

Parents Go on Strike

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TODAY'S greatest strike is not in the automobile plants or the steel mills, not in any of our highly centralized industries, but in the only remaining great household pursuit — reproduction. Parents and could-be parents in America and several other countries are striking against unsatisfactory procreative conditions. Armed with birth-control, an important tactical instrument enabling them to reproduce or not reproduce as they wish, they are standing their ground. It is really a sit-down strike, because they are occupying the establishment (the home) and yet are not performing its function. This strike, scarcely noticed at present, is likely in the end to be the most important in history. Already a few nations are trying to break it in one way or another, but without success. Other nations, mainly those outside the sphere of European civilization, such as Japan, are free from birth-strike trouble but are suffering instead from an overproduction of babies. These look upon the procreative walk-out in Europe and America with mingled curiosity and hope.

The figures in this stupendous strike tell their own story. In practically all western countries the birth-rate has been steadily declining for an entire century. Whereas prior to 1850 most countries had enjoyed the extremely high annual rate of thirty to forty babies per thousand inhabitants, by 1920 most of these rates had dropped to twenty-five or less, and since 1920 there has been an unusually sharp drop, in some cases the number now being no more than thirteen or fourteen. We find, for example, that England and Wales had a birth rate of around thirty-

four per thousand until 1885. From that time the rate has diminished constantly until in 1933 it hit the very low figure of 14.4, and in 1935 still stood at only 14.7. Germany's rate dwindled from 39.2 in 1885 to 14.7 in 1933, but has since risen slightly to 18.9 in 1935. In the United States as far back as 1875 mothers gave us around thirty-seven babies per thousand persons, but in 1935 they gave us less than seventeen. Obviously the strike among parents has not been complete. It has been more of an *rw* "ca' canny" policy than a full walk-out. But it has nevertheless crippled our reproductive industry by more than fifty per cent of its previous output.

This in itself would be nothing to worry about. Indeed many persons, especially militant birth-controllers, see no problem in the falling birth-rate. But specialists in population have been pointing out for years that the present rate of procreation in northwestern Europe, Australia, America, and in fact wherever white civilization has reached its zenith, is not sufficient to maintain the existing numbers. If this is true it constitutes a genuine problem for the western world.

A strange thing, not commonly known, is that a people may for the moment maintain or even enhance its numbers with an annual excess of births over deaths, and yet be actually failing to reproduce itself. To understand how this paradoxical condition arises we must ascertain not how many babies are born per thousand inhabitants, but how many are born per woman in the child-bearing age. Since the age composition of a population can change (mainly as a result of past reproductive rates), it follows that the proportion of women of childbearing age may be large or small. If large, there may be more births than deaths even though each woman has very few children. But later this numerous body of women ages beyond the

fertile period, swells the ranks of the old and increases the death-rate. Deaths may then exceed births.

This becomes clearer if we concentrate, as Kuczynski and others have done, upon the average number of *girl-babies* born to a woman living through the child-bearing age. These girl babies are the future mothers who in turn will give birth to still another generation of girl-babies. If on the average women are failing to bear enough girl-babies to replace themselves later on, they are failing to reproduce the population. If, for example, the average woman passing the age of forty-five has borne only one-half of a female child, this means that for every hundred such women there will be, in the coming generation, only fifty women to replace them. Under such conditions the population is bound to decrease.

During the last half century the average number of female babies born per woman has declined sharply. Fifty years ago, in western and northern Europe as a whole, about two hundred and ten girls were born to one hundred women passing through the child-bearing age. But by 1933 the figure had fallen to ninety girls born to each one hundred women. The same is roughly true of the United States.

But we should bear in mind another aggravating factor. Even though one hundred women gave birth during their lifetime to one hundred females, these latter would not entirely replace them — because some of the girl babies would die before reaching, and others during, the childbearing age. Hence, in order to insure the maintenance of the population, the average woman must give birth to more than one girl baby. This fact makes the actual figures seem all the more sinister. We can state categorically that in Austria, Germany, Sweden, England, France, Finland, Denmark, Hungary, Australia and

New Zealand, the number of girls born per woman is insufficient to maintain the population. Statistics are not equally available for the United States, but the same ominous conclusion is probably true here as well.

Why, then, do we have the illusion that our birth-rate is sufficiently high to maintain the population? Primarily because, at present, most of the countries mentioned, including the United States, have growing populations in spite of the low number of births per individual woman. The secret, as indicated above, lies in the age distribution. Because we have had a high birth-rate in the past, there are now many people who are in the reproductive age. Naturally, even though most of these persons have comparatively few offspring, the total number of children is great enough to give us an increase in numbers.

