

"Thoughts of Wise Men," by Count Leo Tolstoy.

"The Story of a Peasant" ("Histoire d'un Homme du Peuple"), by Erckmann-Chatrian.

"The Government and People of Switzerland," by T. Bogdanovitch.

"Organizations of West European Laborers," by L. Kuprianova.

In no circumstances, Governor Muratof said, could these books be allowed to go into the hands of wounded soldiers in the hospitals of the Kursk Province. He thought best, therefore, to exclude the libraries of the Free Economic Society altogether, because he could never feel sure that, among a lot of harmless books, there might not be pernicious literature of this kind.

The example of Governor Muratof has already been followed by the governors of Yaroslav and Kherson, and for the libraries of the Economic Society there have been substituted small collections of approved books furnished by the Russian Red Cross, a "politically trustworthy" organization.

In the province of Chernigof the *zemstvo* undertook to provide the hospitals with maps and war literature, and to organize courses of lectures on the war for the benefit of wounded soldiers. The Governor, however, interfered at once with a prohibition. These men had fought in the war, but after

their return from the front it was not safe, he thought, to let them know anything more about it than they could glean from the arid pages of the "Army Messenger," an official publication.

The efforts of the Government to keep "pernicious" literature from the soldiers may be more or less effective in Russia, but they will be of no avail in Germany. In that country there have been printed in the Russian language scores, if not hundreds, of books, pamphlets, and brochures which, on account of their "pernicious" character, the Russian censors would not allow to be published at home, and the hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners whom the Germans now hold can there obtain them and read them without fear. Fifty thousand Russian prisoners became enlightened in this way in Japan, and if the present war should continue another year ten times that number may get a Socialistic and revolutionary education in Germany. The fact that two-thirds of them are illiterate makes no difference. One educated soldier can read aloud to fifty who are not educated, and in the prison camps they will all have plenty of time for reading and discussion.

With the attitude of the Russian people toward the army and the sacrifices that the peasants have made for the soldiers at the front I shall deal in another article.

THE SHIPPING BILL AND MARCH FOURTH¹

BY HENRY CABOT LODGE

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

IT is not an easy matter to argue about the Shipping Bill—a bill that is still, as I write, being constructed somewhere between the White House and the Senators in charge of it. We do not know what the bill is to be, with so many changes suggested and to be made, thus changing its entire character from day to day. And at the time of writing there are signs that the bill will not pass by March 4. Although it is not possible to forecast how many additional changes will be made to the original bill or what other important amendments may again be made, the Nation

is now convinced that the opposition to the bill is not due to politics, but to the prevailing conviction in the Senate—openly or secretly espoused—that the bill is dangerous to the interests of the United States. These dangers will increase in number as the days go on and the technicalities of maritime warfare and diplomacy become more numerous. The bill commits the Government of the United States to Government ownership in a direction never before attempted, except on a perfectly insignificant scale, by any nation, and never by any great maritime nation. It is an advance in the direction of Socialism, as I look at it, which alone would merit a thor-

¹ See editorial in this issue on the "Peril to Government Merchantmen."

ough debate in the Senate. It opens up the whole question—one of the greatest questions with which this country has had to deal for many years—of the best method of reviving the American merchant marine in the foreign trade. It also involves international questions of the gravest character and fraught with most serious possibilities.

The double danger lies in proposing that the Government of the United States should enter upon the business of owning and operating ships, and should undertake that new task in the midst of a world-wide war.

The Senate, as well as the people throughout the country, are confronted in all directions by a total lack of necessary information, *which should properly be furnished by those who are urging the passage of this measure.* The President has contented himself in speaking of it with a few simple generalities, which are of no use in the discussion, and with the assertion of his own personal determination to have the bill pass, which is a governing factor in the whole business but which is not a satisfactory argument. Secretary McAdoo, who competes with the President in zeal for the bill, has uttered more words in regard to it, but has said comparatively little. In his testimony before the House Committee, however, he gave the Committee to understand that the ships which the Government intended to buy are the German ships now laid in American ports because they are unwilling to go to sea through fear of capture by the opponents of Germany. When this matter was first brought forward, it was generally understood, both here and in Europe, that the Government's intention was to secure this legislation in order to buy the German ships. This purpose was never denied by any one in authority, and the Governments of France, Russia, and England protested against it, although Great Britain made her protest with certain modifications. We know what the belligerents think; we know what their prize courts will decide. It is all set forth in their directions to their own courts and in the Declaration of London; and we know how they feel. They cannot make a protest until the overt act has been committed; but warnings have not been lacking. They were made last summer, and they have been given since. Warnings or statements of how they feel have been presented, formally or informally, to our State Department.

