

to serve the purpose of unifying knowledge the kind of course needed is an analytic one, "which finds a method of thought and gives a student practice in it." In other words, the President of Amherst would supply the student with a tool rather than a map. The fullest development of the principle of the survey course is that described in Professor Erskine's article. It is particularly to be noted that the course in General Honors at Columbia which he describes, does not depend upon the diffusion of the influence of a single personality through a large body of students, but is permeated by the energies of a corps of tutorial assistants reinforced by the cooperative effort of the students in the course.

The Columbia course in General Honors is also an illustration of the third plan of reform which consists in the organization of the later period of college residence into a school of *litterae humaniores* which in unity of purpose and intellectual validity may rank with schools of engineering, law, and medicine. This plan is actually at work or under discussion at Harvard, Smith, Wisconsin, Nebraska and elsewhere. The idea has been carried out most fully at Harvard, where Professor Moore's account of it is illuminating. At Harvard the testing of a student's mastery of his special field, not in the fragments known as half courses, but as a whole and with reference to other fields, is extended to all candidates for the bachelor's degree except students of natural science. At Smith the special plan of work for the last two years is limited to highly qualified students. In the former the burden of administration is borne by the various faculty groups, but a large degree of responsibility falls on the student; in the latter the initiative is evidently taken by the student but the fullest cooperation of teachers is obviously necessary to its carrying out.

These two elements of faculty and student responsibility are implicit in every phase of the discussion before us. After all, the virtue of the American college depends on the human factors involved in it. Its problems must be solved in terms of human material. The plans put forward for its reform depend for success on the energy and devotion of administrators and teachers, and a corresponding response on the part of students. Without these they are mere machinery. It is certainly a hopeful aspect of the present discussion that this fact is fully recognized. President Meiklejohn and Professor Alexander both call attention to the fact that the college teachers of the present day are themselves the product of the narrowing influence of the elective system; President Burton and Professor Vernon emphasize the dangers in the democratically unselected mass of students. On

the other hand the effort to work out the curriculum in individual terms, to establish a personal relation between student and teacher instead of the mechanics of the factory system is everywhere apparent. To the success of this conception above all are necessary college teachers who are willing to take education seriously, not as the cultivation of a small field of knowledge, nor yet as a matter of acting and instituting for large bodies of students, but as an individual service rendered to individual minds. Clearly the number of men and women available for this high calling is limited. It must be increased. But meanwhile the college authorities have in their hands a method of rectifying the ratio between the real teaching capacity of an institution and the size of its student body. The rigid administration of the final test for a degree may be expected to cut down the number of matriculants to any required percentage. It will be a sign of good faith on the part of the colleges to open the doors to such education as they ought to offer, only to the willing and the fit.

Eventually, Why Not Now?

NOW that the dust and the confusion which first surrounded the recent crisis in the Near East are subsiding, its remoter and deeper significance is beginning clearly to stand out. The happenings of the last few weeks open up the first serious breach in the legal ramparts which the victors in the war built to protect the fruits of their victory. The Treaty of Sèvres treated the Turks in substantially the same way that the Treaty of Versailles treated the Germans, the Treaty of St. Germain the Austrians, and the other treaties the Hungarians and Bulgarians. Its territorial provisions were supposed to embody the principle of national self-determination; and it did embody this principle in that it did not try actually to extinguish the national existence of the Turks. But it outraged Turkish national susceptibilities; it reduced the territory under Turkish control to the minimum; and in all doubtful regions it placed large numbers of Turks under alien rule. The whole settlement was fortified by setting up local imperialist states whose business it was to fight for it. France and Poland were leagued to prevent any change in the German settlement; the Czechoslovak Republic was the guardian primarily of the Austrian settlement; Rumania of the Hungarian settlement; Jugoslavia of the Bulgarian settlement; and Greece of the Turkish settlement.

