

minism and argue that these results produce, or at least excuse, riots. That would be a novel approach indeed for conservatives and potentially fatal to their normal analysis of human nature.

The dominant anxiety of the political establishment now is to try to fudge the issue. To say that the cause of the riots is "complex" has the advantage that it sounds humble and also excuses the government from being particularly decisive. A few grants here and there, more community relations officers, some pressure on the police for more "sensitivity," job training schemes, aids for housing, better riot shields and helmets for the police, more social workers—the program can be all things to all men.

Government ministers voice the hope, privately, that 1981 will simply prove to be an aberration. "We must hold out till the end of the summer" as one put it in a mood of mindless optimism. The frightening thought that the rapidly growing colored population of the inner cities, rootless, unhappy, and alienated, could produce a long-term law-and-order disaster is thrust aside. It is hard even to get the matter ventilated. To discuss it, hiss politicians, newspaper editors and program producers, would be to make it worse. With that sort of approach dominant, future historians will not find it hard to discern why Britain has been in general decline for some time.

Andrew Alexander

*German Divisions**

West German attitudes toward the Alliance are currently characterized by two main conflicts. There is a strong division about Alliance policies between the left wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—and to a certain degree also of the Free Democratic Party (FDP)—on the one side, and on the other side the majority of these two parties together with the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) opposition. This internal conflict in the SPD is the latest skirmish in a permanent battle between its marxist-socialist wing and its pragmatic social democratic

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wing. Behind this main conflict is a second, more sophisticated one between the SPD-FDP and the CDU/CSU opposition.

Few question the German membership of NATO. At party conventions some Young Socialists usually criticize NATO as an instrument of conserving capitalism. But, although it can be argued that there is a latent majority against the Alliance among the Young Socialists, no resolution to leave the Alliance has yet passed a national meeting.

Thus the issue is not the membership of the Alliance. Instead the defense budget, nuclear armament, the NATO rearmament decision of December 1979, and the neutron bomb are the most disputed topics.

For example, in January 1981 a group of SPD Members of Parliament requested a reduction of the defense budget by \$390 million, which they wanted to spend instead on foreign economic aid. This, of course, was a tiny minority in the German parliament. But it is perhaps significant that in 1980 the Federal Republic had already failed to reach its goal of an increase in the defense budget of 3 percent in real terms. And in 1981 the Federal Republic will fail again at a time when the Minister of Defense admits that his budget is too small to finance the long-term modernization of the German Bundeswehr. Nevertheless, a left wing SPD parliamentarian called the 3 percent increase "just mad," and the NATO rearmament decision of December 1979 was heavily disputed at the SPD party convention. At that time Chancellor Schmidt gained a broad majority by linking the rearmament decision with a new arms control proposal. NATO would negotiate with the Russians on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) and the Pershing II, and the Cruise Missile would be deployed only if these negotiations should fail.

In the meantime it has become obvious that there is a fundamental difference in how this decision is understood. The United States and the West German opposition understand it as meaning that the production and deployment of the new weapons is one thing; the negotiation with the Russians is a second and different subject. The left however, see it in a much more coupled way. It must first be proved that the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. have failed before the new weapons can be deployed. On this basis the Brezhnev proposal of a "freeze" with regard to long-term theatre nuclear weapons was regarded by leading SPD politicians, notably Willy Brandt, as an encouraging signal. In other words, by accepting the SDP Conference compromises, the left hope that

minor concessions by the Soviet Union will be sufficient to cancel the deployment of the new weapons.

Carsten Voigt, the SPD spokesman for foreign policy, thus proposed that the NATO decision be renounced because it was based on the assumption that SALT II would be ratified. It is difficult to understand why and how the non-ratification of the SALT agreement could have balanced the existing unbalanced TNF ratio in Europe. But Mr. Voigt's argument does not, of course, express strategic thinking but must be regarded as another attempt to eliminate serious defense efforts.

It was against this background that Chancellor Schmidt and Minister Genscher visited Washington in Spring 1981 and pressed the new administration to start negotiations with the Soviet Union. They did so primarily for domestic political reasons. But the risks of such negotiations are obvious. As long as they are in progress and the smallest hope exists that they will reach any result, there will be a mobilization of forces against the deployment of the new LRTNF. Both Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. Genscher naturally see this risk; but their domestic position is weak and they have to play politics — increasing the likelihood of conflict within the Alliance. For instance, when the German Defense Minister, Hans Apel, pointed out at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich in February that arms control was one approach to restoring equilibrium in Europe, he was strongly criticized by several American delegates who made it clear that there is no alternative to rearmament. Domestically, the West German opposition is not opposed to negotiations, but it insists that a military balance has to be achieved first by military efforts.

