

Originally, in 1946, the New Orleans Riverfront Expressway was proposed by Robert Moses, the Napoleon of parks and highways. Mr. Moses, a New Yorker, substantially ruined Long Island and its railway system by a merciless expressway built after World War II; elsewhere, too, even in the little Michigan town where I was born, Mr. Moses' touch blighted old beauties. He professed himself a conservative; but his only accomplishment that met with my favor was his New York World's Fair of 1964—which everybody else seems to have denounced as a failure.

As matters turned out, happily, New York taste was not permitted to devastate New Orleans. Through my syndicated newspaper column, I swung my little mace in the Second Battle; the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, zealous for the expressway, cancelled its subscription to my column; but the preservationists distributed 20,000 copies of my denunciation on the streets of the city. At length John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation in the Nixon administration, was persuaded to cancel the whole project.

*The Second Battle* can be used as a manual by other people, in other cities, trying to defend the amenities of urban living against "renewers" with federal funds and powers who are bent upon creating urban deserts and jungles. The New Orleans fight saved the oldest and best quarters of one of the South's three most interesting cities. This victory suggests that the southern spirit remains capable of self-defense; and that some things iconic will still stand, in the southern states, when all the rest of America is one monotonous sprawl.

Russell Kirk

## Will South Africa Survive?

SOUTH AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT. THE REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA. *Foreign Policy Study Foundation, Inc.* (University of California Press, Berkeley and London, 1981)

In 1947 Arthur Keppel-Jones, a distinguished South African historian, published a book entitled *When Smuts Goes* in which he predicted his country's coming breakdown in a bloodbath. Mr. Keppel-Jones set a fashion; ever since 1947 liberal-minded academics, journalists, clergymen, and television commentators have predicted South Africa's impending violent demise. A massive array of "guilt-gloom-and-doom" books concerning South Africa now fills library shelves. Between them, their authors have created a strange fantasy world where the clock eternally points at five minutes to twelve, and

time is forever running out. The sense of drama has been heightened of late by South Africa's acquisition of a nuclear potential. *Mother Jones*, a *lumpenintelligentsia* radical journal, has predictably joined this club.<sup>1</sup> But even moderates look with dismay to an atomic *Götterdämmerung* in the South Atlantic.

When we first opened *South Africa: Time Running Out*, the report of the Rockefeller Foundation Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, we assumed from the title of the report that it would follow the same time-honored pattern. This report, however, is not quite like the others. It is more realistic about South Africa's military strength than was the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Study in 1965, when it prepared an estimate of the costs and casualties that would be incurred in an international invasion of South Africa. This report presents a relatively moderate and rational analysis of South Africa's problems as seen from the liberal standpoint. Nevertheless, it is profoundly wrong in its recommendations, in part because it fails to understand the dilemma facing white South Africans. It calls for more of the same policies (boycotts, sanctions, diplomatic pressure) that have failed in the past to get whites to change their policy. These are only too likely to fail in the future because the whites are convinced that a democratic consensus society, based on the formula of "one man, one vote," will not work in South Africa any more than it has worked anywhere else in black Africa.

The failings of this report — as of so many other academic reports — do not derive from lack of men, money, or ability. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the commission in December 1978 as an independent, tax-exempt, nonprofit corporation (the Foreign Policy Study Foundation). The Rockefeller trustees authorized a \$2 million budget (nearly as much as the Carnegie Corporation spent in South Africa over a fifty-year span, and more than the Hoover Institution spent annually to operate its library which comprised 1.5 million volumes). Franklin A. Thomas, the Ford Foundation's president, chaired the commission; its ten members received help from a staff of fourteen and from seventy-nine consultants; the commission held meetings in the United States and in western Europe; the commissioners also took a two-and-a-half week trip to South Africa where they met with a wide variety of men and women drawn from there and from neighboring states. The report is a bulky document (516 pages); it sells at a reasonable price (\$8.95), the University of California Press having received a subsidy to ensure wide sales of Southern African books.

What, then, has gone wrong? Mr. Thomas himself supplies part of the answer. In an interview given to *The New Yorker*, he stated that the commissioners were objective and completely independent in outlook.<sup>2</sup> There was only one inbuilt bias Mr. Thomas could foresee: that apartheid was "wrong" and that it constituted "a unique violation of

1. See Adam Rothschild, "In the Final Day," *Mother Jones* (November 1980).

2. *The New Yorker* (August 31, 1981), pp. 25–26.

human rights." The latter assumption is, of course, questionable. Whatever the demerits of its social policies, South Africa's record on the African continent is hardly uniquely evil. The last two decades have seen, for instance, bloody civil wars in Nigeria and the Sudan in which an estimated one million people lost their lives, a ferocious mass-murder campaign conducted by the ruling Tutsi people against the intelligentsia of the subject Hutu, mass liquidations and mass starvation in Ethiopia, and the creation of a huge refugee problem. (Black Africa now supposedly cares for nearly 8 million refugees, very few of them from South Africa.)

