

widely distributed over the globe. More recently the Department of Agriculture has sent representatives, comparatively few, to Europe and South America, and their work sometimes overlaps that of one or both of the others. Thus some amount of triplication of effort has come about.

The United States Government has not too many foreign representatives. Our interests demand the work of all those now abroad, and even a larger number, particularly in the agricultural field, might be desirable. It is reasonably to be expected, however, that the President's unification order will bring an increase of efficiency equivalent to the work of many additional men.

### Pierre Monteux

**P**IERRE MONTEUX leaves the United States for his native France at the end of this musical season with the admiration of all who prize the approach to perfection in art.

Coming to the United States five and a half years ago, at about the end of the war, M. Monteux served as conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra until the arrival of Henri Rabaud, who was engaged as the conductor to succeed Dr. Muck, and a year later he succeeded M. Rabaud as regular conductor. He encountered certain difficulties at the outset. In the first place, Dr. Muck, a scholarly, academic, and very German musician, had created a devoted following in Boston until he made himself personally obnoxious by his activities during the war. The feeling engendered at that time was not conducive to an artistic atmosphere. At the same time the orchestra itself became disintegrated. Consequently when M. Monteux began his duties he had an orchestral instrument very much out of repair for performances in an atmosphere charged with a certain amount of hostility. In the five years in which he has had charge he has re-created the Boston Symphony Orchestra. He has, in fact, combined the services rendered to that orchestra by Gericke with the services rendered by Neksch. He leaves it a superb organization.

Once on a time when the Boston Symphony Orchestra made its regular monthly visits to New York tickets were virtually unobtainable except by regular subscription. In recent years other orchestras have been developed and the whims and fashion of concert-goers have



Keystone

Pierre Monteux, conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra

changed; so the audiences at the Boston Symphony concerts have not been so large. New York is the city of the musically *nouveaux riches* who want excitement and thrills rather than the satisfaction that comes with pure and restrained beauty. For some tastes, however, there is no orchestra that surpasses the Boston Symphony Orchestra as it exists to-day, and for a few perhaps there is none that equals it. To have rebuilt this great band has been an achievement which would bring distinction to any man. Among the conductors of the Boston Symphony Orchestra Pierre Monteux will occupy a place of distinction.

### The Dawes Report

**V**ICTORS do not usually salve either the bodily or the mental wounds of the vanquished. The doctrine that even the conqueror should do unto the conquered as he would have the conquered do unto him is usually considered either utopian or revolutionary. As a matter of fact, it is neither revolutionary nor utopian. When it is possible, it is reasonable and practicable to overcome evil with good.

This, in brief, is the principle embodied in the report of the Dawes Committee. It is a wholly unsentimental report. It does not indicate any illusions on the part of its authors concerning the present or past disposition of the German people or the nature of their offenses

against civilization. The men who made the investigation are accustomed to consider realities. General Dawes, the Chairman of the more important of the two committees of experts which, on behalf of the Reparation Commission, have been investigating conditions in Germany, is notoriously immune to mere emotional appeals. Perhaps the most significant paragraph in the whole report is to be found in General Dawes's covering letter. It is as follows:

Since as a result of the war the creditors of Germany are paying taxes to the limit of their capacity, so also must Germany be encouraged to pay taxes from year to year to the limit of her capacity. This is in accord with the just and underlying principle of the Treaty of Versailles, reaffirmed by Germany in its note of May 29, 1919, that the German scheme of taxation must be "fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the Powers represented on the Commission." More than this limit could not be expected and less than this would relieve Germany from the common hardship and give to her an unfair advantage in the industrial competition of the future. The plan of the Committee embodies this principle.

Can any such statement be found as the official utterance of the victors in any other world war? Expressions of a desire for peace after war are common, but the expressed intent on the part of responsible officials to see that the subjugated are "encouraged" to share with the victors in the cost of the conflict and are told plainly that nothing more is required of them than to bear equal burdens with the conquerors is unique.

It is true that the quoted paragraph refers nominally only to taxation, and it is also true that the Dawes Committee expects Germany to pay reparations, not only out of revenue from taxes, but also out of the profits of railways and of industrial concerns. In the end, however, the weight of the burden which Germany is asked to bear will be felt in the form of taxation. And it is plain, not only from this quoted paragraph, but from the whole letter and from the report, that the Committee has undertaken, as far as possible, to see conditions from the German point of view, has considered the welfare of the Germans of equal importance with the welfare of the rest of the world, and has based its recommendations on a belief that the most practicable way of overcoming evil is with good.


