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THE REORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

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CAN the factions which prior to 1912 composed the Republican party be reunited; and if so upon what common grounds, and what should be done to bring such reunion about?

Before attempting an analysis of the differences between the opposing elements a few general observations are appropriate.

Every permanent political party is identified by a few well-defined principles. These principles form its groundwork, and are substantially unchangeable. A radical departure from them would destroy the identity of the party, and would forfeit the right to a use of its name. However, there may come about such a change in conditions as to justify a material modification of their application. When the exact conditions are not generally known, a difference of opinion as to the application of one or more of them may be entertained, and factions be thus created; but this does not affect the principle itself; and as reasonable men can agree upon a method of ascertaining the facts, there is no justification for such a division to become permanent.

Again, the changing conditions in society present from

time to time new questions. These questions generally relate to some supposed need, which is either soon met or is shown not to exist, and, therefore, passes out of consideration. For illustration, for some years previous to 1893, there was a demand that railroad companies equip their rolling stock with safety appliances. In that year, after extensive hearings, such an act was passed, which has since been extended by amendments, and as there is no demand now even upon the part of the railroad companies for its repeal, that question no longer exists. Questions of this character are in a broad sense political, because they relate to the welfare of society, and require consideration by legislative bodies; but it is often better that they be kept out of the wrangle of organized politics altogether. It is not every good principle relating to human need or conduct that should be incorporated into political platforms. The merits of many principles are so palpable that it must be assumed that they are generally favored by the public. Furthermore, it is not infrequent that a meritorious measure is defeated because it is championed by the minority party.

It is apparent that such questions are continually arising, and that about some of them there may be many shades of belief. Hence, if a platform embraces many of them, some adherents of the party are certain to be more or less out of line with its declared principles. But as every citizen can not have a platform which conforms to his ideas in every respect, he is not justified in abandoning the party for that reason unless the declaration from which he dissents be of such importance as to overshadow for the time being the party's permanent principles.

As the National Government is separate from the several State governments, so in a very large measure should National politics be kept separate from the politics of the several States. In each State the National and State laws supplement each other, the two together making a harmonious whole. So in politics the National platform should be confined to National policies and the State platform should supplement the principles there declared by setting forth the principles which the party favors in conducting the affairs of the State. The conditions of society in one State may be entirely different from its condition in another, and hence a local policy good for one might be disastrous

to another. The fact that the sentiment of society relating to a principle applicable to local government only is opposite in one State to what it is in another, can afford no valid reason why the majority in both should not favor the same party nationally. What right has a Republican in Massachusetts to impose his views as to some local matter upon the Republicans of California? Each State has its own local problems, and the party therein should be left to choose its own attitude as to them; and it is apparent that if a party's National policies are sound, the citizen who believes in them is not best conserving the interests of his country by abandoning the party nationally, because he can not quite agree with some of its local policies. There are, however, certain principles which apply to both State and National Government, as for illustration, laws relating to commerce. Congress may enact laws regulating *interstate* commerce, while purely *intrastate* commerce must be controlled by State laws. But even in such instances the National platform should not be considered binding as to what attitude should be taken upon the subject by the party in each State, because the conditions in one locality may be entirely different from what they are generally, and the party in the State must be permitted to decide for itself what policy it will adopt locally.

One more general observation. In these latter days the word "progressive" is much in use. There are "progressive" Republicans, and others who feel that they can not afford longer to be called Republicans, yet there is much doubt as to the real difference between these Progressives and those who are still content with the old party name. It is certain that the shades of belief among the many varieties of Progressives are about as distinct as between some of them and the so-called "Stand Patters" or old-line Republicans. The real condition appears to be that there has been within the last few years a shifting of political ideals along rather indefinite lines, but arising largely from the belief that public servants have not had proper regard for the public welfare. It may be that some Republicans have hardly kept pace with this change of sentiment; but this was because the country has prospered under old-time Republican policies; and they regard the evidence insufficient to warrant the belief that a radical change would be profitable, and not because of any

corrupt motives or desire to oppress the masses for the benefit of the few, as has been often charged. The leaders of these various factions are in the main patriots; and certainly there is no reason why the rank and file should not desire to promote the welfare of the country. If there could be a temperate exchange of views, it would be found that all desire the principles and policies of the Republican party to be such as would best conserve the public interests under the conditions now existing, and that the differences of opinion as to those policies are not nearly so great as the heated controversy through which we have passed is supposed to indicate.