In addition to this admitted bias, the commission members, the staff, and the consultants were all of one outlook in a more general sense: they were all liberals, and as such they were uniformly critical of whites in South Africa. According to Mr. Thomas, most of them were actually surprised to discover that Africans and Afrikaners both regard one another as legitimate residents of South Africa. A conservative voice cannot be found anywhere in this report. And the commissioners have often permitted their prejudices to interfere with their analyses. They rightly censure the homelands policy, as we do ourselves, but they give no credit whatever for such progress as was made during the 1970s—advances that were quite startling when compared with conditions in the past. Between 1970 to 1976, for example, their joint gross domestic product (at factor cost and current prices) nearly quadrupled (from R. 300.9 million to R. 997.9 million). There was a substantial increase in agricultural production whose total value rose from R. 27 million 1959/1960 to R. 259 million in 1976. The commission points to the world community's criticism of the homelands on account of their small size and lack of economic resources. Yet that same world community calls for the creation of a Palestinian West Bank state which would be smaller and less fertile than the Transkei and which—unlike, say, Bophuthatswana—would lack mineral resources.

The commissioners likewise might have said more about the close links that exist between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Liberals are apt to shy away from the subject, lest they be stigmatized as McCarthyite witch-hunters. In fact, however, the ANC party line never diverges by one iota from the pro-Soviet course maintained by the SACP. The ANC is but an adjunct organization. Finally, like most American liberals, the commissioners seem obsessed with *white* racism as a worldwide problem; they do not seem to be sufficiently aware of ethnic discrimination as a widespread phenomenon among nonwhite peoples throughout much of the so-called Third World.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, having spent a great deal of time and money, the commissioners have produced yet one more off-the-target attack on South

3. See, for instance, Willem A. Veenhoven, editor, *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey*, 5 vols. (The Hague, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1975–1976).

Africa. In reaching their conclusions, they merely reflected the wider assumptions current in American academia where liberals heavily predominate particularly in the social sciences, and where conservatives are rarely found (if not excluded altogether) from teaching positions in African studies and even more in black, Afro-American, Chicano, and women's studies.

What are the general characteristics of such investigations? They are excessively funded; they have overly large staffs; they select staff members according to political more than functional criteria. (The staff of the Rockefeller commission, for over a year, had no one who could read Afrikaans.) They seldom consult conservatives. Obviously, foundations have their own political axes to grind. This applies to conservative bodies such as the Mellon Foundation as well as to liberal institutions. The "big three" (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie) are, however, far wealthier and more influential than the rest. They are exceptionally liberal in their political approach, and they discriminate against conservatives in giving grants for the purpose of doing research in "sensitive" subjects such as South Africa. Conservatives such as the authors of this essay, Kenneth Adelman, or Ned Munger are seldom consulted. (Dr. Peter Duignan did give evidence briefly before the commission which wrote *South Africa: Time Running Out*. No one of the commission staff had read his written material beforehand, and all, with the exception of the chairman, F. A. Thomas, seemed hostile to his oral evidence.) Support comes only for those who come out with the "right" answer, that no case can possibly be made for South Africa.

The commission considers that the Reagan administration should express fundamental opposition to South Africa's racial policies. If white South Africans are unwilling to allow for "genuine political power sharing" with the black majority, the United States should impose a form of economic boycott. American firms already operating in the country should not extend their operations. Firms not already established should stay out. In addition the commission calls on U.S. corporations already there to allocate generous amounts of corporate resources to improve the lives of their black employees, to promote black welfare, and to assist in the development of black leadership. But, unlike many liberals, the commission does *not* call for the immediate disinvestment of American capital from South Africa. Nor does it advocate—for the time being—a break in our non-military trade with South Africa (worth \$3.4 billion in 1980). It has more limited recommendations, including a limit on sales of advanced technology to South Africa; an increase on U.S. aid to neighboring countries so that they can reduce their dependence on the racist regime; and U.S. stockpiling of strategic minerals so that we too can limit our own dependence on South Africa. In these respects, the Commission occupies a minority and moderate position within the anti-apartheid front.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, the Commission overestimates the power and influence that foreign pressure can yield, partly because they have an exaggerated notion of the importance of foreign investment to the South African economy. Widespread misconceptions not-

withstanding, South Africa generates 92 percent of its capital at home, and South Africans themselves supply nearly all of the country's technical and managerial skills. And U.S. investments in South Africa, though amounting to about \$2 billion, are equal to only 18 percent of South Africa's foreign investments as a whole. Linked with this is the Commission's underestimate of the forces working for economic and social change within the country. The Commissioners believe in some ways that South Africa is still an economic colony, an assumption long since out of date.

Regarding the much-heralded South African revolution, the commission takes a much more realistic tune. It concludes that a violent overthrow of the system is not imminent and that South Africa could well withstand a "war of liberation." The Commission also rightly rejects the notion that foreigners should declare war on the country in order to enforce change. Taking account of South Africa's military strength—the commissioners reject the training and equipping of African resistance movements. Again, it proposes more limited policies: that the U.S. should extend its arms embargo on South Africa and tighten its ban on supplying the country with nuclear materials. If South Africa makes no significant changes in the apartheid system, moreover, the commission calls on the Reagan administration to reduce its diplomatic representative but not to make a complete break. At the same time, the American taxpayer should provide more aid to South Africa's neighbors to reduce their economic dependence on Pretoria. *Time Running Out*, therefore, will satisfy neither the Right nor the Left. But, despite its apparent moderation, it leaves some questions unanswered and suggests mistaken solutions to others.