Let us consider the Dacia. I know that Great Britain has taken a position against the Dacia being allowed to sail. To-day the Dacia is on her way to Rotterdam. England holds that it is not at all a question of whether the sale of the Dacia is a bona-fide sale for commercial purposes. She was an imprisoned ship. By taking our flag she may escape from the danger of capture under which she now rests; and that, to the extent to which it goes, is a change in the balance of conditions created by the war, and on those sound grounds England would not recognize it.

Russia and France have made a formal protest, going much further, adhering to the old doctrine of France, Russia, and Germany that after the outbreak of hostilities the transfer of a belligerent flag to a neutral cannot be recognized. Those protests are here in the State Department. This means that if those ships go out of our ports after the Government has bought them, flying the American flag, France and England and Russia will decline to recognize that they are American ships, but will regard them as German ships, good prize, liable to be captured, or to be sunk if they resist.

To show that this matter of the transfer of the ships from a belligerent to a neutral flag has already engaged the thoughts of this Administration, I desire to call attention to the decision of our War Risk Bureau in regard to the Dacia, which has sailed with the approval of the State Department in order to make a test case. It seems to me a rather dangerous business to make test cases of this character in time of war. I need not point out that the situation is admittedly serious internationally. And I wish to remark that as late as January 13 last our War Risk Bureau declined to insure the Dacia, but a fortnight later the same Bureau issued a policy insuring the cotton cargo at four per cent, but declined to insure the vessel itself. Naturally, the War Risk Bureau was willing to insure the cotton because the British Government formally announced, through the Washington Embassy, that they would pay for the cotton themselves. But the vessel was not insured because England declared that, "if the Dacia should be captured, the British Government would find themselves obliged to bring the ship—apart from the cargo—before the prize court. The British Government have found it impossible to agree that the transfer, in the circumstances in which it has been effected, is valid in

accordance with the accepted principles of international law."

But if it is not the intention of the Administration to buy German ships, this can be easily demonstrated by placing in the bill the amendment, already voted down in the Committee, to debar the Government from buying the ships of any belligerent or of the citizens or subjects of any belligerent. Voting down this amendment is an admission that the purchase of the German ships is the intention of the Administration. Yet that amendment embodied my very strong conviction that the Government should under no circumstances buy the ships of any belligerent. I am just as much opposed to buying English or French or Russian or Austrian ships as I am to the Government purchase of German ships. The only difference is that the Administration is apparently intending to buy the German ships and no others, and Congress should have the wisdom to prohibit the purchase of any belligerent-owned ships.

It is idle to say that we could not buy ships elsewhere. Among the neutrals are maritime nations possessing many steamships, some of which we could buy. There are many vessels belonging to the American-South American trade which are unable to secure full cargoes owing to financial conditions in South America. Owners of these vessels would be glad to sell. And from these sources we could obtain just the type of vessels we need—large, modern freighters—whereas with few exceptions the German ships are wholly unsuited to our present purposes.

The only argument I have heard for the purchase of the German ships is that they are ready to our hand and that, as an emergency exists, we must buy ships of which we can take immediate possession. This is merely a pretext. The emergency may have existed last summer for a short period, but it does not exist now.

No doubt the rates are high. That is because war exists and insurance rates and freight rates correspond to the risks; but high rates do not constitute an emergency. The number of ships which the Government could purchase from any source could take but a trifling part of our freight, and the favored few who could get their freight on the Government ships would no doubt have their risks paid for them by the United States; but this would be of no advantage to the great mass of our shippers and export-

ers. The emergency argument, therefore, wholly fails as a reason for buying the German ships.

Buying the German ships would be, on the other hand, an unneutral act, and very readily might be construed as a hostile act and an actual breach of neutrality. The German ships are in port through fear of seizure by hostile cruisers if they emerge from their present place of safety. The removal of these ships from trade means of course a great loss to the owners and to Germany. Not only are the owners and Germany, which subsidizes the lines to which they belong, losing a large amount of money by their being laid up at neutral ports, but they are at a heavy daily expense in caring for them and in mitigating, as far as possible, the inevitable deterioration which idle ships incur. Therefore to buy these ships and relieve their owners from these expenses and to hand over to them thirty or forty millions of dollars belonging to the people of the United States would be a great and direct assistance to one of the belligerents in the war now raging.

