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BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.—I.

BY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[SUCH an article as follows from the pen of Lord Curzon on the problems of British rule in India has the supreme merit, apart from its other qualities, of being the work of the greatest living authority on the subject. India fascinated Lord Curzon from his earliest youth; he visited it frequently long before he became its ruler and visited it, I need hardly say, not as a mere tourist, but as a statesman, a student and an administrator already familiar with the problems of Oriental government; and for seven years, from 1898 to 1905, he held the office of Viceroy and turned its powers and opportunities to masterful and resounding use. He has thus known the great dependency, as perhaps no other man has ever known it, both from the inside and the outside; he has been able to envisage it in relation to the foreign and Imperial interests of his country; and there is not a branch of Indian policy or a detail of Indian administration with which he has failed to familiarize himself or which has escaped the impress of his compelling personality.

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It is odd to recall nowadays the start of astonishment and apprehension with which England twelve years ago heard the news of his appointment to the Viceroyalty of India. Disraeli hardly raised a greater commotion when he nominated Lord Lytton to the same high office. For some Lord Curzon was too young—a fantastic objection, first, because the most successful Viceroys of India have all been men of between forty and fifty; secondly, because Lord Curzon is precisely one of those men—Pitt was another and Mr. Winston Churchill is a third—who never have been and never could be really young. Others doubted the wisdom of sending out a man with just enough knowledge of the country, as they thought, to incline him to his own judgment and not

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enough to make that judgment really trustworthy. They feared lest Lord Curzon's naturally dogmatic and combative temperament would lead him to trust to his tourist impressions rather than to the advice of his official councillors. Still more, and these mainly members of the Liberal party, looking to the strong anti-Russian strain that runs through Lord Curzon's works on China and Persia, took his nomination as a sign that the designs of India's northern neighbor were to be checked by a new and vigorous policy which might end in serious embroilment. Remembering, too, Lord Curzon's staunchness as a party man, they saw little chance of his abandoning the Forward Policy which the Conservatives had apparently made their own. Others again somewhat dreaded the impact of his personality upon the Indian bureaucracy. The House of Commons, and indeed the whole country, was only just beginning, in 1898, to understand Lord Curzon and to pierce through his little mannerisms to the real man behind them. It admired him, but it rather laughed at him. He showed, perhaps, too openly a cold contempt for the stupidity of his fellow mortals who made up the bulk of his fellow members. He had chosen a public career for himself at an early age and fitted himself for it with an industry that might be called a passion, reading Blue Books while other men read novels, and burrowing in statistics while his frivolous contemporaries shot pheasants. Omniscience and the Oxford manner, it was complained, hung heavily upon him; and what Mr. Labouchere used to call "the sport of taking Curzon down a peg" became a regular Radical pastime. But it was a pastime not without its dangers. Few men came out of an encounter with Lord Curzon feeling that they had had the best of it. The average M.P. stood no chance whatever against his gorgeous rhetoric, his mastery of the grand manner and the annoying fact that he not only pronounced all the foreign places correctly, but had been to them, written of them, and "ought to know."

It was precisely this quality of overwhelmingness that those who knew the Indian bureaucracy best predicted would be Lord Curzon's chief stumbling-block. The society and officialdom of Simla and Calcutta, naturally enough, prefer a "manageable" Viceroy without much force of character or initiative, one who will contentedly remain a gold-gilt dummy and figurehead, who will put himself frankly in the hands of his Council, who will preside but abstain from governing and who will receive his policies and his information at third or fourth hand. Lord Curzon never had any intention of being a Viceroy of that stamp. He landed in India with a policy; he proceeded at once to unfold it; and up to the very moment of his resignation he was remorselessly absorbed in carrying it out. Perhaps that was why few Viceroys have ever been so abundantly criticised or have aroused, both personally and politically, such heated disagreement. The strength of his self-assurance, his merciless insistence on efficiency, the vast sweep of his reforms, the trenchancy of his dialectics and his unshakable resolve to deal fairly all round—all these characteristics stirred up against him, singly or together, a vast array of antagonisms. The Bengalis whom he lectured on their

