

States are beset by the childish dilemma expressed in the old saying about having one's cake and eating it too. We are in favor theoretically of free speech and universal suffrage. We recognize that the enforcement of them by national authority would absorb too large a place in the function of government, would necessitate the granting of special powers which would be dangerous, and would ultimately weaken the whole federal structure. In regard to prohibition, the attitude of the majority is not so clear, for, as Mr. Franklin points out, the Amendment specifies the manufacture and sale of liquor, not its purchase, possession and use, and it is certain that if such provisions had been included in the Amendment it would never have been passed. It may be questioned whether in these circumstances the Amendment can ever acquire the moral position necessary to its enforcement. How much of a moral sanction would be given to a law against larceny if it were no crime to receive stolen goods, and if a large portion of the men who enacted the law and administered it were themselves profiting by this omission? There is no national act of enforcement for the Bill of Rights, since the Espionage Law was repealed, and none for the Fifteenth Amendment. There should be none for the Eighteenth Amendment. The present law is a source of weakness and corruption which amount to a national scandal.

## Help Europe! How?

We believe that the time has come for the government of our country to formulate the principles on which it will be able to cooperate with other nations in order to bring about the needed rehabilitation of European countries and the peace of the world.

**T**HE American Bankers' Association adopted the foregoing resolution on the last day of its recent meeting in New York. President Harding told the reporters on the day following that he was willing and anxious to move in the direction of cooperation with Europe, provided a practicable plan were forthcoming. But he did not repeat his announcement of September 1st to the effect that the American government was preparing or had prepared a plan of this kind. Probably those members of the administration who are chiefly responsible for its foreign policy have not as yet succeeded in drawing up a plan which they consider to be "practicable," and, if they are doubtful and hesitating, their fellow countrymen should not blame them too quickly and with too much assurance. The framing by the administration of a method of extending American aid to Europe which would really

work under existing conditions is at best an extremely difficult business.

Americans such, for instance, as the members of the National Council for the Reduction of Armaments, who wish the administration to summon an economic conference to meet in Washington soon after the election and to submit to such a conference "a concrete proposal" analogous to the proposal which it submitted to the Washington Conference of last year, do not realize what a large portion they are ordering. When Secretary Hughes submitted his plan for the reduction of capital ships to the Washington Conference he possessed one enormous advantage on which he cannot count in relation to any similar proposal with regard to Europe. In planning naval sacrifices by the American government which might be beneficial to the peace of the world, he was practically certain of the cooperation of Congress and the support of American public opinion. But in submitting proposals to a European economic conference which were intended to accomplish an analogous result, he would not be sure of corresponding cooperation and support. Any remedial plan which originated with the American government must, as part of the new deal, offer a partial or complete remission of the debt which the European governments owe to this country in exchange for some amelioration of the policies of the European nations towards one another. Yet if Mr. Hughes submitted such an offer to a conference and if it were accepted, it is extremely doubtful whether he could get Congress to back him up. He would invite the same treatment which the Senate handed to Mr. Wilson.

Nor is this the only or the gravest difficulty. Concrete proposals of cooperation between the United States and Europe imply the existence of a Europe with which to cooperate. No such Europe exists. Europe at the present time is a distracted and chaotic continent, whose constituent nations are to all appearances irreconcilably divided one from another and who sharply disagree one from another as to the kind of assistance which the American nation should furnish. It is not a question of cooperation with Europe. It is a question of cooperating with one of two factions in Europe—the faction which is headed by Great Britain and proposes in effect to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and the faction which is headed by France and intends to fight for its preservation. That these two factions are divided irreconcilably in their estimate of the facts of the European economic predicament and the way to deal with them is indicated by the speech which Sir Reginald McKenna recently delivered before the Bankers' Convention in New York. Sir Reginald's speech did not contain a word which could be remotely

construed as intentionally unfriendly towards France; but it called attention to facts, which, if they are facts, would compel the United States to intervene in Europe either as a declared opponent of the existing French policy and an ally of England or not at all.

Sir Reginald's sketch of future probabilities with respect to the payment of debts and reparations was not merely gloomy; it was hopeless. According to his account Germany has at present no exportable surplus with which to pay reparations in cash. France might derive something like a billion dollars by obtaining possession of securities and assets which German citizens possess in foreign countries, but her ability to collect even this moderate sum will depend upon the creation of confidence in Germans that the Reich will hereafter be allowed some chance of security and growth. Neither did he hold out the expectation of any substantial future payments by Germany. If his calculations are sound, it is not only impossible to force Germany to pay the \$32,000,000,000 demanded in the London ultimatum, it is impossible to collect from Germany the interest and amortization even on the \$12,500,000,000 representing the A and B series of bonds, and undesirable to attempt to force her to do so. She can collect practically nothing, now or in the future, unless she will consent to a long moratorium accompanied by the assurance that even at its close Germany will not be required to do the impossible.

The speech of Sir Reginald McKenna, if its facts and inferences are true, means that the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles demand of the German people mischievous impossibilities. Only the most drastic modifications will help: modifications involving a reduction of the total burden well below the \$10,000,000,000 which has generally been regarded as just reparations. Moreover since it is unjust to penalize human beings for not performing impossibilities, the elaborate structure of sanctions which the French government has cherished and flourished as its means of coercion must also go overboard. English politicians and financiers have slowly and reluctantly reached this conclusion. But the French politicians and financiers are still divided from it by half the circumference of the earth. The difference between them and the English is incalculable and it is apparently irreconcilable. It is for the moment the dominant fact in European politics. It is the most important fact which any American government would have to face when it started to "formulate principles" for a renewed American intervention in Europe. The United States cannot cooperate in the "rehabilitation" of Europe without throwing the weight of

its influence either in favor of France and the execution of the Treaty with drastic penalties for failure or in favor of Great Britain and of the scrapping and rewriting of that document.

