

WHO BROKE THE WINDOW?

BEGINNING A SERIES OF ARTICLES AND
STORIES ABOUT CHILDREN WHICH WILL
APPEAR IN THE OUTLOOK DURING 1913

"GOOD and Bad are two boys, each fourteen years of age. They attend the same school. One day Bad said to Good, 'I am going to throw a snow-ball through the window.' Good made no reply. Bad threw the snow-ball and broke the window, and Good saw him do it. The next morning at school the teacher asked the pupils singly and privately the questions, 'Do you know who broke the window?' and 'Who broke the window?'

"1. What should Good say when the teacher asked him, 'Do you know who broke the window?'

"2. What should Good say when she asked him, 'Who broke the window?'

"3. Should the teacher have asked the boy these questions?

"4. Should the teacher have the same right as the Court in compelling Good to tell?

"5. Modern American schools are rapidly adopting systematic instruction in ethics. In your opinion, should children throughout the public schools be *taught* that it is their duty to tell the truth about wrong-doing when questioned by a competent authority?"

These questions have been sent out in a printed circular by Mr. Harlan E. Hall, High School Principal in Mansfield, Ohio. The value of such questions as these lies not in the specific answers they may evoke, but in the thoughts they may stimulate. For that reason we submit them to our readers. Perhaps some teachers may find in them an occasion for re-examining certain matters they have taken for granted. Perhaps some parents may find in them a topic for discussion not only among themselves but with their children. Perhaps from these questions there may spring other questions to lead the discussion further afield. For example: Has a father or mother any more right to seek such information from a boy than a teacher has? Does the nature of the offense make any difference? Would there be, for instance, any difference in principle if the offense was not window-breaking, but the

morally corrupting influence of an older boy over a younger one? If there is a distinction, should the boys be expected to see it, and taught to act accordingly? Or should it be left to the teacher to see the distinction and enforce it? There is no limit to the extent to which such a discussion may go. And its usefulness will not altogether depend on the success with which satisfactory answers to the specific questions are found. It will depend much more on the success with which those who discuss the questions attempt an understanding of one another's point of view and an understanding of what is education and of what is good conduct.

Most fathers, if asked, "Do you wish your boy to be a good boy?" would, we imagine, if they spoke frankly, reply rather hesitatingly, "Why, yes, I suppose so." At the same time, if they were asked, "Do you wish your boys to grow up to be good men?" they would reply emphatically, "Of course!" There is no suggestion of reproach in saying of a man that he is a good man. Somehow, on the other hand, there is just a suggestion of reproach in the term "a good boy." Conversely, no one with an unperturbed conscience would care to have the reputation of being a bad man, while many a man, whom no one would think of calling bad, finds no cause for real shame and perhaps some little secret gratification in the fact that in former days he was considered somewhat of "a bad boy." In the case under consideration it is Bad that throws the snow-ball and breaks the window, and it is Good that does nothing. Of course Bad is bad—really bad; for that is one of the given factors in the problem; and Good is really good. On the face of it, however, there is nothing to show except in his name that there was anything really bad about the boy who threw the snow-ball. If it were not that we were told so, we might suppose that the boy broke the window, not because he was bad, but because he was boy; and that the other did not break the window, not because he was good, but because he was something less than boy. Of course

school authorities cannot allow boys to break windows indiscriminately; but we fancy that most fathers, remembering their own boyhood, would have a furtive sympathy with the lad who tried his skill on that inviting pane and found it equal to the challenge. We are not condoning the practice of breaking windows by using them as targets. That practice is of course highly inconvenient and should be suppressed. The boy who indulges in it wantonly should be made to feel the displeasure of his elders, and to take upon his shoulders as large a share as possible of the inconvenience. All that we wish to point out is that inconvenience caused to adults should not be regarded as proof positive of badness in the boy who causes it. It too often is so regarded. That is because adult human creatures, being fallible, are apt to regard the comfort of the adult population as a criterion by which conduct is to be measured. Whatever interferes with that comfort is bad; lively boys are apt to interfere with that comfort, they unconsciously reason, therefore lively boys are apt to be bad. The balance is happily struck by the fact that the youthful human creature applies the same sort of standards, and declares that any adult who, by insisting on washed hands and faces, or some degree of quiet in the house, or promptness in going to school, interferes with the comfort and pleasure of the youthful population, is a "bad old thing." Of course if the standard is right in the one case it is right in the other. Unhappily, faces must be washed and windows must be protected against snow-balls. So that standard is plainly not a sound one. Yet if we were to examine the reputation for being good won by a boy, we should find, we think, as a rule, that it was based on the freedom of offense against the adult standard of comfort and convenience. And that is why most men with red blood in their veins are a little hesitant when they say that they want their boys to be good boys.

