

sons killed and between 100,000 and 200,000 people suddenly shoved out of this territory—a few hundred of them now languishing in foreign prisons. Damages to property mean hundreds of millions of your dollars. This economic ruin brought our financial disorder, already great, to a climax. The occupation forced us to increase our currency incredibly. This sapped the Berlin Government's prestige and cruelly exposed its increasing powerlessness.

"The economic and financial damages were swiftly followed by political damages—the rebellion at Munich, the rebellion at Dresden, the rebellions in the Rhineland.

"All these happenings have been disas-

trous enough to us. But, morally, their reaction on France and Belgium leaves those countries in an isolation perilous to them and of no good augury to the peace of the world. For through everything that has happened here you can discover a little red thread running—German revenge. We have one fixed and controlling idea—to free ourselves from the Versailles Treaty. Together with this there has been a rebirth of the Teutonic martial spirit and patriotic impulse.

"But this looks to the future. We were discussing history.

"At first we thought that a general refusal to work would force the foreigners ere long to leave. This refusal became known as 'passive resistance.' But in the

long run it did not work. The foreigners, not the Germans, have won. Passive resistance has probably cost our Berlin Government a couple of billion of your dollars, anyway, to cover the cost of the simplest living of the half million Ruhr workmen and their families during the long period of idleness. For a Government with a supposedly empty treasury this sum, I do not hesitate to say, has been worse than wasted. Nor is this all. It is also the striking proof that our Government lied when it proclaimed that it was bankrupt. As an honest man, I must, with shame, make that confession. Of course the money should have gone towards settling our reparation debts."

Dortmund, Westphalia, January, 1924.

What are the Armaments of Germany?

By RAYMOND RECOULY

What has been done to disarm Germany? Raymond Recouly reports the views of Ferdinand Foch and of other outstanding leaders of French opinion. What Germans have to say about France is reported by Elbert Francis Baldwin elsewhere in this issue

THE question of the armaments of Germany has just been put in the clearest manner, not only before France, but before the world. A ray of light has suddenly been thrown on a number of facts which the initiated already either knew or, in many cases, suspected: the considerable strengthening of the Reichswehr; big military maneuvers, started under the pretext of crushing the Communists; the manufacture of war material; intensive development of illegal military organizations, etc.

The French public had grounds for being, if not alarmed, at least very anxious when, over a year ago, a few months before the occupation of the Ruhr, the Interallied Commission of Control found it was impossible to continue their work.

Such anxiety is most legitimate. France has just gone through a war which has cost her so much that she does not want to start another in a short time.

What do the armaments of Germany really consist of? What is their origin and development? What is their present strength and for what purpose do they appear to be intended? What would be the best course for France to take to parry these armaments?

The information which I am going to give here has been culled from the most reliable sources. It comes from two or three people in France who, owing to their competency and the high functions

which they exercise, are in the best position to know all about this important question.

No Mushroom Growth

IT must not be thought that German armaments have suddenly grown, like a mushroom, during the last few weeks, or even the last few months. Immediately after the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed a very severe limitation of her army, Germany—military men being aided by civilians—tried by every means to violate or get round the provisions of this Treaty. They sought and, as usually happens in such cases, they found a way.

The man who is best qualified to have a well-grounded opinion, Foch, has told me, not once, but ten times: "A great country like Germany cannot be disarmed effectively and efficaciously when she does not wish to allow herself to be disarmed. Napoleon tried it, as you know, and he failed. We are going to try it once more; but let us guard against having any illusions about the value of the results obtained. It is quite evident that these results can only be relative and temporary. Apart from what the Commission of Control will see, there will, necessarily, be many things that will escape their notice.

"The day when this Commission will no longer be in function the feeble obsta-

cle it opposed to the armaments of Germany will disappear. That day armaments will be resumed more than ever. Consequently, we are not going to establish our security on such a fragile basis and on such a deceptive aspect—namely, the more or less supposed weakness of our adversary. Security can come only from our own force; that is, from a good army and, above all, from a solid *military frontier*, the Rhine. If we hold the Rhine, we have not much to fear from an attack on the part of Germany. If we left the Rhine, our situation would be worse than it was in 1914, because Russia is no longer beyond Germany to act as a counterpoise."

These words of Foch are wisdom itself and reason. France is occupying the Rhineland, which for her is not only a pledge of security but also of reparations, about the only pledge she can count upon. Unless she commits veritable suicide, it is likely that France will not abandon the Rhine for some time. As long as she is there her situation is secure.

Therefore when thoughtful Frenchmen ascertain the armaments of Germany they need not lose their heads. This does not mean in any way, however, that they can light-heartedly, with an indifferent eye, regard Germany preparing quietly a war of revenge without the slightest intervention on their part.

Only, they have time for reflection. They are not urged to come to an imme-

diate decision. They may observe attentively what is happening, get their files ready, prepare their retort, and when the moment comes, before any counter-action is taken, speak first clearly to the Allies and afterwards to the Germans.

A Lively Skeleton

WHAT do the armaments of Germany consist of—in man-power and in material?

Let us first take the man-power.

