

would limit the scope of the inquiry. It is asserted that the American Government believed that the French conditions rendered the inquiry futile. The French hold that it is impossible under present conditions in Germany to ascertain what Germany may ultimately be able to pay, and that therefore the inquiry should be confined to Germany's present capacity for making payments. The American Government, on the other hand, seems to assume, if unofficial reports can be believed, that any plan must assume Germany's present inability to pay virtually anything. If the American Government makes that assumption, it ought never to have made a proposal for an inquiry, for it has already partly prejudged the case. Some of those who have been disappointed at the French disinclination to acquiesce in this prejudgment have urged that the United States join with Britain and perhaps with others in an inquiry based on the assumption that Germany cannot ever pay what she is asked to pay and cannot pay at present anything. This proposal, it is scarcely concealed, is not primarily for the purpose of ascertaining Germany's capacity to pay, but primarily for the purpose of isolating France and reducing her power.

It is not to the interest of America, however, to promote misunderstanding or dissension anywhere. We have no interest in preventing direct negotiations between Germany and France, such as were under way between Loucheur and Rathenau when Rathenau was assassinated. We have no interest, as Germany has, in causing a rupture between England and France and isolating France from her allies. Our interest lies wholly in promoting understanding and in helping reconciliation.

To pursue a separate inquiry without France into a matter that concerns France primarily would be to promote not understanding but misunderstanding, not reconciliation but resentment. It would not serve any purpose of changing Germany's ill will to good will. On the contrary, it would help to give Germany reason to believe that her ill will had proved profitable. When Germany was defeated on the battlefields, she undertook to discount her defeat by leaving a large part of France a ruined country. The evidence of that is spread over all of northern France. She counted on human forgetfulness. She thought the allies of France would be willing to leave her prostrate so as to get back

to business. And Germany was not far wrong. The allies of France have been chiefly interested in getting back to business. They have quieted their own consciences by bidding France to cultivate a forgiving spirit. But what they have either deliberately or naively forgotten is that reconciliation can never take place without a change of will on the part of the offender. And there has been no change of will.

What can change Germany's will? In the answer to that lies the peace of Europe. Without an answer to that there can be no peace. Certainly efforts to relieve Germany of the natural consequences of her course will not tend to make her see the folly of it. Interference by America in Europe for the purpose of making Germany's burdens lighter, of bringing France not Germany to terms, can serve only to promote the ill will which it is our interest and desire to cure.

JOHN MARTIN'S LIST

ON another page we print a list of sixty books which John Martin, editor of "John Martin's Book," regards as of basic worth for children's reading.

We do not expect every reader of this list to trace through the letters

and figures that follow each title John Martin's judgment concerning the influence of every book on the list; but we doubt whether any reader who is at all interested in books for children will fail to note that list and profit by it. Most people who know both children and books will want to add to that list some titles. We should like, for instance, to make that list sixty-two by adding Walter De La Mare's great contribution to imaginative literature, "The Three Mulla-Mulgars" and Charles Boardman Hawes's stimulating story of adventure "The Mutineers." Both of these books, we realize, are excluded from this list because they are not "standard;" but if they do not in time become recognized as classics we shall become convinced that there is something the matter with the process by which books acquire immortality.

Chiefly, however, it is not for the purpose of mentioning these two books or any others—for we could continue with our selection—that we began these remarks, but for the purpose of suggesting to our readers that they send to John Martin, 33 West 49th Street, New York City, for his "Blue Book of Best Reading for Children," which contains the titles of, we believe, more than two hundred books which he, a good judge, unreservedly recommends.

GROVER CLEVELAND

BY LAWRENCE F. ABBOTT

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR OF THE OUTLOOK

IT seems to be the lot of every American President of strong personality and vigorous policies to be damned by his political opponents and to be abandoned by some if not many of his partisan supporters during his lifetime, only to be recognized after death both by opponents and supporters as a patriotic and constructive statesman. This is certainly true of Washington, of Adams, of Lincoln, and of Roosevelt. It is no less true of Grover Cleveland.

One of the most interesting things about the recently published two-volume biography of Cleveland,¹ by Professor McElroy, of Princeton University, is that it brings out so clearly this curious damnatory and laudatory habit of mind of the American people toward their Presidents.

¹ Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman. By Robert McElroy, Edwards Professor of American History, Princeton University. 2 vols. Harper & Brothers, New York. \$10.

When Washington was first inaugurated, after his marvelous leadership of the Revolution, he was hailed as the Father of his Country; when he retired on March 4, 1797, the "Aurora," the chief newspaper of the opposition, said almost in these words: "This day should be celebrated as a day of jubilee throughout the United States, for the man who has brought untold misfortunes upon his country is about to step into well-merited oblivion."


When Grover Cleveland was inaugurated President on March 4, 1885, he was hailed as the champion of honesty in politics, the man who would and could treat public office as a public trust; upon his final retirement from the Presidency on March 4, 1897, just one hundred years after the "Aurora" had condemned Washington to everlasting oblivion, the Atlanta "Constitution," one of the strong and influential organs of the Democratic party,

declared: "Grover Cleveland will go out under a greater burden of popular contempt than has ever been excited by a public man since the foundation of the Government."