untruthfulness; the British regiment whom he publicly disgraced because it failed to discover and punish the private who had murdered a native; the feudatory princes whom he admonished on statesmanlike lines, but somewhat in the tone of a reproving schoolmaster; the veteran civil servants whom he browbeat, overruled, outargued and made to feel that he was Viceroy in fact as well as name; and the society people whom his bearing often repelled—had all their special grievances against him. No one ever rattled the bureaucratic bones as he did; no one ever drove the machine of State with such unremitting power. He made as little effort as does Mr. Roosevelt to cultivate the small, softening, lubricating graces and the social instinct that came so easily to Lord Dufferin. No Viceroy, on the other hand, ever worked harder or accomplished more or proved so great an inspiration to the zeal and practicality of those under him. Lord Morley paid to him a year or so ago in the House of Lords a tribute as generous as it was deserved. "I hope," he declared, "it will not be bad taste to say in the noble Lord's presence that you will never send to India, and you have never sent to India, a Viceroy his superior, if, indeed, his equal, in force of mind, in unsparing and remorseless industry, in passionate and devoted interest in all that concerns the well-being of India with an imagination fired by the grandeur of the political problem that India presents—you never sent a man with more of all these attributes than when you sent Lord Curzon."

Much of the unpopularity that gathered round his Viceroyalty, let it be said at once, was of the kind that did him honor and could not have been avoided without a sacrifice of duty. Thus the partition of Bengal and the creation of a new frontier province were both unpopular measures and fiercely resented, but both were necessary. They were reforms that might have been effected in a different manner, with more regard to the feelings and interests of those concerned, but that were, at any rate, carried out and assuredly will never be undone. The outstanding feature of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty was, indeed, precisely this: that what his predecessors for thirty years merely talked of doing he actually did. He showed the Chatham "touch"; the faculty for getting things done. On all the matters he took in hand he stamped the impress of his energy and thoroughness, leaving for his successors a definite foundation to build on with a detailed plan of the superstructure to be erected and not merely voluminous reports and sketchy outlines. He did not content himself with discussing projects; he put them through; he rescued them from the oceans of ink in which they were sinking and set them finally on their feet. And to a devouring industry and practicality Lord Curzon added the priceless gift of imagination—not the imagination of sensationalism, a poor, ill-balanced, unrelated thing, but the imagination that comes, and can alone come, from profound knowledge and profound sympathy. "If our rule in India is to last," he once declared, "it must depend on the eternal moralities of righteousness and justice. Unless we can persuade the millions of India that we will give them absolute justice as between

man and man, equality before the law, freedom from tyranny, injustice and oppression, then your Empire will not touch their hearts and will fade away. . . . Let no man admit the craven fear that those who have won India cannot hold it. That is not my forecast of the future. To me the message is carved in granite, it is hewn out of the rock of doom, that our work is righteous and that it shall endure." There spoke the true statesman, inspired with the authentic spirit of British Imperialism. It was in that spirit that Lord Curzon labored throughout his Viceroyalty. It was that spirit that drove him in the terrible summer heats to leave cool and comfortable Simla and travel through the districts that were devastated by famine. It was that spirit that made him risk his life and set to all India a vibrant example of British courage and sympathy in visit after visit to the plague-stricken natives in the hospitals.

Much of his unpopularity, whether with the natives or with the British officials, was honorable to him. Among the latter he covered himself with obloquy because he tried to hold, and succeeded in holding, an even balance between Englishmen and Indians. "Only those who have lived in India," says an experienced and impartial authority, "know how subtle and numerous are the influences which warp our judgment on this question of questions, and how much courage is needed to brave the storm which is so quickly kindled in the English community when it suspects partiality in favor of Indians. Lord Curzon was aware that at one period he ran the risk of being hooted and pelted by the English of Calcutta—a town for which he has always felt a peculiar regard—because of the action he took in the case of an Englishman accused of beating a coolie to death, but he faced the storm with equanimity in the cause of just dealing." That was an unpopularity that will be held by reasonable men among his first titles to fame; but we are bound to add that as often as not he ruffled both English and Indian susceptibilities from sheer heedlessness, overconfidence and disdain for the petty arts of management and conciliation. But admitting that some of the disfavor with which he ultimately came to be regarded by natives and English alike was gratuitously incurred and constituted a real political defect in his administration, it is still mere unbridled partisanship to pretend that it outweighed or nullified the immense value of his practical achievements. It is not possible as yet to assess those achievements at anything like their true worth. The data are lacking or are only partially forthcoming. It is too soon to judge precisely the results of his policy in Tibet, in Afghanistan, on the Indian frontier and in Persia; but enough is known to make one believe that never were the foreign affairs of India—which, remember, are the pivot of nearly all British foreign policy—so ably, courageously and successfully conducted.