But this false paradise cannot last forever. Gradually the huge number of people in the childbearing age will grow older. They will not be entirely replaced by those who come after them. Already the number of children is diminishing. In 1934 there were nine per cent fewer children under five years of age in the United States than in 1930, and seven per cent fewer in the age group 5 to 10. The following passage is from O. E. Baker's study of population and the national welfare, published by the United States Department of Agriculture.

With urbanization the nation is becoming middle-aged, and the prospect is that old age will creep upon it prematurely — only twenty-five to fifty years hence. During the next quarter century there should be the strength of middle-age, and then, unless the birth-rate rises, or there is heavy immigration from abroad, a decline will set in. No nation can suffer such a decrease in births to continue as that during the last decade — over twenty per cent — and not suffer the decline in strength that accompanies a rapid aging of the population.

As the proportion of aged persons rises, the fruit of the present low birth-rates will be reaped, for the population will begin actually to decline. The number of persons born will be less than the number who die — for the latter will have multiplied enormously.

The process is more advanced in England than in this country. It has been reliably estimated that, even if present fertility does not diminish further, the English population will reach its peak in 1943 and will then begin to decline, falling to 38,500,000 by 1975 and to 20,000,000 in 2035. But if fertility should continue to fall as it has done during the last decade, it would fall to 31,400,000 by 1975, and to 4,400,000 by 2035. In other words, in less than a century, the number would have shrunk to about half the population of greater London today. For the United States it has been predicted that by 1950 our numbers will reach 136,000,000 and will then fall to 126,000,000 by 1980; but this prediction rests upon the assumption that the birth-rate will stop declining at a certain point. If we assume that it will continue descending indefinitely, we get a result very similar to the second English estimate.

In the balance of births and deaths it is the birth-rate that counts. It comes first and sets the pace, the death-rate, which ultimately equals it, coming second. A generation can potentially reduce births to zero, but it cannot eliminate death. It is impossible to imagine our continuing to compensate for a declining birth-rate with lower mortality rates. The limits to which we can go in prolonging and saving life are unfortunately rather narrow at present. We have learned how to save the lives of infants and how to keep people alive through middle age. But we have learned little about prolonging life once the age of sixty has been reached. Ninety years ago only three-

eighths of the newly born reached the age of sixty; now two-thirds of them do — but those who reach sixty now have practically the same expectation of life as those reaching this age a century ago. All things considered, we cannot indefinitely compensate for a low birth-rate with a low death-rate. In a young population the number of deaths is bound to rise after a few years, and if the number of births is already low, the population will dwindle.

So much for the facts. We can now ask who and what is responsible for the tumbling birth-rate. Of the many theories propounded, some are absurd on the face of it, others obviously incomplete. Some have asserted, for example, that a given nation's capacity to reproduce varies from one era to the next because of a mysterious biological cycle. A period of high fertility, according to this Italian view, is followed by a period of low fertility, not because of social conditions or human motives and desires, but because of biological changes in the racial germ plasm. This preposterous theory appears to explain the obscure by the still more obscure, the term "race" camouflaging something that is not biological at all, namely a *nationality*. It would seem much more sensible to talk in terms we know something about, namely, human motives, human techniques, and human conditions.

If parents have gone on strike they must have had reason for doing so. Not even capitalists believe that laborers strike for no reason at all. It would be equally foolish to think that parents strike for no reason at all.

Unfortunately we think about social matters, for the most part, in medieval terms. Whenever something goes wrong we explain it in terms of the Devil. We have, for example, a devil theory of war — the devil being the nation that happens to be fighting us. We still have a devil theory of depressions — the bankers, the Republi-

can party, or the stingy consumer playing the malevolent role. Similarly there are those among us who blame the birth-strike on the evil machinations of birth-control propagandists.

It is true that unceasing agitation for contraception, pushed with religious zeal by gifted advocates from Francis Place to Margaret Sanger and identified with the powerful women's rights movement, has disturbed England and America for practically a century. It is true that during this time the practice, as a scientific technique, has spread over the civilized world. It is true, finally, that contraception is the instrument by which people now voluntarily limit the size of their families. But to attribute the use of this instrument to the instrument itself, or to its advocacy, is to put the cart before the horse. First we must ask why the sudden appearance of this birth-control propaganda, and why its acceptance? The propaganda *against* contraception has been just as powerful as that for it. Even the law has been on the side of the opposition. Why, then, has the contraceptive movement succeeded? If in spite of legal proscription and religious taboo people go on using contraceptive devices and resorting to abortionists, it is not because of the devilish propensities of those who advocate these practices, but because of the social conditions affecting the physically capable.