How can these differences be so very great? There was no controversy as to principles in the preconvention contest in 1908, or in the convention held in that year, nor was there during the ensuing campaign any desertion from the party or any complaint among its adherents resulting from its declaration of principles. It was generally understood that the party platform then adopted was prepared in Washington, and received the express sanction of some who are now the leaders of the most conservative Republicans and also of the most radical Progressives. What change in social or economic conditions occurred during the four succeeding years that justified the disruption of a party reaffirming those principles?

Having made these general observations, let us ascertain as far as possible the real differences between the factions which in 1908 composed the Republican party, and upon what grounds these factions may be reunited. The subject may be divided into two general heads, the first of which relates to principles of government, and the second to party organization and control.

The views and policies of the extreme Progressives are set forth in the platform of the Progressive party; and hence, the views between which there exist the greatest differences may be ascertained by comparing that platform with the Republican platform adopted in 1912. That there are differences between the principles therein declared, some of which are serious, can not be questioned; yet as to nearly all of them, is there not a common ground acceptable to all, and as to those differences which are serious, are there a material number of Republicans and former Republicans who are really out of harmony with the Re-

publican view? A brief consideration of the two platforms, will, I think, afford answers to these questions.

With reference to a protective tariff, there is no substantial difference between the Republicans and Progressives. All believe, and both platforms in effect declare, that American industries should be protected to such an extent as will enable domestic producers to pay a liberal wage to their employees and still compete on equal terms with their foreign competitors. The Progressive platform denounced the Payne-Aldrich bill because they believed many articles are protected thereby beyond this requirement. The Republicans have never contended that that bill is a perfect measure, and concede that some reductions should be made; but both platforms advocate the creation of a tariff board to make an impartial and exhaustive investigation of the cost and conditions of production both at home and abroad so that the principle as to which all agree may be properly applied.

Upon the following subjects both platforms express substantially the same views: limitation of campaign funds, the parcels post, improvement of inland waterways, prevention of Mississippi River floods, inquiry into and removal of causes of high cost of living, establishment of agricultural credits, conservation of natural resources, development of Alaska coal-fields under terms preventive of monopoly, and protection of American citizens against discriminations by foreign governments. The parcels post has been established, a Department of Labor created, and a bill passed providing for the valuation of railroads as favored in the Progressive platform, and hence these questions have been eliminated. Mere mention of the following principles enunciated in the Progressive platform will show that no material differences can exist among Republicans, or in fact among all American citizens, in regard to those subjects, to wit: a more compact organization of the health service; the enactment of a patent law that will prevent the suppression of patents and their use against the public welfare in the interest of monopolies; the co-operation of the Federal Government with producers and manufacturers in extending foreign commerce, and the appointment of diplomatic and consular officers with a view to their fitness and worth; the extension of good roads and rural free delivery; the use of the Panama Canal primarily for the benefit of the American people, and that it be maintained in such a way as to create competi-

tion between the ships using it and the transcontinental railway lines; the imposition of an inheritance and also an income tax; governmental action to prevent the congestion of immigrants in cities; and the application of the Civil Service Act to all non-political offices, and the enactment of an equitable retirement law.

With reference to the Navy, the Republican party favors the maintenance of a Navy adequate for the National defense, while the Progressive party favors building two battleships a year until an international agreement for the limitation of naval forces shall be made.

