

entrance examinations of Yale, Princeton, or Harvard as the case may be.

5. No coach shall sit on the sideline bench or communicate with the players on the field or on the bench during periods of play.

6. Organized scouting shall be abolished.

Perhaps this platform prepared by undergraduates of the three Eastern universities whose football traditions and rivalry are the oldest in the country may serve to suggest to those who are discussing this subject in letters to *The Outlook*, or otherwise, certain aspects of the subject which invite special consideration.

## NOT ALLIES BUT FRIENDS

WHEN, on March 24, the Four-Power Treaty concerning the Pacific was approved by a vote of 67 to 27 in the Senate, the programme of the Armament Conference was assured of adoption by the United States. Indeed, that programme was at no time in any such peril as to justify serious doubts as to its ultimate success. As at Paris, so in Washington, the outcome was implicit in the way the problems were approached. A comparison between the Peace Conference at Paris and the Armament Conference at Washington would call for a more extended discussion than we intend here to enter upon, but in no respect would it prove to be more instructive than in the contrast it would show between the vagueness, confusion, and secrecy in the midst of which a theory was launched at Paris, and the definiteness, decision, and open diplomacy in the midst of which a practical proposal was introduced at Washington. At Paris the American representatives had the advantage of great prestige among the peoples of Europe, but they lacked the support of their people at home. At Washington the American representatives had no such prestige among the peoples of other countries, but they had the support of the American people. Those observers at Washington who were constantly seeing a parallel between the course of the American Government at the Peace Conference and the course of the American Government at the Armament Conference were simply possessed by a desire to prove their discernment by seeing what nobody else could see for the reason that it did not exist. Within forty-eight hours of the first session the success of the American Government's armament proposal was as certain as it has been at any time since then, and with the signing of the Four-Power

Treaty almost exactly a month later the success of the whole programme on the Far East was made practically inevitable.

Consequently, we were not disturbed at any time by the reports of the opposition in the Senate to the Four-Power Treaty. It was politically almost inconceivable that the Senate or any party in the Senate would venture to impair, if not destroy, the work of a Conference which was overwhelmingly supported by the people of the country. When the opposition among the people could scarcely be discovered outside of those newspaper readers who take their opinions from William Randolph Hearst and those self-styled intellectuals who nourish their pacifism on the editorials of Oswald Garrison Villard, it did not seem likely that politicians would find it profitable to prevent the ratification of the treaty. If the votes in the Senate in opposition to the treaty had not been so largely eked out by Senators from States which are comparatively small in population, and which would never dream of turning out a Democratic Senator for voting against a Republican Administration, the vote against the treaty would have been inconsiderable.

Though the result was almost a foregone conclusion, nothing in politics is certain until it happens. When, therefore, the vote was recorded which empowered the President to ratify the treaty, the people of the country were entitled to a feeling of relief, which expressed itself through the press and through public speeches. Perhaps the suspense would not have been so great if it had not been for the provocative character of much of the debate in the Senate. A very general impression is recorded by the "Harvard Crimson," the undergraduate daily paper at Harvard University, in its comment upon the approval of the treaty by the Senate. "Mark Twain," says the "Crimson," "once told of a Missouri steamboat with a six-inch cylinder engine and an eight-inch cylinder whistle, so when the captain blew the whistle everything else had to stop. Our Senate is constructed on an amazingly similar plan. But when the leaders shut down on the whistle by setting the time for the vote, the Senators at last disposed of the treaty." If, as has been suggested, the opinion of the undergraduates to-day is an indication of what the leaders of public opinion will think twenty years from now, there can be found in this comment reason for hoping that the American people will hold the Senate in the future responsible for its words as well as its acts. For the present the Senate's reputation has been somewhat retrieved.

In particular, fairness requires recognition of Mr. Lodge's able leadership of

the Majority and Mr. Underwood's unpartisan course in leading in support of this treaty a minority of the Minority.

By the treaty itself America agrees to respect the rights of the other parties to the treaty so far as they concern the region of the Pacific, as they agree to respect hers; to confer with them in case of any dispute among the Four; and to communicate with them in case their rights in the Pacific should be threatened by an outside Power. By a supplementary treaty, which has also been approved by the Senate, the homeland of Japan is excluded from the scope of the treaty. One of the humors of the passage of this treaty through the Senate consists in the fact that the exclusion of the Japanese homeland was something very much desired by the Japanese themselves, but it was secured only as a consequence of the violent demands of the extreme anti-Japanese in the Senate. If only Japan had hinted at her real wish in this matter, the extreme anti-Japanese would have insisted upon retaining in the treaty America's promise that she would respect Japan's rights to her own home territory! By the American delegates' declaration accompanying the treaty America makes it clear that she does not consider domestic questions (such as immigration) within the scope of the treaty; and by a reservation adopted by the Senate America makes it clear that she does not commit herself through this treaty to any alliance or to the use of force.

What is attempted by this treaty is very simple. It is to put international relations on the basis of friendship. Nations which depend for peace upon an alliance thereby announce that they do not rely upon mere good will. Behind every alliance there is a contract to employ force. Under some circumstances such an alliance is necessary. It is particularly necessary if peace is to be maintained between nations who suspect one another's motives. Often an alliance is the only means by which enemies can make peace. In fact, for one nation to make an alliance with another is virtually to recognize in that other nation a potential enemy. This Four-Power Treaty abandons altogether the theory on which alliances rest. It is an experiment in international good will and understanding. It is worth trying at some risk. America has made it impossible for herself to fight a naval war in the western Pacific unless she is willing to expend many billions of dollars and perhaps ten years of time in warfare. She abandons all chance for imposing her will upon other nations in the Far East. That is the risk she takes. She thinks it is worth while to take that risk in order to see if justice and right-

eousness cannot be secured in the Far East, not by means of imposing the will of one nation upon another, but by means of friendship. That is why she calls Britain, France, and Japan, not allies, but friends.

