, it seems to me, reasonable attitudes, and I am unable to make a distinction by saying that the first objection is conscientious, the second and third only intellectual. I am not conscious of becoming unconscientious when I begin to think.

It is a pity Dean Inge was not employed to preach to the tribunals. Nevertheless, he concludes that the state had a right to coerce Quakers, while, per contra, it is morally justifiable to smuggle alcohol into a country that has gone dry. It is to be hoped that he will amplify this view in a series of lectures in Philadelphia.

Discussing the Communism of Plato's Republic, he maintains that "Communism is only possible under two conditions. One is the abolition of the family. . . . The other indispensable condition is a religious basis, in the absence of which quarrels soon break out, ending in early disruption." Both these statements have a measure of truth, but both, stated thus absolutely, seem misleading. As regards the family, what is essential is the abolition of inheritance and of the power of purchasing superior education for one's children. The kind of care and affection for children which is not concerned with things having a money value and does not, therefore, put them into a separate social class, does not seem incompatible with communism, provided the community is able and willing to supply the necessaries of life and education. As for the religious basis, no doubt, where the communistic community consists of people whose mental habits have been formed in our competitive societies, some powerful motive of cohesion will be required; but the necessity of resisting reactionaries may be relied upon to produce a sufficiently compelling motive for a generation, after which new mental habits and unquestioning acceptance of economic justice may be expected to suffice. The argument from small voluntary communistic communities surrounded by competitive capitalism, which is employed by the Dean, is by no means applicable to large communistic states. And his occasional remarks about the Bolsheviks show him to be a somewhat credulous reader of the Times.

Eugenics supply Dean Inge with a number of specious arguments against various types of social reformers. The argument is: Nature is more important than nurture; therefore, it is vital to breed our population from the best stocks rather than the worst; now the best stocks are in the middle classes, especially the learned professions; these at present have the lowest birth-rate, and are actually not reproducing their numbers; therefore, the biological quality of the population is deteriorating. (So far, the argument is probably sound.) The cause of the trouble is said to be that the middle classes are overtaxed, and that the good education which they demand is too expensive. Let free elementary education be abolished, and the system of scholarships be so worked as to give free advanced education to the children of professionals. (There is, of course, also an argument concerning the feeble-minded, but that hardly has a political complexion.) Is it not obvious, however, that the trouble comes from snobbery, from the desire to establish oneself and one's children as high as possible on the social ladder? Given equality and the abolition of classes, motives would operate quite differently. Free advanced education ought to be given to those best able to profit by it, not to those whose parents are well-to-do. There is much that is valid in the arguments of eugenists as to the biological evils of our present system. But it is strange that they do not perceive the only possible remedy for these evils, namely, Socialism; so long as inheritance and social inequality persist, they cannot be remedied. The Socialist state *may* ignore them, and if so it will ultimately come to grief; but it can tackle them successfully if it chooses, and no other kind of state can. It is to be hoped, however, that nothing will be done about these problems until our knowledge is far greater than it is at present. And it is much to be feared that governments will regard their opponents as ipso facto feeble-minded. Dean Inge says: "The theory and practice of government are divided between sociologists, who have knowledge but no power, and politicians, who have power but no knowledge." He has here allowed himself to lapse into optimism. Sociologists have very little knowledge, and that little vitiated by social prejudices; politicians have very little power, being controlled by blind forces, material, financial and popular. Even the most learned and scientific are, as yet, the victims of their passions in their political thinking. Until the majority have learned to think independently of their passions, mankind will remain the sport of circumstance, tossed up and tossed down, like a little boat on a stormy sea.

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

The English in Egypt

Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, by Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $5.00.

THIS volume is a textbook in imperialism. It is a record of close observation of the forces, human instruments and events which resulted in the stifling of the national aspirations of one people and their subjection to the will of another. Blunt was extraordinarily fitted in person and position to conduct these observations. He had come to know intimately the various peoples of Islam during journeys between 1873 and 1880. From the latter date he lived much of his time in Cairo, where he witnessed the oppression of the Egyptian fellahin at the hands of a government which was in effect a revolted satrapy of Turkey, and whose venality and fear put it at the mercy of foreign money lenders and the nations which backed them. He was the close friend and adviser of the Egyptian Nationalists, of whom Arabi Pasha became the dominating figure. At the same time through his family connections in England and especially through old acquaintances in the diplomatic service he was able to keep informed of the development of a situation in the British Cabinet, in Parliament, and in European diplomacy which brought about the occupation of Egypt. Although a private citizen, he was able to bring pressure to bear on public men and in a measure to influence public events. He accepted responsibility for the advice which led Arabi and the Nationalists to refuse to surrender the forts at Alexandria on the demand of the British Admiral: and on the other hand it is clear that but for his determined intervention Arabi would have been handed over to the Khedive to be shot. It may be thought that Blunt's ardent partisanship disqualified him for the function of observer. He writes, however, with eminent restraint and candor. He has no illusions about Arabi and the Egyptian fellahin who followed him. And in regard to his own country his testimony has the force of a witness who is convinced against his will. At the beginning of his

observation he declares: "Nothing was further from my mind than that we English ever could be guilty, as a nation, of a great betrayal of justice in arms for our mere selfish interests." Throughout the story nothing is more pathetic than his trust in the ultimate decency of Englishmen of the ruling caste, and in something beyond decency in such a leader as Gladstone; yet in his disillusionment he does not apportion the blame narrowly. "England's decay," he notes, "rests upon causes far more general than any one man or party of men can be responsible for. We fail because we are no longer honest, no longer just, no longer gentlemen."