On the currency question neither platform is specific, except that the Progressives declare the present method of issuing notes through private agencies harmful and unscientific and oppose the Aldrich currency bill without offering any definite system. This question, though an important one, was mentioned but little during the campaign, and it certainly did not even contribute to the party division.

Much stress was laid during the campaign upon the Progressive plank denominated "Social and Industrial Justice." This plank declares in favor of both National and State legislation designed to promote the health and better the condition of laborers in the respects described, and prohibiting child labor, regulating wages and hours and time of service of women, and abolishing convict labor. In so far as these principles apply to the National Government, the legislation heretofore enacted by Congress shows that there is no substantial disagreement as to them. Among the laws passed relating to this subject are the several acts requiring rolling stock for railroads to be equipped with safety appliances; those fixing hours of service for laborers working on Government contracts, also hours of service for Government employees, and the minimum consecutive hours railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce may remain on duty, and the employer's liability act. In fact, the field for additional legislation of this character by Congress is not large.

The Progressive platform declares in favor of female suffrage. This, as are many of the other matters above mentioned, is strictly a State and not a National question. The Constitution of the United States has left it with the States to determine the qualifications of those who shall exercise the elective franchise even as to National matters;

and the National Government has no more right morally or legally to compel New York to enfranchise its women than it has to compel California to disfranchise its female citizens. Each State must determine for itself whether female suffrage will best promote its interests.

The initiative, referendum, and recall advocated in the Progressive platform is by its express terms limited to State action; and hence, however much many Republicans may oppose these methods of holding officials responsible to the people, and of giving the people an opportunity to initiate and reject legislation, there is no necessity that such dispute should divide the National organization. The same is also true as to the plank relating to the courts. The only suggestion as to the powers of the *Federal* courts is that "every decision of the highest appellate court of a State declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional on the ground of its violation of the Federal Constitution shall be subject to the same review by the Supreme Court of the United States as is now accorded to decisions sustaining such legislation." This favors an extension and not a restriction of the powers of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Now let us consider those matters about which there is substantial disagreement.

The Republican platform favors the enforcement of the present Anti-Trust Law, but also declares that as to its criminal feature it should be so amended as to define with certainty what acts constitute an offense; while the Progressive platform urges the establishment of a strong Federal administration commission of high standing, which shall maintain permanent active supervision over industrial corporations engaged in interstate commerce, or such of them as are of public importance, doing for them what the Government now does for National banks, and what is now done for the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission. That is, the one party favors the prohibition of trusts and monopolies and the other their supervision and regulation by a commission. Here is certainly a vital difference. The merits of the two principles can not be here discussed, except to say that it would certainly be unwise to reverse the present policy before the most thorough test is made of its efficacy. If the policy of prohibiting monopolies and of maintaining competition

be demonstrated to be erroneous it will be an easy matter to change to the policy of regulation. But if great combinations and monopolies be permitted to arise by sanction of law, if such policy be found to be unwise, how could it then be changed from regulation to prohibition? There is certainly no popular demand for the *regulation* of trusts; and it is believed that comparatively few voters gave adherence to the Progressive party on account of this plank in its platform. A Republican Congress enacted the Federal Anti-Trust Law for which the party through its conventions when largely dominated by those who are now Progressives have often claimed credit; and practically all of those who were Republicans before the Convention of 1912 are undoubtedly in accord with the party on this question.

The Progressive platform pledges the party to "provide a more easy and expeditious method of amending the Federal Constitution." This is favored because, it says, a free people should have the power from time to time to amend their fundamental law so as to adapt it progressively to the changing needs of the people. This is directly opposed to the traditions and principles of the Republican party, which has always favored a strong central government and opposed every effort to weaken its stability. There is not a need of the people suggested in the Progressive platform which can not be sufficiently met by legislation within the Constitution as now written. It would be far better for the welfare of the country if instead of criticizing and thus destroying respect for that instrument, the people were taught to treat it as sacred; far better that it be imperfect but loved and revered, than perfect but despised and disrespected. The fact that it has been twice amended within the last four years demonstrates that it can be amended with sufficient ease. There is no demand for such a modification of our fundamental law, and it will be unfortunate for the Republic if such a demand shall become general.

