

England only a week before the race, and, though they were defeated, their achievement against the pick of two universities is therefore especially creditable. The race of seven and one-half miles was run over the famous Thames Hare and Hounds Course, which includes three severe water jumps, a long stretch of plowed field, and numerous hills. The English runners have always been at their best in long-distance races, and the Oxford-Cambridge runners are said to comprise the strongest 'varsity' team which has been assembled in many years. It is reported that next year Oxford and Cambridge will not only send their track teams, but also their boat crews, to compete with Cornell. It is to be hoped that this report is true.

Even if an American team did not succeed in defeating Oxford and Cambridge, American tennis players have once more gained possession of the famous Davis trophy. At Auckland, New Zealand, on January 1, William T. Tilden and William M. Johnston made a clean sweep of the Davis cup lawn tennis championship by defeating Gerald F. Patterson and Norman E. Brookes in both the singles and doubles. The Davis trophy has been in the antipodes since the beginning of the war. Doubtless America will be called upon to defend its possession at Forest Hills, Long Island, this coming summer.

On New Year's Day a third athletic event took place which, while not of an international character, was at least of continental interest. The eleven of the University of Ohio played the eleven of

the University of California at Pasadena that day. The game resulted in the favor of the Western university by the very decisive score of 28 to 0. California apparently swept the Ohio team off its feet by the precision and brilliancy of its overhead attack.

Fiume Surrendered

As was anticipated, the Italian regulars made short work of Gabriele d'Annunzio's legionaries at Fiume. As for some time the citizens of Fiume had been saying, "*Liberaci dai Liberatori*" (Deliver us from our deliverers), it was appropriate that the new Provisional Government of Fiume should begin the disarmament of the defeated legionaries and should preserve order in the city by its own police. The poet-commander begged permission to leave Fiume at the head of his legionaries. This was refused. On January 5 the troops which had held Fiume for sixteen months began to leave the city under the guard of regulars on special trains in relays of three hundred legionaries each. They will be enrolled with their original units in Italy. The regulars worked as quickly as possible, so as to establish the new Independent State of Fiume at once. The Provisional Government will hold an election almost immediately.

Thus ends a chapter of history.

Some three years ago at Fiume a member of The Outlook's editorial staff, noting the independent spirit of the Fiumani, asked one of the City Councilors: "Why should Fiume not be an

independent republic?" "Ah, that would be the ideal solution," was the reply, "*una repubblica fiumana*." This ideal might have been realized by the heads of the Paris Peace Conference. But the extremes of Italian realism and Wilsonian idealism prevented.

A Civilian's Fight with the Military

Years ago, at the University of Bonn, William II and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg were students together, and friends. Doubtless this friendship made Bethmann's path easier to the presidency, first, of the district of Bromberg and, second, of the province of Brandenburg; to the Secretaryship of the Interior and the Vice-Presidency of the Prussian Council; to the Imperial Vice-Chancellorship and to the Chancellorship itself.

A highly trained bureaucrat, Bethmann represented the tendencies of a Prussian patrician, not of a Prussian Junker—that is to say, though beginning with strong prejudices, he was susceptible of change. He had fought against giving to the people a larger share in the government of Prussia, but later became an apostle of universal franchise.

Bethmann has just died, sixty-four years old. With him passes the broadest of the Kaiser's generally narrow-minded counselors—certainly he was in glaring contrast to such bigots as Tirpitz and Ludendorff.

Bethmann's Chancellorship meant a trial of strength between two forces—the military and the civil. It was to last eight years and was to end with a tragic military triumph.

In his recently published memoirs he blames the German army for starting the World War.

In 1914, however, he also blamed England. It was he who said that Great Britain was going to make war "just for a scrap of paper."

This phrase discrediting a solemn treaty and his other statement admitting the wrong done to the Belgians but defending that wrong on the ground that necessity knows no law revealed in him a kind of honesty not characteristic of all Germans, together with a characteristically German disregard of the conscience of mankind.

Bethmann's divergence from the militarists increased as time went on. It was illustrated by his protest against the German aerial bombardment of London, his opposition to a ruthless submarine campaign, and, above all, his instigation of a peace resolution in the Reichstag.

When Ludendorff, the chief of the militarists, and Bethmann resigned at



Underwood

D'ANNUNZIO MESSING WITH HIS SOLDIERS IN FIUME BEFORE HIS SURRENDER

the same time, the Kaiser turned against his old friend, accepting his resignation, and reinstated Ludendorff. That was the end of Bethmann's career.

LYNCHINGS IN 1920

PROFESSOR WORK, of Tuskegee Institute, annually compiles a list of lynchings in the United States. His report for 1920 has at least one encouraging feature, for he records fifty-six instances in which officers of the law prevented lynchings either by the removal of prisoners or by the use of armed force. Ten of these instances occurred in Northern States and forty-six in Southern. Armed force was used to repel lynchers in fourteen cases and in four instances mobs were fired upon.

