

JAPAN IN CHINA

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During the past few months The Outlook has received many letters from Chinese or friends of China accusing it of being pro-Japanese in sentiment. As a matter of fact, The Outlook is as much a friend of China as of Japan. It will stand as distinctly for the fair treatment of China as it has stood for the fair treatment of Japan. It has refused to condemn Japan until it knew the facts in regard to the so-called demands on China. None of the letters it has received have thrown any light on these demands; on the contrary, the letters, many of them anonymous, have been expressions of feeling rather than contributions to the discussion. For months past The Outlook has been endeavoring in vain to secure a dispassionate, authoritative statement of the Chinese position. In pursuance of this purpose we have asked Professor Jenks to make such a statement, and we are glad to present his view in the present article. Professor Jenks, as the adviser of the Chinese Government, has had exceptional opportunities for familiarizing himself with the situation in that country and with Chinese sentiment. If it shall appear that the Japanese demands involve the impairment of the territorial or governmental integrity of China, The Outlook will be the first to condemn the attitude of the Japanese Government.—THE EDITORS.

IT is difficult to speak with any approach to finality upon the present situation created by the demands or requests of the Japanese Government on China. The negotiations have been carried on mainly in secret. The proposals put forward by the Japanese Government are at times represented as requests, at times as demands. The proposals themselves have changed their form more than once, and of course the future is still veiled.

There are nevertheless certain undoubted facts that have a bearing upon the question, and upon which one may base some reasonable conclusions.

Every thoughtful American wishes to be just toward Japan as well as toward China. The friendship of America for Japan is of long standing, and, in spite of the sharp differences of opinion regarding certain minor questions in connection with Japanese immigration into the United States, the California land laws, and the belief on the part of many Americans that Japan has not played the game openly and fairly in Manchuria and elsewhere, this traditional friendship still remains and ought to remain undisturbed. Differences of opinion on even important questions must arise between nations as between individuals. So long as they are honest, are treated frankly and sincerely, they do not disturb friendship. Treachery and double-dealing, that give rise to suspicion and the unrighteous employment of force—

these are the primal sins in international matters as well as in personal matters. So long as these are avoided, settlement of misunderstandings is easy.

Japan recognizes frankly and cordially the generous and just dealings of the United States in the past. The United States recognizes no less frankly and cordially the marvelous record that Japan has made in times of war as well as of peace for upright, strict observance of rules of international law, and for not only courteous but most generous treatment of rivals and adversaries. Witness the care taken of the Russian prisoners and the treatment now accorded Germans resident in Japan. This much regarding feelings.

Every one recognizes that the Japanese Government ought to defend Japanese territory and Japan's legitimate interests. Every one knows that before the Russo-Japanese War not only those interests but the integrity of Japan's territory itself was in dire danger from the aggressions of Russia. Japan had known that she must inevitably fight Russia from the day that Russia leased Port Arthur, after, in conjunction with France and Germany, treacherously forcing Japan to give it up at the close of her war with China. The Russo-Japanese War came in 1904. Japan fought with wonderful gallantry and skill, secured her own safety for the time being at any rate, and incidentally took southern Manchuria from the rapidly tightening grip of the Russians. It is reasonable

and right that she now take due care to prevent further Russian aggression in the future. Similarly, Japan witnessed German aggression in Shantung—an aggression that not merely violated the sovereignty of China, but that harmed Japan's commercial interests and measurably threatened her political interests as well. It is right that she guard against the repetition of such danger in the future.

American and English merchants and business men claim that Japan has violated the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunities for all nations in China, in the face of her repeated declarations that she would maintain these policies and the integrity of China. These seem to be facts :

1. Goods entering China over the Japanese railway through Korea enjoy a preference of one-third of the customs charges. This, as a matter of fact, deprives all other nations of an equal commercial opportunity, but it is in accord with a treaty, probably against China's wishes but actually made between China and Japan, and, by their failure to enter protest, assented to by other nations. In this respect Japan, therefore, seems to be within her technical rights.

2. There are certain internal charges made upon foreign goods imported into and transported throughout Manchuria. These charges are, under ordinary circumstances, the same for all foreign business men and are usually paid alike by them. Certain of the large Japanese importing houses have commuted these charges for a fixed sum agreed upon in advance with the Chinese authorities and paid through the financial agent of these associated Japanese trading concerns to the Chinese tax collectors. In this respect again the Japanese importers often have an advantage. So far as I can see, however, it is legitimate; and other traders, if backed in the same way by their governments, might be placed on equal terms. The advantage exists, other foreigners insist, through means employed by the Japanese authorities that are not employed by others. I do not know all the facts; no one does. The advantage, on the face of it, is legal.

3. Under the terms of the Russo-Chinese agreement for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Russians had the right to appoint their station agents as guards and to make police regulations along the route followed by the South Manchurian Railway. Japan took over these rights under the terms of her peace settlement with Russia. At that time and under the Russo-

Japanese peace agreement Russia and Japan covenanted to restrict the number of railway guards to fifteen per kilometer, Japan pledging herself to withdraw these guards from Chinese territory traversed by the section of the Chinese Eastern Railway which she thus acquired at such time as Russia should withdraw the Russian guards from the section of the railway in Manchuria still remaining in Russia's hand. Japan possesses these rights within the railway zone. She has no such rights outside the railway zone.

It is asserted on high authority that Japanese merchants and settlers have established themselves at places outside—sometimes far outside—the railway zone; that when the Chinese have protested the Japanese insisted upon remaining; that at times Japanese police have set up their sentry-boxes far outside the railway zone, and that, against the protests of the Chinese, the Japanese officials in Peking have insisted upon maintaining the Japanese there. This is contrary to agreement, injurious to the rights of foreigners, a violation of the principle of equal opportunity, and would not be tolerated if China could resist.

