

THE FOUR-POWER TREATY

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan,

With a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,

Have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries

The President of the United States of America,

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India

And for the Dominion of Canada,
For the Commonwealth of Australia,
For the Dominion of New Zealand,
For India,

The President of the French Republic,
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,

[NOTE.—The names of the plenipotentiaries will be inserted after they are ap-

pointed respectively by the heads of States above named.—E. H. A.]

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I. The high contracting parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the high contracting parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other high contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II. If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other

Power, the high contracting parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III. This agreement shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the high contracting parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV. This agreement shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.

THE DIPLOMACY OF TRUST

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE FROM WASHINGTON

BY ERNEST HAMLIN ABBOTT

AT about half-past two in the afternoon of Saturday, December 10, a correspondent strolled into the press headquarters in the New Navy Building and inquired whether there was any prospect of a plenary session.

"Why, man," was the reply, "where have you been?"

He explained that he had spent the night in a suburb of Washington, had come to the city in the morning, and, without looking at a paper, had spent the intervening time at work in his office. It was evident that he was not joking. Then the truth was broken to him:


"The plenary session you are inquiring about adjourned an hour ago."

It was the most important session of the Armament Conference, with the possible exception of the first; and he had missed it. And not he only. So suddenly had the call for it come that no notice of it was definitely posted at the correspondents' headquarters till eight o'clock the night before. And thereby hangs a tale.

For over two weeks the delegates had been working hard at the four chief subjects of the Conference: Naval Armament, Land Armament, Far Eastern Affairs, and the Problems of the Pacific. They might have called an open session and made some speeches to satisfy public curiosity and the importunate demands of the press; but they preferred to get work done. The nature of that work does not differ radically from the work involved in large business transactions or in framing and drafting important and involved legislative measures. It requires deliberation, informal discussion, technical

study; and those who are engaged in it must be free from distractions. It cannot be done, and that sort of work never is done, at public meetings in the presence of a gallery. Much of it is of no interest to the public because it is technical or detailed; much of it, if it is to be done at all, involves the interchange of tentative personal opinions which if made in confidence commits nobody to anything, but if made publicly would invariably lead to misunderstandings. For example, one reason why the American proposal for the limitation of armaments has proved acceptable in its main structure not only to the Governments involved but also to the American people is that its terms were not divulged until everything that was merely tentative and ultimately proved unacceptable was by careful and undisturbed examination eliminated. This was not secret diplomacy, and it is misleading and confusing to call it so. Secret diplomacy commits a nation to a policy without giving the nation a chance to know what the policy is to which it is committed or to understand the ends which that policy is designed to serve. But secrecy, if you wish to call it that, is often absolutely essential to the proper preparation of measures of a public character and destined to be subjected to public discussion. It was inevitable, therefore, that during the time since the last open session the Conference should seem to halt. In fact, it was making very rapid progress. And it was by no means being conducted in secret. The nature of the work done by the various committees was made known by official communications and by unofficial but frank explanations made from day to

day to correspondents of the press. Those who suspected intrigues and secret purposes were simply unwilling to believe repeated assurances to the contrary. Not only were the conclusions of each committee announced as soon as they were reached, but in some cases detailed reports of the discussions were given out and published. For example, a very full report was made of the discussion which led to the adoption of the resolution which was added to the four-fold declaration of the eight Powers concerning China. I dare say that most newspaper readers do not even now know that this fifth paragraph was added, and of course know nothing about the discussion; but it was all given out and printed immediately after the discussion took place. What the public wanted to know about was the big decisions; and the big decisions had not been reached. It is true that to any one who recognized the logic of events the acceptance of America's proposal to stop the naval race was a foregone conclusion. It is also true that any decision as to land armaments was by the nature of the Conference confined to recommendations concerning matters incidental to land warfare—such as poison gas—and could not extend to the subject of a general limitation of land forces. It is true, moreover, that under the subject of the Far East important decisions—any one of which would have been regarded as of extraordinary importance if it had been announced apart from such a Conference as this—had been reached. It is true that Shantung, which had not only been a source of violent irritation between China and Japan, but had greatly disturbed the Paris Peace Conference



(C) Underwood

THE CONFERENCE HEADQUARTERS AFTER THE SEASON'S FIRST SNOWFALL

and, left unsettled there, had aroused a good deal of feeling in America, was at last, through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, under friendly discussion by the Chinese and Japanese delegates. In all conscience this seemed enough to account for several weeks of study and discussion; but public opinion exerted through the press was daily, hourly, seeking for the big decisions.

