

regard that the public unions are nearly unanimous in their opposition to "sunshine bargaining" proposals whereby the rest of us, even if we can't bargain, could at least know what is going on in those hitherto closed door negotiations.

The author is careful to state that his critique is not against public employee organizations, as such: indeed, he endorses the irrefutable notion that, in a democratic society, they have as much right to organize and promote their interests as do any other groupings of like-minded individuals. Dr. Lieberman's brief, rather, is against the unique special nature of public unions as currently organized and protected: it is against an organizational type, a "hybrid union-political party" enjoying rights and privileges denied by statute or practice to the rest of us.

It is of more than passing interest that the current president of the AFT (AFL-CIO), Albert Shanker, was interviewed regarding *Public Sector Bargaining* (in *Education Daily*, December 12, 1980). While characterizing Dr. Lieberman's predictions about what might happen to public sector bargaining in the future as "just plain silly," he went on to provide a powerful argument in Dr. Lieberman's favor — "A lot of things happen in legislators' offices that are not open to the public." Just so. And one of the things going on is intense lobbying by public sector unions, including Mr. Shanker's own AFT.

Mike Lieberman has performed a signal service to all of us concerned with the debate on public sector unionism. Though his newest book is eminently readable and hence recommended for general audiences, one hopes that some person with the resources to do it will see that *Public Sector Bargaining* reaches the policy-maker in particular.

— Dan C. Heldman

Laurence W. Beilenson

Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Age, (Regnery/Gateway, Chicago, 1980).

The author of earlier books on the limits of diplomacy and on subversion (of communist governments), Colonel Beilenson, is a Los Angeles man of law who was a soldier in both World Wars. His *Survival and Peace*, suffused with historical learning, is realistic, very readable, and a sound manual for twentieth-century statisticians.

"For our survival and peace in the nuclear age," Colonel Beilenson writes, "what should we do? Realize that whatever we do, nuclear war is likely sooner or later. Prepare the best shelter (civil defense) for our population that money and brains can buy. Go all out to develop an active defense. Know that treaties are a trap and avoid them except in the case of *temporary-settlement* treaties and alliance treaties; and understand that they too will be broken. Comprehend that diplomacy is only a patching tool; use it for that purpose, though sparingly, but do not harbor the illusion that diplomacy can do more than patch. Forget SALT. Build up our nuclear deterrent

to strive for superiority. In short, employ armed might in being as our tool of choice for survival and peace.”

You would label Laurence Beilenson as a Hawk? Well, then you would not altogether read him aright, for others might find him a Dove in more respects than one. He recommends that America withdraw from many of her overseas bases, prepare western Europe and Japan to conduct all their own defense, be concerned for America’s survival in freedom to the exclusion of other considerations if necessary, and abandon the ruinous notion of guarding the world. America’s massive intervention in Vietnam was a ghastly miscalculation, he writes. Our first necessity is to build up our nuclear strength, and to that end large economies must be effected, he points out. “In the real world, those who count a dollar spent for arms as a dollar lost to the social services forget that the indispensable service our government must do for us is to keep us alive and free.”

Colonel Beilenson, in short, is no ideologue: he is a bold and rather original thinker, much read in everything from *The Federalist* to the writings of Lenin. This is as convincing a guide to a successful military and diplomatic policy as ever I have encountered. If Mr. Reagan should study it, he might begin to act as John Adams or Theodore Roosevelt acted in their different circumstances: that is, to join courage and prudence in America’s external affairs.

Whether discussing the construction of fall-out shelters or the possibility of subverting communist regimes in Africa, Colonel Beilenson writes with assurance and practical knowledge. He has the art of worldly wisdom—and a patriotic heart.

—Russell Kirk

William A. Rusher

How To Win Arguments, (Doubleday & Company, New York) 1981.

The dust jacket contains a quote from that master of oleaginous liberalism, John Kenneth Galbraith: “An interesting and informed treatise. And when you consider the cases the author has to argue, you know that it has to be good.”

Not surprisingly, of course, it is good. Mr. Rusher, one of the most articulate spokesmen of the conservative Old Guard, argues with authority and experience, having debated and lectured from coast to coast, in connection with *National Review*, of which he is the publisher, and on the Public Broadcasting Network’s series, “The Advocates.”

Effectively, Mr. Rusher’s book is a Clausewitz on conversation, and it covers everything from establishing the terms of a debate to delivering the *coup de grace* in as clean or messy a manner as you choose. His tactical stratagems are useful in debates, whether in a boardroom, a bedroom, or a bar room, and he discusses such things as “The Blunder” (he says back away...and fast!), how to nail down topics or opponents, and how to cope with hostile audiences. The Tory M.P. Lady Astor was being heckled by a Labor Party supporter. “How many toes on a pig’s foot?” he shouted. (Transla-