

When informed that it was, he promptly told the committee that there would be no parade unless he were permitted to ride a cow-pony. The automobile was side-tracked, and the parade, with the young T. R. astride of a mud-colored bronco, made its way through the cheering crowds.

There is a lot of the old T. R. in the new T. R. There is something else besides. Not for a moment does he forget that much of the attention which is

given to him is simply through affection for his father. He knows thoroughly that he has his own way to make in the world, and he intends to do it. He has taken a homely motto for his own guidance—"Every tub must stand on its own bottom." He has done amazingly well at the start. He already has behind him a military record of genuine worth. He has served acceptably as a member of the New York State Assembly, and—as he would personally

point out—he is the father of four children. To-day, at the age of thirty-three, he is Assistant Secretary of the Navy—an office in which his father made his first appearance in National public life. There is no doubt that the new T. R. will succeed in his official position, and there is no doubt that the public, when it finds time to look him up a little more intimately, will find in him a character which it will come to hold in genuine affection.

## MILLENNIUM OR ARMAGEDDON

### AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH FACE THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES AT WASHINGTON

BY P. W. WILSON

EVERY day furnishes evidence that the world is awaking to the momentous issues challenged by President Harding when he summoned certain of the Powers to what will be known in history as the Washington Conference. However this matter now proceeds, that invitation, already recorded, must leave the chances of peace in the coming years either definitely better or definitely worse. For the Conference to fail would be serious. In 1870 Gladstone proposed to France and Prussia that they should limit armaments, but Bismarck refused and war followed. In 1898 there was the Czar's rescript, in a similar sense, but the nations did not heed, and a few years later there broke out the Russo-Japanese War. At the Hague Conferences disarmament was resisted and Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin in 1912 came to nothing. Once more, in August, 1914, the peace was shattered. It is impossible, therefore, to discuss the Washington Conference without a solemn sense that here is a drama which means life or death in its ultimate *dénouement*.

PRESIDENT HARDING has decided at the outset a point of profound significance. In respect of disarmament, there are two schools of thought. The first of these maintains that we can, here and now, disband our troops and scrap our ships, leaving any differences among nations to be settled later by negotiation or some judicial process. It is on this theory that the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations is proceeding with its deliberations at Paris. Three sub-committees are at work: the first, on the private manufacture and traffic in munitions; the second, on the right of investigation and international control of armaments; and the third, on the collection of statistics, showing what armaments there are in the world and the expenditure upon them. These committees are to report by September, and one question is whether the information so rendered available will be admitted at Washington, where the story is that

letters from the League of Nations remain unanswered! The attitude of many Wilsonian Democrats, as explained to me, is that they welcome President Harding's action because, in their view, disarmament will be found impossible except through the League.


According to the second school of thought, there must be a settlement of outstanding international difficulties if the world is to disarm; and for this reason President Harding has called for two conferences—the first to deal with problems of the Pacific, and the second with armaments. For the Pacific Conference, there are invited Britain and her Dominions, France, Italy, Japan, and China; while Holland, with the Dutch Indies, claims a seat. This list is criticised because it includes Italy, which country has no interests in the Far East, while it excludes any Latin-American state and Russia. It is, however, obvious that the main parties to the Conference are the United States and Japan, on whose agreement everything else depends. The Armaments Conference, which presumably must await the success of the other, will consist of Great Powers only—the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Italy. Once more there are critics who would like to see Germany, and even Russia, at the table.

THE aim of the first or Far Eastern Conference is not to deal with the late war, which was done ill or well at Paris, but to prevent the next war, to make peace before war comes, or, as the late W. T. Stead would have put it, to negotiate *before* you fight. The nearest modern parallel to this gathering has been the Congress of Berlin, also summoned to handle an Eastern question, to revise a Treaty of Peace (San Stefano), which, like Yap and Shantung, was unsatisfactory to an English-speaking Power—in that case, Britain. In Berlin Disraeli attended as Prime Minister, bringing back peace with honor. And if the Irish question is settled, Mr. Lloyd George, also Prime Minister, hopes to be a delegate—this despite the at-

tacks of Lord Northcliffe. Indeed, there has been the even bolder proposal that the Prince of Wales might be allowed a seat as "spectator," which would almost necessitate the presence of Prince Hirohito, of Japan. It is perhaps a safe rule to avoid ceremonial innovations which might complicate serious business. If he comes across, Mr. Lloyd George will of course take some of the risk that proved almost too much for President Wilson. Assuming his welcome, we have also to consider under what circumstances he will leave for home. It was the return journey that mattered to the American delegation at Paris. It is to be hoped, moreover, that invaluable time and strength will not be wasted, as in Europe, upon banquets and receptions, which should have followed the work to be done instead of delaying it.