Then came rumors that there was to be some kind of agreement between three or four of the principal Powers. Even with the best of intentions to observe good faith, there is no way of preventing eager seekers for news from drawing fairly correct inferences from answers to questions or from mere refusals to answer. Then the President said in a public address that the success of the Conference was going to exceed "our fondest hopes." The rumors became more definite, but until Friday night remained rumors. The American delegation, it should be said, observed good faith not only conscientiously but skillfully; but as soon as the decision was reached, without waiting for even important details to be arranged, and without the usual notice, the Chairman of the Conference, who is also the head of the American delegation, announced the open session.

Each of the plenary sessions has had its own character and atmosphere. The first, following the impressive service at Arlington, had at the beginning the air of a ceremonial occasion, but was shaken into a mood of astonishment by the American proposal and ended almost in the atmosphere of a political meeting. The second, at which, it was announced, Mr. Balfour would record Britain's acceptance of the plan for ending the naval race, was greeted with a mood of curiosity aroused by the inauguration of a new kind of diplomacy which removed these formal gatherings from the cate-

gory of dress parades and made of them a genuine part of the diplomatic campaign. The third session was marked by a flutter of excitement at the prospect of hearing a masterpiece of French oratory. And now came the fourth session, which, lacking all of the novelty and most of the dramatic elements of the other sessions, was greeted nevertheless with an expectancy which was later justified by its record of definite and conclusive achievement.

This achievement related wholly to Far Eastern and Pacific affairs. It is worth noting that the Conference rendered its first decisions not on the means but on the causes of war, not on armament but on national policies. This was inevitable. Although the first subject introduced into the Conference was that of the limitation of naval armament, it was not the first subject on which the Conference reached a conclusive decision. As I pointed out in correspondence written before the Conference began, the fundamental question at Washington was not what arms the nations should bear, but what attitude they should have towards one another. On Saturday, December 10, the assembled delegates recorded by solemn agreement their deliberate purpose and intent to follow a policy of mutual consultation and confidence.

This policy was adopted first with regard to specific questions in the Far East and then with reference to the Pacific Ocean.

With regard to questions in the Far East Mr. Hughes read the reports so far adopted by the committees of the Conference. It should be explained that all the delegates of all nine Powers sit as a committee of the whole to consider the affairs of the Pacific and of the Far East, and then assemble in plenary meetings of the Conference to adopt finally their own recommendations. In one sense,

therefore, their action at this session was purely formal; but in another sense it was vital because it brought together four separate resolutions and transformed them into solemn international agreements. The first of these was the statement of the four principles which have already reported as the eight Power agreement, by which the Powers which have interests in China have framed a charter giving assurance to China of protection against future infringements upon her independence and sovereignty and recorded a mutual pledge to observe in matters relating to China the principle of free and equal opportunity. Special significance is given to the action of the Conference in this case, because, whereas originally the resolution was adopted by the eight Powers, in the final action by the Conference there was recorded China's assent. The second of these reports adopted as an international agreement provided for the creation of an international commission to inquire into the practice of extraterritoriality (that is the use of foreign law in Chinese territory) and to submit a report upon it with their recommendations within fifteen months. To this China likewise assented with satisfaction. The third action recorded the recognition by the eight Powers of China's rights as a neutral in any future war to which she is not a party; and in this China also joined. The fourth of these actions was the adoption of a resolution of the Committee declaring it to be the intention of the Powers not to enter into any treaties or any kind of understanding that would infringe or impair the principles they had adopted as a charter for the independence of China and equality among themselves.

