

"French Revolution" to one who has read Freeman's "History of the Norman Conquest" or the "Cambridge Modern History."

The trouble with the writers who let artistic instinct carry them too far in their presentation of the great panorama of history is that the reader is never quite sure how far to give them his confidence. For example, Froude as regius professor of history at Oxford, gave a series of lectures at that venerable institution on the "Life and Letters of Erasmus." These lectures constitute one of the most delightful books of biographical history that I am familiar with in the English language. But in reading it, as I have more than once, I never feel quite sure how honestly Froude has translated the letters that were originally written in Latin, and how much he has allowed his own imagination to paraphrase them. Moreover, the artistic temperament, if too highly developed in a historian, sometimes leads to rhapsody. This is true of Carlyle.

In our own country, up to the end of the last century history was too habitually made a vehicle of political and social prejudices. History, or what purports to be history, may so excite the emotions as to lead into international catastrophes. More by good luck than by statesmanship we have avoided on one or two occasions a serious break with England because the story of the American Revolution as told by our early historians was so highly colored by their prejudices and animosity.

It is perfectly possible, although it requires the highest kind of literary skill, to make the records of history both scientific in their statement of facts and hypothesis and artistic in the mental pictures and impressions which they produce. Two examples occur to me as I write. One is Theodore Roosevelt's "Naval History of the War of 1812." It was written when he was a very young man, and yet is still regarded, I believe, by the British Government as one of the standard works on that conflict. It does not blink the facts even when they are not creditable to the author's country. But it contains a story of the Battle of New Orleans which is as good as if it were taken from the pages of a novel. The other example is a history of the origins of New England entitled "The Maritime History of Massachusetts." This title might lead the reader to think that the author belongs to the extreme scientific school. But he who has persistence enough to leap the title will find the book a delightful example of the manner in which careful and accurate historical research may be transformed into the most delightful literary art without injuring their scientific value. The author is Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, of the Department of History of Harvard University, who for the four years 1922-5 was Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford.

Having, I hope, thus far convinced the reader of my historical impartiality, I now come to the real point of this article. It is a piece of historical propa-

ganda. Believing, as I do, that the best present guaranty of international peace is the maintenance of an accurate and friendly understanding among the English-speaking peoples, I should like to see extended the plan which led to the establishment of the chair of American History at Oxford, which Professor Morison so ably filled and which is now occupied by Professor McElroy, lately of Princeton. Such an extension is now a possibility. An international committee, or, rather, an Anglo-American committee, has just been formed to establish a chair of American History at the University of London. Its purpose is approved by leading historians in both countries. A comparatively small sum—say \$200,000—would insure a successful initiation of the project. Such a sum would provide for the payment of an adequate salary to the incumbent and the beginnings of an adequate library on the subject. The Hon. John W. Davis, our former Ambassador to England, is Honorary Chairman, and Major George Haven Putnam, the dean of American publishers, is Executive Chairman of the American Committee. The University of London, which educated Thomas Huxley, the scientist, and Walter Bagehot, the economist and man of letters, is a most appropriate place for such an experiment in the international science and art of history. Is it too much to hope that American believers in international peace and intellectual friendship will promptly raise so modest a sum for so promising an undertaking?

What Farmers Want of the President

A Review of the Effect of the President's Veto of the Farm Relief Bill

By The Outlook's Washington Correspondent

THOUGH the President has discussed with devastating clarity the weak and pernicious features of the McNary-Haugen Bill, he has said little that had not been said before. When he said that the plan of relief is, of itself, undesirable and extremely difficult of administration, he repeated what even the authors of the bill and all of its advocates who made their advocacy understandingly had admitted from the outset. Perhaps no thinking man, in or out of Congress, has ever regarded such a scheme as a National blessing. Most of them have regarded it as a National evil, necessary in order to modify another and, to their understanding, a greater evil. These facts the advocates of the McNary-

in their refusal to accept the President's veto as the end of the matter.

That other evil the President stated repeatedly in his veto Message. "The evidence is all too convincing that agriculture has not been receiving its fair share of the National income since the war." "Farmers and business men directly dependent upon agriculture have suffered and in many cases still suffer from conditions beyond their control." "One of our difficulties to-day is the great spread between the farmer and the consumer."

That last sentence states what the advocates of schemes like the McNary-Haugen plan have always contended. They have contended that this condition exists for reasons beyond the control of

mits in another of the sentences quoted. The contention has never been that the farmer receives prices which are of themselves too small, but that he receives prices which, in comparison with prices received by other producers and prices paid by consumers, are too low.