The treatment received by the Turks in the Treaty of Sèvres was no worse than that of the other vanquished peoples, but it was less securely

protected. The Turks were not so completely disarmed as their allies in the war. After the restoration of Constantine the Greek government, whose interest it was to safeguard the Treaty, lost the confidence of France completely and of Great Britain to a considerable extent. Greece was economically exhausted and her people reluctant to fight. The Turks decided to resist. Their resistance could hardly have succeeded if both Great Britain and France had loyally supported Greece, but the French and the Italian governments gave aid and comfort to the Turks, the result being that the latter finally gained a complete military victory. By virtue of this victory the Turkish people have won the right to be consulted about their political destiny. They are the first of the losers who are permitted to act as if the principle of national self-determination applied to the vanquished as well as the victors. The petty Greek kingdom, a shabby attempt to renew the grandeur of old Grecian imperialism, is subjected to a drastic pruning. The Near East is to become not a pseudo-empire but an easterly extension of the Balkan peninsula. It is dedicated for the present to competition and quarrels among hostile nationalities and their governments.

The Turkish post-war settlement is the first to vanish, because its fortifications were comparatively feeble. The fortifications of the other treaties, particularly of the Treaty of Versailles, are much more formidable, but their complicated design and their frowning front do not render them secure. Sooner or later they too will succumb, although less to the attacks of their enemies than to their own inherent weakness. The causes which have restored to the Turks the right to be consulted about their political destiny will eventually restore the same right to the Bulgarians, the Hungarians, the Austrians and the Germans. For the principle of national self-determination, barren though it be as a constructive leaven in politics, becomes in so far as it is ignored, almost irresistible as a grievance and as a revolutionary ferment. In relation to the European system created by the post-war treaties, there will be no denying its dangerously corrosive effect, for the treaties themselves affirm the principle for the benefit of the victors and repudiate it whenever it may benefit the vanquished. The victors, that is, are unfaithful to their declared rule of political salvation, and they have really no defence for their infidelity but their power to suppress by force any resistance to their decisions. Distrust of Greece and quarrels between France and Great Britain dissipated in the case of the Turkish settlement this sanction of force. Mutual distrust and contention constantly fomented by treaty-made economic and social disorder will in

the end work the same destruction on the other treaties.

They richly deserve it. They were intended to reconstruct Europe after the most destructive war in history exclusively in the interest of the victors and by the simple agency of permanent coercion. Two nations, France and Great Britain, with the half-hearted support of Italy and the much warmer assistance of the newly emancipated peoples of central Europe, proposed to dictate the political destiny of the whole continent. The attempt had, of course, a justifiable aspect. The war had destroyed the military power and the political cohesion of the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires; and created the opportunity of replacing them with a national democratic federation. But the Treaties ignored the opportunity. They not only legalized the destruction of the defeated empires but they treated the defeated peoples as if the attempt to obtain their consent to their own fate was superfluous and in some way wrong. Such an organization of Europe was bound to create two fatal obstacles to its own endurance. One was the hostility of the 250,000,000 men and women more or less who were coerced into submitting to the "settlement" or not consulted about it. The other was dissensions among the nations and the governments who arrogated the right to dictate the political destiny of the rest of Europe.

These causes will eventually undermine the Treaty of Versailles. But if eventually, why not now? Many well-intentioned people have ever since the Treaty was formulated insisted on supporting it as the best attainable settlement and as the only possible existing basis of European order. They committed a costly mistake. The Treaty of Versailles was far from being the best attainable settlement. It was merely an arbitrary and essentially unbalanced compromise between the good and the evil forces at Paris in which the latter obtained the better of the bargain by working on their opponents' fear of immediate disorder. But the avoidance of disorder by invoking force to legalize vengeance and injustice was a fatal method of bringing to an end a war which was fought to save civilization. The Treaty from the point of view of the war aims of British and American liberals was not a compromise; it was a default and a repudiation. It is itself a permanent and a necessary cause of economic social and political disorder in Europe. Good people committed a mistake in the beginning by consenting to it. The best way to repair the mistake is to insist now on getting rid of it.