Nuclear armament in general, and the enhanced radiation weapon in particular, also demonstrate the case. Indeed the general anti-nuclear attitude was mobilized during the debate on the neutron bomb. The secretary general of the SPD at that time, Egon Bahr, spoke of a perversion of human thinking because this weapon kills men without destroying homes. The usefulness of this weapon for the defense of Europe was simply not discussed in such circles. They took up a straightforward ideological position. An attempt was also made to mobilize antinuclear feelings again this Spring when a left-wing magazine, *Stern*, published a map showing the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic. When the new administration in Washington hinted that the deployment of the neutron bomb might assist the defense of Europe, the German government argued that such discussion

would make it still more difficult to implement the NATO decision of December 1979.

The background of all these unstable positions is that, on crucial defense issues, the government has a majority in parliament only if it gains the support of the opposition. Following the 1980 general election, more than sixty SPD members of parliament formed the so-called "Parliamentary Left." They find additional support on crucial issues among other SPD and even FDP Members of Parliament. This means that the group enjoys a veto power because the overall government majority of the SPD/FDP coalition over the CSU is only forty-four seats. Employing this leverage, the left has partly transformed the conflict between themselves and the government into a conflict between government and opposition. It may soon become a conflict between the American administration and the German government.

Public Consensus on the Alliance

In contrast to these disputes, a broad consensus on the principles of the Alliance characterizes the electorate. A few figures may demonstrate this fact. In Fall 1980 the following questions were presented to a representative sample:

Should we belong to an unchanged NATO, or should we try to gain a more loosened or a more solid NATO, or do you think we should leave NATO?

	Total %	CDU/CSU %	SPD %	FDP %	Youth (up to 24 years) %
unchanged NATO	81	84	83	78	74
more solid NATO	10	13	8	10	11
more loosened NATO	4	1	3	8	7
leaving NATO	1	1	2	2	2

Between 85 percent (youth vote) and 97 percent (CDU/CSU vote) prefer an unchanged or more solid Alliance. This is indeed a clearcut majority.

There is slightly more controversy on the function of American troops in Europe:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
indispensable	33	41	29	30	26
important	48	46	49	54	46
of minor importance	11	8	13	8	18
unimportant	3	2	3	5	4
harmful	2	1	2	2	2

Here again the support for the American troops is highest and strongest among the CDU/CSU vote and lowest and most reluctant among the youth vote. But in general the belief that American troops are important for the security of the Federal Republic only wavers between 72 percent and 87 percent.

The question on the withdrawal of American troops from Europe shows almost the same result:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
withdrawal	15	10	17	14	23
against withdrawal	82	89	80	81	73

Even if the support of the American troops in Europe is high, it must be noticed that about one-fifth of the SPD vote and the youth are in favor of a withdrawal. This can be regarded as a critical minority.

This becomes more obvious and more important when the question is asked whether the Federal Republic should make financial contributions to prevent American troop withdrawal:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
some contribution	59	62	55	63	56
a great contribution	13	14	12	8	10
no contribution	28	24	33	30	34

If the presence of American troops has to be paid for, support remains high—but significantly lower than before on this issue. The critical minority has the strength of one-third. And even among CDU/CSU votes, opposition to financial contributions climbs up to a quarter. If those who are not willing to pay for the American presence are asked how then to guarantee security, the answer most frequently given is neutrality.

One variable that explains these differences between various groups in the electorate is the perception of the Soviet threat:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
very great	12	20	6	7	7
great	36	44	33	32	25
not so great	38	27	47	47	53
not serious	10	8	13	12	10

Only half of the German electorate perceives a great or very great Soviet threat. If one also includes those who perceive “not so great a threat,” this perception climbs up to about 86 percent, which is comparable to the support of the Alliance in general. This implies that the perception of even a limited Soviet threat is regarded as a sufficient argument for the Alliance. But is it enough for the support of effective defense efforts? The results cast doubt on that.

Among the CDU/CSU vote, the percentage of a perceived great or very great threat increases to 64 percent—nearly double the figure for the youth, the SPD, and the FDP vote. Perception of the Soviet threat is an important conflict line in the German electorate.

