


Democratic Party, however, though broken, humiliated, divided, weak, is far from being dead. Even with the damage done it by La Follette, it is in better condition than it was four years ago. The Solid South remains as solid as ever, and the Democracy of the big Eastern States is uninjured. The party seems wiped out in the West, but it has been wiped out there before. It will revive as soon as the Republicans give it an issue or it finds one for itself.

And the La Follette party has proved itself a poor claimant for the shoes of the Democratic Party. Even if La Follette could remain its leader—which his age will prevent—it has not shown itself even a good nucleus for a new major party. It is not a Nation-wide nor a true liberal movement; its strength is confined to limited areas and definite classes. It will be weaker in the new Congress than the old, in far poorer position to force legislation and get its issues defined before the public. And, although its four million votes are impressive, they represent only about half the popular strength shown by the Progressive Party in 1912. Roosevelt in that year received about the same number of votes, but the electorate has doubled since then.

More Independent Voting

THE tremendous size of the vote cast is almost as important as the result, because of the emphasis which it gives to that result. It has been said that this was a campaign without excitement or issues, but the heavy vote shows that the people believed there was an issue, and that they wished no doubt to remain as to how they felt about it.

Along with the weight of voting went a splitting of tickets which shows that there was more care and intelligence used than at any previous election. In half a dozen States party lines were trampled almost out of sight. The most notable instance is in New York, where with Coolidge winning by nearly a million plurality, Colonel Roosevelt was beaten by above a hundred thousand. Smith's immense popularity, which put him a million votes ahead of Cox in 1920, but did not save him then, was too much for the Colonel to overcome, though it is clear that he would have won against any other man the Democrats would have put up. However much Mr. Roosevelt's defeat may be regretted, it indicated an independence in the mass of



(C) Underwood

Mrs. Coolidge being sworn in by a notary public, on the White House lawn, in order that she might cast her absentee vote

voters which it is wholesome for politicians to observe.

Other cases where tickets were heavily split were in the Middle West. Ohio gave Coolidge a strong majority, but has apparently re-elected Governor Donahey, a Democrat. Oklahoma went for Davis, but chose a Republican Senator. In Indiana Ed Jackson, although elected Governor, ran far behind Coolidge. Iowa has apparently marked its ballots with great care in order to beat Brookhart, for he was on the same ticket with Coolidge and had to be "cut." Altogether, it is a fair estimate that a full quarter of all the votes cast were split in some degree. The right to expect party regularity of the voters has to be earned.

The British Elections and the Zinoviev Letter

BRITAIN is not fertile soil for the sowing of Bolshevik seed.

Persuaded that the Labor Party was

playing fast and loose with Communism, the British voters turned the Labor Government out on October 29, and put into power the Conservatives with a majority over all of 209 seats in Parliament.

Four days before the British election there was published a letter said to have been received by the Central Committee of the British Communist Party from the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It was signed by Zinoviev, President of the Presidium.

This Russian letter, addressed to the British Communist Party, urged the Communists to stir up strife in Great Britain. Denouncing the MacDonald policy as an inferior copy of the policy of his predecessor, it not only urged activity in propaganda, but gave instructions for undermining Government in Great Britain and paralyzing any war efforts on the part of Great Britain if any open outbreak of war should occur.

The letter constituted, in fact, an incitement to sedition, violence, the undermining of the British army and navy, and the formation of a Communist army of revolt.

With its publication there was made public a protest sent by the British Government to Rakovsky, Chargé d'Affaires representing the Russian Soviet Government in London. But the protest of the British Government only added fuel to the fire of resentment which the Russian letter had kindled.

Why MacDonald Was Distrusted

IN its reply the MacDonald Government declared: "No Government will ever make an arrangement with a foreign Government by which the latter is in formal diplomatic relations of a correct kind with it, while at the same time a propagandist body organically connected with that foreign Government encourages and even orders the subjects of the former to plot and plan revolutions for its overthrow."