By the will of Lloyd George, who was far more frightened by words than by realities, and did not wish to hear of conscription, and contrary to the formal advice of Foch, the Treaty of Versailles endowed Germany with a professional army of 100,000, composed of soldiers contracting a long-period engagement. Germany well knew how to escape this obligation. From the first hour she endeavored to transform the Reichswehr into what the French call "*une armée de cadres*"—that is to say, composed of officers and petty officers. All the military experts, starting from Foch, had predicted this, and it is exactly what is now happening. The Germans have enrolled only former non-commissioned officers, chosen among their best men. Each unit of their army is like a cell around which other forces must come and amalgamate. One company should form a regiment, and so on.

One of the principal efforts of the Commission of Control consisted in supervising the effective force of the Reichswehr, in order to be sure that the figures fixed by the Treaty were not exceeded. As one might expect, the Germans set their wits to work so as to thwart this supervision. As they are past-masters in the art of fraud and trickery, they partially succeeded. One of their tricks consisted in making so-called substitutes enter the Reichswehr; they are sent off when the man replaced returns. In the meantime they have received several months of military instruction, and hold themselves in readiness to return at the first call. For more than one year the Commission of Control has practically ceased working; the Germans no longer need to be under any restraint, as they can operate almost in broad daylight. They have profited by this stratagem and strengthened considerably the effective force of the Reichswehr. According to information received from almost all parts, the French military experts estimate at the present time that they are double and number 200,000 men instead of 100,000.

After the Reichswehr, come the Schupo—that is, the Security Police, apparently charged with maintaining order

and quelling disturbances. The Germans have formed a veritable army of these men, formed of old non-commissioned officers, disposing of machine guns and even of airplanes. In the first place, the number was fixed at 100,000, but at one of the innumerable Conferences which followed the Treaty of Peace the Allies were weak enough to allow Germany to increase this number to 150,000. At the present time it must be largely exceeded.

The Reichswehr and Schupo are the two essential elements of the future German army. Add to them all the illegal and clandestine organizations which have developed almost everywhere, but, above all, in Bavaria.

Prosecuted and dissolved when the Allies insisted, they sprang up almost immediately under a different name. Most of the members of the different societies have received and do receive thorough military training; they have a solid organization and staffs.

You thus reach a total of from 500,000 to 600,000 well-trained men, which evidently is not to be overlooked.

These forces would constitute an active army, which would be rapidly increased by innumerable reservists.

A Game of Hide and Seek

LET US now look at the material side. All the efforts of the Commission of Control were vain when it was a question of searching and destroying the rifles and machine guns. Nothing is easier than to hide these arms. Even supposing that they were all destroyed, owing to the formidable industrial power of the Germans, they could manufacture as many of them as they wished. This has been done.

Far more serious results were attained by the Commission with the artillery, especially the heavy artillery. Rather a large number, however, of guns were hidden. In one factory alone 600 tubes for the 105 gun were discovered recently. The same experts estimate that Germany could allot 50 to 60 field guns to each division put into the line, which is almost a normal quota. At this time Germany would have far more difficulties as regards the heavy artillery. But in this respect there is an impression that the manufacture of these guns, which was forbidden by the Treaty, is now being actively carried on both in the German factories and in those abroad. It is the same case with airplanes. Here Germany has a fine part. Thanks to the intensive export of her capital, she has created in all neighboring countries—Scandinavia, Switzerland, Spain, without forgetting Russia—aviation factories which belong to her. There is nothing to

prevent her from manufacturing planes which would all reach Germany by air when the moment comes.

What Should France Do?

THESE are the facts summarily. The most important perhaps of all must not be overlooked, namely, the growing authority of the military party, more particularly of General von Seeckt, Supreme Chief of the Army. As he has practically a free hand, we may be sure that he is profiting by it to perfect all this organization. The Germans never have money when it is a question of paying their debts, but they are never short of it when it is a question of improving their army. By tradition they are led to believe that military expenditure is evidently productive—*paying*.

In the presence of these facts—and their gravity cannot escape anybody's notice—what can be and what must be the attitude of France?

Good sense would seem to indicate that the first thing to do is to distinguish carefully between what is possible and what is not. Even if the French had at their disposal an army of controllers who could circulate freely throughout Germany, they would never succeed in controlling everything. The results they have obtained and can obtain are necessarily relative. This was known from the start. Therefore there is no reason for France to get excited or angry with regard to the limits of this Commission, which, moreover, cannot operate indefinitely. This is far from being a capital question. France would have committed the greatest mistake had she quarreled with England on that account. She would have been placed in a very bad position.

The same may be said about the sanctions. What good would it do France to occupy one or two more German towns? She already occupies enough of them. That would not prevent Germany from continuing to arm. Mr. Poincaré has therefore acted very wisely by accepting a compromise on all these points. If, by misfortune, France should break with England (let us ardently hope that this contingency will not occur), it should be on an essential question, where her vital interests were at stake. She should also have exhausted all methods of conciliation and done everything to put unquestionably right on her side.