Let us assume, then, that Good, in the incident under consideration, is not what is ordinarily called "a good boy"—that is, a convenient boy for adults to have around—but such a boy as a boy of fourteen ought to be if he is going straight along the way toward being what we all like to think of as a good man. He has seen one of his schoolmates do something that is in defiance of the rules of the school and contrary to the public welfare; and he is asked by his

teacher whether he knows who that schoolmate is. What answer does such a boy as he make?

This question of the teacher's is one that can be answered by a simple yes or no. It is conceivable that the boy could decline to answer; but unless the circumstances are such that an affirmative answer would necessarily implicate some other boy, there is no reason to suppose that he does not answer, "Yes, I do know."

The real crux of the matter comes with the teacher's next question, "Who broke the window?" To answer that question, the boy who knows the culprit must "tell on" a schoolfellow. Will the boy who is in fact the kind of boy whom we ought to honor reveal the fact about the wrong-doing? Is it right to expect him to be a witness against his mate?

Why should he not do so? Is he not expected to grow up to be a public-spirited citizen? Is he not in reality a citizen of his school community? Does he not owe a duty to that community in protecting property and maintaining order and obedience to authority? When a citizen of a state is called upon to give evidence, is he not expected to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," even though his testimony may inculpate an acquaintance? Is not that man counted a good citizen who, when called upon by the constituted authorities to give information necessary for the enforcement of the law, gives that information even though it costs him friendships? The man who shields a murderer is not excused because he happens to be the murderer's friend. Can we, then, expect a boy who shields a schoolmate from discovery by the authoritative investigation of a teacher to become a good citizen? Should he not be told that it is his duty, at whatever cost to his own feelings, and even to his sense of fidelity to an associate, to assist the constituted authority in the effort to discover an offender and bring him to book?

The difference between the position of the boy in the school and the citizen in the state is radical. Whether the state is a republic, or a monarchy, or an oligarchy, the authority exercised over its members is the authority of the state—it is a group authority. In the case of the school, the authority exercised by the teacher is not a group authority at all. If the teacher is wise and is given sufficient freedom by superiors, that authority will be exercised with due regard to the views pre-

vailing among the boys, but it does not emanate from them, and the boys know very well that it does not. When called upon to give an account of himself to his teacher, the boy is not in the position of a citizen summoned by the state. To insist that he shall act under those circumstances as a good citizen is expected to act will not help him to be a more wholesome member of the school; if it has any effect, it will only implant in his mind the view that the authority of the state is as extraneous to him as the authority of the school. To require of him an obedience to the authority of the teacher that involves a renouncing of his allegiance to the group of which he is a member, to subordinate his relations with his schoolmates to commands of the teacher, is not to prepare him for good citizenship, but to weaken those very ties which hold together the structure of society and render good citizenship possible.

John Bull was schoolmaster in Ireland for generations, and brought a great deal of trouble upon himself as well as upon his pupils by his failure to recognize this fact. It is to the credit of the Irish that they preserved for

so long that sense of fidelity to the group which their schoolmaster did his best to disrupt, and that they have not become more deeply imbued with the conviction that to be "agin' the government" is the normal attitude of every good citizen. Fortunately, boys cannot be in school as long as the Irish have been John Bull's pupils, and so cannot learn all that might be taught them. If it were otherwise, they might in time learn what most normal boys, no matter what the provocation, refuse to learn, that it is more expedient to yield to the teacher's power than to stand by one's fellows and to do one's share in keeping the school solid.