The utter worthlessness of such passionate contemporary judgments must occur to every reader of the calm and well-considered estimate of Cleveland written a quarter of a century after his final Presidential term closed, by the greatest living representative of the Republican party. Elihu Root, in the Introduction which he contributes to Professor McElroy's volumes, has this to say of Cleveland:

He had strong common sense, simplicity and directness without subtlety, instinctive and immovable integrity, perfect courage, a kindly nature with a great capacity for friendship and with great capacity also for wrath which made him a dangerous man to trifle with. There was nothing visionary or fanatical about him, but he had a natural hatred for fraud and false pretense, and a strong instinct for detecting the essential quality of conduct by the application of old and simple tests of morality. . . . No thoughtful and patriotic American, to whatever party he may belong, and however much his opinions may differ from those of Mr. Cleveland, can read the story of his Administrations without admiration and sympathy, or without a sense of satisfaction that his country can on occasion produce and honor such a man as Grover Cleveland.

This tribute appeals to me, not only on account of its fine spirit of justice, but because—a much more petty reason, I suppose—it enables me with some self-complacency to say to myself, "I told you so." For I voted for Cleveland in 1884 and in 1892, and would have voted for him in 1888 if I had not that year lost my vote by reason of unavoidable absence from my native State. Born and brought up a Republican, I had cast my first vote in a Presidential election for General Garfield. In 1884, however, I was one of the "young Mugwumps" who resisted the nomination of Mr. Blaine. I well remember the political passion of those days. They were recalled recently when I was discussing Mr. McElroy's sympathetic but wise and impartial story of Cleveland's career with an old and dear friend of mine over the luncheon table. My friend had been a captain in a Vermont regiment during the Civil War, and therefore his Republicanism rests upon a very much deeper foundation than my own. When I told him I had been a Cleveland Republican in 1884, he remarked with courtesy but unmistak-



(C) Gutekunst

GROVER CLEVELAND

able decision: "I can forgive your voting for Cleveland, but I cannot forgive your voting against Blaine, who was one of the ablest, noblest, and purest-minded statesmen this country has ever produced!"

Such was the glamour of the "plumed knight" from Maine in the eyes of a great multitude of personal followers. Henry Clay and James G. Blaine had a personal charm which Cleveland did not possess. Their followers voted for them out of personal devotion; Cleveland's adherents, I think, were not so much attracted by the man as by the principles for which he stood.

The main facts of his life are known, of course, to every man who takes an interest in American political history. He was the son of a clergyman with a pitifully small income; he had to forego an education at Hamilton College, which he ardently desired, because as a boy it was necessary for him to support himself and help his widowed mother; he succeeded in studying law as a clerk in an office in Buffalo; he became successively Assistant District Attorney, Sheriff of his county, and Mayor of his city, the most important in the State except New York; his integrity and efficiency as Mayor gave him a reputation throughout the State; he was elected Governor; his unterrified courage and unswerving integrity as Chief Execu-

tive of the State gave him a reputation throughout the Nation. Thus he became President.

His election to that high office is perhaps a unique example of the greatest honor in American political life being conferred upon a man solely for administrative merit. He never liked machine politics and the political machine never liked him. The Democratic bosses took him because they had been out of power for twenty-four years and they were willing to do anything to get into power again. To their intense disgust, however, they found that when he had carried the Democratic party to victory he had no intention of giving them what they thought was their share of the spoils. They had to renominate him in 1888, but they did it apathetically, and he was defeated. Mr. Harrison, his political opponent, was elected. But Mr. Harrison proved to be politically a "colder proposition" even than Cleveland, and the Republican bosses became apathetic. The independent vote—that is to say, the vote which is always independent of boss dictation and which therefore always holds the balance of power—believing then, as it believes now, that the aphorism ascribed to Cleveland, "Public office is a public trust," expresses the basic principle of good government, placed him in the Presidential chair again. Thus Cleveland is the only American who has been nominated three successive times for the Presidency.

Cleveland's two Administrations were characterized chiefly by a steady, patient, faithful, almost drudge-like attention to the day's work. There was nothing picturesque about it, unless his marriage while in the White House to a young and beautiful woman, the daughter of a former law partner, may be called picturesque. Only one great dramatic action stands out during his eight years in the White House—his abrupt and forceful ultimatum to Great Britain in connection with the Venezuelan dispute. He practically threatened Great Britain with war if she declined to submit to international arbitration the controversy with Venezuela on a boundary question.

This ultimatum coming like a bolt out of a clear sky shocked practically everybody. Prosperous, and therefore peace-loving, Americans thought it was jingoism; the British people, who believed the whole world ought to recognize their supreme imperial power, thought it was an insult; and Europe was startled to find that the

American Republic, which had never been considered a factor in world politics, would have to be taken into account as a world power. To the everlasting credit of the British Government, its good sense got the better of its surprise and chagrin; the result was a great act of arbitration—the greatest in its influence on interna-

tional affairs that the world had known up to that time, with the possible exception of the settlement of the Alabama Claims.