Apparently, therefore, by the exercise of a reasonable amount of patience and by a display of a reasonable liberal spirit, an agreement between the different factions of the party can be reached so far as political principles are concerned.

The most important subjects relating to the organization and control of the party are, the basis of representation in the National Convention, the powers of the National Com-

mittee, and methods of choosing the delegates which compose the National Convention.

A brief historical review of the present basis of representation will be of interest. The first National Convention met at Pittsburgh on February 22, 1856, in response to a call made by a number of chairmen of State Committees, as recited, "in accordance with what appears to be the general desire of the Republican party, and the suggestion of a large portion of the Republican press." This convention was necessarily informal, and the principal business transacted was the issuance of an address and adoption of resolutions, and also the selection of a "National Executive Committee," consisting of a delegate from each of several States. On March 29, 1856, this Committee called a convention to meet in Philadelphia on June 17th, those favoring their principles being invited "to send from each State, three delegates from each Congressional District and six delegates at large." By resolution of the convention it was provided that in voting for a candidate for President, each State should be limited in its votes "to three times the number of electors to which such State is entitled"

In the call issued by the National Committee for the next convention (1860), the invitation was "to send from each State two delegates from each Congressional District, and four delegates at large to the Convention." On the incoming of the report of the Committee on Credentials, a lengthy discussion occurred over the representation from certain Southern States and Oregon, and the matter was recommitted to the committee; and in its subsequent report, which was adopted, the vote of Texas was reduced to six. After nominations had been made, Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, offered a resolution providing that thereafter "the basis of the nominating vote be fixed as near as may be in proportion to the number of Republican electors found to reside, at the last general State election preceding the nomination, in each Congressional District throughout the Union." This resolution was laid upon the table without debate.

In the call for the Convention of 1868 it was recited that "each State in the United States" was entitled to a number of delegates equal to twice its number of Senators and Representatives; and the National Committee interpreted this to exclude certain Southern States on the theory that they were not in the United States, but the convention

ordered that all States be called; and the report of the Committee on Rules, which was adopted, provided that four votes should be cast by the delegates at large for each State, and that each Congressional District should be entitled to two votes. However, some of the Southern States and a number of Congressional Districts were not represented. While the basis of representation has been the same ever since, except that delegates with the power to vote have been added from the Territories and the District of Columbia, yet it has not thus remained without dissent. In the Convention of 1884, on motion of Mr. Pierce, of Pennsylvania, the subject of a revised apportionment of delegates to future national conventions was referred to the Committee on Rules; and a minority report signed by eight members of the Committee was submitted, which provided for four delegates at large for each State, and one additional delegate for each Representative at large, and for one delegate from each Congressional District and an additional delegate for each ten thousand or majority fraction thereof of votes cast at the last preceding Presidential election. After a lengthy and spirited debate, the minority report was withdrawn. In the Convention of 1900, when the report of the Committee on Rules was submitted, Senator Quay moved a substitute for the Rule relating to the composition of the convention, which provided that thereafter each State should be entitled to four delegates at large and one additional delegate for each ten thousand votes or majority fraction thereof cast at the last preceding election for Republican electors, and that each organized Territory and the District of Columbia should be entitled to six delegates, the method of the selection of delegates to be provided for by the National Committee. After some discussion the matter was passed till the following day, when the motion was withdrawn.

In the Convention of 1908, Mr. Burke, of Pennsylvania, presented a resolution relating to the basis of representation, which was sent to the Committee on Rules. A minority report was submitted, signed by fifteen members of that Committee, recommending substantially the same basis as to the States as that presented by Senator Quay in 1900. After a prolonged discussion, the convention refused to substitute the minority for the majority report by the vote of 471 to 506.