Moreover, it seems to be established that controversies have arisen repeatedly in Manchuria, in sections where the Japanese have no legal right to be, between Japanese police and Chinese; that Chinese police have been killed and that no proper reparation has been made by the Japanese. Furthermore, it is very generally asserted by the Chinese and foreigners that everywhere in Manchuria the Japanese, regardless of the merits of any controversy, insist that Japanese prestige must be maintained—that is, that Japanese are to be held always to be right regardless of the merits of the case. These statements are, of course, more or less *ex parte* statements. They seem, however, to be fairly well founded and to be reasonably interpretative of that intangible but real entity called the spirit of a people under the exigencies of a difficult situation.

4. There can be no doubt—and this is a matter on which I speak from personal knowledge—that very many of the Chinese students in America, Chinese business men in America, Chinese officials at home, Chinese officials traveling abroad, the Chinese press, American and English residents in China, all assert that the Chinese fear, and believe that they have reason to fear, serious attempts on the part of the Japanese to secure actual physical, political control of

certain parts of China. They believe that, although Japan may seriously intend to maintain the nominal integrity of China, she is seeking an influence in Chinese affairs so completely dominating that (if secured) it would amount to an abrogation of Chinese sovereignty.

It is sometimes asked whether the Chinese would prefer Russian to Japanese domination. The Chinese are determined to suffer the domination of neither nation. The Japanese, I personally believe, are justified in seeing to it that there is no Russian domination. I do not believe that it is either just or wise—if one is to take the far-sighted view—for Japan to seek Japanese domination.

As regards the present demands, Japanese, I understand, declare that many of the concessions made to foreigners in connection with loans or development enterprises amount to an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and that they are determined to prevent any further extension of this policy. Apparently, however, they seek to assume a right of tutelage as regards China's policy, which in itself, if granted, would be a distinct violation of sovereignty.

To my mind, the Chinese do not need a single dominating mentor. So far as the Chinese Government needs advisers, it is competent to select its own advisers and to decide how far it will follow their advice. The progress of the last two years toward a consolidation of the Government, toward arousing and solidifying patriotic feeling among the people, toward uprooting the old Manchu system of official corruption, toward the re-establishment of the finances, toward everything that marks progress along modern, progressive lines, is worthy of the highest admiration. The great progress of Japan that has aroused the wonder of the world has, in my judgment, nothing to equal this late record of China, because at no time did the Japanese Government have to struggle against such terrible odds as those confronting the Chinese.

Japan has an opportunity never before offered to her, and rarely if ever before offered any nation, to adopt a helpful policy to a sister nation which will give her free scope to exercise the noblest and best powers that her great statesmen possess. She can meet this opportunity, not by threats nor by force, but only by moral suasion—in the best sense of that expression—and by presenting suggestions and plans that commend themselves through their wisdom. The use of

force or the threat of force will defeat the ends for which she ought to strive.

Japan could doubtless, temporarily at least, by physical force dominate certain parts of China. My own feeling is that such domination—owing to influences that would shortly be brought to bear not only by China but also by other countries—would be brief, and that the final event would be most humiliating to Japan. But I personally have never for one moment believed that the Japanese intended such physical domination. The wonderful self-restraint and good judgment that they showed at the close of the China-Japan War, at the close of the Russo-Japan War, in practically all of their negotiations with foreign countries, I have believed will be exercised now.

The United States and Japan, as I view the question, have interests in China that are substantially identical along commercial lines. There will naturally be rivalries, and in those rivalries, for many reasons—geographical, racial, and others—Japan has the decided advantage. Japan aspires to be leader in Oriental affairs—a worthy aspiration. She can attain that end best by working with the United States instead of by attempting to undermine either our interests or those of any other nation. I hope the Japanese statesmen see this. To my mind, the method of conducting the present negotiations in Tokyo has aroused suspicions that are very injurious to Japan. It is possible that under the circumstances no other method was practicable. It is to be hoped that in the very near future the full truth can be made public, and that it will then be found that Japan is not seeking to force China into a position of humiliating subjection to a tutelage which the entire body of the Chinese people would resent, however strongly and sincerely some Japanese might consider such tutelage advisable or desirable. It is hoped that, while protecting Japan—exercising, if you please, a real Monroe Doctrine for Asia—the Japanese statesmen have had the far-sighted wisdom not to be selfishly aggressive any more than the United States has been aggressive in the Western continent. It is hoped that the inspiration back of these demands is Japan's eager desire to do everything possible to help the Chinese to develop themselves, a help which Japan is fully capable of rendering. To my mind, this is the only wise policy and the only just policy for Japan—viewing the question even from the Japanese standpoint.

SING, YE TRENCHES!

BY HELEN COALE CREW

Sing, ye trenches bloody-lipped!
Sing! For into you has slipped
Lycidas, dead ere his prime.
All ye cruel trenches, sing!
Under frost and under rime
All his body beautiful,
All his body wonderful,
Low hath lain. Now, cunningly,
April, with sweet mystery,
Molds the trenches horror-lipped
Into chalices of spring.

Who would not sing for Lycidas?
See, across the hideous gashes
Soft green fire of April flashes,
Starred with windflowers delicate;
Gemmed with purple violet;
Roseate with crimson glow
Where again his pulses blow
In young clover. For his sake
See the budding crocus break
Into flame; and hear the grass,
Green-tongued, sing for Lycidas!

Sing, ye gaping wounds of earth!
Tomb-like, ye have taken him,
Cradled him, distilled him;
Womb-like, ye have brought to birth
Myriad flowers and fragrances.
Requiemed with spring he lies.
God, who took unto His heart
All his throbbing, vital part,
Sowed his body in the earth.
Let the trumpets of the grass
Pæan shout for Lycidas!