I need not say that we are in friendly relations with Germany and wish to remain so, as with all the other fighting nations. But if we buy French or Russian or English ships and transfer them to our flag, can we imagine that Germany will accept our act? Germany feels that she is fighting for her life, and, however willing she may be to make sacrifices and to hold our friendship and good will, we may be sure that she will not sacrifice her own safety in the slightest degree in order to do it. That is the attitude of Germany on one side just the same as that of the opposed Powers on the other, and here we are proposing to buy—and to buy on the spur of the moment—ships owned by a belligerent (I care not what belligerent), and going much further than the mere question of contraband, making ready to put them into a trade where the seas are strewn not only with mines, but with international complications of the most dangerous character.

Yet, despite all this, we are apparently not to be permitted to put a simple clause into the bill which will at once guard us against any such dangers or misunderstandings. Why not? I have thus far found no answer to this question, nor have I heard any reason given why we should enter upon Government ownership by purchasing a large number of unsuitable ships from a belligerent, with all

the difficulties and real dangers which such a step implies.

But supposing the purchase, however, to be made, the transfer of these ships to our flag would follow. Then the question at once arises as to whether the belligerents opposed to Germany would recognize that transfer; and I emphasize the fact that France and Russia have always held consistently to the doctrine that the transfer of the flag from a belligerent to a neutral, after hostilities had begun, was not to be recognized; and England, it would seem from recent information, makes it abundantly clear that her objection to the transfer would lie if the ships were put into the European

trade. If the ships were purchased, the unneutral act committed, and the ships transferred to our flag, they would then go to sea as Government-owned ships, and, in the view of Germany's opponents, would still be German ships, would be regarded as good prize and liable to be captured or sunk because they were still German ships. I need not, I am sure, enlarge upon further or reiterate the danger which such a situation would present to the peace and welfare of the United States.

It would not help our export trade, and would bring us within measurable distance of war, not with England alone, but with France, Russia, and Japan.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THIS WAR

BY ARTHUR BULLARD

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE OUTLOOK IN EUROPE

This article, written by Mr. Bullard during his recent voyage to Europe, is the first of a group of articles in which our former "War Correspondent at Home" will give his impressions of war conditions abroad and of what is likely to follow the close of the war.—THE EDITORS.

EVERY one who has made any study of military matters has at least heard of the writings of Karl von Clausewitz. But his collected works run into ten volumes, and I had lacked the courage to tackle them; but at sea there is nothing to do but read.

I have seldom enjoyed so pleasant a surprise. Few writers have succeeded in expressing in more direct and simple language the prime reality of their generation as adequately as did Clausewitz. War was the business of his day. He was born in 1780. At the age of twelve he entered the Prussian army as *Fahnenjunker*, and served through the Rhine campaigns of 1793-4. At twenty-six he was aide-de-camp to Prince August of Prussia, and was present at Jena. In the wholesale surrender which followed he was captured and sent to France. In 1807 he was back in service on the staff of Scharnhorst, and was active in the reorganization of the Prussian army—the first experiment in universal conscription. In 1812 he entered the Russian army as a staff officer and saw the Moscow campaign. The next year he

was back in Prussia and served on Blücher's staff at Lützen and Bautzen. In the winter of 1813 he was chief of staff on the lower Elbe and defeated Davoust at Goerde. In the final campaign of 1815 he commanded the Prussian left wing at Ligny and the rear-guard at Wavre. After the peace he served in a dozen military posts. He was at one time chief of staff to Field Marshal Gneisenau, and at another Director of the Military School at Berlin. He died of cholera in 1831.

The world in which he lived was at war—and it was this world he wrote about. His great work—"On War"—is not only an authoritative exposition of a technical subject, it is also a wonderful mirror of his times. Although so much more voluminous, his writings bear a spiritual kinship to Machiavelli's "Prince." Machiavelli has lived in literature, not because he wrote an able textbook on the art of ruling, but because his manual gave such a fascinating picture of the Italy in which he lived. The dominant reality of his day was the intriguing of princelings—to be a prince, by fair means or