The present plan can not be justified either by practical

results or by theory. It is easily understood why in the conventions preceding, during, and immediately after the Civil War special consideration was given those who for principles had forfeited all social ties with and incurred the bitter odium of their former friends. Furthermore, for some time after the enfranchisement of the negro it was supposed that the Republican Party would be powerful in the South on account of his presence there, and that favorable recognition of that section in the national conventions would tend to preserve and strengthen that power. But time has proven the fallacy of that supposition. This system has not only failed to strengthen the party in the Southern States, but, for reasons so apparent that they need not here be stated, in many sections has greatly tended to weaken its prestige.

Doubtless the present system had its origin in the Constitutional method of electing Presidents; but the underlying principles in the two systems are in sharp conflict. The Constitution provides that for the election of Presidents each State shall appoint a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress; and by another provision in the Constitution the Representatives are apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. Hence, those electors who correspond to the Representatives are apportioned according to population.

There is a material difference between the election of a President and the nomination of a candidate for President by a political party. In the first instance the choice of the *entire voting population* is expressed through the electoral college, while in the latter the choice of *the party* is expressed through the convention. The nomination is made by the party, and is not participated in by those outside the party; and the nominee personifies the party's principles and ideals. Hence, the delegates selecting him should represent proportionately the membership of the party, and not the population of the United States, as is now done except as to delegates from the States at large.

If this is the correct principle, a few statistics will show how far the present system is wrong. In 1908 the seven extreme Southern States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas cast 159,948 votes for Mr. Taft. In the Convention of 1912 these

States had one hundred and sixty delegates. Pennsylvania and New York cast respectively 448,785 and 667,100 votes for Mr. Taft, or nearly three and four times as many as all the States mentioned combined, and yet the former State had only 76 and the latter 90 delegates in that convention. The injustice is just as glaring when comparison is made between those and other Southern States. Tennessee and North Carolina together cast 233,406 votes, or 73,458 more than the States mentioned; yet they had only 48 delegates. And the State of Kentucky gave Mr. Taft 244,092 votes, or 85,144 more than all of those States, and yet it had in the Convention only 26 delegates. The entire eleven distinctly Southern States, which include those first mentioned and Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, cast but 502,551 votes for Mr. Taft, or 164,549 less than the State of New York alone; but they had a combined delegation of 252 members, or nearly one-fourth of the entire convention. Such a condition could not possibly have been perpetuated had it not been to the interest of those who from time to time have controlled the party.

There appears no just reason why the delegates should not be apportioned according to the Republican vote cast in 1908. The total Republican vote of that year was something over seven and a half millions; hence if thus apportioned and if the convention be composed of about the same number of delegates as that of 1912, the basis should be one delegate to every 7,000 votes or a majority fraction thereof. In general, delegates should also be chosen by Congressional Districts and not by States, as by so doing the sentiments of each section would be represented. In States containing districts which on this basis would not be entitled to a delegate, from the vote cast by the entire State the vote of those districts which have delegates might be deducted, and the remaining delegates to which the State is entitled be selected by the delegates to the State convention from outside the districts entitled to representation. This plan is a mere suggestion, and has not been worked out to ascertain what the results would be in the several States.

It has been suggested by some that a reapportionment of delegates can be made by the National Committee without additional authority being conferred upon that body by a national convention. That the Committee is vested with no

power to give substantial relief of that kind can admit of no doubt. Precedents could be cited which show that both the Committee and national conventions have distinctly recognized that no such power is possessed by the Committee, but such citations are unnecessary.

The first rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted for the government of the Convention of 1908 provides that "*Hereafter* the Convention shall consist of a number of delegates from each State," etc. By the twelfth rule of the report provision is made for the National Committee, and it is authorized to designate the manner in which the delegates shall be chosen. In the Convention of 1912, the first rule in the report of the Committee on Rules adopted the language of the first rule in 1908, but it appears that the entire report of the Committee was laid upon the table; and the National Committee therefore are still acting under the rules adopted in 1908. Hence, the very document under which the Committee exists expressly specifies the basis of representation, and thereby excludes every implied power relating thereto that might otherwise exist. The use of the word "hereafter" in this connection appears to have originated in the Convention of 1908, as theretofore the rules provided for the representation in the convention then organized, and not, except by implication, for representation in subsequent conventions.