This will be the first conference of the kind held at Washington or in the atmosphere of the New World. Over cables and correspondents there will be in this case no censorship. Even private discussions will be made almost public next morning. In London this prospect has made diplomatists of the old school rather nervous, and there has been an idea of getting the more awkward issues out of the way before the Conference meets. Washington has vetoed, however, any notion of a formal conference in London which might clear the ground for events at Washington. The Dominion Prime Ministers, now in London, are discussing matters among themselves.

It is indicated that President Harding will not attend the Conferences, where he will be represented by Secretary Hughes. As associates of Secretary Hughes many distinguished men have been mentioned—Elihu Root, Herbert Hoover, Senator Lodge, and so on. Two principles are likely to be followed: First, that the delegates shall include Senators—omitted at Paris; and, secondly, that among them shall be Democrats. President Harding knows that, after the failure in the United States of the Treaty of Versailles, he may be



### THE STAGE SETTING OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

AT the extreme northeast corner of the map are the republics of Siberia, the capital of one of which is Chita, while that of another is Vladivostok. The island of Saghalien, formerly half Russian, is now in fact wholly under Japanese control. Shantung is under control of Japan by virtue of her occupation of Kiaochow. French interests in the Pacific are chiefly in Indo-China. British interests in China center along the Yangtse River, at Weihaiwei, and at Hongkong. Shanghai is a treaty port. The territorial interests of Holland are in the islands of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, the western half of New Guinea, and intervening smaller islands—all known as the Dutch East Indies. Belgium has applied for inclusion in the Conference on the strength of her railway and financial interests in China. All the other Powers have similar, though unequal, interests. American interests in the Pacific center in the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, besides Midway and the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands, which are not on the map.

The islands formerly German are the islands in the middle of the map, east of the Philippines, inclosed in a dot-and-dash line. Of these islands, those north and south of the equator were given by the Treaty of Versailles to Japan and Australia, respectively, under a mandate; the United States, not being party to the Treaty, has not yet officially consented to this arrangement. Besides these, the German part of Samoa was given to New Zealand. That part of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago which was formerly German are indicated by a dotted line. At present Yap, one of the smaller of the Caroline group, is a bone of contention. As it is the center of international cables, the United States is unwilling that Japan should have complete control of it under a mandate from the League of Nations. This island, though small in territory, is now big in importance.

Steamer distances from important points, especially those not on the map, are indicated.



faced at the Conferences with the question whether (in common parlance) he can "deliver the goods." Hence his determination to have Congress at his back from the outset. It has been suggested that the Conferences might meet in the building where Senators have their offices, which includes a marble hall for caucuses. Provided the acoustics are satisfactory, which I am told is doubtful, there might be a tactical advantage in having the Conferences at the Capitol, under the eye of Congress, instead of at the rival end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

**J**APAN is ready to agree to limit armaments here and now, but she prefers that Pacific problems be not discussed. In other words, her solution for the future is peace and the *status quo*. With the *status quo* in the Far East the United States is not entirely satisfied and Japan is so informed. She answers that she must know in advance what Far Eastern or Asiatic problems are to be put upon the *agenda*. The reply of the United States to this is, at the moment, that the *agenda* will depend on the Conference itself. Hence there arise the following questions:

(1) Will the Anglo-Japanese Alliance come before the Conference or will it be denounced in advance? Has it been already, in effect, killed by the opposition of the British Dominions to the British Foreign Office? And what importance should be attached to the opinion of Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor of England, that the Alliance continues automatically for a year from June? Can Mr. Lloyd George obtain a contrary opinion from his law officers in time for the Conference?

(2) How will the mandate over Yap be treated, and with it the whole question of ocean cables, on which the International Cable Conference at Washington failed to agree? Will the discussion be broadened so as to include the Japanese mandate over other German islands north of the equator, and especially the fortifications of those islands, lying as they do on the routes between the United States and the Philippines? Will Japan, on her side, then raise the question of mandates given to Australia for islands south of the equator? And how will all this affect the League of Nations at Geneva, which authorized the mandates?

(3) Is Japanese sovereignty over Korea to be challenged and her administration of that Kingdom, with alleged abuses, reviewed? At Washington there is an independent Korean Commission. How far will Japan ease this aspect of the position by pushing home her reforms in Korea and allowing freedom of the press, by which alone the sincerity of the reforms can be guaranteed to the civilized world?