That idea of group solidarity is more than an idea. It is an ideal. It is generally agreed that every individual repeats in his own life roughly the chief stages in the history of the race. As his body before birth passes through in terse form the various periods of biological evolution, so his mind, after birth, passes through the various periods of racial evolution. This process is sometimes called "recapitulation." It is not exact; it does not even approach exactness.

BOY EPOCHS						RACE EPOCHS
NO.	STAGE OF BOY LIFE	AGE LIMITS	CHARACTERISTICS	WILL-PROGRESS	ALLEGIANCE	RACIAL PROTOTYPE
0	Infancy	Years 0—3	(Before Self-Consciousness)	(Self-Discovery)	(Blind)	Pre-Historic Period
1	Early Childhood— Later	3—6 7—11	The Self-Period The Clique Period	Self-Control	Father Chum	<i>Patriarchal Period</i> <i>Savage Kinship Clan</i>
2	Boyhood	10—14	The Gang Period	Comradeship	The Gang	The <i>Tribal</i> Period Limited Democracy to Monarchy 1-Council of Braves 2-Federated Tribes with Chieftain by Prowess
3	Early Adolescence	13—15 Grammar School Age	The Chivalry Period	Personal Loyalty (Obedience)	The Hero	The <i>Feudal</i> Period of the Absolute Monarchy
4	Middle Adolescence	14—18 High School Age	The Self-Assertive Period	Self-Reliance (Through Struggle)	The Ego	The <i>Revolutionary</i> Period of the Constitutional Monarchy
5	Late Adolescence	17—24 College Age	The Co-operative Period	Leadership (Resourcefulness)	The State	<i>The Republic</i> : Social-Democracy in a Self-Governing State

FROM "BOY LIFE AND SELF-GOVERNMENT," BY G. W. FISKE (ASSOCIATION PRESS)

NOTE.—It is necessary to make the age periods in the second column overlap to allow for wide differences in boy development.

The environment in which a twentieth-century boy grows up to manhood is very different from that which has changed with the changing stages of the race's history, and consequently modifies the recapitulation very greatly. Nevertheless, if we want to understand children, we shall find one entrance into the realm in which they live if we follow as guides the brave, the chieftain, the hunter, the patriarch, the knight, the feudal lord. Professor George Walter Fiske, of Oberlin, has written a book entitled "Boy Life and Self-Government," published by the Association Press, which will serve as a sort of Baedeker to one who wishes to make a trip to the realms inhabited by these primitive peoples all about us—the boys of our own families and our own schools. Whoever makes the trip once will make it again. In that book there is printed a chart which we reproduce on the preceding page.

The reader will see that Professor Fiske places the boy of fourteen—the age of our two acquaintances of the snow-ball episode, Good and Bad—either in the Gang Period or the Chivalry Period, and his allegiance as due to the gang, the group to which he belongs, or to the impersonation of that group or the group idea in a hero. There, in a practical form, expressed in personal loyalty, is the fourteen-year-old boy's ideal. To induce a boy to tell on his fellows is to weaken this allegiance, and to weaken this allegiance is to attack his idealism.

But, it may be asked, suppose the boy ought not to be persuaded to give evidence against the snow-ball thrower, may he not be compelled? Do not the courts compel witnesses to testify against their will? May not the teacher have the same power? In other words, shall the teacher, while allowing the

boy to retain his ideal, show disrespect to it?

The courts themselves do not do this. They recognize that there are some forms of allegiance superior to that which they demand for themselves—the allegiance of a lawyer to his client, the allegiance of a physician to his patient, the allegiance of a priest to the penitent, the allegiance of a wife to her husband. The great ideals of the race are not abandoned in the course of its progress; they are preserved and respected. The teacher should respect the ideals of the boys in the school; for they are acquiring the ideals of the race, and are the only ones who can pass those ideals on to future generations.

Suppose, however, that the offense is not window-breaking, or the infraction of some school rule, or the disregard of school discipline, but something affecting the moral character of the boys themselves. Suppose Bad is not only breaking windows but teaching the younger boys to be wantonly destructive, or is corrupting the minds of the younger boys with foul ideas. What then is Good's duty? What is the duty of the teacher?

