

of indictment which is indicated might be drawn as follows. The University of Tennessee prefers getting growth to scholarship. Where intellectual and vocational interests conflict, it advances the vocational. Its conception of scholarship is narrow and conventional, and its theory of teaching pettifoggery to the last degree. It has an inferiority complex that makes criticism intolerable. Upon the evidence of this report one can only conclude that a timorous and unenlightened administration has thrown out some of its strongest men because it could not stand their disapproval, and has done so without suffering more than a perfunctory slap on the wrist from the one body in America which it should justly fear in such a crisis.

By drawing such a picture the committee has allowed itself to be hopelessly caught. Either the picture is false, in which case the university has cause for grave complaint, or it is true, in which case the plaintiffs have been "done in." Indeed, the most disquieting suggestion that comes from the printed record is that the Association of University Professors is interested not in universities nor in the individual victim of injustice but in the professorial caste. That caste is defined not by excellence of scholarship or teaching but by rules of tenure. Consequently considerations of educational quality must be excluded from the examination of a university. Throughout the report these professors reprove their injured colleagues for "a certain want of tact," an "inability to work harmoniously with their superiors under an organization which they disapproved,"—as if they were office boys under a head clerk with an ugly temper. What should be the attitude of a group of scholars under an administration intent upon educational suicide? What is the attitude of the Association toward such an administration? What if it is committing hari-kari with the utmost decorum and most accomplished tact? We have yet to learn. There is no Committee on Academic Competence.

European Politics in Paralysis

AT no time within our generation has European politics presented so baffling and uncertain an aspect as it does today. International problems of the first magnitude are pressing for solution. They can be solved only by resolute and intelligent action on the part of the four great powers of western Europe, seconded, in an important sense, by the United States. The situation is one which requires competent statesmanship, supported loyally by a solid parliamentary backing. But this requirement is nowhere realized. Indeed, the reverse is nearer the truth.

In England, France and Germany the responsibility for governing rests with a minority. The

Italian situation appears, on the surface at least, to be much more stable. It will be worth while later to scrutinize this apparent stability more closely. For the present we may disregard Italy, because she stands outside of the circle of powers most immediately concerned with the settlement of the problems of reparations and the Ruhr.

At the close of the war the victorious nations had only to dictate terms which the vanquished were bound to accept. The Versailles Treaty was, or appeared to be, a completed act. In the present negotiations among the powers there can be no such thing as dictation and submission. Any settlement will have to derive its force from consent, and consent involves engagements on both sides which there must be reason for believing will be kept. Promise and probability of performance are both necessary. How far can the governments of England, France and Germany give promises that inspire confidence?

In England the tradition of domestic unity with respect to foreign relations is strong. MacDonald does not need to fear that his political enemies will seize the occasion of an international deadlock to manoeuvre him out of office. But the current of domestic affairs flows on and may at any time throw up an issue which the MacDonald government cannot face squarely without encountering defeat, nor side-step without giving an impulse to forces of disintegration within the party. MacDonald has the country behind him only very provisionally—a fact which Poincaré plainly took into account, and which any new French government is also likely to take into account. British influence on the settlement must therefore be decidedly provisional.

In France the defeat of Poincaré and the Bloc National has cleared the way for a government by the more moderate factions, which are far better disposed toward a reasonable adjustment of the German problem. But there is no real unity in the group of moderate parties upon which a solid government could be based. Herriot may try to govern; Briand and Painlevé may try it. There are enough recalcitrant minority groups, however, to threaten the stability of any moderate government. The Reds have only to form a limited alliance with the defeated Bloc National to turn any other government out. The net result would only be confusion, since the Reds would never enter into a plan for restoring Poincaré or any of his lieutenants to power. But the Reds thrive on confusion, and may be expected to coquette with it.

The German situation is analogous. The Marx-Stresemann group has been gravely weakened by the election. Reactionary nationalism and communism have both grown stronger. In combination, they could throw out any moderate government. Here again the result would only be confusion, but both the reactionary nationalists and the communists may expect to thrive on confusion. Both parties hope for material gains in the next election and would be glad to see a parliamentary

deadlock which would force the calling of elections at an early date.

