

July 13, 1927

service, to join in the "expression of international friendship."

As the French honor paid to Lindbergh at Paris, so the Canadians' tribute to Johnson at Ottawa, is a token of growing amity and sympathy.

The New Federalism

MR. SEITZ'S view of Federalism is not The Outlook's. That is one reason why The Outlook prints it. It is obviously not that which prevails in the United States or has prevailed for many years. That is a good reason why Americans should examine it. Long-accepted ideas are apt to become hazy and are reclarified only when challenged.

That sectional or other special interests have sometimes invoked and will hereafter sometimes invoke the power of the National Government to break down the restraining power of State authority may be true; but that does not account for the continued and irresistible increase of Federal power. Wherever it appears, whether in State or Nation, whether in executive, legislative, or judicial arms of the Government, political power is potent for harm as well as for benefit; it may be employed for selfish purposes as well as for the public good; but that does not account for the existence of political power or for its development. Political power of one kind and another has increased mainly because modern society needs adequate political power to deal with its problems. It is no more able to use the political instruments of the eighteenth century than it is to rely for its transportation upon the ox-cart and the sailboat.

This is true in all countries. It is particularly true in the United States. As industry has grown in complexity it has needed new resources of power to operate its machines. So as society has grown in complexity it has needed new resources of political power to carry out its functions. In America the change has been the greater because of the greater difference between the simple frontier life of colonial days and the modern life of this continental Nation composed of all the races of mankind.

It is a mistake to think that Federal power in the United States has been the only political power to increase. State power has also vastly increased, and so has the power of municipalities. In his book on "The New American Government and Its Work" Professor James T. Young goes so far as to say that "during the last thirty years"—he was writing twelve years ago, but his words are equally applicable now—"the duties and

activities of the commonwealths have increased fully as fast as those of the Federal Union." A mere survey of one field alone, that, for example, of public health, is sufficient to afford abundant illustration of this truth. The people of the twentieth century could not survive under such public health administration as was afforded when our Constitution was adopted.

If the growth of Federal power has been the most striking characteristic of our history, it is because the growth in wealth, in power, and in happiness of the American people as a whole has been the most striking fact in the history of the world for the past century and a half. Without the growth of Federal power the United States as it is to-day would have been impossible. What South Carolina tried to do in substituting the power of the State for the power of the Federal Government was to withstand the inevitable processes that were making the Nation. The right of the Nation to levy a National tariff and enforce its collection can no longer be questioned. Likewise as essential for the growth of the Nation was National control of inter-State commerce, and that meant, of course and inevitably, National control of inter-State transportation. As for such control leading to Governmental ownership of transportation lines, its proper exercise has been the one thing that has prevented Governmental ownership. Federal power did not create railway monopolies; it controlled them in the public interest. Monopoly is of the essence of railway transportation and without Federal control would itself control the life of the people.

From the beginning the Federal power has never been wholly removed from the control of the suffrage. Whatever extension there has been of the Federal power over the suffrage has raised questions not so much of Federalism as of suffrage. Whether, for example, the right to vote should have been extended to women or not would have remained precisely the same question if the right had been extended by the several States. Whether woman suffrage is wise or not has nothing to do with States' rights.

Similarly the wisdom or unwisdom of prohibition is not primarily a question of Federalism at all. That is a question of the best way to deal with a trade that has at all times been lawless. The Federal power was invoked by the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, not primarily in the interest of temperance, but primarily in the interest of the rights of the States. It was because the several States had the right to control that lawless trade and yet, under the Constitu-

tion as it was, lacked the power that the country came to see that the control of the liquor trade had become a National problem and had to be dealt with Nationally.

In somewhat similar fashion we may have to deal with child labor and other matters involving State control of industry. If States that have adequate laws against industrial abuses remain defenseless against the competition of States that have inadequate laws, the demand for some kind of Federal action will become resistless. In this, as in other matters, States' rights are dependent upon Federal power.

There is no conflict between the true interests of the States and real Federalism. To ask whether the Nation can exist half Federal and half State is like asking whether a household can stand half family and half parents and children. The States are essential to Federalism and Federalism is essential to the States.

We agree with Mr. Seitz in opposing the establishment of a Department of Education at Washington; but this is not opposition to Federalism. There is no question of a new power involved. The Federal Government already has the power to establish such a department if it wishes to do so. The question is what form that power shall assume and how it shall be exercised.

As Woodrow Wilson pointed out in his "Constitutional Government of the United States," the Constitution is not a "mere legal document," but a "vehicle of life," and is to be interpreted, "not by the original intention of those who drew the paper, but by the exigencies and the new aspects of life itself." As Lyman Abbott wrote once in an editorial in The Outlook, "The Constitution is not like the hoops of a barrel that hold the staves together. Hoops fitted for a barrel of thirteen staves would not serve for a barrel of forty-eight. It is like the bark of a tree that grows with the growth of the tree and expands with its expansion."

More and more, as life expands, as business grows more complex, as travel and communication develop, issues that once were considered local will become National. Highways for ox-carts might well be left to counties. Highways for automobiles have become matters of National concern. What of highways for airplanes? And now who even questions the need for National control of the radio? And yet where is the radio mentioned in the Federal Constitution? When we cease to have an expanding Constitution we shall cease to be an expanding Nation.

Some Summer Psychology

By LAWRENCE F. ABBOTT

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EXCEPT for students in university extension courses, the summer is not a good time for abstract discussions in logic, psychology, ethics, and æsthetics. People are too much engaged in enjoying the beauty of nature or the pleasure of outdoor life to care to spend much time in discussions about the philosophical meanings of the words "beauty" and "pleasure."