(4) Is it the intention of Japan to evacuate Shantung, absolutely and without equivocation, leaving to China the guardianship of railways and other property and confining Japanese enterprise to the commerce which she shares

with other nations foreign to China? Is China to be given powers to prevent Japanese and any other smuggling of opium into her territories?

(5) The Government at Peking will be represented at the Conference—to quote Mr. Balfour—"as an independent Power." But will President Sun Yat-sen, of the Southern Chinese Republic, be also recognized? And what is to happen about the Siberian Republic, of which the capital is Chita? And what about Manchuria? Is Japan to retain the northern half of Saghalien?

(6) What is to be the interpretation of "the open door"? on which question the facts may be, perhaps, briefly explained:

In 1894 the war between Japan and China destroyed the prestige of the latter Empire. Various European Powers—Russia, Germany, and Britain, in particular—therefore declared what they called "spheres of influence" over large areas of the disintegrating country. While Japan acquired Formosa, she held aloof otherwise from this game of grab—perhaps she had then no choice—and even supported Secretary Hay when in 1900 he compelled Europe to acknowledge the doctrine of "the open door," which means, broadly, the principle of equal commercial opportunity in the regions under development. At this period, therefore, Japan and the United States were standing together against the exclusive enterprises of the Old World, which threatened to shut out both of them from the Chinese market.

In 1905 Japan had beaten Russia and acquired Korea. It was no longer a question of Europe shutting out Japan, but of Japan shutting out everybody else; and in 1908, therefore, there was the Root-Takahira interchange of notes, by which Japan, now becoming predominant in the Far East, reiterated to the United States her assurance of "the open door."

In 1914 Europe was paralyzed by war, and Japan dispossessed Germany of Shantung. Profiting by the confusion, she forced on European belligerents in the dark days preceding 1917 a series of secret agreements disposing of Far Eastern interests to her own advantage, and on China she pressed the famous Twenty-one Demands, which amounted to annexation. Even the United States had to concede the Lansing-Ishii notes, which added to the doctrine of "the open door" the concession that Japan has "special interests" in China, due to geographical propinquity. The phrase, "special interests," was magnified by Japan into "paramount interests" and was so translated into Chinese and promulgated four days before the date of publication agreed with the United States. There arise, therefore, the questions:

(1) Are any European Powers still bound by secret agreements made with Japan during the war? The answer is, Presumably not.

(2) Is China thus bound? Her reply is that she signed nothing, save under

duress. How, then, is China to be saved in the future from such compulsion? Is the United States ready to help in the management of her finances, as they were managed for so many years and with such conspicuous fidelity by Sir Robert Hart? How are you otherwise to lift mandarins above their habitual bribery? Is it possible to make the existing Consortium of the United States, Japan, Britain, France, and Belgium a real instrument for extending and uniting her railways, by which alone China can be saved from falling apart, and for developing equitably her other resources? If China falls a prey to some other Power, how is she to be defended? And how are the incalculable mineral resources of Siberia to be apportioned?

**J**APAN is herself deeply stirred. The militarists, led by Prince Yamagata and Admiral Kato, are fighting the movement for a broader franchise and for disarmament, which has attained through the eloquence of Ozaki a most formidable impetus. Prime Minister Hara wants peace and a measure of progress. The masses are tired of taxation and conscription and are scandalized by exposures of graft and bribery in high places. And the Emperor is relaxing the etiquette which symbolizes divine right.

The question is whether Japan will raise the problem of race equality and immigration. Her population is increasing. Where and on what terms may the surplus emigrate? If California, British Columbia, New Zealand, and Australia—even tropical Australia, where white men cannot live—are closed, will Japanese already domiciled in these countries at least receive full citizenship side by side with the white man? Will immigration into the Philippines, Hawaii, the Dutch Indies, and Latin America continue? And with what opportunities for holding land? If the white man has his Monroe Doctrine for North and South America, is the yellow man to have no Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia? May Japanese penetrate China, carrying their flag, or when they enter must they leave their flag behind them? And is China to come, like India and Mesopotamia and Egypt, under "Anglo-Saxon" suzerainty? These are tremendous and searching questions, probing to the very roots of man's rights as man. Provision must be made, not indeed for Japan's imperialism, but for the commercial progress and reasonable emigration of the Japanese. Otherwise the militarists will say—most foolishly, but none the less plausibly—that the only way is war.

