

younger Italian school had instituted, in which the taste for melodrama and primitive passion was cultivated, was serenely ignored by Humperdinck. It might have been supposed that the peaceful, childlike, unsophisticated character of Humperdinck's operas would have rendered them unacceptable to a public which seemed to crave artificial excitement. On the contrary, the very contrast served to make Humperdinck's operas more popular. Very few music dramas of recent years have approached in popularity Humperdinck's "Hänsel und Gretel." Originating as a children's entertainment, it became one of the greatest and apparently most enduring of modern works for the operatic stage.

Although Humperdinck composed purely instrumental and choral music, he is particularly known in America for his operatic work.

Engelbert Humperdinck was a native of the Rhine Provinces, where he was born sixty-seven years ago. The latter part of his life was spent for the most part in Berlin. He several times visited the United States. It is here that his opera "Koenigskinder" was first produced on the stage.

#### SOME PRUSSIAN SPIRIT STILL LEFT

PROFESSOR FANGNANI, of the Union Theological Seminary, New York City, was recently expelled with members of his family, rudely and brusquely, from Bavaria, where he was traveling, on the ground that he was an obnoxious American citizen. His obnoxiousness consisted in the fact that while America was at war with Germany, and even before we went into the war, he was active in various public ways in appealing to the best patriotic sentiment of Americans against the monstrosities of German militarism. While his expulsion from Bavaria was not actually Prussian, because Berlin has disavowed it, it was certainly the result of the Prussian spirit. It is possible to forgive the Germans for this indignity, for the war is too recent to expect that all its passion and vindictiveness should have been blotted out from the minds and hearts of the vanquished. Accordingly, we did not become very indignant when we read the news of Professor Fangnani's expulsion—indeed, we accepted it with equanimity as a kind of honor paid to him.

But another aspect of this case has been brought out by a correspondent of the New York "Times," who writes to that newspaper saying that the New York "Staats-Zeitung," a daily newspaper published in America by those who are supposed to be American citizens, gloated over Professor Fangnani's

expulsion and said that all Americans of his stripe should get the same treatment. There are apparently some irreconcilable Prussians still left in the United States who masquerade under the name of Americans and enjoy all the rights of American citizens.

Apropos, we may add that Mayor Hylan, of New York, recently went down to the harbor with a brass band and a special committee of honor to welcome the first German steamer that has arrived at this port, except as a capture from the enemy, since America went into the World War. A certain type of Irishman still thinks that the Germans are the great defenders of human liberty and freedom.

#### THE IRISH SITUATION BRIGHTENS

A NEW "formula," or basis for negotiation, was propounded by the English Prime Minister in his letter of September 29 to Mr. De Valera. It consisted of an invitation to a conference on October 11 in which the Irish delegates should appear "as the spokesmen of the people whom you [Mr. De Valera] represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations."

This invitation was definitely accepted by De Valera on the part of the Sinn Fein "government" in a letter which carefully followed the phraseology of the Lloyd George invitation. He says, in part:

Our respective positions have been stated and understood, and we agree that conference, not correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding.

It certainly was time that the splitting of straws over phrases should come to an end. What does it matter whether Ireland "comes into" the Empire (as the Sinn Fein puts it) or "stays in" the Empire (as Lloyd George puts it) so long as after the agreement she is in and in with wide self-governing powers? If the Sinn Fein delegates have had any illusion as to the hope of complete severance from Great Britain, they must surely have been disillusioned by the correspondence between Lloyd George and De Valera. On the other hand, they have made perfectly clear their own belief that absolute independence is their ideal. What they are asked to confer about is something quite different—the self-government of Ireland within its own bounds. The field and scope of discussion are wide. Whether a dual Dominion plan with Ulster and Southern Ireland carrying on home rule, each in its own territory, is the best feasible plan, or whether the two sections can

be brought together in national self-government, is a question which has never been thoroughly worked out, nor does any one know to-day in what a referendum to the people would result. There is a strong probability, at all events, that a majority of the whole Irish people would go a long way in the direction of compromise as between the extremes of a total severance from Great Britain, on the one hand, and a renewal of guerrilla warfare, on the other.