So, too, with his internal administration. It is premature to pass judgment on it. But this much at least may be said, that he was able to realize the proud task which he set before himself on assuming the Viceroyalty—the task of "placing upon the anvil every branch of Indian policy and administration, of testing its efficiency and durability, and

of doing, if possible, something for its efficiency and durability." Look at the mere record of his activities. He altered the assessment of the land revenue; devised new methods for educating the native chiefs; opened up military careers for the Indian aristocracy; reorganized primary, secondary and technical education; reformed the Indian police; appointed and supervised a commission to lay down a comprehensive scheme of irrigation that will decide for the next fifty years the operations of Government; zealously furthered meanwhile the building of canals and railways; partitioned Bengal and created a new frontier province; rescued the Civil Service from a part at least of the tyranny of the pen by abolishing a large number of reports and by encouraging a return to the old patriarchal style of rulership; ventured upon a most interesting and far-reaching experiment in economics by forbidding the Punjab peasant to offer his land as security for debt; almost halved the cost of telegraphic communication between England and India; effected a comparatively stable rate of exchange in the currency system; fostered native industries and native arts and showed the passion of a scholar and an archaeologist for the preservation of historical remains. It is true that his policy, and his whole conception of what the British Raj should be, excluded the idea of making any political concessions to native demands and that efficiency and justice were the only goals he admitted to be worth striving for. It is true also that his policy of upholding good government rather than self-government as the aim of British rule has been largely reversed by his successor. To us, who hold that any kind of self-governance is preferable to any kind of any other, this seems a fortuitous fact. But nothing can detract from the enduring merit of what Lord Curzon actually accomplished. He understood, he dared, he achieved; and he will stand out in history as one of the bravest the sanest of Viceroys.—THE EDITOR.]

I HAVE been asked to write an article for publication in America as to the main features of British rule in India. It is notorious that in recent years a propaganda has been initiated in the United States, deliberate in its character, wide in its range and sometimes not too scrupulous in its instruments, for misrepresenting and belittling the work of Great Britain in India. In a country penetrated with the democratic sentiment, till lately unfamiliar with the onerous burden of ruling Oriental peoples, and perhaps suspicious of the methods even of the most benevolent of despotisms, such a sowing was assured, at any rate, of some harvest; and high-minded and thoughtful American citizens have sometimes been found to condemn that which they did not understand or to give currency to charges which admit of the easiest refutation.

A great setback was given to this campaign of conscious or un-

conscious slander by the frank and fearless utterances of ex-President Roosevelt. No man in the Western Hemisphere could less be suspected of an interested motive; none is more familiar with the problems of world administration; none could speak with a like authority. When, therefore, he was heard to declare that the administration of India by the British has been a greater feat than any performed under the Roman Empire, that it is one of the most notable and admirable achievements of the white race during the past two centuries, and that it has been for the immeasurable benefit of the natives of India themselves, the British reader not merely experienced a thrill of pride at this signal tribute to the work of his own countrymen, but he felt convinced that such language must exercise an almost immeasurable effect among a people whose good opinion he values beyond any other in the world and on whose desire to judge rightly he places sincere reliance.

Mr. Roosevelt's pronouncement did not stand alone. Quite recently I have heard that Mr. Fairbanks, lately Vice-President of the United States, having visited India in the course of a tour round the world, on many occasions stated on public platforms in India and elsewhere that he had nowhere seen a more unselfish or benignant system of rule. Similar, I am sure, is the verdict of those excellent American missionaries who, planting themselves with the aid of ample funds from home in suitable localities among the native population in India, where (I am sure they will readily admit) they are unhampered by Government and are given a free hand in the pursuit of their disinterested aim, have exercised a most appreciable influence on the moral and intellectual development of the Indian peoples. While I was in India as Viceroy I more than once encountered American public men, professors and divines travelling through the country with the sole object of forming a just appreciation of British rule. Readily would I appeal to their enlightened and dispassionate verdict. In one case it was given to me, before its author had left Calcutta, in the shape of a draft for \$150,000 to be devoted to whatever purpose I might select for the benefit of the native peoples, in recognition of the administrative blessings which the donor was convinced, from the evidence of his own eyes, that Britain had conferred upon the country.