By these four actions the nations represented at Washington record a revolution that is of more significance to China than that which replaced the Manchu Dynasty with the outward semblance of a republic. They commit themselves to the abandonment of the old scramble for privilege. They do something more than profess good will to China; they set in motion machinery which will manufacture good will into practical aid. To the fulfillment of their intention they pledge not their arms but their credit. They recognize the requirements of their own enlightened self-interest, and thus practice what among nations is the only enlightened altruism.

Unprecedented as these actions are, they have nevertheless been obscured by the public interest in the announcement that was made by Senator Lodge of an agreement by America, Britain, France, and Japan. This agreement is in the form of a treaty. It is so brief that its general purport can scarcely be adequately stated in fewer words than are used in its text. Senator Lodge, however, in his speech presenting the treaty paraphrased it as follows:

To put it in a few words, the treaty provides that the four signatory Pow-

ers will agree as between themselves to respect their insular possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific, and that if any controversy should arise as to such rights all the high contracting parties shall be invited to a joint conference looking to the adjustment of such controversy. They agree to take similar action in the case of aggression by any other Power upon these insular possessions or dominions. The agreement is to remain in force for ten years, and after ratification under the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties the existing agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. And that is all.

And to this report of the treaty Senator Lodge, speaking officially for America in the presence of the other delegates, made this observation:

There is no provision for the use of force to carry out any of the terms of the agreement, and no military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under cover of these plain and direct clauses.

Either implicitly or explicitly the spokesman of each delegation reiterated the point that this agreement is without any military or naval sanction.

Some illusions concerning this treaty have already made their appearance. No true understanding of the achievement which this agreement records is possible so long as those illusions remain. This is not a league to enforce peace upon the whole world. It does not propose to establish a new world order. It is not an agency of reform. It is not a guaranty against war or against anything. It is limited in scope and in purpose. It limits no sovereignty. It makes no promise which any nation cannot easily and justly perform.

It does not undertake to protect China. It has nothing whatever to do with China. It has nothing to do with any country or territory or right that is not already possessed by the four nations that sign it; and there is no right established by the treaty which is not already recognized. It relates solely to the islands and dominions in the Pacific of the signatory Powers. Japan itself is included in the subject of this treaty; so are Australia and New Zealand; so are Hawaii and the Philippines. So is every island belonging to or part of any nation of the four. It does not create rights where rights do not already exist; it does not recognize rights where rights are not now recognized. In particular, as Senator Lodge, speaking with the acknowledged approval of all four Powers, said, this agreement is subject to a convention to be made with Japan (perhaps it will have been made by the time these words are in print) "concerning the status of the island of Yap and what are termed the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator," and subject also "to the reservations with respect to what are termed the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the equator." In other words, this

does not commit the United States to any view concerning Yap which will not already have been settled by the time this treaty is in force, or to any acceptance of the arrangements made about the islands in the Pacific by the League of Nations.

This treaty is not the creator of a rival to the League of Nations, nor does it let the United States into the League of Nations by the back door. It has no effect upon the League of Nations in any way whatever. The treaty is different from the League in scope and in character.

It is not an alliance. When nations sign a treaty of alliance, they agree to come to one another's defense or to join one another in an offensive undertaking. There is no agreement of either kind in this case. It has no "Article X" in it. There is no mutual promise given to preserve any territory or guarantee any rights. It does not create any organization. It provides for no constitution or by-laws or offices or seat of government or anything else pertaining to an organization. It is not an attempt to force any policies upon any governmental body whatever. It provides in its terms that it will go into force only after ratification by the constitutional methods of each state; and it is accompanied by a clear statement that it is subject to definite reservations. It simply anticipates certain exigencies and then arranges to meet such exigencies by conference and consultation.