In Italy, on the other hand, political unity appears solidly established. Mussolini is everything. He has a parliamentary majority that will do his bidding, and he would do as he pleased even if the majority turned against him. It would appear, then, that Italy is one country which can adopt a policy and stick to it; make engagements and carry them out. Yet this appearance, on closer inspection, is deceptive. Mussolini represents, not the will of the Italian people, but the abdication of that will. Factional strife had shattered the machinery of parliamentary government. Mussolini has put in a substitute machine which works tolerably for the time. How well it will work when the factional organizations growing up within Fascism have solidified into real parties is another question. The rest of Europe will take Mussolini's diplomacy for what it is worth, a dictator's will, binding so long as the will of the people is without an organ for expressing itself.

It is in such a condition of political paralysis that Europe is called upon to make a decision which will profoundly affect all public and private relations through a generation. If they had strong parties behind them, MacDonald, Herriot, Stresemann and Mussolini could work out a formula for putting the Dawes plan into effect. The differences in the views of these statesmen are not so wide as to make a compromise settlement impossible.

Without solid political support, however, the statesmen must divide their attention between politics and the peace and prosperity of Europe. A French moderate government might be inclined to make concessions, but only such as would not stir the beaten, but still formidable Bloc National into a frenzy of triumphant criticism. Similar difficulties beset the German and the British governments. Even Mussolini is compelled to take into account the possibility that a great part of his following is not at all eager to see the Franco-German quarrel composed. France, prosperous and at peace, would be an insurmountable barrier to the realization of Italian imperialistic ambitions in the Mediterranean. A France bent on realizing the Napoleonic dream of European hegemony would collapse, sooner or later, and Tunis, and even Algeria and also Morocco, might assume their old Roman relation to Italy.

Behind this anarchic play of political forces lies the major interest of the peoples, ill represented, if at all, by the governments. The small shopkeepers and investors, the peasants, the working class, in France as in Germany and England, need the revival of economic life and security against war more than they need anything else. Whether Germany pays somewhat more or less, whether Germany is more or less humiliated, are relatively minor considerations. The Dawes plan as it was proposed by the commissioners, offered so promising

a solution that no major political party in any of the countries vitally concerned dared to come out for its direct repudiation. Political opposition to the plan had to take the form of reservations which might defeat the plan while shifting the blame for its failure.

In this situation it appears plain that no settlement is possible without outside intervention. And the only quarter from which intervention can come is America. It is not a question of direct political intervention, but simply one of a clear and definite statement of the American position. The Dawes plan, all Europe knows, can be put into operation only through American financial coöperation. The economic recovery that might follow the acceptance of the plan implies far more extensive financial coöperation. America is therefore in a position to say how far the Dawes plan can be modified or mutilated without passing entirely beyond the range of her interest.

Europe is politically paralyzed, precisely at the time when she most needs to act wisely and consistently. Accordingly the United States is in a position to intervene wholly to the advantage of Europe without involving herself in any commitment lying beyond her own interest. Such intervention would not only break the present international deadlock. It would set in motion forces which would eventually make a sound European political life possible.

What has paralyzed Europe is the crystallization of party life around war issues. So long as Germany and France continue to carry on virtual war in time of peace, neither can organize parties or select leaders who represent the permanent civil interest of the mass of commonplace, peace-loving people. Remove the question of reparations and the Ruhr from the zone of political debate, and the trend toward prewar political alignments, distinctly observable in both the German and the French elections, will become irresistible. We shall again have governments which derive their power from self-conscious popular support instead of from the disunion of their enemies.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1924, IN THE U. S., BY
REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC., 421 W. 21ST ST., NEW YORK.

HERBERT CROLY, PRES. ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREAS.
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RATES: SINGLE COPIES, FIFTEEN CENTS; YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION,
FIVE DOLLARS; CANADIAN, FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS;
FOREIGN, SIX DOLLARS; THREE MONTHS' TRIAL, ONE DOLLAR.