If only the armaments of Germany were made known and stated precisely, British opinion would soon be aroused and become anxious. The *entente* with England is easier to realize as regards the problem of security than that of reparations. As for the latter, the demands of France run counter to a very strong

English coalition of industrial and commercial interests, financiers, etc. With regard to security, the great majority of moderate Englishmen understand perfectly well that the French people do not wish to have a fresh war in ten or fifteen years' time, perhaps before. They are ready to admit that strict precautions should be taken.

If the Commission of Interallied Control found it was impossible to continue work—which is to be anticipated and feared—the French Government could turn towards the British Government, having a strong hand owing to the concessions it wisely made at the time of the last Conference of Ambassadors, and say, in substance:

"You asked me to be patient and conciliating, and I have been. Germany continues to take no notice of our legitimate observations. Our vital interests forbid us to accept quietly such a condition of things. We warn you that we are resolved to keep the military frontier of the Rhine, which Maréchal Foch stubbornly demanded but which the Americans and English forced us to sacrifice in exchange for a still-born covenant. We are ready, besides, to discuss once for all this question of security, it being clearly understood that we will be satisfied only

with a genuine guaranty, not a mere mirage. In case German armaments were rushed, we would reserve to ourselves the right to take the indispensable measures, on the choice of which we shall never refuse to negotiate with you."

To a declaration of this kind it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for England to reply by a mere "plea in bar." There France is in a position which cannot be attacked. Both in America and England, also throughout the world, the opinion of moderate and thoughtful men would surely be on her side.

It is true that Russia no longer exists to act as a counterpoise on the eastern side. On the contrary, there is nothing to prove that the Red army would not make common cause with the German army. But, failing Russia, there is the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, not forgetting Poland.

Without forming too high an estimate, we may be sure that they represent a most important force, which, if well organized and utilized, could play a very great rôle in the present condition of Europe. A country like Czechoslovakia, for instance, represents something very solid. She has proved her worth by deeds. The Czech crown three years ago was worth only twenty centimes; to-day

it is worth fifty, and the rest is in conformity. Even if Germany thinks she is threatened only on her eastern frontier, she will doubtless look twice before starting on adventures.

It is unlikely that she will think seriously of attacking France for some time to come. All kinds of reasons, not only military, but diplomatic and also economic, will dissuade her.

The economic reasons are not the least important of all—far from it. To carry out mobilization at the present time there must be money in the coffers, credit, supplies in raw materials and in food, without mentioning the moral force—all of which are lacking in Germany.

So far as one can guess what the game will be, her intentions are different. In a short time, when Germany feels herself strong enough, not to attack, but simply to resist, she will throw aside the mask and declare the Treaty of Versailles is null; will expel from Germany all Commissions of Control and perhaps re-establish both the monarchy and compulsory military service. After that she will wait for France's retort, saying to the French: "Come and attack me if you wish; however, you will find out to whom you are speaking!"

Wagner the Second

By CHARLES HENRY MELTZER

Siegfried Wagner has come to America "for to admire" (possibly) and "for to see" (certainly). This article is an intimate picture of the man and the tradition which envelops him

MORE than once since the death of his illustrious father, Siegfried Wagner has made known his wish to discover the United States. Trifles like the late World War and stress of work have prevented him till now from carrying out his plan. But the expected has at last come true; and the younger Wagner has landed in New York and has already appeared before an American audience as a conductor. While he remains with us he will no doubt be lionized by many Germans and Americans of German blood—partly because he has done something to aid German art, though chiefly as a tribute to his sire.

The spur which has urged him to come over to this country is of a pressing kind. For, like his mother, he has felt the pinch of poverty. Wherever we may stand as to world politics, we were shocked a little while ago when we learned that Mme.

Cosima, long high and influential among women, had been compelled by want in her declining years to sell her mementoes of her far-famed husband. Siegfried, her son, has felt the same sad pinch. And, whether we may care or not for him as a composer and conductor, we are not likely to deny him a fair share of sympathy.

Ten years ago Siegfried Wagner and his fast-aging mother were the center of the mecca of true Wagnerites. Their house, the Villa Wahnfried, still drew thousands to the little town of Bayreuth. Some time before this human ailments had forced Mme. Cosima to live much alone, in her own suite of rooms. But all who visited the villa were quite conscious of her being in the neighborhood. She and the dead composer's tomb in the garden of the villa seemed vital facts. A host, however, greets one now at

Wahnfried—not a hostess. On Siegfried has devolved the task of receiving and entertaining his father's votaries.

Among them I had been welcomed at the shrine. Not very willingly; for visitors were subjected to somewhat rigid scrutiny before they were admitted to the sanctuary. I had been snubbed, I know, before; thanks to an introduction from a Perfect Wagnerite, I was invited to what in Germany is called a "smoking" (a misleading term) at the villa. The day before, at a café near the Festspielhaus, I had presented my credentials to Herr Siegfried. As I remember him, he was a man of middle age, not so impressive to the eye as his more famous father, but quite pleasant in a coldly courteous way, though rather conscious of his peculiar claim to deference. At first he was more cordial than he might have been had he not mistaken me for a distinguished art