In these circumstances it might seem superfluous that an

Englishman should be called upon to say anything about the work of his own race, still more one who was himself engaged for nearly seven years in the task of Indian administration. And yet if we are entitled to assume, as I think we may, that no one can rule India without an overwhelming sense of the moral responsibilities of the undertaking, or without acquiring the right to speak with some authority as to its distinguishing features, he may perhaps even have a special claim to be heard. If he be in a position to add that America contributed no small share to the easing of his burden, and to such measure of good fortune as may have attended his steps, may he not find therein an additional passport to the hearing of that great community across the seas?

The charges that are made against British rule in India by speakers or writers in America differ in no respect from those which are uttered by agitators of the advanced or national party in India itself, or by those English politicians who, too often seeking a seat in the British Parliament as a means of airing doctrinaire views, are a persistent medium of discord between India and England, embarrassing the home Government in the discharge of its complex and delicate duties, raising false and often cruel hopes in India itself, misrepresenting the nature of the problem to their ignorant countrymen and preaching everywhere the fallacious doctrine that Eastern ailments can be cured (in reality they are often aggravated) by Western prescriptions. From all these sources we learn with an almost monotonous iteration that Great Britain holds India for her own selfish advantage, that her methods of rule are harsh and unsympathetic, that the Indians are allowed neither scope nor hope in the government of their country, that the people are becoming poorer, the soil more unproductive, even the visitations of Providence more alarming. This amazing picture, the product sometimes of a perverse malignity, at others of a culpable ignorance, is held up to audiences who have neither the means nor the experience to correct it, and who, even if they are repelled by the obvious exaggeration, may yet be pardoned if they carry away the notion that there must be something wrong in a system that can admit even of such a caricature.

I might say in reply that I have never met, and do not believe that there exists, an impartial observer who would not in-

dignantly repudiate this travesty. But, after all, the best method to refute calumny is to refer not merely to authority, but to facts. These facts are accessible in books, in publications, in documents, in Parliamentary papers. Once a year the India office in London publishes an admirable statement entitled "The Moral and Material Progress of India"; and once in every ten years a more compendious summary is issued. But in England—I do not know if it is the same in America—an almost immediate oblivion settles down upon official literature. It is condemned as unreadable because it is serious, as interesting because it emanates from Government, and as suspect because its conclusions are supported by a panoply of figures and facts. From time to time, therefore, it seems necessary for some public man to draw attention once more to the familiar facts, and with such weight, if any, as he may derive from personal authority or experience, to readjust the balance of public opinion.

In the course of last year I delivered an address to a literary and philosophical institute at Edinburgh, in which I endeavored to describe the place of India in the British Empire, and to appraise the advantages which both parties have derived and still derive from the connection. Much of this would not be specially interesting to an American audience; although to any student of history a more philosophic or enthralling theme could scarcely be suggested than an examination of the part which the acquisition of India has played in the expansion and continues to play in the maintenance of British world-power. De Tocqueville said that the conquest and government of India were really the achievement that had given to England her place in the eyes of the world. The great Napoleon had one eye always upon the East; and the ambitions of the earlier part of his career, until they were shattered by his failure in Egypt or confined by European complications, always contemplated a move upon India as the death blow of the power that stood between him and universal dominion and as the secret of universal dominion itself.

I am far from saying that the question at issue ought to be decided exclusively upon a balance of gain or loss, or that any mathematical calculation can be expected of factors which often elude strict analysis. But there is so frequently a tendency in India to assume that the advantage of the connection is mainly or wholly on the side of England, and perhaps in England to

think that India is the chief gainer, that a comparison of the advantages conferred upon both may not be without value in enabling both parties to arrive at an unbiassed judgment.

First let me endeavor to state what India gives to Great Britain and the Empire; for that she is a source of great material and political advantage to them has always been one of my favorite propositions. From her abounding population she has supplied England with labor for the exploitation of Empire lands in all parts of the globe. Few persons probably have any clear idea of the extent or variety of this service. After the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, had it not been for the supply of Indian labor, many of the islands must have fallen out of cultivation, and would probably long before now have been transferred by cession or secession to another flag. In Trinidad there are now 86,000 East-Indians and in Jamaica 10,000. With the opening of the Panama Canal, these islands will gain enormously in material and strategic value, and their continued possession will be an Imperial asset of the first importance. But for a similar relief, Mauritius, where there are 206,000 East-Indians, would probably have fallen to France, and British supremacy in the Indian Ocean would have been in grave peril. We should never have been able to exploit our South-American colony of British Guiana without Indian labor; the Indian population there is now 105,000 out of a total of 278,000. We have even been able to spare surplus labor for other Powers, the French in Réunion, and the Dutch in Dutch Guiana. Indian coolies have penetrated to the remote Pacific; and the Fiji Islands contain 17,000. Africa, which from its proximity to India, supplies a natural field for Indian labor, can tell a similar tale. The planters of Natal would not have been able to develop that colony had it not been for an Indian population, which is now 115,000 strong and exceeds in numbers the European inhabitants of the State. The Uganda Railway was constructed by more than 20,000 Indian coolies, and Indian labor was more than once sought of me by the late Cecil Rhodes. Every year an emigrant force of from 15,000 to 20,000 coolies leaves the ports of India for these distant fields. There is another side to the question also. The benefit is reciprocal, both in relief to the congestion of India and in occupation and wages to large numbers of poor men.