Moreover, general support for the Alliance is one thing, defense spending quite another. Evaluation of the German defense budget leads to the following results:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
much too much	5	4	5	9	6
too much	17	13	19	21	26
sufficient	58	56	63	55	54
too little	15	23	10	13	10
much too little	2	3	1	—	1

A majority in all segments of the German electorate believes that the present spending on defense is sufficient. Of those who want change, a slight majority prefers a reduction. Here it is important that the youth and the FDP votes are most in favor of a reduction of the defense budget.

If this attitude is further analyzed, it becomes obvious, that the perception of the Soviet threat is of great importance:

Defense spending	Perception of the Soviet threat			
	very great	great	not great	not serious
much too much	6	3	6	13
too much	12	10	22	27
sufficient	40	61	64	52
too little	30	22	6	6
much too little	8	1	1	2

Obviously among those who perceive a very great Soviet threat, the demand for an increase in the defense budget is significantly higher than the demand for a reduction. And the core support for reduction is found among those who do not believe in a serious Soviet threat.

These attitudes toward the Alliance have to be complemented by some statistics on trust in the Alliance. Which Alliance is superior, NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
NATO	15	16	15	11	18
Warsaw Pact	39	42	39	47	35
equal	43	40	44	40	44

Those who believe the Warsaw Pact to be superior, are twice as numerous as those who believe in the superiority of the West. Here differences between segments of the electorate are irrelevant.

Finally, does the German electorate believe that, in the event of Soviet aggression, NATO, including the Bundeswehr, would be

strong enough to protect us effectively or would the Russians overrun us?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
NATO strong enough	51	50	53	41	55
USSR would overrun	44	47	43	55	39

Only half of the electorate, with minor differences among different segments, believes that NATO is strong enough to protect its territory. If this result is compared to the perception of the Soviet threat, it again becomes obvious that it is mostly those who do not perceive a serious Soviet threat who believe in the strength of NATO:

Strength of NATO	Perception of Soviet threat			
	very great	great	not great	not serious
NATO strong enough	36	47	59	57
USSR would overrun	59	50	38	42

Inconsistency and the Forthcoming Conflict

At first analysis this appears to be a perfect example of inconsistent public opinion. People have serious doubts whether the Alliance can protect them. They realize the superiority of the other side but they also give overwhelming support to the Alliance in general—as long as they do not have to pay more. But public opinion only reflects politics. If the trend is inconsistent, the likelihood is that the politics of the last decade were also inconsistent. And so it was that people were told that they could have detente with the Soviets; therefore, why spend more for defense? The only problem is that the Soviet Union did not believe in the same theory. They have spent more, have come close to a dangerous superiority, have invaded Afghanistan, and—with the help of Ayatollah Khomeini and the American hostages—have gotten Ronald Reagan elected President of the United States on a broad consensus that great efforts must be undertaken to re-establish at least an in-

ternational equilibrium. This new administration has increased its defense budget considerably and is again willing to accept worldwide responsibility. Its language toward European allies is still very polite—consultation is the word used most often. But how long will it accept what it sees as unfair burden-sharing. Senator Tower pointed out at the Wehrkunde meeting “If by the shortcomings of our European Allies a situation should occur in Europe where the risk for the security of our forces becomes unbearable, American public opinion will force the withdrawal of our troops. This would be a tragedy for the Free World.”

In the Federal Republic of Germany a broad consensus supporting the Alliance exists. Political leadership has the opportunity to create in addition a new consensus for a higher defense budget. But until now the government has made no efforts to fight for such a goal—which can be explained by a veto power of the far left which regards Europe as an island of detente in a troubled international world. How long will the American people accept this policy? On the other hand the Soviet Union is offering *more* detente in Europe with the strategic aim of decoupling Europe from the United States. The longer the present West German government delays following the new American leadership, the more difficult it will be to get public support for stronger defense efforts and the new American policy. The Federal Republic of Germany is confronted with a period of turmoil.

Werner Kaltefleiter

The Timerman Affair

That anti-Semitism is still abroad in the world is hardly stop-the-press news. It has been part and parcel of official Soviet policy since the death of Lenin. It has been the intellectual baggage of influential elements in British and French society. The Arab world, behind the fig-leaf of “anti-Zionism,” has embraced it. The Terror International, in both its “black” and “red” excrescences, has made it an article of faith. And anti-Semitic organizations thrive even in the United States.

But does the presence of anti-Semites, even when they happen to hold government office, justify the wholesale tarring of nations and peoples with the anti-Jewish brush? To the Liberal Establishment the answer is “Yes”—but very selectively. If the country in