

made by Mr. Elihu Root which may appropriately be repeated here:

The first theory of the ancient republics, that the state is all in all and the individual derives his rights as a member, is the principle which was applied to Belgium. It is the principle which was applied to the Lusitania. Its logical and inevitable result is that the state is free from those rules of morality by which individual men are bound.

The other, asserted in the Great Charter, by logical and inevitable result, binds the state by the rules of morality which the individual recognizes, and the supremacy of that rule of right, governing all men and all states and powers, is the hope of mankind.

The assertion of that great and cardinal principle seven hundred years ago we celebrate to-night as the greatest of all events in the political development of modern liberty.

Every effort to honor the first assertion of the principle of individual freedom is deserving of encouragement.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE THROUGH LLOYD GEORGE'S EYES

NEVER was Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, more plausible or persuasive than in his speech before the British House of Commons on May 25, when he made his report on the Genoa Conference. The effectiveness of his speech can be measured by the vote of confidence it elicited—a vote of 235 to 26. Coming after a sharp debate, in which the Prime Minister was attacked by Mr. Asquith, Lord Robert Cecil, and the labor leader Mr. Clynes, the vote is specially impressive.

Lloyd George's uncanny gift for retaining political support has certainly not deserted him. He never needed it more sorely than now, and never used it to greater advantage. Having planned the Genoa Conference and having given the impression that on its success depended the future of European civilization, he encountered opposition from France, which he barely overcame, and disappointment in the form of America's refusal to be represented; he then saw Russia and Germany using his Conference as an occasion to defy the other nations assembled there by the negotiation of their treaty; he had to witness the abandonment of his plans for a ten-year truce and for settling the unsettled frontiers of eastern Europe; he had to consent to the postponement of all practical attempts to bring order out of Europe's economic chaos; and now he comes back to Britain, makes a speech, responds in a few sentences to the assault of his critics, and gets a vote of nine to one that is virtually as complete an indorsement of his course as if it were unanimous. Even those who deny that Lloyd George is a statesman have

to admit that he is to-day unequalled in the world as a politician.

He described the Conference as meeting under the most distracting and unfavorable of conditions. The nations assembled included some who were not on speaking terms with one another. While the Conference sat there was "marching and counter-marching of armies toward frontiers." And yet, said Lloyd George, "we met in perfect calm and in perfect harmony."

Toward Russia he outlined three alternative policies: First, to use force; second, to leave Russia to her fate until she changes her Government (a suggestion which elicited cheers); third, to help Russia swell the volume of trade. He outlined the experiences which the British Empire delegation had had in attempting to follow this third policy. He explained the coming together of Germany and Russia by attributing it to their sense of "a community of misfortune, community of debasement, community of what they regarded as maltreatment." The refusal of Russia to accede to the demands of the Conference he attributed to the fact that between their demand and the reply there intervened the First of May—the customary day for radical labor demonstrations in Europe. He recognized that the Bolshevik Government was an oligarchy, but he added:

It is a great mistake to imagine that autocratic governments are altogether free from the influence of public opinion, and there is one public opinion in Russia, not the public opinion of vast masses of people—ninety-five per cent of the people are indifferent to this system or hostile to it. The only opinion there that matters is the opinion of the workmen in the towns, who represent less than one per cent of the whole population. But the Soviet system and its power is based upon that. It is not democracy, it is oligarchy. And this talk about nationalization in Russia is all humbug when they talk about the great principles of the Revolution. . . . You have the paradox of a Communist Government speaking in the name of an individualist population.

The Bolshevik reply to the demands of the Conference was, in Lloyd George's phrase, "so foolish a document that it could only have been written by a very clever man." He asked how many trade unions would have invested their funds on the strength of that document. When the First of May came, the Bolshevik delegates ceased to talk business and "nailed their flag to that barren fig tree of Communism, under which multitudes are dying of pestilence." He drew an alarming picture of the danger threatened by the Red Army at the present moment. On the other hand, he said that the agreement among the nations

to abstain from any act of aggression while the questions raised at Genoa remain under examination raised the hope that the consequent sense of security would dispel the fears that cause war. "We have already captured positions," said Lloyd George in conclusion, "from which a further advance can be made." During his speech he showed a more conciliatory attitude toward France than has sometimes characterized him, and in answer to his critics he said definitely that it was impossible to settle the reparation question without carrying along the judgment of France, and that he desired to work with the good will of the democracy of France. To the suggestion of Lord Robert Cecil that it might be possible to get the United States into conference Lloyd George replied that he had invited, pleaded, and used every other method except force to get the United States into conference, and if the noble lord could do anything more his assistance would be welcome.

GENOA THROUGH AMERICAN EYES

LLOYD GEORGE's speech furnishes in itself a full justification for the refusal of America to take part in the Genoa Conference.

In the first place, he makes it clear that the Conference was devoted chiefly, if not wholly, to European international politics. America helps nobody, and helps least of all herself, when she tries to give advice on the politics of Europe. Of course every European Power would like to get American backing. The weight of America in the balance of power is worth seeking; but we have no interests to serve in satisfying any European nation's desire for our aid in establishing that balance in its favor. If the issue at Genoa had been a plain one, with the forces of aggression on one side and the forces of defense on the other, an issue as plain as that which arose when Germany undertook to dominate the world, the case would have been different; but the issue was not plain; if there is any danger threatening the peace of the world, it is resident in the oligarchy headed by Lenine and Trotsky's Bolshevik Government in Russia; and yet we find Great Britain advocating measures, not of resistance, but of aid. It is clear that on the only issue of first magnitude in Europe there are differences of policy between nations that are equally our friends. In such disputes we cannot afford to become entangled.