Charlie, Warren and Ned

The Fourth Installment in the Story of "the Ohio Gang"

IN any study of "the Ohio gang" and what it did in Washington 1921-1923, there are two personalities which stand out most vividly. It happens that heretofore in this series I have had no occasion to do more than mention Ned McLean and Charles R. Forbes. Yet the characters of these men are the best possible key to the whole spirit of the Harding régime. No others were more intimate with the occupant of the White House than these; they were "Charlie" and "Ned" to him; he was "Warren" to them.

Do not misunderstand my linking of these names. The careers of the two men are not connected. They have striking similarities of temperament; but the ways in which they differ are equally conspicuous. McLean is both wealthy and a child of wealth, who has never known what it was like to have an income of less than a million dollars a year or so. Forbes was reared in poverty, enlisted in and deserted from the United States Army and for a long time wandered from place to place working at whatever came to hand. I have no evidence that McLean has done anything which according to his ethics was dishonorable; nor am I aware that his association with President Harding at any time rebounded to his personal advantage. Forbes, on the other hand, is under the gravest possible charges of personal dishonesty; and it is conservatively estimated that the waste and graft during the two years of his career as head of the Veterans' Bureau amounted to some \$225,000,000 a year, or perhaps two-thirds of the government's total surplus.

Let us begin with the worst and get it over as briefly as we may. Undoubtedly, the least excusable of all the personal appointments of incompetent or dishonest men by the President was his selection of Forbes as head of the Veterans' Bureau. It remains one of the mysteries of public opinion that the country should be roused to tropic heat by a hundred thousand dollar bribe to Secretary Fall and remain cheerfully indifferent to the appalling record of the Forbes administration which in two years' time spent close to a *billion dollars* of government money of which nearly one-half went in graft and waste.

Forbes's story, recently recited by Will Irwin in a brilliant series of articles for the North American Newspaper Alliance, illustrates with melancholy perfection the outstanding characteristics of President Harding. The man who wound up as head of the Veterans' Bureau was at one time a deserter from the United States Army, whose wife appealed in vain to the army authorities to force him to support her. Later, he drifted out to the Hawaiian Islands. The Senator from Ohio, as he

then was, visited the Islands on an official tour shortly before we entered the Great War. He met and was entertained by this rough-and-ready hail-fellow-well-met, who is anybody's match at a story-telling contest . . . or at diversions of a rougher character. The friendship was instantaneous and lasting. Then came the war, and Forbes went to France with the Thirty-third Division. He is next heard of after Harding's election, when he bobbed up again at Marion and with brazen nerve demanded that he be made head of the Shipping Board.

His effrontery was based on a shrewd calculation; for despite the fact that he had no qualifications whatever for this important post, the President-elect wanted to award it to him, and was dissuaded with difficulty by his advisers. The Veterans' Bureau for some reason was regarded as less important, and to placate Charlie, Warren gave him this consolation prize. As things turned out, it is hard to see how Forbes could have done any more damage in the post he had asked. His two years in office are a record of the most astounding incompetence, waste and corruption.

While many thousands of sick and crippled war veterans suffered under inadequate care, or starved with none, Forbes blazed for himself in Washington a path of dubious glory. On his salary of \$10,000, he entertained with lavish parties, only equalled by the famous hospitality of Ned McLean. He went on a lengthy joy-ride over the country, pretending to select sites for hospitals (though, in fact, they had already been chosen), accepting generous entertainment from commercial organizations everywhere on this pretense. One site, the old Cresta Blanca Vineyard at Livermore, California, was purchased for \$105,000, far more than any reasonable interpretation of its value; and the seller promptly turned over \$22,000 commission to an "agent," a friend of one of Forbes's associates, who had not heretofore appeared in the transaction. Another hospital, for psychopathic patients, was built at Northampton, Massachusetts, the contract being awarded to a firm which asked some \$30,000 more than the lowest bidder. On the erection of several of these hospitals it is said that Forbes had an arrangement whereby he was to pocket one-third of the profits, and these were to be not less than ten percent of the total cost to the government.

The responsibility for authorizing this orgy of waste is one of the many things which must be placed on the shoulders of Harry M. Daugherty. The army has a Quartermaster's Department which makes a business of building hospitals and similar edifices. Its engineers are paid by the year and their