There the situation is changed. Now the integrity of the gang itself is in peril. Now the ideal of the boys is under attack.

If Good is the boy we take him to be, he will consult with his fellows and see that the matter is made a common cause. If the teacher is on Good's level of spirited common sense, the boys will be all ready to make it a common cause. It is possible that this red-blooded fellow Good and his red-blooded mates will not have any occasion to bring the teacher in at all; but if they do, it will be because they wish to enlist Power, represented by the teacher, not against but on behalf of the Gang Ideal.

Here we leave Good and Bad for the present. We shall not attempt to answer the questions about them explicitly—at least not unless our readers indicate that they wish explicit answers. Then we may attempt such answers—on one condition: that those who ask for our answers shall indicate their own.

HISTORY AS LITERATURE

BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT

An important feature of the meeting of the American Historical Association held in Boston during the last week of the old year was the address on the subject of "History as Literature" delivered by Mr. Roosevelt, as President of the Association, in Symphony Hall on the evening of December 27. The Boston papers report that the audience which heard the address was notable both for its size and character; that the speaker was listened to with peculiar interest; and that after the address was concluded he became the center of a cordial personal reception.

Mr. Roosevelt's address of course was wholly without any allusion to political questions, and was, as the title indicates, a discussion of the relative value of history when written as a scientific compilation of statistics and when written by a creator of literature inspired by human sympathy and imagination. The address, we regret to say, is too long to be reprinted in full, but we here give our readers some detached passages from the address that convey both the feeling and the arguments which Mr. Roosevelt expounded in support of his belief that history is literature rather than scientific compilation.—THE EDITORS.

THE HISTORICAL SPECIALIST

THERE has been much discussion as to whether history should not henceforth be treated as a branch of science rather than of literature. As with most such discussions, much of the matter in dispute has referred merely to terminology. Moreover, as regards part of the discussion, the minds of the contestants have not met, the propositions advanced by the two sides being neither mutually incompatible nor mutually relevant. There is, however, a real basis for conflict, in so far as science claims exclusive possession of the field. There was a time—we see it in the marvelous dawn of Hellenic life—when history was distinguished neither from poetry, from mythology, nor from the first dim beginnings of science. There was a more recent time, at the opening of Rome's brief period of literary splendor, when poetry was accepted by a great scientific philosopher as the appropriate vehicle for teaching the lessons of science and philosophy. There was a more recent time still—the time of Holland's leadership in arms and arts—when one of the two or three greatest world painters put his genius at the service of anatomists. In each case the steady growth of specialization has rendered such combination now impossible. . . .

As regards philosophy, as distinguished from material science and from history, the specialization has been incomplete. Poetry is still used as a vehicle for the teaching of philosophy. Goethe was as profound a thinker as Kant. He has influenced the thought of mankind far more deeply than Kant because he was also a great poet. Robert

Browning was a real philosopher, and his writings have had a hundred-fold the circulation and the effect of those of any similar philosopher who wrote in prose, just because, and only because, what he wrote was not merely philosophy but literature. The form in which he wrote challenged attention and provoked admiration. That part of his work which some of us—which I myself, for instance—most care for is merely poetry. But in that part of his work which has exercised most attraction and has given him the widest reputation, the poetry, the form of expression, bears to the thought expressed much the same relation that the expression of Lucretius bears to the thought of Lucretius. As regards this, the great mass of his product, he is primarily a philosopher, whose writings surpass in value those of other similar philosophers precisely because they are not only philosophy but literature. In other words, Browning the philosopher is read by countless thousands to whom otherwise philosophy would be a sealed book, for exactly the same reason that Macaulay the historian is read by countless thousands to whom otherwise history would be a sealed book; because both Browning's works and Macaulay's works are material additions to the great sum of English literature. Philosophy is a science just as history is a science. There is need in one case as in the other for vivid and powerful presentation of scientific matter in literary form.

This does not mean that there is the like need in the two cases. History can never be truthfully presented if the presentation is purely emotional. It can never be truthfully or usefully presented unless profound