

and philosopher. His successor as Ambassador did not have such distinction. He was simply an administrator. Yet on such as he the British Empire chiefly rests. Its main work must of necessity be quietly done in order to be efficiently and effectively done.

Especially has this been evident during the crisis of the past few years. Here was Germany with her agents—Bernstorff, Dernburg, Papen, Boy-Ed, and the rest—full of luridly conspicuous and unceasing energy. To oppose their activity Great Britain's representative seemed markedly inconspicuous; but he was none the less effective. We heard no more about the British Ambassador than if we were living in peace times. Though he had a charming personality and winning speech, he rarely spoke in public.

In truth, Great Britain did not *have* to be sensational. Germany did. Germany's thought was alien to ours. The British Ambassador, however, knew that he represented what both Great Britain and the United States stand for. He was useful because he was not sensational, as the German Ambassador was.

Yet a year before America entered the war the British Ambassador had a difficult task. He had to reconcile us to the hardships of the British blockade. A ready and acute writer—though the forceful quality of his writing is known only to a too restricted body of men—he was the author of remarkable state papers supporting the British contention that the blockade rigors were necessary to combat German warfare. In the many troublesome cases that have arisen between this country and England no one, we think, could have worked more faithfully or shown greater discretion. Sir Cecil's success in this line of endeavor is generally admitted. The patience and courage with which he handled the grave problems provoked by the war will cause his memory to be preserved as an inspiration not only by all those privileged to work with him but by all for whom he worked.

LET US DEFEAT THE GERMANS IN THE AIR

The best way to silence the German artillery is to conquer the German air fleet. The aerial supremacy of the Allies enabled them to achieve their advance at the Somme. At once the whole German aeronautic department was reorganized, with the result that to-day in aerial strength the Germans appear to be equal to the Allies.

It is now for the United States to offset this balance of power, not in a small way, but overwhelmingly and by every means.

Hence we call attention to the appeal now being made by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to increase the number of engineers in the Naval Aviation Service. Applicants do not have to be graduate engineers. All that is asked is that they should be practical men, those who have managed garages or shops or who have been the bosses of repair gangs. Any further necessary training will be supplied by the Government. The age limit is forty-one years, but exceptions will be made where special skill or experience is shown.

Thus some of the men above the draft age who have been lamenting the fact that they cannot take an active part in the war have now a chance to prove the sincerity of their plaint.

DR. ODELL'S ARTICLES

We are sure our readers will be interested to know that the articles by Dr. Joseph H. Odell which have been appearing in *The Outlook* on our training camps, under the title "The New Spirit of the New Army," have been published in book form by the Fleming H. Revell Company, 158 Fifth Avenue, New York City, with an Introduction by Mr. Baker, Secretary of War. In this Introduction Mr. Baker says: "These chapters interested me greatly when in part they first appeared in *The Outlook*, for I found in them a complete understanding of the work of the War Department Commission on Training Camp Activities."

In the same patriotic spirit which prompted these articles on the training camps Dr. Odell is now writing for *The Outlook* a series of articles on the necessity of establishing a durable peace on the battlefield before negotiations can be taken up at the

conference table. The first of these articles appeared in *The Outlook* of February 13, and was called "Passing the Buck in Washington"; the second appeared last week under the title "Who Is the United States?"; the third of the series will appear in next week's *Outlook*, dated March 6, under the title "Interpreting the People to the President." Its purpose will be to endeavor to show from the President's own speeches that the true policy of the war is a defeat at arms of militaristic autocracy. The article will maintain that the spirit of the American people is such now that they will not be willing to abate the President's own demand in the slightest, that they will not be contented with a negotiated peace unless the negotiations are sought for by the German people after their recognition and admission that Prussian militarism is a complete failure as a war machine, and therefore as an instrument of world politics.

KAISER, PREMIER, AND PRESIDENT

IF the German Kaiser, the British Prime Minister, and the American President had met in conference, they could hardly have exchanged views more effectually than by their recent utterances within the period of two successive days.

