

electing the president than they were of any other feature of the Constitution, and they seemed to regard it as having solved the problem for any country of how to choose a chief magistrate. There was not the same satisfaction felt with the Vice-Presidency. In fact one of the members of the committee reporting the plan frankly admitted that the officer "was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time." Particular objection was made to his being forced upon the Senate as its presiding officer. The convention, however, accepted the committee report in this particular and, when the ultimate election of the president was transferred to the House of Representatives, it retained the provision with regard to the Vice-Presidency that in case of a tie the Senate was to choose.

It is well known that this method of presidential election broke down with the development of political parties. In the election of 1800, the organization of the Democratic-Republican party was so perfect that its two nominees, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, received not only a majority but an equal number of electoral votes. When the House of Representatives thereupon proceeded to carry out its duty of choosing between them, two unexpected dangers presented themselves. The contest was so bitter and feeling ran so high that there was a possibility on the one hand that out of spite the election would be given to Burr instead of Jeffer-

son, and on the other hand that no choice would be made before the fourth of March.

This experience resulted promptly in a formal proposal to change the Constitution, which was adopted by the necessary three-fourths of the states, and just before the next presidential election was held in 1804, it was proclaimed to be in force as the Twelfth Amendment. This provided that the electors should distinguish between the president and vice-president and should cast separate ballots for each. The other regulations regarding the Presidency remained the same, except that in case the ultimate election was thrown into the House the choice was limited to the three persons standing highest on the list of those voted for.

The amendment then proceeds: "And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President . . . before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President." And it further provided: "of the whole number of Electors appointed, . . . if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President."

If, then, the approaching presidential election is indecisive, and the ultimate choice is left for Congress to make, it seems clear that the contingency was not merely provided for, but that the framers of the Constitution would have regarded it as perfectly normal and quite in accordance with their expectations.

MAX FARRAND.

## A Soldier in Politics

**O**SWALD MOSLEY is twenty-eight years old, a world-war veteran and one of the most brilliant members of the British House of Commons. He is the heir to an English baronetcy and the son-in-law of Lord Curzon, foreign minister in the Stanley Baldwin Cabinet and one of the stalwarts of English Conservatism. By all traditions, Mosley should be as staunch a Conservative as any in the British Isles—and there are some who are very staunch. But he isn't. Some months ago amid the gasps of the high-hats, he "crossed the House" and threw in his lot with the British Labor party.

"I did it," he told me last summer, "because I am an ex-service man, and Ramsay MacDonald stood and still stands for the things for which I fought. He's our best bet that England will make good on its war ideals."

I returned from Europe wondering where American ex-service men, like myself, could find such a "best-bet." I've looked, rather carefully, at the three party platforms and the records of their candidates. I've finished looking with the conviction that, for the first time, the men who served in khaki have a candidate and a chance to realize on

the pledges that were made to them when they were needed to fight, and forgotten when the fighting stopped. The truth is that Robert La Follette stands for precisely those fundamentals in the United States that ex-service men made the basis for their allegiance to Ramsay MacDonald in England.

And I'm not thinking of the bonus. There is another—vastly greater—debt that the country owes to its fighters. The most important pledges assumed in the war were not in terms of money. The young men of America, when the war came on, were taken up onto a high hill where we were shown the kingdoms of the earth cluttered up with a great mass of *débris*—*débris* that had accumulated as a result of the misgovernment of the world's elder statesmen. And we were promised, then, that if we rolled up our sleeves and cleaned up that mess a new world would arise on the ground we cleared. The clearing job was fairly well done. But the pledge of a new world that was given has remained unfulfilled. The young men of America, under the leadership of Robert La Follette, can make good their claim to those spoils of the war.

I am going to vote for La Follette because

I know it is not too late to realize on the war pledges of America to its young men and to the world.

On that issue—the war—Ramsay MacDonald and Robert La Follette stood together. They stood together against the war lies and for the truth. They dared to say, then, that imperialism and secret treaties and competitive armaments in all nations, and not the total depravity of one, made the war inevitable. MacDonald said that in the House of Commons. La Follette said it in the Senate. MacDonald was ostracized and branded as a pro-German traitor and driven from the House by those who have since admitted that he was right. La Follette was similarly ostracized and branded and if he wasn't driven from the Senate it was not because of a lack of charges.