Modern life is so organized that there is no longer any advantage in having children. At one time there were all kinds of advantages, but now, apart from the pleasure of children's company, there are practically none. City life has taken the place of village and farm life. Rapid movement, not only across land and sea but also up and down the social ladder, has displaced social stability. And industrialism, as the main mode of economic production, has replaced agriculture. The effect of these changes

upon the family, which is the institution supposed to perform the function of procreation, has been disorganizing. Having lost most of its functions, the family no longer ties in with the whole of life the way it once did.

In the stable rural society of the past kinship ties were strong. The most important people in one's milieu were kinsmen, the center of one's activities was the busy homestead, and the determinant of one's status was the natal family. Since husband, wife, and children all helped out in the multifarious tasks of farming, economic production was a family affair. Thus the family, or at most the extended group of kinsmen, formed a miniature society in itself, governing the individual's entire life-organization. Typical of this kind of familistic social system was the bold peasant régime of Europe, described so brilliantly by Thomas and Znaniecki in their four-volume work on *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. But still more complete familistic systems existed in old China and old Japan, where even religion was mainly a family matter. The Chinese system, inimitably described in Nora Waln's *The House of Exile*, represented perhaps the highest degree of familism attainable. Here, as in other places, it was plain that there are two outstanding characteristics of familism. First, whether at its height as in the Orient or partially modified as in feudal Europe, familism can flourish only in a static, rural society. Second, it places a great value on children.

In a familistic system children are assets. Economically they constitute the only form of old-age insurance, and they can perform profitably many simple tasks of farm and household production (as anyone can testify who has watched children of six and seven chop cotton, peel fruit, or water stock). Socially they give their parents prestige, because a person is not regarded within the kin group as

fully mature, or sometimes fully married, until he has children. Spiritually they represent great value, because the religion (especially if it gives prominence to ancestor worship) attaches extreme importance to the continuance of the family line. In short, where the family is the essential unit in society and kinship bonds are consequently strong, the perpetuation of the family line through procreation becomes inherently necessary. Procreation therefore seems a sacred duty, a moral obligation, as well as an economic gain and social asset.

Our present mobile industrial urbanism, on the other hand, minimizes the importance of family relations in a person's life and hence destroys the motivation for performing the family's main function — the procreation of offspring. In our crowded cities each extra room costs money, and each extra child annoys one's neighbors that much more. There is no space for children to play or work. Our industries, having already taken the economic functions out of the home, proffer an infinite number of attractive ways of spending money in competition with the huge financial outlay which children now represent. The choice between a Ford and a baby is usually made in favor of the Ford. But in addition to their own wants, parents have raised their standards of what children should have. If they refuse to have children it is frequently because they know they could not rear their offspring as they should be reared. The higher the parents' social position the more it costs to rear the child appropriately. Thus is explained the apparent paradox that, though people limit their family size because of low income, the more money they have the fewer children they bear. The fact is that in our society no matter what the social level of the family, children are an economic burden to a greater extent than ever before. They are a competing

element in a rising, more variegated standard of living. As one author puts it, "The single man with no dependents is not a little better off than a man with a wife and four children. He is about six times better off."

Since the home has yielded to the factory as the integration point of economic functions, it has split up the family group into so many independent individuals. Wife and husband are tied together only by affection. Both have contacts, and often jobs, outside the home. The children are in the hands of outside agencies to a great extent. As the bonds of the entire group weaken, the sentiment for children itself weakens.

If, then, the whole character of modern society makes children a burden and a handicap, it would seem to be this fact and not birth-control propaganda which is responsible for the shortage of babies. The devil theory must be thrown overboard. We cannot blame parents. They did not create our present mode of life; they were born into it. In fact we cannot blame anyone. Like most other things that happen to human beings in the aggregate, the present sit-down strike among parents springs from forces of which we have little knowledge and still less control. It springs from those same forces which have brought forth modern civilization, which have caused us to evolve out of the familistic feudal age.

In a sense married people are striking for higher wages. Society calls upon them to perform one of its most important tasks, and yet they are now penalized rather than rewarded for performing this task. They have then every right to quit work, to strike. They must force society to recognize and reward them commensurately with the service they render.