On the part of the German Kaiser on the one side and on the part of the British Prime Minister on the other there was no sign of yielding. "We desire," said the Kaiser, "to live in friendship with neighboring peoples, but the victory of German arms must first be recognized." "It was adamant," said the British Prime Minister, concerning the attitude of Austria as well as Germany to the demands of the Allies; and like adamant stood Lloyd George himself. But the President seemed far from being irreconcilable. Though he replies to the German Chancellor as to one who lives "in his thought in a world dead and gone," the President takes up the words of Count Czernin, the spokesman of Austria, with what seems like eagerness for reconciliation and mutual understanding.

Does this mean that the President is entertaining the thought that possibly America may compromise with those who by terrorism and lawlessness have undertaken to impose their will on the world? Is it possible that to the demands of such as these the President is making ready for yielding anything essential to victory? We think not.

Does this mean, then, that the President sees any reasonable prospect that the enemy is ready to make concessions? We do not believe so.

What seems far more probable is that the President saw an opportunity of unmasking an enemy, of stripping him of his disguise, and took it.

To understand the President's speech, it is necessary to recall what preceded it.

On January 8 President Wilson, in an address before Congress, announced fourteen "arrangements and covenants" which he declared to be "the programme of the world peace," and "the only possible programme." (These fourteen points can be found quoted verbatim in *The Outlook* for January 16.) These may be summarized very briefly as follows: I. Public diplomacy. II. Freedom of navigation except as limited by international action. III. Equality of trade conditions. IV. Reduction of armaments. V. Adjustments of colonial claims, with equal regard for the populations concerned and the claims of the Governments in question. VI. The unembarrassed opportunity for Russia to determine her own political development. VII. The evacuation and restoration of Belgium. VIII. The restoration of invaded France and the righting of the wrong done to France in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine. IX. The readjustment of the frontiers of Italy. X. Autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary. XI. Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, and guarantees to the Balkans. XII. Autonomous development of the non-Turkish parts of Turkey and international guarantees for the Dardanelles. XIII. An independent Polish state. XIV. A general association of nations.

To this address, intended very clearly not primarily for Congress but for the Central Empires, both the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Min-

ister, Count Czernin, replied. These two men assumed different rôles. It is altogether probable that their respective rôles were assigned to them. To Hertling was allotted the task of speaking for the Junkers, the reactionaries, the whole military hierarchy of the Central Powers. To Czernin, on the other hand, was allotted the task of speaking for the more liberal elements in both Germany and Austria. Thus everybody in Pan-Germany might be supposed to be satisfied. So Hertling thundered and Czernin cooed. We can imagine the pride with which the conservative read the Hertling speech and the new confidence that it gave him in the might of the German arms. On the other hand, we can imagine the thrill that came over the half-hoping, half-despairing liberal as he read Czernin's speech, with its suggestion of promise to long-subjugated peoples. Thus Pan-Germany thought to keep up the courage of its fighters while at the same time it allayed within its own borders the ferment of liberalism and enticing with fair words the pacifists and liberals in Allied and neutral countries.

This is a dangerous game to play; it is like playing with explosives. Germany can be handled with comparative safety by its rulers, for the people of Germany have become used to handling. But Austria-Hungary is different. Here is a so-called Dual Empire that is not dual really, but multiple. It is composed of a group of nationalities that are ready to fly apart. The ruling classes in Austria-Hungary have acquired skill in keeping these elements together.

If we read President Wilson's address of January 11 aright, he saw the possibilities in that game and chose to make use of them.

So the President proceeded to show how hopeless the militaristic and Junker doctrine of Hertling was. He set the German Chancellor aside as hopelessly incapable, at least at present, of even understanding what men of to-day demand. But to Czernin, who had been striking this attitude of liberalism, the President offered, with every appearance of good faith, words of welcome. Here is a man that can understand the language of the twentieth century, so the President seemed to say. He has traveled a long way toward the position of the true liberal. If he will only come further, just these four steps (and the President enumerated them), he will be on ground where we can actually discuss with him the terms of peace.

Where does such a speech as that leave Czernin?

He cannot go further without mortally offending all the Junkers, the conservatives, the Hindenburgs, and the rest of the Potsdam gang on whom Pan-Germany depends. And yet he cannot turn back and eat his words without proving to every liberal within the Empire and to every pacifist outside that he has been indulging in mockery and false pretense.

This would not be important if it were a mere matter of bringing confusion upon a certain Bohemian nobleman. But it is something a great deal more than that. It is a signal of warning to the liberals of Austria-Hungary and its component peoples. It is virtually saying to them: "Now is your chance to turn the trick."

