

That is why we are called upon to make haste, to the very utmost of our ability.

Our Allies are sorely stricken and distressed. Make haste to succor them before they fail. Our enemy is rampant and exultant. Make haste to strike him down before he increases his strength. Our own Republic is menaced by the possibility—it is still a possibility—of a Hunnish triumph.

“Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!”

### THE JAPANESE AGREEMENT

“THE bearings of this observation,” quoth the Ancient Sage, “lays in the application on it;” a sapient and lucid explanation which might with much pertinence be made concerning the “gentlemen’s agreement” which has just been concluded between the United States and Japan concerning their respective rights in China and the future status of that country.

We find, for example, among some of what Rufus Choate called “glittering and resounding generalities” about the Open Door, Equality of Opportunity, Independence, and Territorial Integrity, the following:

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. . . . The Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

We are quite willing to accept as axiomatic the general proposition that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, but we are by no means ready to concede that therefore Japan has special interests in China if by that stock phrase we are to understand interests different from and superior to those of other nations. For Japan’s territorial propinquity to China is by no means unique. The contiguity of her possessions with China is neither unique nor of nearly as long standing as that of the territories of other Powers.

The only Japanese territory which abuts upon China is Corea, which has belonged to Japan for only a little more than seven years. Great Britain, France and Russia have important territories abutting upon China along much more extended boundaries, which have belonged to them for much longer periods of time. It is therefore certainly pertinent to inquire whether they also are to be recognized as having, on grounds of territorial propinquity and contiguity, "special interests in China." If they have not, why not, if Japan is thus to be recognized? If they have, how do their special interests compare with those of Japan?

If we go beyond actual contiguity, and consider mere proximity, the same questions are raised in even more acute form. Our great American island of Luzon lies much nearer to the Chinese coast than does Japan itself, and scarcely further from the nearest important Chinese port, Canton, than does the nearest Japanese island, Formosa. In fact the Philippines have a propinquity to China differing only a little in degree and not at all in kind from that which Japan and her insular possessions have. If the propinquity of the latter is a basis for special interests, what becomes of that of the former?

We must in candor and friendship declare that upon the face of the case at least four other Powers; to wit, America, Great Britain, France and Russia, appear to have upon the ground of geographical position a title to special interests in China similar to that which is claimed by Japan and which Mr. Lansing's amiable note concedes to that Power; and we cannot help thinking that this "gentlemen's agreement" would have been stronger and would have given a surer guarantee of satisfactory permanence if it had in any way taken cognizance of that circumstance.

Again, the United States is made to express confidence that Japan has no desire "to disregard the commercial rights *heretofore* granted by China in treaties with other Powers." The italics are our own, and they call attention to the nub of the matter. Why, we are impelled to wonder, was that word "*heretofore*" inserted in Mr. Lansing's note? Has it any significance, as discriminating between treaties already made and those which may hereafter be made or be sought to be made? If it has no such significance, it is quite superfluous. Indeed, it is worse than superfluous, for it logically suggests a false idea. On the other hand, if it has such sig-

nificance, the way is opened for endless trouble; for we shall be tacitly recognizing Japan's right to supervise all future treaties which are made between the United States and China; and to intervene at will against the granting therein of commercial rights and concessions to this country, a state of affairs which could scarcely prove satisfactory.

These questions are not disposed of by the repeated and resounding assurances that "the territorial sovereignty of China remains unimpaired" and that both America and Japan "always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." Neither are they satisfactorily met by the declaration that both America and Japan are "opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China." This latter declaration is in itself eminently satisfactory. But how does it harmonize with that concession of "special interests"? We are in effect told that Japan has special interests in China which do not affect the independence or territorial integrity of that country, and which do not interfere with our enjoyment of equal opportunity with Japan herself in the commerce and industry of China. What, then, it will be asked, are those special interests? What is their scope? What do they affect, and effect? Of what value are they to Japan?

This agreement has been widely characterized as establishing a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East; suggesting, of course, that Japan is proclaiming such a doctrine in behalf of China, as we proclaimed it in behalf of Central and South America. In that view it will be pertinent to observe what "special interests" Japan should have in China, according to the analogy of our "special interests" in our American neighbors. As a matter of fact, there are none; or at any rate there are none beyond the limits already prescribed in the "open door" agreement of ten years ago. The United States does not claim and has never claimed any "special interests" in Latin America beyond the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries and the maintenance in them of the open door, or equality of opportunity in commerce and industry.

If there appear to be an exception to this rule in the sole

case of the Isthmian Canal, the answer is ready and obvious. Our original transit concession was acquired as a complement to a guarantee of sovereignty and integrity, and our objection to the acquisition of such a concession by any other Power was based not upon any pretension of "special interests" but upon the infringement of sovereignty and integrity which it would involve. As a matter of fact, we never effectively opposed even such a concession, which was granted again and again to more than one foreign Power, and we are at this very moment cordially acquiescing in the existence of a great British railroad across the Mexican isthmus, in rivalry with our own canal at Panama.

All we have insisted upon is that independence, sovereignty, integrity and the open door shall be maintained. Beyond that, no consideration nor circumstance of territorial propinquity, geographical position, or contiguity, has so much as suggested anything resembling "special interests" which might not freely and equally be claimed and possessed by the whole world. If in that sense a "Monroe Doctrine for the Far East" is being applied to China, well and good. But in that case, why these references to "special interests" and to the maintenance of treaty rights "heretofore" granted?

## BARNARD'S LINCOLN

[THE frontispiece of this number is an unsatisfying representation of George Gray Barnard's statue of Lincoln which has been sent, as a gift to the British Empire, to be set up in London. In consideration of the savage criticisms of what, as a layman, we regard as a masterpiece, largely manufactured in consequence of the expressed disapproval of Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, we sought and present herewith excerpts from the expert judgments of Mr. Frederick Mac Monnies, sculptor, Mr. Thomas Hastings, architect, and Mr. Richard Fletcher, art critic.—EDITOR.]

BY FREDERICK MAC MONNIES

IN response to Colonel Harvey's request to write my view of Barnard's Lincoln, I feel called upon to say before doing so that I consider a nation-wide organized attack upon the serious work of any intellectual—whether scientist, musician, or artist—with the object of preventing its being carried out, is a dangerous precedent. Constructive criticism, based on logic, seasoned with sympathetic imagination, tempered with moderation, analyzing, illuminating,—never presuming to pass a final verdict, is wholesome. Destructive