But MacDonald kept on speaking the truth. So did La Follette. When the war ended, MacDonald was still insisting that rotten diplomacy had started it. And, to keep faith with those who fought he declared that the old statesmanship that brought it on must be succeeded by a new statesmanship. The old capitalistically dominated diplomacy must be replaced by a diplomacy of truth and service. Something more than talk must be started to make sure that the latest war was the last.

That is MacDonald doctrine. That, precisely, is La Follette doctrine. It makes foreign affairs, not a series of closed-and-barred intrigues, but an open-and-above-board business. As La Follette himself puts it:

It is a policy of avowed peace to the world. It is a policy of non-aggression. It is a policy of co-operation with the other nations for the ending of conscription, for disarmament, for the release of subject peoples. It is a conservative policy. A policy of peace on earth and good-will toward all mankind, a policy that will mobilize the world for peace, that would free the world from conquests and release its workers for the production of wealth and for its enjoyment unpoisoned by fear.

When Ramsay MacDonald declared for that sort of policy in Great Britain, the ex-service men of the country believed him. He, like La Follette, had suffered too deeply for his faith to be mistrusted. He spoke the hopes of the young men and women of Great Britain. Up at Oxford, ancient training ground for English politicians, the Oxford Union voted for MacDonald. At Cambridge, another Conservative altar, MacDonald carried the University Union. Not Oswald Mosley, alone, but scores of the young leaders of Britain, including the son of Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservatives, joined with MacDonald and Labor. These young men and women had seen enough of the failure of every other sort of policy. They believed in MacDonald—and believed in him enough to give him a chance.

In nine months, the open-and-above-board diplomacy of Ramsay MacDonald and for which

La Follette stands has changed the face of Europe. For the first time since 1919 one can say that the war may not have been fought in vain. A new spirit has entered the halls of European diplomacy. It is a spirit of confidence and trust, and under its influence the forces of understanding, to which La Follette has pledged his coöperation, are mobilizing for peace. And, more than ever, the younger generation in Great Britain realize that they have, in Ramsay MacDonald a "best bet."

All this, too, has happened because these English voters had courage sufficient to ignore the campaign of misrepresentation and villification that preceded the return of Ramsay MacDonald. It amounts to an admission of ignorance of the principles for which La Follette stands to maintain that the success of the Progressive movement would be less constructive.

Stereotyped political leadership had five years at the job of cleaning up Europe. It failed to clean up anything as completely as the present administration has failed to clean up anything. It was only when the older order politicians were supplanted that conditions took a turn for the better.

Stereotyped political leadership never had a better exponent than the present occupant of the White House. Silence and evasion mark the high-water point of his courage on every side of the vote-alienating questions that are before the country. In Massachusetts a bitter campaign is in progress against the child labor amendment. The result in Massachusetts will be of great significance for only in that state is there a referendum on the question. It is significant of the success of the President's play to win the votes of the friends and foes of every measure that both sides, in Massachusetts, quote Coolidge in support of their position.

La Follette, in every line of his record, represents an aggressive honesty that neither leaves the public in doubt of his position, nor shows him trimming sail when his position becomes unpopular. The question is whether or not the United States can afford to have a President whose qualities are any less statesmanlike.

I am going to vote for La Follette because he stands pledged to those things in which I believed when I volunteered in 1917. And because he has, to back his pledges, a public record that convinces me he will fight to fulfill them.

What if I do not agree with every detail of his method? The big aim isn't to get the world saved this way or that, but to get it saved. I won't worry about my own pet panaceas if we can put the political power of the nation in the hands of a man whose spirit, on domestic and international problems, is so aggressively honest as that of Robert La Follette. He, to my mind, is the ex-service man's candidate. To vote for him is to lay claim to the pledges that were made, in the war, to the nation's young men and that have gone unpaid.

STANLEY HIGH.