Americans who wish to help Europe can do it most effectively by repeating this truth and acting

on it. An essential condition of European recovery is an increasing measure of European political unity; and this unity the European peoples can attain only by replacing the old empires with a system of federated autonomous national democracies. The Treaty of Versailles erects an impossible barrier against such a substitution. Having ignored the consent and violated the legitimate susceptibilities of the vanquished peoples, it is incompatible with democracy. Having broken up the old empires in the name of national self-determination, it hinders the new nations from supplementing their individual weakness with federalism because it has organized Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia into petty empires with discontented subject populations. By depending for its endurance on the sanction of force only, it sets up a military terrorism which renders any fundamental security impossible for the European peoples and invokes the executioner in order to compel its victims to perform impossibilities. If the United States had ratified this instrument it might have lasted as long, say, as the Treaty of Vienna. It was framed for the purpose of perpetuating by means of American political and economic power the dictatorship of France and Great Britain in Europe. But when the American government backed out, it was doomed not merely to a certain but a comparatively early and ignoble death.

The Senate of the United States by repudiating the Treaty of Versailles performed—quite without intending to do so—an inestimable service for Europe. It shortened by many years the period of insecurity and distress during which the Treaty had to be endured as well as the sharper agony of getting rid of it. At the time the real meaning of the Senate's action was obscure. The Republican senators explained it as a repudiation of the obligations of the covenant rather than as a protest against the impossibilities and infidelities of the Treaty. But the effect of the Senate's action was far more important than the reasons by which it was defended; and its major effect was undoubtedly to deprive the Treaty of one absolutely necessary support to its prolonged existence. American public opinion can repeat and consummate this service by asking Europe to face the necessity of radically amending it at once. A large part of Europe has already anticipated this necessity, but it does not wish or dare to confess it in public. It still hopes to obtain from the United States the kind of assistance which will delay the day of reckoning and avoid at least for a while the dangers and sacrifices which the framing of a new treaty will involve. But Europe will never obtain

assistance of this kind from the United States; and it would be an act of kindness to proclaim this truth so emphatically and definitely that no further misunderstanding is possible. Then the European governments may be able to screw up their courage and tackle the job of cutting out a source of economic, social and moral infection, which so long as it lasts will condemn the European peoples to poverty, suffering, insecurity and irreconcilable conflicts.

Who Cares for Coal?

RECENTLY President Harding took a step which four months ago would have excited interest throughout the nation. He named the members of the commission which, under authority of Congress, is to inquire into the coal industry and set before the public the facts bearing upon costs, profits, the labor situation, the efficiency of the present system of mining. The President's recognition of the importance of the work to be done is shown by the character of his nominations. The members of the commission are, without exception, men of standing, of proved public spirit, who cannot afford to permit this opportunity for service to lie fallow. John Hays Hammond, former Vice President Marshall, Judge Alschuler of Chicago, Clark Howell of the Atlanta Constitution, George Otis Smith of the Geological Survey, Dr. Edward Devine and Charles T. Neill are names in which the public may with reason repose confidence. They are not experts, to be sure, in this special field of inquiry. But they know the value of expert service and the appropriation provided for the expenses of the commission, although meagre, will suffice to procure such expert service as may be indispensable.

The President is alive to the necessity of getting at the facts as to the coal supply. Is the public? Not if the press offers a fair sample of public opinion. There has been little comment on the appointment of the commission, and that for the most part perfunctory. It is assumed that a thousand and one things are more interesting to the general reader than any coal inquiry could be. We found ourselves, two months ago, facing the prospect of a winter of heatless days. It was an intensely disagreeable prospect. But luckily the strike came to an end somehow, and our coal bins are gradually filling. And we'd much rather not think about the distress which might have fallen to our lot. The Freudians have a pat explanation of our rather illogical attitude. Unconsciously we are putting ourselves through a systematic course in forgetting.