What distinguishes this report from





(C) Underwood

Owen D. Young



(C) Underwood

General Charles G. Dawes



(C) Underwood

Henry M. Robinson

The three Americans who played a part in the drawing up of the Dawes Report

most of the talk commonly heard about reconciliation is its recognition of the fact that Germany ought to pay, can pay, should see that it is to her own interest to pay, and, if need be, must be made to pay for all that is reparable. It was not the business of the Dawes Committee to determine what the policy of the Allies toward Germany should be. In spite of what some pro-German and some thoughtless newspapers and commentators have said, it was not the business of the Dawes Committee to name the amount of reparations, for that amount has been named, and repeatedly renamed, by those who are responsible for the policies of the Allies. It was not the business of the Dawes Committee to decide any questions of political or military policy. What is more, the Dawes Committee has found it not necessary to decide any such policy in order to reach a definite conclusion as to the means by which Germany can pay.

What the Committee provides is, in fact, a plan for a concealed but very real receivership. Emphasis is laid upon the desirability of Germany's doing everything possible herself, but implicit in the plan is an arrangement by which in any emergency representatives of the Allies can take up the work of administration whenever the Germans themselves prove incapable or unwilling to carry it on.

Three sources of revenue for reparation payments have been discovered and tapped. One source consists of the excess of income from taxation over gov-

ernmental expenditure. Another is the profits from the operation of the German railways. The third is the profits from investments in German industry. In order to secure this revenue for the Reparation Commission, the plan of the Dawes Committee provides for two important measures—the stabilization of German currency principally by means of a bank of issue, and the floating of a foreign loan. At the basis of the whole plan lies an organization which is designed to provide “adequate productive securities.” This organization consists of certain boards and officials, including commissioners. It is this organization which constitutes the unobtrusive but real receivership.

Most of the report consists of a description of these related factors, consisting of the sources of revenue, the means for tapping them, and the guaranty of payment. If Germany accepts this plan, her bank of issue, for example, will be administered by a managing board consisting wholly of Germans under a German president, but subject to the oversight of a general board consisting of seven Germans and seven foreigners, one of the foreigners being known as a commissioner, and being responsible for seeing that there is no infringement of the provisions establishing the bank. Similarly there is an organization provided to manage the railways.

That the Dawes Committee's consideration for the Germans' interests is not due to any credulity concerning the Germans' good faith is indicated by what it

reports concerning the German railways. It recognizes the German railway tariffs “as a weapon in the hands of German trade.” It describes the expenditure on rolling stock and works of every kind as “extravagant.” It does “not believe that any German management will have the strength necessary to fight successfully against the traditional mental attitude unless there is behind it the constant pressure of an expert control established and maintained in the interest of the Allies to supervise the management in the matter both of tariffs and of expenditure.” It declares that “the German Government has since the war run railways in a manner which cannot be defended.” It describes the executive officers of the railways as “afflicted with what it is not too strong to describe as megalomania.” (These quotations are from Annex No. 3, containing the report on the German railways by Sir William Ackworth and M. Lèverve, which is a part of the Dawes report.) With these facts in mind, the Committee has made provision to see that the German railway management observes good faith. At the same time, it gives the Germans opportunity to run the railways themselves under private management without governmental interference and with a chance for profits to German stockholders.

In a similar manner, but with different organization, the Dawes Committee provides for getting profits from German industry. For this purpose, there is provision for the issuance of bonds properly

secured to be delivered to a trustee for the Allies.

No brief account of this report can be either accurate or comprehensive. All that we can here attempt to do is to give some account in untechnical language of some of its more salient features. Those who wish to study its details will find themselves confronted with what amounts to a fair-sized volume.

From beginning to end it is clear that, while the Committee has been *suaviter in modo*, it has at the same time been *fortiter in re*.

The acceptance of the Dawes report by the Reparation Commission, the general approval it has received, and the apparent acquiescence of the German Government in the plan which it proposes indicate that the plan has a fair chance of success. We shall believe that the Germans will co-operate in carrying it out when they begin to do so. If they take it simply as a new basis for negotiations and for evading their obligations, they will get less sympathy from the rest of the world than they have been accustomed to receive. If they accept it, they must not complain if they find themselves on probation for a long while yet to come.