Americans who seek immediate intervention in Europe visualize the rôle of their country as a mediator and healer whose good offices would restore and reunite Europe. This rôle can not be executed merely by moral suasion. America will have to make sacrifices, if her advice is to count. She will have to be prepared not only to cancel her claims upon Europe, but to exact in exchange conditions that would be accepted, if at all, with extremely bad grace by France at least. She would be accused by the partisans of France of playing Britain's game in seeking to force a settlement which would not only scale French pecuniary claims, but would relax French military power on the continent. Nothing less would do any good at all. Now, have we just ground for assuming that American diplomacy would play well so difficult a game as that, or that public opinion is prepared to force Congress to make the sacrifices involved in it?

These are the points that are crucial in the formulation of principles on which America will be able to cooperate "to bring about the rehabilitation of European countries and the peace of the world."

We are not supporting the view of those who would simply turn their backs on European distress. America must suffer if disaster overtakes the rest of the world. But America will do nothing for either herself or the world unless she is able to proceed on the lines of a definite policy based upon an appreciation of the realities instead of upon glib goodwill and pious resolutions.

## *The New* REPUBLIC

*A Journal of Opinion.*

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1922, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT; ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER, DANIEL MEBANE, CIRCULATION MANAGER.

### EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY	ROBERT MORSS LOVETT
ALVIN JOHNSON	STARK YOUNG
PHILIP LITTELL	ROBERT LITTELL, Assistant Editor

### CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

JANE ADDAMS	JOHN DEWEY
BRUCE BLIVEN	DAVID FRIDAY
H. N. BRAILSFORD	R. H. TAWNEY
LEO WOLMAN	

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES FIFTEEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS, FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

# The Sad Photograph

**J**OHN GORDON is read by thousands. He has written long and short poems about the slums, the farm people, the working man and the sea. His work is vivid, rough and strong—perhaps a little rougher than strength really is—and full of that combination of the tender and manly that is one of the best traits of our English poetry. Gordon is regarded by some people as a revolutionary, by others as a realist, by others as degenerate, by others still as pessimistic; but all unite in regarding him as tragic. The number steadily increases of those who are familiar with his work and with his photograph.

This photograph, sometimes the frontispiece of a volume of Gordon's and sometimes furnished to reviewers everywhere by his publishers, shows a man of around forty. It is a three-quarters view of a gentle, clear-cut face with the skin drawn rather tightly over the well-shaped skull—a meagre look that suggests early dissipation—a thin, sensitive mouth and a good square chin. The eyes look slightly downward and out into space. They are set; their outline is plaintive. Their droop leads us to notice the hopeless look about the lips and the slight bend of the ascetic head. It is the picture of a very sad face; the aspect of it is absent, melancholy, habitually tragic.

It is this photograph that represents the side of Gordon that disturbs me. As a devoted friend of his I could wish that Gordon would let his work speak for him, and in his photograph would give to the public not this more or less acted version of himself but only whatever outer semblance the camera might secure. To be so reserved and withdrawn as he is with most people and then to broadcast this photographic outpouring of himself seems to me a doubtful business. But after all, if you like, this may be a good thing to do. It may be a legitimate arrangement to make in one's life. This selection and promotion of a single pattern, an essential expression as it were, for Gordon's face, may serve to convey to his public, as Nature unaided might never do, his melancholy vision of life. It has no doubt helped already to create a certain point of view from which his readers have learned to approach his poetry. I will grant that, though I must add that I regret to see a man whom I admire and whom I know to have a deep and beautiful and sincere response to life, allow himself even a chance of striking a pose. Great natures do not need that expedient.

But I am willing to pass all this over and to

forget for the moment the sad photograph. What distresses me is that Gordon seems really to have settled into this rôle of sadness, into this profession of melancholy. And I regret this not only on Gordon's account but for so many realists who have done exactly the same thing. If I confronted Gordon with such a platitude as that one thing is not more real than another, that the camellia is as real as the ashbarrel, the smile as the tear, the ruby as the wound, he would of course grant that; and he might be for a time less ready with his talk about the real and realism. But half a minute later if I went on to speak of yet other realities than those he glowers on, to speak of dancing and laughter and fruit and flowers, Gordon would say, "Oh, those—" with a falling intonation in his voice, and in his eyes a mild, blank contemplation of my forehead. This would be equivalent to his saying that no doubt such things are very pretty. From which we may conclude ultimately that while our elation over a flower is only pleasant, our depression over an ashbarrel is terrible; our thoughts on Shelley's imagination are agreeable, on the world's neglect of him, agonizing. And the truth is that Gordon would talk about Shelley's tragedy with such tragic feeling and tragic charm that for the moment I too would think that men's neglect of Shelley meant more than Shelley's power through his imagination over men forever. I shall not say any of these things to Gordon.

But some day I shall try to make one point at least for him. I shall say that the world around us is—obviously—full of things that can leave in our minds some abstraction that will feed our living. The moon, for one example, the moon at night shining in the heavens—there can be in it a pause, a silver vista of possibility, a suspension, a silence, that may leave in the mind a kind of quietness and space, may leave a peace that is not theological, not optimistic, not necessarily comforting even, and that is not a conclusion of any kind; but is merely a proportionment, a release, a harmony, such as we might get from a pattern of lines and colors which mean nothing at all but that one quality which they express. In music there is pure flux and commerce, apply it to your beliefs or not, as you please. In the lines of a statue there is a quiet waiting, a rhythm of parts, the rebuke of time to the impatient moment. The lines of a temple carry on them the acceptance of and the creation out of physical law or necessity. A Greek vase may have pure roundness, points swimming at