But if the Committee possessed such power it would be unwise to exercise it. Such a fundamental change would create great dissatisfaction unless made after the most mature consideration by a regularly called and organized convention.

There has been much criticism of the National Committee with reference to the manner in which it has made up the temporary rolls of delegates. This power is certainly a far-reaching one, as the permanent control of the convention largely depends upon the temporary roll. It may be interesting, therefore, to learn whence such power was derived.

In the Convention of 1864 Thaddeus Stevens moved "that all contested cases be laid over, and that the delegates from such States shall not be entered on the roll until the credentials shall have been sent to a Committee on Credentials and reported back," which motion was adopted; and the States whose delegates were contested had no representation on the Credentials Committee. In the Convention of

1868 California and Maryland did not participate in the organization of the Convention, and were not represented on the Credentials Committee, because their delegations were contested; and for a like reason Utah and Dakota did not participate in the organization of the Convention of 1872. In organizing the Convention of 1876 it was moved "that in case of any State or Territory where there is a contest as to the proper delegation, or where there are contesting delegations, such State or Territory be passed upon the call of the roll," which motion was adopted after the District of Columbia was added.

For the Convention of 1880 the Committee appears for the first time to have prepared a temporary roll, from which they excluded Louisiana. Apparently no additional authority was given the Committee in this respect by the Convention of 1876; and it was a far-reaching innovation inaugurated on its own initiative. In the twelfth rule adopted in 1904, it was provided that "Twenty days before the day set for the meeting of the National Convention the credentials of each delegate and alternate shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the National Committee '*for use in making up the temporary roll of the Convention,*'" and the same provision appears in the rules adopted by the Convention of 1908. This was apparently an authoritative recognition by the convention of the power of the Committee to prepare such a roll.

It is easily seen how this power may be abused by a Committee; yet the former custom of excluding all contested delegations from participating in the organization of a convention is subject to equal, or even greater, abuse. Under such a system many frivolous contests might be instituted for no other purpose than to control the organization. But it might be more satisfactory than either of these methods for each convention to choose a number of persons well known for their probity and ability to perform that function for the succeeding convention, their jurisdiction to extend solely to a determination of whether contests are frivolous, with direction that where a contest has merit neither the contestees nor contestants shall appear upon the roll. At present there is no limitation upon the power of the Committee in this respect; and it has been accustomed to determine contests fully for all purposes relating to the temporary organization.

In considering the basis of representation and the powers of the National Committee it has been assumed that the nominations of candidates for President and Vice-President for a time at least will continue to be made by conventions, as otherwise the composition and organization of the convention are not matters of so great importance.

At present there exists no National primary law, and there is apparently no pronounced sentiment in favor of such a law, even if Congress has the power to enact it; and but few States have statutes which enable the voters to express a preference for a Presidential nominee.

Heretofore delegates have been selected generally by State and Congressional District conventions composed of delegates chosen by county conventions. In the smaller counties, and sometimes in counties of considerable size, these conventions are mass-meetings, in which every Republican present has the right to participate. As these meetings are now conducted it is doubtful whether any other scheme could be devised which would give greater opportunity for the real sentiments of the people of a county to be misrepresented.

For selecting delegates to the State convention a county convention is called, at the instance of the State Committee, by the County Committee or its Chairman, and the meeting is called to order by such Chairman, his sole duty being to receive nominations for temporary Chairman, take the vote thereon, and declare the result. In conventions called to select delegates to a Congressional convention this function is sometimes performed by the Congressional Committeeman for that county.