## Japan's Diplomatic Boomerang

**I**T is the inalienable right of every nation to be the architect of its own internal destiny. Essential to that right is the power to determine, according to its own will and volition, the qualifications for citizenship.

This right, like all other rights, must be exercised in accordance with that comity of spirit which is as necessary for the peace of nations as for the happiness and comfort of individuals.

Good feeling is never increased either in the case of nations or individuals by equivocation and subterfuge. It is the part of statesmanship to follow the direct route with the least possible alienation of friendship and good will.

During the past decade there has been a growing feeling throughout the United States—the evidence of which is plainly written in the returns of The Outlook's Platforms of the People—that the time for indiscriminate acceptance of immigrants has passed. In response to this feeling the Government enacted a quota law, arbitrarily based upon the Census of 1910. The purpose of this law was to

exclude or cut down the representation from certain races and peoples without mention of their names or without trespassing upon their feelings. The first end it has in cumbersome fashion accomplished, the second end it has failed to attain.

Now it is proposed arbitrarily to determine the national quotas upon an earlier Census (that of 1890), and thereby still further restrict such immigration as has proved slowest of assimilation. Such a revision of the Quota Law would undoubtedly accomplish its restrictive purpose, but it has been shown that this cannot be done without arousing the hostility of foreign nations and of immigrant groups within our own borders. This hostility has been wholesomely disregarded by the passage of the bill in the House of Representatives.

Besides this there has been a provision inserted excluding altogether (except for certain exempt classes, like students and travelers) all people not eligible for citizenship. This Japan recognizes as obviously designed to exclude her nationals. It has led the Japanese Ambassador, speaking for his Government, to recite the history of the "gentlemen's agreement" entered into by Theodore Roosevelt, by which Japanese labor has been practically excluded from entrance into America. It has led the Japanese Ambassador further to state in a letter to Secretary Hughes that the inclusion in our Immigration Bill of a clause barring admission to this country to all who are not eligible to citizenship would inevitably result in "grave consequences" to the "otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries." Whether or not the Ambassador used the phrase "grave consequences" with its usual diplomatic significance, it nevertheless remains obvious that the effect of this phrase was almost inevitably unfortunate. It was taken by the Senate as an attempt to influence purely domestic legislation by the weight of foreign displeasure and resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of the provision to which the Japanese Ambassador objected. American history shows, and there have been several ambassadors who have had reason to understand this, that American opinion is peculiarly sensitive to such a challenge.

Supineness in the matter of preparations for national defense, indiscriminate blank checks upon our future good will—these things we Americans have again and again forgotten at the suggestion that

we could be forced either by praise or blame to forget our natural rights. The whole controversy adds strength to the argument that we ought to abandon a system of restriction which is at best a subterfuge and get back to the basic principle that we have a right to select as our future citizens whom we choose. Such a straightforward programme as Canada has carried out could be put into effect without hurting the pride of any nation or race.

So far as Japan is concerned, such a programme would not in any way vitiate the "gentlemen's agreement" secured by Theodore Roosevelt. Japan has repeatedly agreed to the principle of excluding her laboring population from the United States, and she has, we believe, loyally co-operated to that end. We believe that she would as loyally acquiesce in any frank and open system for the control of our immigration founded upon the principle that the United States must be the sole judge of its fitness.

The word "fitness" brings up a matter referred to in Ambassador Hanihara's letter to Secretary Hughes upon which we hope every effort will be made to set Japan's anxieties at rest. Too often Japan's statesmen and publicists have taken the stand that we were excluding the citizens of Japan because they were unworthy to partake in our American civilization. In this editorial we have said that every nation had the right to be the architect of its own internal destiny. Architects build according to plan. National architects may draw up poor plans, but they must be the final judges of the type of civilization they desire to construct. For such architects to reject certain materials as unsuited to their kind of civilization cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as meaning that this same material might not be highly desirable for some other structure. Japan has herself been injured, we believe, by the adoption of certain of our Western ways. If she were to turn aside from these ways, it would not necessarily imply that they were therefore unworthy of a place in our own civilization. No man in his senses could maintain that the keen minds of Japan do not spring from a civilization in some ways even higher than our own. It is not on grounds of unworthiness that we seek to prevent an influx of Japanese, but solely on grounds of biological and traditional differences. If there is anything which can be done to relieve Japanese suspicion of this