Men, too, are available from India for another and a more

dramatic form of Imperial service. Natal would not have been saved in the Boer war of 1899-1900, and the European legations at Peking would not have been rescued in the Boxer rising in China in 1900 but for the contingents that were despatched to the scene of war from India. To South Africa I sent out in the Boer campaign 13,200 British officers and men from the British army in India, and 9,000 natives, principally followers. To China we despatched from India 1,300 British officers and men, 20,000 native troops and 17,500 native followers.

Nor were these mercenary forces employed against their will to fight the battles of a distant Government. Not a war can take place in any part of the British Empire in which the Indian Princes do not come forward with voluntary offers of armed assistance; and the fact that the native army was not allowed to stand by the side of the British in repelling the Boer invasion of Natal in 1899 was actually made the subject of attacks upon the Government in India—so keenly was the popular sentiment in favor of Indian participation aroused. I was in India throughout the South-African and Chinese wars. Though not far short of 30,000 troops, British and Indian, were at one time away from the country, perfect tranquillity prevailed; and while the inveterate foes of England may have sneered at the early reverses to our arms, there could be no question of the genuineness of the rejoicings when the tide turned and the news of victory was flashed along the wires.

The actual strength of the army in India is now 74,000 British troops and 150,000 native troops, to which must be added 2,700 British officers attached to the latter and 1,000 staff officers, or a total of 227,700. There are, further, 35,000 men in the Native Reserve, 33,000 European and Eurasian Volunteers and nearly 20,000 Imperial Service troops. The total net military expenditure in 1907-08 (including military works) was nineteen and one-half millions sterling.

By a wise provision in the Act of 1858, it is laid down that, "except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of His Majesty's Indian dominions or urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by His Majesty's forces." But this, which was a necessary safe-

guard against the unauthorized employment of Indian troops beyond the frontiers or shores of India, does not prevent the employment of these forces with the full knowledge of Parliament and at the expense of the Imperial Treasury; and the knowledge that there is always present in India, in a high state of efficiency and ready for instant mobilization, one of the finest fighting forces in the world, adds materially to the strength of the British position alike in Asia and Africa. The argument that because some portions of the Indian army have at different times been spared there must be more than enough for the needs of the country, is a singularly feeble one, for it would equally apply to any country a portion of whose forces was engaged on foreign service, and it entirely ignores the fact that the security of India in the absence of any considerable number of her troops depends not upon the numerical sufficiency of the remainder, but upon the British command of the sea. As a matter of fact, in relation to the population of India, the Indian army is by far the smallest in the world. I entertain no doubt that as long as the military feeling survives among the old fighting races of India, and the loyalty of the native army resists, as it has hitherto done, the efforts that are made to tamper with it, Indian forces will be able to come to the assistance of the British in any field where native troops can properly be employed. But it would be neither proper nor wise to make too frequent a use of this advantage; neither can it be expected that the springs of recruitment in India will forever remain unexhausted. As regards the argument which is sometimes heard from extreme native politicians that the British army in India is an expensive luxury which might be dispensed with or reduced, such is not the view that is entertained by any responsible person acquainted with the facts, and if the British contingent in India were by some incredible act of folly to be diminished, nothing is more certain than that the men would have to be recalled, and probably after a heavy price had been paid for their absence.

The presence, therefore, of a large army, European and native, in India is not only a source of security to India, but lends strength to the British position everywhere and is the most effective practical guarantee for peace in the Asiatic continent. As I shall show presently, it is also a source of much advantage to the Indians themselves.