For several days preceding the convention the leaders of each faction engage in an effort to secure a larger attendance than their antagonists; and success by no means depends upon the sentiment of the people, unless the sentiment be pronounced and the popular interest great. Visits to county towns by most country people are infrequent. Many of them reside some distance away, and unless specially urged are unwilling to lose a day from their labor to attend a convention the only object of which is to choose delegates to another convention. But with a small amount of money a leader can employ messengers to canvass the entire county and make a personal appeal to many friends, and also leave a few dollars with an active citizen of each

neighborhood charged with the duty of bringing his friends to the meeting. It is apparent that thus a great advantage can be gained over an opponent who has no money to spend, or, if he had, would refuse to spend it for that purpose. Then naturally those most conveniently situated will attend in the largest numbers. A town upon a railroad, especially where one faction has sufficient funds to pay for transportation, will be largely represented; and sometimes a convention is overwhelmed by the employees of some factory temporarily closed for the purpose, or in large towns, by the riffraff, who for a small sum each are corralled and marched to the convention and voted in a body. When the time for opening the meeting arrives the principal struggle is over the election of a temporary chairman, as that affords the first test of strength, and the course of the convention is controlled largely by the presiding officer. If the person whose duty it is to call the meeting together is fair, he will see that the meeting is called in a room designated some time before the assembling, and large enough to hold all present; or, if such a room cannot be found, that it be called in the court-house yard or public square, that ample opportunity be given for the nomination of candidates, and that a division of the crowd be made and a count actually taken by impartial men selected from all factions, and that the result be declared according to the count. But if such person permits his personal preference to prevail over his sense of fairness he may call the meeting to order in a room packed with his friends while the opposition is forced to remain outside unrecognized; or he may permit the opposition to understand that the meeting will be called in one room, while secretly having the leaders of his faction fill another room with his friends, where it is actually called; or he may refuse a division and declare on a *viva voce* vote the candidate of his faction elected, and thus force the opposition to organize independently. In contests between delegates much stress is laid upon "regularity," and hence the importance of being selected by a convention the organization of which can be traced back to the regularly constituted source of authority. In such cases the opposition must rely upon showing that the unfairness of their antagonists was so glaring, and that they so greatly preponderated in numbers, that the technical claim of regularity should not be sustained. Sometimes, notwithstanding the

fairness of the presiding officer, the opposing faction under some pretext will organize an independent convention. In such instances they rely wholly upon the sympathies of those by whom the contest will be decided. Thus the seats of more than half the delegates to a Congressional District convention may be contested, or at least enough to determine the action of the convention. If the Congressional Committee assumes to prepare a temporary roll, the faction which the majority of such Committee favors has a great advantage, and the validity of its action will in all probability be denied by the other faction; or it may be that the uncontested delegates will undertake to organize the convention, which action will be attacked by those displeased by their action. Where there is a considerable number of contested delegates the result generally is that two conventions are held, and two delegations sent to the National Convention.

The same result may occur in a State convention, though on account of their size it is not so probable. When the matter is heard by the National Committee or the Credentials Committee of the National Convention, unless the contest be an unusual one, not more than thirty minutes, and often less, is given each side to present its claims, which is done without the introduction of witnesses, but by a mere statement made by some one selected for that purpose. It goes without saying that where the facts are complicated or doubtful such a hearing cannot inform the Committee of the real facts, and that the members of the Committee necessarily vote in accordance with their predilections.

This is the way the American people have been choosing candidates for the highest elective office which has ever existed. The wonder is that by such a crude system men of such high character and possessing such pronounced ability have always been chosen.

It is not intended to condemn political conventions in general, and to indorse primary elections as a substitute for them. This is especially so while but few States have laws regulating primaries. The holding of such elections is expensive; and when candidates are required to advance the means to defray those expenses, every person, regardless of merit, is excluded from the running who has not the necessary amount and is not willing to place himself under obligation to others for its advancement. Moreover,

primaries offer even greater opportunity than conventions for the improper use of large sums of money, and unless carefully guarded by law may be used as vehicles for gross frauds. Furthermore, the convention system possesses a peculiar merit for a self-governing people. There the statesman often has his first experience, and it is of much practical value for the leading citizens of a county to assemble and engage in a contest of this character which involves a choice of both persons and principles, provided the contest be fairly conducted.