The prospects of the final triumph of reason and moderation in Irish affairs are growing brighter.

#### JAPAN AT THE CONFERENCE

IN a personal letter to one of the editors of The Outlook a Japanese, a resident in Japan, writes: "In spite of fact, much suspicion and prejudice seem to be entertained by most Powers towards Japan alone, to my amazement."

Perhaps the suspicions which other nations entertain toward Japan are somewhat exaggerated in the minds of the Japanese. Nevertheless, with all due allowance for the natural sensitiveness and self-consciousness of the Japanese in response to ordinary international discussion and criticism, it must be acknowledged that Japan has not the confidence of all of her neighbors and is regarded by some as a potential disturber of the peace of the world. In fact, there is no other country which is the center of quite such anxious thought. For the present at least Germany is eliminated as an aggressive Power. Russia seems to be for the time being incapable of united aggressive action even if her people were inclined to it. China, however enormous in bulk and undeveloped resources, is as a factor in international affairs inert. Neither France nor Italy is seriously regarded as an aggressive Power. Great Britain, in spite of the enormous prestige she has gained as a result of the World War, is not feared by other nations except as an economic power, since all her resources are dependent upon the Empire, which is virtually a commonwealth of free nations without ambition for military dominance. The United States may be envied and in some quarters disliked, but is not anywhere suspected of aggressive military ambitions. It is Japan alone whose disposition as an aggressive military Power, with resources sufficient to buttress an exalted ambition for dominance, seems unsettled. If the Japanese wonder why their country is under suspicion by any other Powers, they may perhaps find the answer in the nature of their own Government. In

America, in Great Britain, and even in the more military but less powerful nations of France and Italy, the military policy of the nation is under civilian control. In Japan, on the other hand, as in Germany before the war, the military policy of the country is in the control of military authorities. It is not chance that makes Japan's Minister of War and Minister of the Navy, respectively, a general and an admiral. The difference between Japan and the United States, for example, is in this respect fundamental. In the United States the civilian authorities decide upon the military policy and provide the funds for that policy, and then the military authorities (with perhaps even less freedom than they ought to have) are called upon to put that policy in operation. In Japan, on the contrary, it is the military authorities who originate the military policy of the nation, and they call upon the civilian authorities to supply the means for carrying that policy out. This is not the unfair accusation of foreigners. It is a fact acknowledged by Japanese themselves. In a recently published book,<sup>1</sup> a Japanese, Yoshi S. Kuno, assistant professor in the Oriental Department of the University of California, is very frank in his statement of this situation as it is applied to Korea. "Although the Korean Government is civilian in form," he writes, "yet the whole control is in the hands of military men. . . . As the Government conducts everything in a military way, any Korean offering opposition is punished in accordance with military regulations. . . . Koreans suffer injustice in their own country because they are Koreans. This sort of thing is increasing year by year, and the Japanese administration is becoming more and more militaristic." Professor Kuno's picture of Japanese rule in Korea is as frank as a foreigner's. Other Japanese of liberal minds recognize this military characteristic of the Japanese Government, and Japan's foreign policy is necessarily affected by this military organization. Japan's diplomacy is couched in the terms of courtesy and good manners; but in dealing with countries whose power she does not fear Japan rattles the saber as vigorously and as effectively as ever Germany did. When, for example, she presented her Twenty-one Demands to China, there was no doubt left in any one's mind that behind those demands stood unconcealed an efficient military force. Professor Kuno does not hesitate to speak very frankly of Japan's "dual system of diplomacy" by which, in dealing "with the Orient, Japan uses her hands and feet; with the Occident, her head." Professor

Kuno explains this dual system somewhat at length. Perhaps a few sentences of his may serve to indicate Japan's two diplomatic methods. "When Japan deals with Occidental nations," says Professor Kuno, "she is careful, courteous, and compromising, while at the same time she closely guards her own interests. Sometimes she even goes to the extreme of bowing low and evincing great humility. . . . Her Oriental diplomacy, that in which she uses her hands and feet, is exemplified in her dealings with Korea. . . . With China also, since the Russo-Japan War, in all her diplomatic negotiations, ending with the famous Twenty-one Demands, Japan has gained her points by threatening military force."