A more familiar thesis is the material services rendered by India to Great Britain in the sphere of business and trade. That India is one of the main fields for the employment of British capital, that she supplies in abundance the raw material of a great deal of our industry and much of the food on which we live, and that she furnishes the richest market for our manufactures, are propositions which are widely known. But in what relation the Indian trade stands to that of the Empire is less realized. One-tenth of the entire trade of the British Empire passes through the seaports of India; and this sea-borne trade is more than one-third of the trade of the Empire outside the United Kingdom. It is greater than that of Australia and Canada combined, and within the Empire Indian sea-borne trade is second only to that of the United Kingdom. India has become the largest producer of food and raw material in the Empire and the principal granary of Great Britain, the imports into the United Kingdom of wheat, meal and flour from India exceeding those of Canada and being double those of Australia. At the same time, India is the largest purchaser of British produce and manufactures, and notably of cotton goods. Moreover, it must be remembered that under the existing system English cotton manufactures imported into India pay a duty only of three and one-half per cent., a countervailing excise duty of equivalent amount being at the same time levied on Indian manufactures. This may be contrasted with the heavy tariffs which British goods have to pay in the ports of our own colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. During the past three years the proportions of the import trade of India enjoyed by Great Britain have been forty-five, forty-eight and fifty-seven millions, or a percentage of about sixty-seven per cent. in each year; her proportion of the exports has averaged twenty-six per cent. These figures are enough to show how excellent a customer is India of Great Britain. On the other hand, be it remembered that the whole of the appliances by which this great trade has been built up—the roads, railroads, canals, harbors, docks, telegraphs, posts, etc.—have been created during the period of British rule, and largely by capital supplied from England. Indeed, the amount of British capital invested in India for its commercial and industrial development (including the employment of its people) is estimated as at least £350,000,000.

To me, however, it is less in its material than in its moral and educative aspects that India has always appeared to confer so incomparable a boon upon the British race. No one now taunts the British aristocracy with treating India as a playground for its sons. There is not much play there for the Government official at any time, and, such as he is, he is drawn from all classes of the British community. Just as the Indian army is to the young subaltern the finest available school of manhood and arms, so also the Indian Civil Service is a training-ground for British character that is not without its effect both upon the Empire and the race. The former service is demonstrated by the constant drain upon India for irrigation officers and engineers, for postal and telegraph and forest officers, for financiers and administrators all over the world. The men whom she has trained are to be encountered in regions as far apart as Nigeria and China, the Cape and Siam. They are among the administrative pioneers of the Empire. To those officers of the Civil Service who never leave the country no such field of adventure opens. But India develops in them a sense of duty and a spirit of self-sacrifice, as well as faculties of administration and command which are among the greatest glories of the British race. Acting and not talking, working and not boasting, they pursue their silent and often unknown careers, bequeathing a tradition to their families which is sometimes perpetuated for generations, and leaving a permanent and wholesome imprint on the national character.

When we recall the names of the great men whom service in India has produced—some of them among the heroes of the Anglo-Saxon race—we feel that it is a greater benefaction on the part of India to have exalted and disciplined the national character than it is to have put money into our purses or extended our Imperial sway.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

(To be Concluded.)

THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF AMERICA IN ITALY.

BY THE MOST REVEREND JOHN IRELAND, ARCHBISHOP OF ST. PAUL.

A STATEMENT of the Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church of America relative to the mission maintained by that Church in Italy was given to the public from Philadelphia May 9th by the Secretary of the Board, Bishop Wilson. The statement is important, referring as it does, in most official form, to the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Italy and in connection with this to a recent occurrence in Rome in which a most distinguished American citizen, however much without will or expectation of his own, was made to take a notable part. The statement of the Bishops upholds and justifies the work of the Methodist mission in Italy, claims that adverse criticism of that work is nought else than falsehood and calumny, and assigns to the mind of the Vatican in its connection with the aforesaid occurrence other motives than those avowed by the Cardinal Secretary of State, said by him to rise from the attitude which the Vatican holds itself obliged to adopt towards the work of the Methodist mission. Truth with regard to the Methodist mission and justice with regard to the Vatican bid me controvert *in toto* the statement of the Bishops.

The pertinent points in the statement of the Bishops follow:

"We cannot allow to pass unnoticed the recent unprovoked and unwarranted attempt to discredit one of our most useful missions by widely published accusations which if based upon truth would bring dishonor upon the Church which supports that mission.

"We regret that after repeated challenges for details of the specific acts supposed to justify these charges they still remain in such general terms that their validity cannot be tested before the judgment of the world. We can only observe: That the methods of our mission in Italy,