# The British Election and After

**W**HEN the Labor government came into power last January, it was commonly given a six months' life. It has actually had just over nine, and, amid much wailing and gnashing of teeth from lovers of a quiet life, we are plunging into the third general election in two years. The occasion of it is the defeat of the Cabinet by a combination of Liberals and Tories; the point at issue being a motion to appoint a committee to inquire into the alleged impropriety on the part of the government in breaking off proceedings against the acting editor of a communist paper, who had published an article inciting, as it was said, soldiers to mutiny.

But, as a matter of fact, the abandoned prosecution was only the occasion. For if that particular wave had been surmounted, another was already rolling up. The larger question was that of the Russian treaty—in particular the proposal for a guaranteed loan—and since the Liberals had already declared uncompromising war on that policy, the government was in the position of the missionary who was asked whether he preferred being boiled or roasted. Having received notice to quit in any case, it naturally preferred to choose its own time. The thing which is important and significant for the future of British politics is not the incident of the Attorney-General and the dropped prosecution, but the fact that Liberals, or at any rate the Liberal leaders, decided that the time had come to put the government out at all costs.

Here again, there are wheels within wheels. It was known, of course, that the proposal to make a loan to Russia would meet with strenuous opposition. As far as the Conservatives are concerned, that opposition was obviously irreconcilable: their objection was not to financial details, but to the principle of "shaking hands with murder." But it appeared possible till recently that the Liberals might take a different line. It was thought that they would not resist a loan of any kind provided that they were met on points connected with the particular terms on which the loan was to be made—matters which the government has throughout declared to be subjects for discussion and negotiation. When, quite recently, Mr. Asquith put down a motion opposing a guaranteed loan of any kind, irrespective of the conditions attaching to it, many of his own followers must have rubbed their eyes. Obviously it was a declaration of war.

There has been much speculation as to why the Liberals chose to break all bridges, and as to which of their leaders really forced the decision.

No one who is not in the inner councils of the Liberal party can answer those questions with certainty. But, whatever the explanation, the decision has a significance extending far beyond its imme-

diately effect in precipitating an election. For consider the position. Liberalism has lived on the tradition that it is "the party of progress." It has always insisted that its true affinities were with Labor, and has complained often and bitterly at Liberals being fought by Labor candidates. Now, whatever its private reservations, Liberalism entered the election as, in fact, though not in name, the ally of the Conservatives: promptly one section of the press began to urge that there should be a formal compact between the two older parties not to oppose each other in certain constituencies, in order to increase the chance of "ousting the Socialist." The electors do not draw fine distinctions, and, once the election was begun, it was fought not on the questions which occasioned the dissolution, but the record and policy of the Labor government. The public could see that common action by Liberals and Conservatives turned the government out. They could see that Labor candidates were attacked by Liberals and Tories on the same grounds and denounced in identical language. The effect must inevitably be another nail in the coffin of Liberalism as an independent party.

Assuming that the Conservatives do not win enough seats to secure a clear majority over both the other parties, what will be the position of the Liberal party? Having turned the Labor government out, it could hardly, without covering itself with ridicule, put it in again. Nor is it certain that Labor would accept office without assurances somewhat more binding than are implicit in that quality of the Liberals which leads them to be willing to wound, but not, without anxious consideration, to strike. The alternative which remains, if the Conservatives win less than fifty seats, is for the Liberals to give their support to a Conservative minority.

From such an arrangement Labor has, in the long run, everything to gain. It has always insisted that there was as little to be hoped from one of the two older parties as the other; it has risen because of the decline of Liberalism; and the main obstacle it has had to overcome is the traditional attachment to Liberalism which still lingers, an inherited characteristic, in certain parts of the north and midlands. If the Liberal party maintains in office a Conservative government, a split in the ranks of its parliamentary representatives will be hardly avoidable, and, what is much more important, Liberal electors will crowd into the Labor party.

For Liberalism, in short, this election may well be the close of a hundred years of history—"the end of an old song." For Labor it is another step towards the straight fight with privilege and reaction which has always been its ambition.

R. H. TAWNEY.