There were sixty-one lynchings in the year 1920. Of these fifty-two were in the South and nine in the North and West, a total reduction of twenty-two from the year 1919. The victims of these lynchings numbered fifty-three Negroes and eight whites. The roll of dishonor of the various States follows:

Alabama, 7; Arkansas, 1; California, 3; Florida, 7; Georgia, 9; Illinois, 1; Kansas, 1; Kentucky, 1; Minnesota, 3; Mississippi, 7; Missouri, 1; North Carolina, 3; Ohio, 1; Oklahoma, 3; South Carolina, 1; Texas, 10; Virginia, 1; West Virginia, 1.

The record for 1920 shows some advance over the previous year, but it still constitutes a blot upon American civilization.

THE PLIGHT OF FRANCE

ON January 3 the Paris "Matin" published an article by ex-President Poincaré, in which he cites the provision of the Versailles Treaty requiring the German army to be reduced by March 31, 1920, to 100,000 men, and the German police force to a number not to exceed the ratio to population as it was in 1913. Yet, adds Mr. Poincaré, the Interallied Commission of Control reports that even now Germany has not fulfilled her obligations. It is believed by some, we would add, that Germany has from two and a half to three million men trained for army emergency and a million and a half of rifles ready.

As long as France is not safe from a vengeful and aggressive Germany, the victory in which America participated will remain endangered.

If the Germans could be rendered unaggressive and brought to real repentance, if they could be so changed in spirit as honestly to seek to repair not only the material damage that they have done but also the injuries they have wrought in the social fabric of the

world, the victory of the cause of the Allies would be permanent and would need no other safeguard. But the French have no illusions on that score. They live next to the Germans. They know that nations are not converted in a day or a year. They are not unreasonable. They do not demand the impossible. They are not looking for any one to provide them with a formula for universal peace. They believe, however, that, having borne the brunt of the Germans' assault upon civilization, they have the right to expect such safeguards as will save France from the peril of national extinction. It is not quite fair—is it?—for other nations in positions of comparative security to leave France insecure.

When the armistice brought hostilities to an end, there were four measures which might have been taken to keep Germany from repeating her adventure.

One measure would have been to deal separately with the different elements in the German Empire, and thus deprive Prussia of the strength that she derived from employing the resources of the other German states. Modern Europe has never feared Bavaria or Saxony or Württemberg singly. But Europe, including peoples of German speech and culture, has feared Prussia. If the Allies had offered Bavaria, for example, a separate peace on terms better than she could obtain in partnership with Prussia, she might have been glad to abandon an enterprise that had proved disastrous in the past and was full of ill omen for the future. This, however, was not to be. For some reason of political expediency the managers of the Peace Conference decided to consolidate the German Empire by treating with all the German states as a whole. That safeguard, therefore, was abandoned.

Another measure would have been to make France correspondingly strong. This would have involved the transfer to France not only of Alsace and Lorraine but of other regions inhabited by people for generations German in speech and tradition. There were objections to this measure apart from considerations of justice to the inhabitants of the territory involved. France has been successful in implanting loyalty to the Republic in the heart of many people who are French neither in speech nor in ancestry; but it would have been of doubtful benefit to the French Republic to include such masses of Germans within French territory as would have been necessary if a purely military frontier had been arranged. This second safeguard was thus likewise abandoned.

A third measure would have been to exact from Germany such a price for her orgy as to have convinced her that

a war of conquest does not pay, to have put the leaders of her iniquity under such restraint as to have furnished a warning for others who might seek to imitate them, and to deprive her so completely of military resources as to make it impossible for her to employ the might which she had abused. In some degree this measure was attempted in the Treaty; but it has not been put into effect. What France had to pay for defending civilization is recorded in her devastated area and in the sad disorganization of her social and economic life. What Germany has had to pay for her assault upon civilization is not so evident. It is true that her population has suffered physically and morally from the war as have other peoples, but her factories are intact, her towns and cities remain standing. Germany has not begun really to pay for even the limited amount of damage for which she agreed to make reparation. All accounts agree that she does not intend to pay. She has not surrendered her criminals, and does not intend to surrender them. She has made a show of disarmament, but she still retains military forces and military weapons that she had agreed to dispense with. This safeguard, though not abandoned, has therefore so far failed.

The fourth measure would have been to perfect and strengthen the alliance which proved effective ultimately in thwarting Germany's purpose. That alliance, or league, or association, or whatever else it may be called, was in good working order two years ago last November. Hardly, however, was the armistice signed, than an attempt was under way to abandon it and to substitute for it something else planned for a different purpose and organized in an unprecedented way. It is true that at the same time the three strongest nations associated together in the war tentatively made an agreement to resist German aggression in the future. That Franco-Anglo-American treaty still remains tentative. It has never been ratified. Meantime the League of Nations, devised as a substitute for the War Alliance, has proved ineffective. The fourth safeguard has therefore disappeared.

Americans, far from the scene of the war, should not forget the plight of France.

MIXED MARRIAGE

THERE is a great deal of evidence on which to base the conclusion that art should have little concern with ethics or morals. Certainly many instances may be found wherein an artist with an impelling moral or social purpose has failed to create the artistic