Nevertheless I must ask my readers this week to bear with me while I venture upon the outskirts of such a discussion. It will not be very learned, for I am not a learned man. My ignorance of psychology is only equaled by my distaste for it. But in the present instance I am forced into a psychological or philosophical discussion as a matter of self-defense. Perhaps there may be some who will be entertained by the awkwardness with which I handle an unfamiliar weapon in meeting the attack of a superior adversary.

It all comes about because last week in these pages I was rash enough to criticise Sinclair Lewis. I said that his novels, like those of Balzac, are marred by the fundamental defect of making the reader uncomfortable. They may be useful and even powerful propaganda—in fact, it may be said in passing that Sinclair Lewis is a moralist, not an artist, an assertion which his impresario, H. L. Mencken, will dreadfully resent—but his novels are not art; for "novel writing," I argued, "is an art, not a branch of morals," and "the prime function of art is to give pleasure or produce a feeling of comfort."

To this definition of art a correspondent, much more highly trained in dialectics than I am, takes exception. "Your definition of art is questionable," he writes. "It is certainly too limited. Art comprises all the efforts of man to take the disorderly and unrelated elements of life and put them into orderly and related form, to turn what seems to be a chaos into a cosmos."

At this thrust I am compelled to cry, "Touché!" But I am not yet beaten. My opponent is using the word "art" in its most generic sense. In this sense I admit that all constructive industry is "art." To write a book on even so unpleasant and uncomfortable a subject as cancer is an "art" as my critic defines the term. But I used the word in the limited sense in which it is employed in the phrase "fine arts."

The fine arts comprise architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry.

Fiction or novel writing is based on the elements of all the five—structure, portraiture, harmony, and imagination. Now my contention is that the pleasure-giving and comfort-giving quality of beauty is an essential in any production in the field of the fine arts—that when the total or predominating effect of a novel is one of ugliness or discomfort then the novel is inartistic and must be classified in the category of pathology or morals or propaganda; that Sinclair Lewis may be an expert in social cancer, but he is not an artist.

Of course, I do not expect to conclusively prove my contention in a newspaper article. Philosophers have been fighting about it since the days of Aristotle, and are still at swords' points. But I believe I can marshal some important and credible witnesses in my defense, which I will now proceed to do briefly.

The consensus of human opinion is that beauty is the basis of the fine arts. The Italians call them the *belle arti*; the French, the *beaux arts*; the Germans, the *schöne Künste*.

Both Plato, the ancient, and Schiller, the modern, regarded the fine arts as forms of play—Plato in derogation, Schiller in commendation. Plato thought that what we call the utilitarian trades are superior to the fine arts because the trades are useful, while the fine arts excite only the emotion of pleasure or the sense of beauty. Schiller regarded play, or the activities of the emotions, as the expression of idealism. He asserted in his "Letters on Æsthetic Education" ("Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen") that man is only truly himself when he plays, that "he ought to play with the beautiful and the beautiful only," and that "education in taste and beauty has for its object to train up in the utmost attainable harmony the whole sum of the powers both of sense and spirit." The vulnerable defect of Sinclair Lewis and the Mencken school of novelists is that they are deficient in taste and beauty and deal with only the half sum of the powers of man.

I apologize for introducing into this discussion an element so mid-Victorian as metaphysics or a witness so mid-Victorian as Sidney Colvin, the eminent English critic, but, as I deem myself entitled to use any weapon in self-defense, no matter how archaic, I here take the liberty of quoting Colvin's definition of fine art, which he deduces from the philosophy of Schiller:

Fine art is everything which man does or makes in one way rather than another, freely and with premeditation, in order to express or arouse emotion, in obedience to laws of rhythmic movement or utterance or regulated design, and with results independent of direct utility and capable of affording to many permanent and disinterested delight.

This, I admit, is a little complicated; nevertheless it arouses the query, not as to how many have bought Sinclair Lewis's books—a very large number, I know—but as to how many he has afforded "permanent and disinterested delight." He is obviously a "best-seller," but is he an artist?

Sidney Colvin, however, suffers as a witness from the well-known fact that he was not only a critic but a British moralist, the very worst kind from the Menckonian point of view. Nobody but a British moralist could lay the stress on "spirit and sweetness," "noble integrity," "true unselfishness," "the principle of beauty in all things," which Colvin does in his study of Keats in the "English Men of Letters" series. Well, then, let us try Whistler, whom not even Mencken can accuse of being a moralist. Whistler's definition of art was that it should "stand alone and appeal to the artistic sense of eye or ear, without confounding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as devotion, pity, love, patriotism, and the like." "And the like" being, I dare say, exhortation of Rotarians and Baptists.

Finally, let me turn from those who may be accused of sentimentalism to the most matter-of-fact writer on art that I, in my limited range, happen to know of—the spectacled, laborious, professional German, Wilhelm Lübke. In his massive and monumental history of art he says: "Only so much is certain, that in the first stirrings of an impulse to art, under all zones and at all times, a remarkable harmony may be observed." Not dissonance and ugliness, but harmony and beauty. In describing the great frieze of the Parthenon Lübke has this to say:

The artist has here expressed with the utmost beauty the importance of the temple, by depicting a festive procession, in which the assembled citizens of Athens are represented. . . . In this procession all that was beautiful and excellent in Athens was united—the noble bloom of girlhood, the fresh strength of youths trained in gymnastic exercise, and the solemn dignity of magistrates chosen by the people. The manner in which Phidias apprehended and executed this task, . . . the unity of aim which lay at the