Society manifests itself today in the form of the nationalist state. In this form it cannot help coming to terms

with parents. The life of a nation is just as dependent upon the procreative work of its citizens as that of a factory upon the productive efforts of its employees. Whether democratic, totalitarian, or communistic, modern states cannot, above all, tolerate a decreasing population. They cannot, in the eternally strained international situation, afford to have empty colonies which other nations will envy (as Japan envies Australia), and if they wish colonies they must justify themselves by pointing to population pressure at home (as Italy justifies her Ethiopian conquest). Countries which neither have nor want colonies (such as Czechoslovakia) still must maintain their manpower at home or see themselves threatened economically and belligerently. And the only way to maintain or enhance the population is through an adequate birth-rate. Immigration will not do, because the immigrant brings not only his body but also his culture with him. He brings his national ideals and prejudices and often remains a complete alien, especially now that states are cultivating in their émigrés the idea that no matter where they go they will always owe their first allegiance to the homeland.

Population worries may appear irrational, and indeed they may be couched in the most irrational of racial and political philosophies, but nonetheless there can be seen a certain necessity in the situation of all countries involved in the intense international competition of Asia and Europe. No country is in the least free from population anxiety. If it thinks it is free it is mistaken. Every nation, no matter how unpretentious, must contend with states that have an increasing population and hence an increasing demand for land and raw materials. These growing states will not respect forever the property rights of nations declining in natural resources. National con-

cern over population is unavoidable, and national control of reproduction inevitable. The more ambitious countries, such as Nazi Germany, already have elaborate measures in operation, and their scientists are devoting themselves to careful calculations of present and future manpower in their own and other countries. Following is a summary of a recent book (Burgdörfer, *Volk-und Wehrkraft*) which appeared in Germany:

1. Population development and defensive strength. The biological deficit and the impending decline of the population. Recent changes in the age composition. The change in birth-rates in relation to the basis of selecting recruits in the past and in the future. The numerical strength of age groups subject to military service. The necessity for a sufficient rate of reproduction to maintain national power.
2. War and race. The effects of the system of defense on the development of population before the World War and their effects on reproduction rates.

And here are the titles of two typical articles: *Number of Births and Defensive Ability: A Comparison between Several European Countries. Population Policy and Defensive Ability.*

As long as there remains one ambitious nation in the world, let no one think that national concern over population is silly. In the present birth strike, several states, notably Germany, Italy and France, are taking positive steps to reach a solution.

Like most factory owners when threatened with a strike, modern nations tend first of all to use moral suasion. Endlessly through press, radio and cinema propaganda, parents are told that it is their *duty* to have children. They are requested to be "loyal," "patriotic," "hopeful." They are appealed to in terms of national sentiment, religious dogma, and social welfare. Married persons who refuse to have children, or single persons

who refuse to marry, are the butt of official contumely. In an Italian book, for instance, the latter are called "avaricious egotists" and "poisoners of society." Mussolini himself has called the use of birth-control "mere gymnastic love."

But appeal to sentiment alone is scarcely ever successful, not simply because material considerations are stronger, but because propaganda is a two-edged sword. The strikers and their sympathizers can appeal to justice and arouse public emotion over the plight of poor parents, and advocate something besides moral diatribes.

When moral suasion fails, however, the use of force begins. Modern nations, like many a factory owner with labor, have resorted to force to compel reproduction. They have forbidden by law the practice of abortion and the sale or transmission of contraceptive apparatus or information. This is like forbidding employes to organize, picket, or demonstrate. In 1926 Italy passed a law punishing with one thousand dollars fine and one year solitary confinement any woman securing an abortion. In 1932 a new clause was added making it illegal for drugstores to stock or list any contraceptive appliances.

Such repressive measures, however, seem incapable of forcing parents to tend to their procreative duties. These measures admit the widespread desire to limit offspring; yet instead of trying to alter their desire by changing the conditions under which parents labor they merely try to repress the means by which the desire is realized. But the means in this case are exceedingly diverse and ineradicable. No law has yet been successful in abolishing *coitus interruptus*, abstention, douching, or the rhythm method. Such laws, if passed, would be merely foolish reminders of the ineptitude of the legal regulation of sexual intimacy.

If these efforts to persuade or force parents to return to

work will not succeed, what is needed apparently is some effort that will strike at the heart of the matter, that will change the adverse circumstances under which parents struggle. The demands of striking parents must be met.

