Soviet Government of Russia. They are such conditions as any self-respecting government or organization engaged in charitable relief must insist upon.

That the Soviet cannot be trusted without restrictions such as Mr. Hoover demands even to look after the children of its own people is amply shown in an article elsewhere in this issue called "Russia's Next Generation." The moral breakdown under Bolshevik rule has resulted in physical suffering, character deterioration, and criminal abuse of Russia's children. Any aid the Relief Administration can give must be partial and temporary. The question at once arises whether such relief might not be more than counterbalanced by the consequent bolstering up of the credit of the Bolshevist minority which is responsible for what Sir Paul Dukes rightly calls the appalling conditions among Russian children.

BLASPHEMY AND FREE SPEECH

Some four years ago we reported the conviction of a Lithuanian lecturer named Michael Mockus under a Connecticut statute originally passed in 1642 and then aimed against witchcraft as well as against blasphemy, but later amended and moderated. The interest in the case was in the plea that insult to the Christian religion and its followers was defensible as free speech.

Now some friend sends us pages from a law journal which report another blasphemy case against this same Michael Mockus which came before the Maine Supreme Court recently. Here, again, is the question how far the principle of free speech allows contumely to the religious convictions of others.

The report shows that Mockus, in commenting on various pictures which he threw on the screen, used almost inconceivably indecent, insulting, and filthy expressions about God, Christ, and the Virgin Mary. It is perfectly clear that as a mere matter of public decency no man should be allowed to utter such language in any public place. And this would be true, no matter whether the insults were directed to Christianity, or Moslemism, or Judaism. Conviction was obtained in this case under a Maine statute which makes it an offense to use "profanely, insultingly, and reproachfully language against God" or against the other members of the Trinity or the Christian Scriptures. Whether or not this is theoretically the best method of legally forbidding the kind of thing above described is an open question. A non-Christian (say, for instance, a Jew) might reasonably ask that his sacred convictions and feelings also should be protected against such an offense.

The lower court was undoubtedly right in holding that the offense did come under the statute, and the defense, therefore, was again founded on the definition of the individual's right to speak freely of his own convictions. The lower court held that the offense was not at all mitigated by the Constitutional rights of Mockus to express opinions or to controvert the opinions of others. The Supreme Court in an elaborate and admirable decision not only upheld the lower court as to this, but asserted that the statute "in no manner conflicts with our State constitutional guaranty of religious freedom and freedom of speech." The presiding Justice, Judge Philbrook, most vigorously commended the definition of liberty set forth by the justice of the lower court and commended it as "a charge which for clearness of thought, beauty of diction, accuracy of law, and impartiality of statement is seldom equaled."

It is for the purpose of enforcing and commending this excellent definition that we have thought it worth while again to refer to the attacks of Michael Mockus on religion and the religious feeling. The definition referred to by Judge Philbrook is as follows:

> The great degrees of liberty which we enjoy in this country, the degree of personal liberty which every man and woman enjoys, is limited by a like degree of liberty in every other person, and it is the duty of men, and the duty of women, in their conduct, in the exercise of the liberty which they enjoy, to consider that every other man and woman has the right to exercise the same degree of liberty; that when one person enters into society—and society is the state in which personal liberty exists—each gives up something of that liberty in order that the other may enjoy the same degree of liberty. It is a conception that perhaps some people find difficult to understand, but it is the conception of liberty which we enjoy.

A GOVERNOR UNDER INDICTMENT

The State of Illinois is undergoing the singular experience of having its Governor under indictment on a charge of embezzlement, yet refusing to submit to arrest on the ground that he would thereby violate his obligation to the State to carry on his functions as Governor.

It would be improper, and indeed impossible, to form at a distance an opinion as to the charges and countercharges in this unfortunate affair. The allegations upon which the county Grand Jury acted charged Governor Small with conspiracy together with the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Sterling, and Mr. Vernon Curtis, a banker, to misappropriate or misuse the daily balances of the State in the banks. The Governor denies with vigor the inference that he and his colleagues drew any profit from the handling of State funds. He declares that the Attorney-General has fathered these charges because of political enmity; and, moreover, intimates that moneyed interests have combined to defeat the will of the people in making him Governor, and that they are backed by certain politicians and certain newspapers. These influences and interests he describes as acting through "a whole gang of character assassins and character defamers."

Lawyers are interested particularly in the contention that a State Governor by submitting to arrest after indictment would surrender his official rights and commit an act of political treason. The Attorney-General, on the other hand, insists that the sole question is whether the Governor is or is not guilty of the charges, and asks whether the defense for refusing to obey the courts would apply if a Governor should commit murder while in office.

SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS

The United States Senate has passed two measures of much human appeal, the Soldiers' Relief Bill and the Maternity Bill. The first is also known as the Sweet Bill, from the name of its introducer in the House, Representative Sweet, of Iowa. The passage of this bill should be followed by quick and thorough aid to the needy soldier, for it consolidates into one bureau the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Board for Vocational Education, and so much of the Public Health Service as relates to disabled ex-service men. Such consolidation ought to save the soldier from the waste of time and money due to separated and overlapping bureaus. As it passed the House the bill provided for the new bureau to be under the Treasury Department, but as it passed the Senate the bureau was to be independent and under the President. While the Senate's action is assumed to be prefatory to the establishment of the bureau in the new Department of Public Welfare, as recommended by the President, Mr. Sweet, in recently writing to The Outlook, said that "it would be a very easy matter to transfer the new bureau from the Treasury Department to the Welfare Department" in case the pending bill establishing that Department became law.

The Maternity Bill, also known as the Sheppard-Towner Bill, from the names of its sponsors in the Senate and House, was first suggested by Miss Julia Lathrop, Chief of the Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor. That Bureau, assisted by an Advisory Committee consisting of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Surgeon-General of the

AS HE THAT LEAVES A SHALLOW PLASH TO PLUNGE HIM IN THE DEEP

(The Taming of the Shrew, I, 1)

Bushnell for the Central Press Association

HEY, JAP, SHED THAT HEAVY STUFF AND JUMP IN WHILE THE WATER'S FINE

Darling in the Buffalo Evening News

DOES ANYBODY NEED A SECOND INVITATION?

From Mrs. F. A. Goldthwaite, Buffalo, N. Y.

Bushnell in the Rocky Mountain News

THEY'LL BOTH ENJOY A REFRESHING PLUNGE AFTER SUCH A LONG HOT SPELL

From A. W. Gillette, Denver, Col.

Thomas in the Detroit News

STILL POSING