**A**SSUMING a settlement in the Pacific, proposals for disarmament would then be in order. For the United States, Great Britain, and Japan a reduction of navies would be immediately possible. Presumably, the United States would modify her battleship programme of 1916, while Japan would respond with a change in her so-called Eight-Eight schedule of battleships and battle-cruis-

ers. Fortifications rapidly proceeding in the Pacific on both sides would cease. With regard to the British fleet, the position is that the very Navy League, organized to promote expansion, is now advocating reduction, and for an excellent reason—Britain has no quarrel either with her twenty years' ally, Japan, or with the United States, and she does not want the size of her navy to become a cause of quarrel.

On land, the United States and the British Empire are already disarmed.

Canada, for instance, is reducing her forces this year from 4,400 to 4,000 men—this for about seven millions of people. Disarmament on land is thus a problem, not for those who speak English, but for the rest of Europe, including Russia, and for Japan. Under what guaranties will France and Italy join Japan in abolishing conscription? Are the United States and Britain prepared to give those guaranties? Must there be formal treaties or will gentlemen's agreements be sufficiently explicit and

binding? Will it be necessary to control war material, the making of poisons, and so on, and, if so, will independent nations submit to such supervision of industry by an international commission? The war has shown that metals, etc., can be thus watched, if society thinks it worth while.

And, finally, will there grow out of the Washington Conference a permanent Association of Nations which shall include the United States and all other civilized Powers?

## JUST AS MUCH FUN IN YOUR OWN LITTLE TOWN

BY ROLLIN LYNDE HARTT



Courtesy of Community Service.

BY GATHERING TO LISTEN TO A BAND CONCERT OF GOOD MUSIC TOWNSPEOPLE BECOME BETTER NEIGHBORS

**D**INING with Biaggi the other night—at Migliore's, as usual—I said: "Bimbo, I've often wondered why you Sicilians will consent to live packed together on this hideous East Side of New York when you grew up in charming villages. How can you tolerate the city?"

"Because of its beautiful country life," he replied.

A great wag is Bimbo, a great lover of paradox; Chesterton would adore him. Yet reflect. Outside the restaurant a village *festa* was raging. Arches of colored lights spanned Elizabeth Street. American and Italian flags waved everywhere. Confetti rained down from roofs, balconies, and fire-escapes. Children frolicked on a portable merry-go-round. Paper balloons soared aloft. A procession with gay banners wormed its way through the crowds. Blaring alternately, two Italian bands competed for a prize.

"You see why we like it," said Bimbo. "Big times; play; sociability; friendliness; everybody a good mixer, just as in a Sicilian village. And when we go out into the country, what do we find but city life? *Basta!* Your country folks don't know how to play. They

don't pull together. They don't really know one another. They're stiff, like uptown people here in New York. That's why we can't endure living in the country. We miss the village jollity of this good old East Side."

Only that morning I had been reading Dr. Warren H. Wilson's remarks upon our so-called country life: "No play for the children; no recreation for the young people; no adequate opportunities for acquaintance and marriage," and none for "that satisfaction of the social instinct" which would make the village "a good place to live in."

However, I had also been reading about Salida, Colorado, "a mining town of four thousand people, which to-day is putting on grand opera and the finest plays in the English language. The people are painting their own scenery and making their own costumes. Practically every citizen of Salida takes part in some production, the actors ranging from little children to women in their seventies."

But when I spoke of Salida, Bimbo asked, "Who are those people? Americans?"

I had to tell him: "Well, of a sort. Imported, though. People from Mexico,

Spain, France, Italy, Bohemia, and Serbia."

"There you are!" said he, and, obviously, there I was. I said, "Bimbo, a celebrated American humorist named Josh Billings advises, 'When you argy, allus git beat.'"

Dropping the subject—or, at all events, attempting to—I spoke of having lately visited a new church uptown to examine its exquisitely carved pulpit and choir stalls. I was interested because I had met the craftsman, who remarked, "Perhaps you have seen me before, when I lived in Oberammergau, and I used to act in the Passion Play there."

"Aha!" said Bimbo. "Still getting beat!"

I was. Imagine a Passion Play in Spoon River or Gopher Prairie! Why, bless you, one might as well suggest grand opera for Mechanicsville Junction or imagine any typically American village or "tank town" going in spontaneously for "the finest plays in the English language" with home-grown performers. Our country folks seem devoid, not only of the impulse, but of the capacity. As Dr. Wilson puts it: "Allowing for some exceptions, not too