Some recognition of parents' claims has already appeared. It takes the form of pecuniary reward for having children. All kinds of prizes, tax exemptions, annuities, bonuses, and allowances are being offered by one country or another. Almost every day the newspapers carry a new account of some financial scheme by which marriages will be subsidized and child-birth rewarded. Italy, a Catholic country where presumably celibacy is the noblest condition, places an extra tax on bachelors and gives an exemption to heads of large families. The marriage loan system instituted by Germany in 1933 is well known. To each qualified couple the government grants a loan in the form of coupons which may be exchanged at shops for certain kinds of household goods — furniture, linens, kitchen utensils, radios. The loan can be repaid at the exceedingly low rate of one per cent per month, beginning two months after the loan is made. The birth of a child, however, cancels one-fourth of the original loan, so that if four children are born to the couple within the first few years of married life they need not pay back the loan. Germany also gives preference to heads of families in filling jobs and exemption from inheritance taxes. Moreover, in selected cases, certain large cities "sponsor" third and fourth children. The parents of these children receive twenty marks per month for the support of each child until the age of fourteen, and are honored by precedence in applying for jobs, flats, or tickets. The children themselves receive favor in educational channels and are expected to fill governmental positions when mature.

Even better known is the family allowance system of

France. As early as 1854 the factory of Monsieur Hamel instituted a Family Fund to reduce the economic hardships of the man with a family. There were other isolated instances of private industries or government departments instituting a family allowance — that is an amount paid in addition to the worker's wage and in proportion to the number of his children. But the real movement began during the War when rising prices made it increasingly hard for the married man with children to maintain a decent standard of living. By the end of the War practically all lower-grade government officials were entitled to a family allowance, and at the same time industry was pushing the scheme. To avoid the temptation of individual plants to save the cost of allowances by hiring bachelors, equalization funds were set up. These were simply pools contributed by all the plants in a given region or in one type of manufacturing. Up until 1932 the whole system was voluntary for industry, but in that year the French government passed an act making the plan compulsory for the whole country. It has been calculated that workers in the lower wage brackets in industries now covered by the department funds get a four to five per cent increase in income for each child. This is not enough, however, to pay the cost of rearing children.

Belgium also has a compulsory family allowance scheme somewhat resembling the French system. But in most European countries having allowances at all the plan is limited to civil employees. In England, despite the existence of the Family Endowment Society which has long advocated legislative action on the matter, no scheme has been adopted, although it is probable that in the future the dangerously low birth-rate may bring about a change of attitude. The United States, the home

of *laissez faire*, of course has scarcely thought of the possibility; but there are a few private organizations, such as Wells College, the Columbia Conserve Company of Indianapolis, and foreign missionary societies, which pay more to married than to single men.

The family allowance idea was originally conceived for the purpose of remedying an unjust inequality between family heads and bachelors. More and more, however, it has been advocated as a means of increasing the birth-rate. Yet, in France and elsewhere there is no certain indication that it has even arrested the decline in the birth-rate, much less brought an increase. The reason probably is that the allowances are all inadequate.

Although neither the appeal to moral duty, the use of force, nor the offer of financial reward has succeeded in raising the birth-rate, although Germany, France and Italy (the three countries with the most aggressive population policies) still show a rate below replacement in the first two cases and a steadily declining rate in the last case, it may be said, I think, that official measures will continue to appear and will spread to nations which do not now have them. It also seems true that of the three kinds of measures now extant, the financial reward for parents is the most hopeful. Let us, then, investigate its implications for the future course of population.

It is commonly admitted that the present pecuniary measures are all inadequate if they intend to compensate people for bearing and rearing offspring. In some cases it would seem that the amount given per child is ridiculous, being about enough to pay for the soap and hot water which modern hygiene demands. But there is a deeper criticism than this. Simple lack of money is not the sole reason for voluntary childlessness. We know this from the fact that people with higher incomes have

smaller families. The essential thing is that in our class society, with a great deal of circulation up and down the social scale, children are (at almost any level) a hindrance to social climbing. Poverty is relative to social position. A person may have a ten thousand dollar income and still be too poor to rear five children in the manner he would like. Only at the bottom, where people have insufficient foresight and little hope of climbing, may the hindering effect of children in this respect be disregarded.