There was one other Englishman who had a commanding part in the drama of Egypt's downfall; that was Sir Charles Dilke, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Mr. Gladstone's ministry, his nominal chief being the extraordinarily indolent and stupid Lord Granville. Dilke was not unlike Blunt in certain respects, among them being a curious knowledge of the forces which manifest themselves in diplomacy, and particularly as they concern Islam and the East. In striking fashion Dilke's memoirs, written from a totally opposite point of view, confirm Blunt's Secret History. Blunt places the convention by which Beaconsfield and Salisbury extorted the cession of Cyprus from the Sultan before the Congress of Berlin as "the point of departure for England of a new policy of spoliation and treacherous dealing in the Levant, foreign to her traditional ways." It was Cyprus which led to England's acquiescence in the unprovoked seizure of Tunis by the French. Then remarks Dilke cynically, "Steps were taken on behalf of Lord Hartington, Lord Granville and myself to see whether now that France had knocked another bit out of the bottom of the Ottoman Empire by her attack on Tunis we ought not to try to get any compensation in Egypt for ourselves." (Life of Sir Charles Dilke, Vol. 1, page 450.) It was during Dilke's visit to Gambetta, his intimate friend, that the latter put forward his scheme for joint control of Egyptian finances in behalf of the foreign bondholders by England and France. This control of the Egyptian budget was the initial issue between the Nationalist Egyptian ministers of whom Arabi was chief and the foreign powers, the Khedive hating both and playing one against the other.

Rioting in Alexandria in July, 1882, led to the despatch of the British fleet, the bombarding of the city and the final defeat of Arabi at Tel el Kebir. Blunt quotes a telegram from the Khedive to the Governor of Alexandria inciting the riots on the ground that they would discredit Arabi. Dilke cautiously absolves Arabi in the words: "I believed on the information furnished me from Alexandria and Cairo that they [the riots] were the work of the revolutionary leaders in the capital. A long time afterwards I gradually came to think that this had not been so, and that they had been purely local and spontaneous." (op. cit. page 460.) Nothing brings into sharper contrast the essential characters of the two men than their attitude toward these ill-omened disorders. When Arabi had restored order Blunt telegraphed him frankly: "Praise God for victory and peace." Dilke cites this "abominable telegram" (which he quotes without the last two words) as a reason for his suspicion that the disorders had been excited by the Nationalist leaders. Unfortunately it was Dilke who was on the inside. He made the ultimatum: "Either Arabi must go or I will." (Op. cit. page 462.) Blunt on the outside was employing every resource of personal influence, publicity and parliamentary inquiry to save the honor of his country—all in vain. Mr. Gladstone, with his own Midlothian speeches ringing in his ears, hesitated, but in the end succumbed. It was the political situation of the ministry that made him a jingo. Blunt notes that it was at the same Cabinet meeting that the coercion of Ireland and the attack upon Egypt were decided. He records his conviction that "in all this there was far less of statesmanship or even financial intrigue than of personal pique."

Thus are empires built, and thus they decay. The occupation of Egypt was a flagrant act of spoliation, prepared by adept intrigue and at length consummated in the sight of the world. It was a sequel, it is true, to the cession of Cyprus and the seizure of Tunis, but it was the more monstrous in that it took place at the expense, not of the decaying Turkish sovereignty, but of a genuine national movement of a people long oppressed, such a movement as Mr. Gladstone had made it his glory to praise and support. He found his chief excuse and palliation in the promise to withdraw from Egypt. How deeply the need of some excuse was felt is shown by the number of times that the British government during the last forty years repeated that promise until it became the lie with such monstrous circumstance as the Milner Commission. The occupation of Egypt had the immediate results which Mr. Gladstone prophesied in 1877. He foresaw then that the possession of Egypt would be "the egg of a North African empire" that would demand extension to the Cape. What he did not see was that it would give the signal for the fierce scramble of the European powers for empire everywhere, and lead to the partition of Africa, to the incursions upon Asia, and finally to the gigantic quarrel of the predatory nations over the diminishing loot of the world, in which millions of boys, including some of his own descendants, would die.

Blunt's later connection with Egypt is one of the threads running through the fascinating volumes of My Diaries. He purchased an estate near Cairo, where he lived part of the year, a constant reminder to his countrymen of their broken faith, a constant thorn in the flesh of the British administrators, Cromer and Gorst. He took every opportunity to befriend Egypt and keep her cause before the world, fighting a weary and losing fight against the greed of the few and the indifference of the many which together make up public opinion. What discouraged him most was the indifference, the lack of conscience on the part of a nation. Readers of the Diaries will recall the pathetic passage written on July 11, 1912. "Anniversary of the bombardment of Alexandria thirty years ago today, and there is no sign of repentance in this country. I am the only person left who remembers that abominable event and who still protests." The present volume is a renewal of that protest.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

Patriotic Verse

Poems of American Patriotism, chosen by Brander Matthews. Revised and extended edition. Illustrated by N. C. Wyeth. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $3.50.

PERHAPS, like myself, you are not at all sure what patriotism is, and you read this collection in the hope of finding out. The answer is disheartening. Patriotism turns out to be that passion for one's own side in time of war which excites, rather than inspires, small poets to the