The fundamental defect in the present system appears to be that there are no fixed rules which specify how such conventions shall be organized and their business conducted, and no method provided by which it may be determined in a judicial way whether such rules have been substantially adhered to.

In order to avoid county conventions packed in the manner described and to procure representation therein from each section of a county, it is suggested that they be composed of delegates from each district, township, or ward, selected by ballot, at such hour and place as would be most convenient for the people of each locality. This method is used to a considerable extent in large counties, and could be used with equal profit in counties less populous.

Then, definite rules should be prescribed for the government of all conventions which participate directly or indirectly in the selection of delegates to the National Convention, and a substantial compliance with such rules should be required. Such compliance can be accomplished by devising a method for determining contests by which the real merits of the claims of the respective parties can be thoroughly considered, which would necessitate a review of the proceedings, not only of the State and Congressional District conventions, but also of the county conventions upon whose action the rights of the contesting parties might depend. The task would probably not be a very great one, as the contests would be much fewer in number were conventions held under fixed rules, and it were understood that these rules would be strictly enforced. The body heretofore suggested charged with the duty of preparing a temporary roll might meet for such a length of time before the date of the convention as would enable them to thoroughly investigate each contest, sending a special agent upon the ground to take testi-

mony if necessary, and to report the facts for the benefit of the Credentials Committee.

Precautions equal to these are exercised every day by the courts of the country in determining the rights of private individuals in actions involving but a few hundred dollars, and there is no just reason why the same principles of justice should not be applied in contests upon which the welfare, and possibly the life, of the nation depends.

As suggested, these changes in the organization and government of the Republican party can be made only by a national convention; but there is grave doubt that the present is, or the immediate future will be, an opportune time for such a convention to assemble. The factional feelings engendered by the recent contest remain too intense for the coolest deliberation. A further season for reflection could be used with much profit by the leaders of the factions in the different States getting together and talking the situation over in a friendly way. In 1914 there will be a great contest involving the control of the Sixty-fourth Congress. Would it not be well to inaugurate that campaign with a national convention, dominated with such a spirit of liberality that it will awaken new enthusiasm in the party throughout the length and breadth of the land?

JAMES A. FOWLER.

AMERICAN AMBASSADORS ABROAD

BY ANGLO-AMERICAN

THE real reason, I take it, why the United States has no regular diplomatic service is that it has no regular foreign policy, and that American Ambassadors, in consequence, represent for the most part what is little more than a vacuum. In spite of the Spanish war and of semi-colonial holdings in the Pacific and the Caribbean, and in spite of the multiplication every year of fresh points of diplomatic contact with the outer world, the distinguishing fact of America's position in the general scheme of *Weltpolitik* is still, as it has always been, her comparative isolation. It would be an interesting venture, by the by, to trace the reflex action of this isolation upon the national character and to estimate how far the immunity of America from the effects, at once complicating and fortifying, of a constant external pressure has been a gain or a loss. But whatever one's opinion of its advantages and drawbacks, the fact itself is indisputable that, alone among the Great Powers, the United States is not menaced. Her size and strength and the accident of her geographical situation and surroundings, have combined to shield her in an almost unvexed tranquillity. Nothing endangers her national security. So far has fortune exempted her from the animosities and distractions that convulse the older world; so little is she ever called upon to realize that national safety, national existence even, depends to-day, as much as it ever did, upon brute force; so serenely does she stand apart from the elements of international strife—that one is almost tempted to think that a law of nature has been virtually suspended in her favor. With no enemies to guard against, no definite or even probable crisis to prepare for, knowing next to nothing of all that follows when two Powers of nearly equal strength and of possibly conflicting interests live within striking distance of each other, and herself, if not invul-