## UNCLE SAM'S COAL INDUSTRY

**I**F Uncle Sam doesn't want to mine and move his own coal—and he certainly doesn't—he must see to it that some one else does it efficiently, economically, and with a view to public comfort and industrial utility. Already the sentiment for nationalization of the industry is gaining ground among organized labor; a pamphlet put forth by the United Mine Workers' District No. 2, under the title "The Government of Coal," argues for nationalization and unification on the ground that coal is a public utility and necessity, and charges "waste in production, waste in transportation and distribution, waste in consumption." It quotes Herbert Hoover as saying: "This industry [the soft-coal industry], considered as a whole, is one of the worst functioning industries in the United States. It is equipped with capital, with machinery, plants, and labor for a peak load at least twenty per cent above the average necessity."

Now the people of the United States do not want Government ownership either of railways or of coal. It behooves them all the more to see to it that such an oversight of the great basic industry of coal is maintained as is exercised by the Inter-State Commerce Commission and the Railway Board over the railways. We have these boards, not because we want nationalization, but because we want to avoid it.

In the present crisis Attorney-General Daugherty is quoted in the press as saying that, "since fuel is an indispensable part of transportation, the Government has the same power to act in the case of any interference to coal production that it would have in the event of any interruption in the Nation's transportation system." And a bill has just been introduced in Congress which authorizes the President to create a commission of three members, which shall investigate and report to the President within a specified time the "existing labor conditions in the coal industry, with particular reference to wages, hours of labor, and working conditions of coal miners, together with the causes of the present industrial dispute between operators of the coal mines and coal miners."

If it is true, as has been said, that the soft-coal industry is overmanned, overcapitalized, and overdeveloped, it is cer-

tain that a Nation-wide strike is not the way to remedy the trouble. There is justice in the claim of the operators that the same rate of wages and the same hours cannot be fixed for mines that are productive and profitable and for those which barely keep going; the uniform National wage rate contended for by the striking miners will not work equitably.

On the other hand, cutthroat competition and a universal strike war in the trade is a blow to National industry and prosperity. It is for the National Government to find a way out, flexible enough to deal with varying conditions.

*Morris for the George Matthews Adams Service*



IF WE HAVE TO HAVE A STRIKE-BREAKER

Very probably some plan of this kind may be proposed by the President before these words are read. We should at least so reform the soft-coal industry that it should not have its working year vary in its number of days from as high as 284 (1917) to 170 (estimate for 1921). The miners' wage must be computed, not by the rate per day, but by the amount he can earn in a year. Restricted operation is bound to mean artificial maintenance of prices against the consumer and spasmodic, alternating periods of high wages and "lay-offs" for the worker. With anthracite, which is capable of more uniform conditions, the industry is so closely controlled commercially that the householder complains with reason that he sees high prices maintained in periods both of scarcity and over-production.

What will the people through their President and their Congress do to put their coal business on a basis fair to all three parties concerned—the workers, the owners, and the country's homes and business? Some 560,000 union workers in about 8,800 mines are concerned; the soft-coal operators insist that they

cannot deal with the combined unions as their contracts require because conditions now differ so greatly in different sections; the anthracite operators declare that the miners' request for higher wages is at this time outrageous, and that wages must go down if prices are to go down. The men, if Samuel Gompers truly represents them, say that control of the mining industry has to an effective degree been transferred from the hands of actual operating men to the hands of purely financial interests, and that "so long as purely financial interests control the operating policy in any industry that policy is certain to be destructive, because human needs are overlooked in the race for a balance-sheet showing."

There was one time when Uncle Sam came very near indeed to taking hold of one big part of his coal business and running it himself. That was in 1902, when Theodore Roosevelt was President. An injurious and intolerable strike had been going on for five months in the anthracite-coal region. John Mitchell led the miners as head of the United Mine Workers (then a comparatively feeble organization) and President Baer, of the Reading Railroad, led the operators. There had been violence, suffering, obstinacy on both sides, refusal to meet for conference. President Roosevelt determined that coal should be mined and get to the people. Efforts to bring about arbitration failed. Finally, Mr. Roosevelt summoned the heads of the two hostile parties to confer, not with one another (for the feeling was so bitter that they would not consent to that), but with him. He declared to them that he proposed to use whatever influence he had "to bring to an end a situation which has become literally intolerable." He declared:

There are three parties affected by the situation in the anthracite trade: the operator, the miner, and the general public. The questions at issue which led to the situation affect the operators and the miners; but the situation itself vitally affects the public. . . .

The evil possibilities are so far-reaching, so appalling, that it seems to me that you are not only justified in sinking, but required to sink for the time being, any tenacity as to your respective claims in the matter at issue between you. The situation imperatively requires that you meet upon the common plane of the necessities of the public.

The leaders of both sides recognized the fact that the President was thoroughly in earnest, and John Mitchell proposed that Mr. Roosevelt should name a tribunal to determine the issues in the strike, and said that the miners