This is precisely the position which the United States Government has taken. And the MacDonald Government agreed also with the policy of the American Government in holding the so-called Soviet Government in Russia responsible for the propaganda of the Third or Moscow Communist International. Incidentally this attitude of the MacDonald Government has been a shock to those American sympathizers with the Labor Government of Great Britain who when Secretary Hughes protested against Bolshevik propaganda in America denounced him for holding the Russian Government responsible for the propaganda of the Third Communist International. For his protest MacDonald deserves praise from all friends of order and of international good faith.

What aroused indignation in Great Britain was the fact that the MacDonald Government, knowing fully the Bolshevik Government's real character, had negotiated the treaty with Russia which the Zinoviev letter heartily commended to the British Communists as a step toward Leninism with its accompanying violence in England and her colonies. No one suspected MacDonald of harboring any desire to introduce Bolshevism as such into Britain, but it was not necessary to do that in order to see that

MacDonald's judgment was not to be trusted when it came to dealing with Russia.

It has been said in excuse that the document was a forgery; but MacDonald regarded it as genuine; and the appearance of delay in making a public protest against it subjected him to suspicion. It is said also that the protest, as well as the letter itself, was made public by permanent officials in the Foreign Office, and that it was these permanent officials who thus forced the MacDonald Government to act by seeing that the Zinoviev letter was published in the newspapers. This excuse, however, did not avail, because, if true, it showed that the Labor Government was not master in its own house. Moreover it is almost certainly not true that the under-secretaries tried to force the Prime Minister's hand.

British Common Sense

IT was not, however, the Zinoviev letter alone that turned the Labor Government out. On another page Mr. P. W. Wilson interprets that election from the point of view of one who was for several years a Liberal member of the British Parliament, and for a long time a student of British politics as a newspaper correspondent. His view that MacDonald undertook to destroy as far as he could the Liberal Party in order to substitute the Labor Party for it is undoubtedly correct. MacDonald himself said as much, for at Cleckheaton, a Yorkshire market-place, when a hastily rigged platform suddenly crashed to earth he dexterously picked himself up and, as our editorial correspondent in Europe, Mr. E. F. Baldwin, informs us, shouted, "That's how the Labor Party's weight is going to smash the Liberal Party." As to the success that has attended his attempt, opinions will differ.

It is clear, however, as a result of the experiment of putting the Socialist Party in power in Great Britain that the British people have made a notable discovery, namely, that Socialism in theory is one thing and Socialism in practice is quite another. When theory faces practice the characteristic common sense of the British overrides other sentiments. It is true that the Liberal Party was felt to be a controlling influence; but, as a well-known British statesman remarked to a member of the staff of this journal in London a few months ago, the real con-

trolling influence was public opinion; and the Labor Cabinet, sensitive as all British Cabinets must be to public opinion, very quickly discovered the limits beyond which it could not go.

It was becoming evident too that, while the Labor Government was not as unsafe as many feared it to be, it had allowed the real work of government to be carried on by the permanent officials. In other words, the British nation discovered that it was being run by a bureaucracy. The very common sense of the Labor Government led inexperienced Ministers to defer more and more to the advice of their permanent secretaries. Unfortunately MacDonald did not mend matters by criticising his under-secretaries for an action which, he acknowledged, they took in the belief that they were carrying out his wishes. Admiration at his courage was abated by his censure of civil servants who had no means of replying.

As in other countries as well as in Great Britain at other times, the British elections revealed a tendency for the electorate to retire after a time from advanced positions, and to refit behind the lines—often very far behind the lines. In this case the electorate in retiring from the MacDonald line did not even hesitate at the half-way position of Liberalism, but retired to the heights of the Conservatives, where at least it knew itself safe.

Dealings with the Soviet

IT has been said that France was willing to establish friendly relations with the Soviet, as she has lately done, because she hoped to get the interest on her Russian bonds, while England offered the Soviet recognition because she wanted to sell goods to Russia. If France succeeds no better than England has in the desired object, she will find her approachment to a tyrannical and, internationally speaking, irresponsible Government costly rather than profitable.

France's recognition of the Soviet was, as the text of the French vote shows, a recognition *de jure*, and provides for full diplomatic relations. It is careful, however, to reserve French rights.

The Russian press and politicians, and especially the Premier, Mr. Rykov, are exultant at French recognition and declare that Japan and the United States will surely follow the example. It may