I do not want to misrepresent Professor Kuno in the quotations from his book. He is not writing in criticism of Japan. On the contrary, he makes out a case on Japan's behalf which is very appealing to Americans, and all the more persuasive because he does not hesitate to acknowledge many of Japan's mistakes. His is a book that ought to have wide reading in America even though all its conclusions will not be accepted by Americans. We make these quotations simply to indicate that a lover of Japan recognizes the military character of Japan's Government.

Of itself the military organization of a nation would not be menacing to other nations if it were meant solely for the maintenance of internal order. Switzerland might be as military as she pleased, but no one would fear her, because Switzerland's disposition is distinctly non-aggressive. Japan's military organization, on the other hand, is distinctly one designed for use abroad, and it is coupled with an organization of great naval force. In the October number of the "Atlantic Monthly" Colonel S. C. Vestal, of the United States Coast Artillery Corps, points out very clearly the significance of a policy which combines military with naval power. "Nations that depend upon naval power for defense," he writes, "never enter upon a war that can in any way be avoided. . . . A strong naval power, which maintains a comparatively small army, is not a menace to any strong military power, unless the military power, by its aggressions, unites the world in a coalition against itself. . . . No nation ever attempts to gain a preponderance of armaments upon both land and sea unless it is actuated by aggressive purposes." This statement of Colonel Vestal's may be supported by evidence from history. Whatever propaganda there is at present against Great Britain, for example, falls largely of its own weight, because Britain's navy, gigantic as it is, is not

the arm of a vast military force, but is obviously for defense and protection. Of all the great nations of the earth Japan is the only one which has both a large navy and a large standing army.

When the Conference convenes on November 11 in Washington, there will be one nation there on the defensive. That nation is Japan. It is not because of any difficulty engendered in the controversy concerning agricultural lands in California, or the island of Yap, or the disinclination of Australians to admit Japanese immigrants, or the Shantung problem, or any other one problem or group of problems arising in the Pacific. It is because of the military nature of Japan's Government. There is no advantage in concealing the concern which Japan's neighbors feel because of the power which the military element in Japan has in the determination of Japan's foreign policy. Friendliness toward Japan makes it imperative that her representatives should be under no illusions as to the anxiety concerning Japan's future character which Americans feel. Those who have taken the pains to inquire into the forces at work in Japan to-day are well aware that there are many Japanese who are as much concerned over militarism in Japan as any foreigner could be. Nowhere is there more welcome given to the news of the growing spirit of liberalism among the Japanese than in America. If American fears concerning the military disposition of the Japanese Government are not altogether well founded, it is incumbent upon the representatives of Japan to make clear, not only to the American Government, but also to the American people, that Japan regards her military force as a servant of the nation and not its master.

In some respects Japan has learned much from Germany, but we hope that she has learned nothing more thoroughly than the lesson which Germany has taught the world through the World War. It is the lesson that those who are the servants of military power cannot in these days become the masters of others. It may not be one nation's business to determine what kind of government another nation should have; but it is any nation's business to know whether the kind of government another nation has may not contain within it a menace to its neighbors. The problems of the Pacific would be promptly solved if they were problems involving the interests of the peoples of the United States and Great Britain alone; for, however much we may differ, Americans and Britons are alike in seeking no advantage through conquest. It may not be fair to expect from Japan the same frame of mind that one finds in people

<sup>1</sup> What Japan Wants. By Yoshi S. Kuno. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. \$1.