In the second place, the speech of Lloyd George makes it perfectly clear that our Government was right about Russia. As long as that distressed country is in the hands of an oligarchy that has no regard for its pledged word and

no true feeling of friendliness for any other nation, as even Lloyd George recognizes it is, American participation in any conference with Russian representatives would raise false hopes, and would postpone, instead of promoting, the resumption of financial and commercial relations between Russia and the rest of the world.

It does not seem likely that Lloyd George's speech, exposing the political character of the Genoa Conference, which professed to be economic, and picturing the nations of Europe seeking commercial advantages by negotiations with a Russian Government that is as destructive of business and trade as it is of political and industrial liberty, will do anything to change the policy of this Nation in regard to Europe's political problems, and in particular in regard to Russia. America has been charged with the worship of the dollar; but, in spite of her defects, she is not likely to take part in any arrangement which for the sake of dollars will bolster up a régime so opposed to American conceptions of civil liberty and business honor as that of the Bolsheviks. American common sense will see in such an arrangement no service to the cause of freedom, no sound promotion of commerce, and only further burdens for the Russian people.

THE DOOM OF THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY

ONCE, not so many years ago as to be beyond the recollection of living people, the work day in industries of all kinds was very generally twelve hours long. Gradually, sometimes by peaceful means, sometimes with turbulence, the work day prevailing in factories was reduced. To-day what was once an ideal has become common in practice. Eight hours constitute the normal day's work in so many industries that the eight-hour day has come to be regarded very widely as the unit by which a day's wages are reckoned. And yet one of the greatest industries in America, a basic industry on which the life and prosperity of almost every kind of manufacture and certainly every method of transportation depend, has retained for many of its workers the old twelve-hour day. That laggard industry is the steel industry.

Now it appears certain that the steel industry will render the twelve-hour day obsolete.

On May 19 the newspapers of the country published despatches from Washington reporting the fact that at a conference with the President of the United States at the White House the

leaders of the steel industry, including the two foremost steel men of America, Judge Elbert H. Gary of the United States Steel Corporation and Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, had agreed with the President in approving in principle the abolition of the twelve-hour day, and had authorized the President of the American Steel and Iron Institute to appoint a committee of five to make an investigation and report to the industry on the subject. According to the statement given out at the White House, the President explained "that there was no intention of Government interference in private business, but that we are about to witness a great industrial revival, and the one hope of abolishing the excessively long working day was to do it before the full swing is resumed."

This conclusion, reached by those who are in command of this great industry, is the result of a discussion, amounting at times to an agitation, which has been continuous for the past decade. It was, in fact, eleven years ago last month that the stockholders of the United States Steel Corporation adopted what, from the name of its author, has come to be known as the Cabot resolution. That resolution called for an investigation of statements made in an article by John A. Fitch published in the "American Magazine." At that time the stockholders' committee recommended the ultimate abolition of the twelve-hour day together with its natural accompaniment of the seven-day week. Since that time there has been developing a public opinion that has grown more and more insistent in its demands for the abolition of these survivals of a past industrial age. Finally, a year and a half ago a thorough study of the subject was presented to a joint meeting of the Taylor Society, an organization to promote scientific management, and certain sections of the National organizations of mechanical and electrical engineers, by a management expert, Horace B. Drury.

In that address Mr. Drury made plain the reasons for the survival of the twelve-hour day in this industry. In the ordinary factories, in which it is possible to discontinue work and resume it after an interval of a few hours, the reduction of the work day is comparatively simple; but in a continuous industry, like the steel industry, in which furnaces have to be kept going all the time, day and night, it is not practicable to assign men to work except in shifts of equal fractions of twenty-four hours. It was easy, comparatively, to change the working day from twelve hours to ten, let us say, in a textile mill; but it was impossible to do that in a blast furnace. The only change that seemed

practicable was one from twelve to eight hours, and that change was too radical to come in the ordinary progress toward shorter hours. Moreover, the work in a steel plant is intermittent. Men who work twelve hours are not working at top speed during that time. For a considerable part of the time they can sit about and smoke and talk and even sleep. And even when the work is hard, it is not as hard as one might imagine it would be. A great deal of the heavy lifting that used to be done by man power is now done by machinery.

Naturally, for labor of this sort "the steel industry has for many years," Mr. Drury explained in his address, "recruited its workers from a class of men to whom this combination of long sluggish hours with rather high weekly earnings has had a peculiar charm; and that is the class of newly arrived foreign-born workers. . . . Men of this type would sometimes be willing to work four extra hours for almost nothing. Outside is alien America; inside is the one environment to which they have become in a measure accustomed. Outside are the squalid streets and often wretched dwellings, and nothing special to do except to dissipate the money that one is trying to save; inside are one's fellow-workmen and companions. . . . In fact, there has grown up among these foreigners, and among the Americans as well, a special mode of existence in which the shop rather than the home, or other outside institution, has become to a large extent the center of living. Just as sailors have learned to spend their lives at sea, miners to spend much of theirs under ground, and traveling salesmen and engineers to spend much of theirs away from home, so the steel worker spends his life in the shop."

Such facts as these explain the survival of the twelve-hour day, but they afford no reason for its continuance. Even were the men contented with this life, as they are not, it would be contrary to the interests of the country to have it made permanent. A twelve-hour day means at least thirteen hours away from home. It is not, as Mr. Drury points out, so much because of what goes on inside the shop as because of what a man misses outside that the country should insist that the twelve-hour day be abandoned. That means that the man has no time for his duties as a father of a family and as a citizen.

The men themselves, who have in the past acquiesced in the twelve-hour day, are realizing this fact; but the country ought to realize it more keenly. The twelve-hour day, as Mr. Drury says, simply means "the accentuation and continuance in American life of those lines of class and culture which immigration