In three important movements of American political policy Cleveland may be fairly said to have been a pioneer—the movement for sound money, the movement for a Civil Ser-

vice based on merit, and the movement for the settlement of international disputes by judicial procedure. Because of his leadership in these directions—a leadership which sprang from blunt action rather than philosophical reasoning—he well deserves the growing respect in which his name is held by his countrymen.

A RHINE REPUBLIC?

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE BY ELBERT FRANCIS BALDWIN

FOR a considerable epoch the Rhineland has belonged to Prussia. To-day a Rhine Republic was proclaimed here.

As I went out early this morning I was astonished to find the shops closed. I wondered if it meant some church holiday. But when I saw a barricade, then I surmised that in the night Wiesbaden had followed Aachen's example and had proclaimed a Rhine Republic.

It was so. Last night a body of separatist storm troops succeeded in getting hold of the City Hall. They raised their green-white-red flag over it.

This event seems to have been accomplished with a strange lack of opposition from the German Wiesbaden police. As soon as he heard of what was happening, General Mor-dacq, at the head of the French troops here, commanded this police to keep order without brutality. The police chief replied that it could not be done. Thereupon the General ordered the French troops and gendarmerie to police duty, disarmed the Wiesbaden policemen and sent them to their homes.

Meanwhile, though the overwhelming majority of the population knew nothing of what was going on, a great number of people had assembled in front of the City Hall, crying, "Blood-hounds," "Bloody devils," etc., and made such an effective demonstration that the separatists had to reply by using their pistols. Fortunately, no one was killed, but a number of persons were badly wounded.

Then the French took the situation in hand. Their policy is to keep order, but to allow all possible freedom of speech and action. Hence they have not permitted the German police to suffocate the budding separatist movement.

The revolutionists here were not slow in following up their victory by sticking posters everywhere announcing:

The day of Rhenish freedom has arrived.

The Rhenish Republic is proclaimed!

This morning, therefore, I found the City Hall in charge of new functionaries wearing armbands striped in green, white, and red.

On the other hand, however, as an offset, there was an indignant general strike in the town. No street cars were running, no morning papers appearing (and the curious thing was that, when they did appear to-night, they had accounts of the fight, but no editorial comment on it!). As I have said, the frightened shopkeepers had shut their shops. When this happens, just for one day only, it seems as if it were the last straw to break the German camel's back. The people should not be permitted to lose one chance to buy or sell, no matter how small their stocks, whether of goods or of money.

There was no more shooting. Instead of the usual German police standing at the crossroads, we now saw the French gendarmerie. Many policemen were also continually riding through the streets where the largest number of people were accustomed to assemble, dispersing any too great a crowd. Yet during the entire day I detected nothing rough or unpleasant on either the French or the German side. That the Germans were quiet surprised me as I reflected on the disagreeable astonishment of the German majority at last night's event. The conduct of the French I had a chance to note at first hand. As I was half-way between Friedrichstrasse and Luisenstrasse I saw a blue cloud suddenly appear at the end of my street. It was a row of French *patrouilles* on horseback, rapidly "cleaning" the street—that is to say, the solid line extended from side to side, including the sidewalks! It was coming apparently quickly towards me. No one could pass through it, and, as all doors were closed and bolted, there was nothing to do but to retreat with lightning speed to Friedrichstrasse! As the soldiers swept by I noticed that they were not riding so fast, after all; that they were riding carefully lest they hurt some one and that their manner was quite simple and not at all arrogant.

Why has the success of the few separatists, in contrast to the many nationalists, been possible? I did not discover one man who could explain it. But a German lady did. She said: "Our city consists chiefly of inhabitants formerly well-to-do if not rich, aristocrats, and people with just enough income not to have to work. But the new conditions have cut off their incomes and have given them no chance to work, even if they knew how. They have grown so weary and hopeless that they no longer have the strength for any initiative, certainly not for any resistance." To-day I saw some of these people on the streets, standing in little groups, looking furtively around, apprehensive, and wondering what would happen next.

The separatists are not, as are other Germans, conservatively inclined, not given to changes, and clinging to tradition.

I had expected to find enthusiastic groups of separatists on the streets, celebrating their victory, but groups of that kind were nowhere to be seen.

Why did they choose just this moment to proclaim an independent Republic? First, because the mark has sunk out of sight, and, second, because the rebellion of Bavaria and Saxony against Berlin offers a chance for their own rebellion. In my opinion, however, they are overplaying their hand and are making a mistake. All that the bulk of the Rhineland north of Mayence is ready for is what the Palatinate, south of Mayence, is waiting to do—swing clear from Prussia as the Palatinate would swing clear of Bavaria, but remain a great Rhenish autonomous state within the German realm's confines.

Before the war I repeatedly visited the Rhineland, and I always noted certain differences between the Rhinelanders and the Prussians.

The Rhinelander is slim; the Prussian, heavy.

The Rhinelander is alert and lively; the Prussian, slow and moody.

The Rhinelander is friendly; the