But waiving aside the difficulties that class differences create, let us carry the pecuniary policy to its logical conclusion. Let us suppose that an *adequate* economic return were paid to parents for having children. The sum would be, even assuming an average standard of living, tremendous. Basing their estimate on a family income of \$2500, Dublin and Lotka figure that the parents spend between \$9,180 and \$10,485, or roughly four years of their economic life, in rearing a child through the age of eighteen. On the basis of these figures we can see that, to cover the annual cash expenditures made on children, the United States would have to spend around twenty-four billion dollars, or more than six times the total governmental expenditure in 1930. This seems like a huge sum, and neither the United States nor any other country is likely to assume such a burden, especially since the state already spends a considerable amount on children. But the point is that *at least* this amount would be required if effective economic payment for children were given. I say "at least" because the Dublin and Lotka figures cover merely cash expenditures. They do not cover such things as the labor of the mother. We know, however, that children cause more work for the mother, frequently keep her from entering gainful employment or having a career, cause inconveniences in travel, recrea-

tion and apartment living. All these things are difficult and pointless to estimate in cash, but they are, along with the desire for social advancement, powerful forces against the wish for children. An exclusively pecuniary reward for procreation would have to be large enough to overcome these forces — unless, of course, we assume that the intrinsic emotional value of children is great enough to overcome them. But it is dangerous to place much reliance upon the intrinsic emotional value of children to parents. Undoubtedly they do have such value. Yet only one or two children (sometimes canary birds or goldfish) will satisfy the desire for them. Today, for example, we have the fashionable family of two children, and people who have more are considered a little stupid. But because many couples are involuntarily sterile or for other reasons childless, it takes numerous families of five and six to maintain the population.

One great fear is that if the government paid out really adequate sums to recompense people for having children, many persons at the bottom of the social scale (and probably others) would find this a delightfully easy way of earning a livelihood. This would be bad not only eugenically, according to some authors, but it would tend to create a professional class of child-rearers. Perhaps the state would then demand the right, if it paid people to have children, of insisting upon certain qualifications. Partly in the interest of getting better children, partly for the purpose of cutting the tremendous cost, it could command that persons who live by rearing children must prove their fitness, take training and become efficient at their job. Thus, by a gradual evolution unanticipated at the beginning, there might develop a system in which the father's role is assumed by the state, the mother's role by professional women paid by the state for their services.

This would satisfy those authors who have been demanding that motherhood be made a vocation in the modern economy. The birth strike would then become a real economic weapon in the hands of a real economic group. Feminism could enjoy an effective recrudescence, for women, as producers of an essential and scarce commodity, could dictate their own terms. But such a system would mean the destruction of the family as we know it. A new kind of reproductive organization compatible with modern civilization would have been substituted.

The birth strike instituted by present-day parents has therefore placed the modern nation in a dilemma. The state can hardly force parents to have more children, and in view of the present circumstances of parenthood it can scarcely make an effective moral appeal. On the other hand if it pays them for having children the result may ultimately prove to be both costly and, from the present point of view, morally undesirable. The great question is, will the state, goaded by international competition, eventually throw overboard its moral scruples and abolish the private family? Probably not, but it may do so unintentionally by inaugurating policies whose ultimate effects it cannot foresee. We do know, however, that the modern state, capable of establishing a close emotional bond with its citizens through radio, press, and cinema, is inimical to the private family in many ways. If it finds it impossible to settle the strike and secure adequate reproduction through families, it will secure reproduction in some other way.

Have We Bonds with the British?

QUINCY HOWE

LIVINGSTON HARTLEY'S article, *Our Bonds with the British* in the Spring, 1938, issue of *The North American Review* establishes a happy precedent in the literature of Anglo-American apologetics. Its author is the first man within living memory to avoid false sentiment and hypocrisy while advocating closer ties between the two great English-speaking nations. Unlike such dreamers as Nicholas Murray Butler, Thomas W. Lamont, James T. Shotwell, and Walter Lippmann, Mr. Hartley devotes primary attention to the material advantages to be derived from Anglo-American understanding.

About a year ago I embarked on a different task and tried to smoke out the conventional Anglophiles by insulting them as roundly as I knew how. Under the flip title of *England Expects Every American To Do His Duty* I wrote a book whose chief purpose was to remove the discussion from the atmosphere that infests an English-Speaking Union dinner. Whether my book encouraged Mr. Hartley to write his article I do not know; I do know that his article prompts me to substitute reason for invective and to bring the issues up to date.

The tone of Mr. Hartley's article and his former post in the State department make him a frank if not an official spokesman for the real aims of President Roosevelt's foreign policy. Mr. Hartley does not deny that the Roosevelt policy is essentially pro-British; indeed he rather glories in it for that reason. He also argues the case for a pro-British American foreign policy on logical and practical grounds.

"The high-ceilinged rooms of the State department,"