The President said in his veto Message that "no one could fail to want every proper step taken to assure to agriculture a just and secure place in our economic scheme"—in other words, to wish that the suffering be relieved which, he says, has existed "since the war." Supporters of the McNary-Haugen and similar plans remember, however, that the end of the war is now more than eight years in the past, and that for nearly half that length of time Mr. Coolidge has been President of the

United States. They are at least likely to reflect that when he said in the veto Message, "They [the farmers] are entitled to and will have every consideration at the hands of the Government," he was vaguely promising something that he might long since have performed, at least in large measure. They will recall that he has made similar utterances on several occasions before, and they will feel that he has fallen far short of exhausting his legitimate powers to redeem them.

Suffering, continuing through eight years, of a basic industry and of businesses dependent upon it, they will think, has been a situation which the President should not have dismissed, as often as it became pressing, with words. They will believe that he should have directed such agencies as exist—the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, the Inter-State Commerce Commission, and other executive arms of the Government—to do all that might be done to relieve that suffering by lessening as much as possible the spread between the price the farmer receives and the price the consumer pays for farm products. Completer functioning of the Division of Co-operative Marketing in the Department of Agriculture, the extension of the good offices of the Department of Commerce to bring about helpful co-operation between business and agriculture, encouragement of the Federal Trade Commission to correct what are thought to be price abuses, encouragement of the Inter-State Commerce Commission to correct what are thought to be transportation abuses—these are

some of the things which they will think the President ought to have given his attention to. The two Commissions are independent bodies rather than administrative agencies, but these men will not be unmindful of the fact that the resolute wish of the President has its effect even upon independent bodies.

They will believe that if he was really anxious to relieve the suffering of agriculture he would have suggested revisions in the tariff law in order to smooth down as much as possible the inequalities between prices of manufactured articles which the farmer must use and of commodities upon which the farmer must depend for his livelihood.

They will contend that none of these things has been done, that a condition "beyond their control" has, none the less, been left to them alone. If they sought to control it with a dangerous weapon, they will contend, truthfully enough, that they never would have laid hands to that weapon if they had been given the aid to which they were entitled—if special privileges accorded to other classes had been even a little modified so that those who "have suffered and in many cases still suffer" could have borne their suffering sufficiently to go on producing.

They will not, recalling other utterances of the President, place great reliance upon his present promise that "they are entitled to and will have every consideration at the hands of the Government."

Fortunately, there is still time for the President to demonstrate, though late, the sincerity of his purpose toward agriculture. Another Congress convenes in

December. There need not be before that Congress a McNary-Haugen Bill or anything like it. If the President's Message to that Congress reveals a determination to do what it is believed he legitimately can do for agriculture—or, more strictly speaking, for evenly balanced prosperity in the United States—there probably will not be any such bill. Even in the session of Congress just ended the McNary-Haugen Bill was slow in making its appearance. Representative Haugen, at least, believed that no such bill would be necessary, that the President's attitude toward the problem had become such that the problem would be measurably solved without the necessity of his pressing for a law. As the session wore on, Mr. Haugen lost hope and resorted again to the weapon which even he did not want to use.

If the President in his Message to Congress next December and in Executive Orders meanwhile shows that he is putting the force of the Administration behind measures to bring about a more equitably distributed prosperity, he will have little to fear from an agricultural population which has always wanted to believe in him. Secretary of Commerce Hoover and Secretary of Agriculture Jardine, acting under the orders of the President, may make this determination perfectly clear before Congress meets.

If, on the other hand, something definite and constructive is not done during the intervening eight months, the President may hardly hope to avert injury to those delicate adjustments of commerce and trade which he feared would be thrown out of kilter by the McNary-Haugen plan. DIXON MERRITT.

The Strategic Situation in China

An Account of the Actors and the Drama of the Chinese Civil War

By A. M. NIKOLAIEFF

THE fighting southwest of Shanghai between the troops of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang and the Cantonese Nationalists attracted world-wide attention on account of its nearness to the international port and consequent anxiety for foreign residents there. The conflict seems to be the opening episode of this year's campaign in the long struggle in China, which last fall unexpectedly entered upon a new and possibly decisive phase.

The remarkable successes of the Republican National (Kuomintang) Army of the South, more frequently called the Cantonese Army, are chiefly responsible

for the present Chinese crisis. A series of victories won by the Cantonese over the armies of the rival northern militarists have made possible the creation of a vast independent republic of South China.

The two most important contests were with Marshal Wu Pei-fu, formerly dictator of Central China, in the province of Hupeh, and with Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, dictator of the Yangtze seaboard provinces, in the province of Kiangsi. After these were won, the authority of the Nationalist Government of Canton, which formerly had control only over two southern provinces (Kwangtung and

Kwangsi), gradually extended over five more provinces (Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Fukien), and partly over Szechuan. In other words, the influence of that government, in the course of about half a year, spread over an area equal to nearly half of China proper, with a population of over 200,000,000.

It is significant that such a radical change in the situation took place at a time when two war lords of the North—Marshal Chang Tso-lin, dictator of Manchuria, and Marshal Wu Pei-fu—having defeated the "People's Army" of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang in February,