It is evident that Austria-Hungary is destined for a radical change as a consequence of this war. What the nature of that change may be will depend upon circumstances and upon the leaders of Austria-Hungary themselves.

If that change comes as the result of a smash from the Allies, the elements of the Empire may disintegrate. They may fly to their affinities. The Jugo-Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina would then join the Serbians and the Montenegrins to make a greater Serbia; the Poles of Galicia, their brothers of Russia and Prussia, to make a new Poland; the Transylvanian Rumanians, their brothers of Rumania; the Germans of Austria, their uncongenial fellow-Teutons under the thumb of Berlin; the Czecho-Slovaks would unite to make an independent Bohemia; and the Magyars would be left to rule themselves, something they have perhaps forgotten how to do in their effort to rule others. This would be a revolution administered from the outside.

If the change in Austria-Hungary comes from the inside, it may come as an explosion caused by spontaneous combustion. The disintegration might be quite as complete and might result in much the same new adjustments as those which might come from the outside smash.

If the change comes from the inside, however, it may assume

an entirely different form. It may result not in the dispersion of the different elements but in a new arrangement of them in the form of a free, or semi-free, confederation. The effect of this would be to permit the various nationalities within the Empire to become autonomous. The Slavs and the Rumanians, and even the Italians, might gain a freedom that they have never known under Hungarian and Austrian rule. It is conceivable, if German victory is conceivable, that the change in Austria-Hungary may be directed and determined by Germany.

But whatever form that change may take, it is bound to come. Austria-Hungary as we used to know it we shall never see again.

President Wilson's reply to Czernin is in effect, and we are inclined to think it was in purpose, a notification to the liberals of the various nationalities in Austria-Hungary that they still have a chance for determining their own destiny instead of having it determined for them. It was a notice to the present rulers of Austria-Hungary that if they are ready to accede to the demands of the Empire's subject peoples they might have something to say as to what the new form of the Empire should be. It was a notice to the leaders of the Liberal party that here is an opportunity for them to step forward and to make the people of Austria-Hungary believe that the things which Czernin had said with his tongue in his cheek they were ready to promise on their honor and in good faith and put into effect. It was a notice to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, so far as they could be made to listen or to understand, that if they were ready to throw off German domination and to choose from among their own people leaders willing and able to carry out a programme of freedom for the peoples of the whole Empire they might save themselves not only further bloody sacrifice in the present war, but future suffering in the convulsions of a possible revolution.

To such an appeal the present rulers of Austria-Hungary are not likely to listen. Lloyd George, in discerning no difference in substance between Hertling and Czernin, between the German and the Austrian reply, was right, and it is not likely that the President disagrees with him. But the President's experiment was worth trying, not for any hope of action from the present rulers of Austria-Hungary, but for the chance that the Liberals of Austria-Hungary may really see for what the Allies are fighting.

There can be no peace without victory; and over such a foe as the Potsdam gang there can be no victory that is not a military victory. If the President succeeds in detaching from the support of the Potsdam gang the liberals of Austria-Hungary, the coming of that military victory will be hastened.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE FRENCH

We have received from a lady living in one of the most progressive, prosperous, and well-informed cities of New York State—a university town—the following interesting and suggestive letter:

Has it occurred to you that, in spite of the fact that we are allies of the French and that there is a general acceptance of the fact of their bravery as a nation and people, yet many good Americans harbor a certain prejudice against the French as individuals, as a social entity, associate with them vice and fashions, absinthe drinking, grisettes, and Latin Quarters? Would not a series of articles and stories bringing out the domestic side of the people as it really has existed and as it exists now—the modesty and purity of the girls, the devotion of fathers and husbands, the helpfulness and cleverness of the women as they normally have been—would not such articles help to a better appreciation of the French people?

When the war was only six weeks old, in 1914, the minister of a large church here in — in a sermon ridiculed the *degenerate* French nation. Of course he had been imbibing at a German fountain of truth. In our high schools, at least at — high school, the French Department is still under the German Department, with a strong pro-German, an American of German ancestry, at its head. It will take some effort on the part of parents and taxpayers to change to a French head, although there is a stampede of pupils from the German classes into the French.

Now if in a patriotic, devoted city such as ours such prejudice exists, why not elsewhere? This feeling towards the French