It brings to an end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which has outlived its occasion and its usefulness. It substitutes for that military contract a non-military agreement. As Mr. Balfour, the head of the British delegation, said, that military agreement had placed Great Britain between two possible misunderstandings—a misunderstanding with America if the British retained the treaty, and a misunderstanding with Japan if they denounced it; and the only cure was to replace this agreement between two Powers by an understanding between all those concerned in the treaty. It removes all excuse for fear of Anglo-American domination. It recognizes the friendship between France and America and promotes understanding between France and Britain. It allays mutual suspicion between Japanese and Americans, and it enables the British Dominions to rid themselves of a bar between themselves and the United States without offense to an ally that has rendered the Empire good and faithful service.

It opens the way for similar understandings in other fields. Indeed, it may conceivably have a successor which will apply the same principle of international consultation to China. The hope of an agreement signed by all the Powers assembled in Washington, to which other nations may desire to adhere, and applying to questions relating to the Far East, was, in fact, explicitly expressed in this open session of the Conference by Mr. Hughes.

Above all, this treaty mobilizes moral

force. Senator Lodge, whose sense of reality in international affairs has never been doubted, expressed the great purpose of this treaty in the following words in his address:

If the nations of the earth are still in the innermost recesses of their consciousness planning or dreaming of coming wars and longing for conquests, no treaties of partition and no alliances can stay them; but if, as I firmly hope, the world has learned a frightful lesson from the awful experiences of the Great War of 1914, then our surest appeal in order to prevent wars in the future must be to the hearts, the sympathies, the reason, and the higher impulses of mankind. . . . If this spirit prevails and rules, we can have no better support than the faith of nations. . . . If we enter upon this agreement, which rests only upon the will and honor of those who sign it, we at least make the great experiment and appeal to the men and women of the nations to help us sustain it in spirit and in truth.

And the spokesman for Portugal, Viscount d'Alte, recognizing the absence of military sanction and the reliance upon moral force in this treaty, speaking not as a participant but as an observer, said:

It would of course be easy to evade any of the clauses of the treaty of which I am speaking; it would even seem as if the men who had drafted it had tried to signify that they did not place their main reliance and the achievement of their aims in a long series of carefully worded clauses. Only four Powers who repose the most implicit trust in the honor and integrity of each other could sign a treaty such as this. And it is this fact that gives the agreement its tremendous binding power. The confidence so fully given, no nation would dare to betray.

If this treaty depended upon "implicit trust in the honor and integrity" of the individuals who might in the future happen to be the leaders of government, if its only support were the good faith of some future diplomats or Foreign Ministers now unknown, neither the hope of the signers of this treaty as expressed by Senator Lodge nor the congratulations of their friends as expressed by Viscount d'Alte would have any more than slight foundation; but its basis is implicit trust in the honor and integrity of nations, its support is the faith not merely of governments but of peoples. This is the justification of the appeal that was made at the very beginning of the Conference to the public opinion of the world; this is the justification of the practice, followed throughout the Conference, of opening the negotiations to the knowledge of mankind. If a treaty is made to express the will of the peoples and the will of the peoples is a will to peace, the only sanction that such a treaty needs is, not the sanction of the sword, but the sanction of understanding.

Washington, D. C., December 12, 1921.

A BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT AND A BRITISH PROBLEM




AN
AERIAL VIEW
OF OXFORD
UNIVERSITY

This picture of one of the two most celebrated institutions of learning in England was taken from an aeroplane flying low. The tall spire rises over St. Mary's, the University Church. In the center is the Bodleian Library. Below it is the semicircular Sheldonian Theater. To the left of the Theater, as one looks at the picture, is the Clarendon, containing the offices of the University's governing body. Still further to the left is New College (the large quadrangle group); despite its name, it is one of the oldest buildings in Oxford

Wide World Photos

EGYPTIANS GREETING ONE OF THEIR NATIVE LEADERS

The photograph shows native Egyptians wading up to their waists to greet Zaglul Pasha, a popular leader of the "plain people." The British authorities had, it is said, refused to allow him to land at this place from a boat in which he had been making a journey from Cairo to the Falls—a journey in which he was acclaimed by crowds both on shore and in native craft



Wide World Photos