The commissioners have a profound trust in the efficacy of economic boycotts; they unconsciously base their approach on the assumption that a nation will rather grant political concessions than suffer economic loss. But sanctions historically have been remarkably unsuccessful as a means of international coercion. Stalin's economic boycott of Yugoslavia failed to bring Tito to heel, and American sanctions against Cuba have not forced Castro to amend his policies. South Africa is in a much stronger position than either. It has vigorous manufacturing industries; it manufactures the bulk of its armaments and has stockpiled oil; it is not merely self-sufficient in food, but it is one of the few African states that actually exports it; and it could be self-sufficient in capital, albeit at the expense of its rapid growth rate. In short, South Africa is the wealthiest country in sub-Saharan Africa. A ban on exports to South Africa would not bring down the whites, who would be the last to suffer. On the contrary, sanctions might—in the short run—produce an import substitution boom of the kind initially experienced by Rhodesia after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

The chief victims of a boycott would certainly be South Africa's neighbors. All of them—Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and even Zambia—depend on South Africa for capital, markets, and a wide range of imported goods, for railroad, port, and air facilities, for financial and technical skills, and in many cases for the employment of migrant workers. Apartheid or no

apartheid, hundreds of thousands of Africans still vote with their feet to come to South Africa (a point that the commission might have considered). There is no way — for the time being — by which the various members of this South Africa-centered trade system can be made self-sufficient and independent from South Africa. The Tan Zam Railway, once extolled as an example of socialist generosity and enterprise, has proved a miserable failure; it has failed to decrease Zambia's dependence on its southern neighbors for rail transport. Where are the resources to come from to construct an alternative transportation system not linked to South Africa? How would new markets be developed — except with South African help?

South Africa's neighbors would not be the only countries to suffer from a boycott: western Europe would also be seriously affected, especially Great Britain. According to a study completed by the British Association of Industries in 1977, a boycott of South Africa would increase British unemployment by over 70,000 and one of its most prosperous markets (£600 million a year) would have to be sacrificed.<sup>4</sup> A South African economist, Arnt Spandau, has estimated that a 20 percent reduction in exports could cause unemployment in South Africa — whites, 90,000; blacks, 340,000. Incomes would drop by one million rand. Furthermore, unemployment and decline in income would hit all the states of Southern Africa. The questions to be answered, then: Is the cost worth the objectives to be gained? Would the objectives be gained even after all this suffering?<sup>5</sup>

As it happens, we agree with much that the study commission recommends. We look to a long-term transformation that will end racism in South Africa and create a democratic society. We also look to the formation of a genuine system of free enterprise in which men will be able to move throughout the country, sell their skills, buy land, invest their capital, find their own friends, and marry according to their own discretion — without being guided throughout their lives by ideologues and bureaucrats. *South Africa: Time Running Out* in some ways thus parallels our own analysis.<sup>6</sup>

We do not, however, regard South Africa as the world's worst country. The number of persons imprisoned, tortured, shot, or hanged in South Africa is tiny by comparison with the dictatorships of black Africa, not to speak of those of the Soviet Union or Cuba. South Africa, unlike the Soviet Union and unlike most of the African dictatorships, has an independent judiciary, a parliamentary opposition (albeit

4. South Africa would be most seriously affected by a fuel boycott, but even so, it is not as vulnerable as many observers think. South Africa does not run on oil; of the country's energy needs, only one-quarter is based on oil. The remaining three-quarters are based on coal or electric power.

5. See Arnt Spandau, *Economic Boycott against South Africa: Normative and Factual Issues* (Johannesburg: Labour Research Programme, University of Witwatersrand, 1978).

6. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

elected by a minority vote), independent universities, and independent churches (many of them bitterly critical of the government). Most of the English-language press opposes the government in a manner unheard of even in a moderate African country such as Zimbabwe or Zambia. Black per capita incomes are higher on the average than they are in black Southern Africa; housing and hospital facilities available to blacks in Soweto are markedly superior to those available to African slum dwellers in Kinshasa, Lusaka, or Nairobi.

Moreover, the South Africans have of late effected considerable reforms in breaking the industrial color bar and extending the African workers' right to join a union and to strike.

Given these circumstances, the United States should encourage South Africa to make moderate reforms. In doing so, we should back the reforming wing of the Nationalist Party (the *verligtes*) against the rightwingers, and against the ultra-conservatives, the *Herstigte* (Reconstructed) *Nasionale Party* (HNP). In the 1981 elections, the HNP failed to gain any electoral seats; the HNP, did, however, succeed in enlarging the share of its poll from 3.3 percent to 13.1 percent. Given the HNP's undeviating opposition to any kind of reform, the United States would make a fatal mistake by failing to support Prime Minister Botha with his more moderate and constructive policy of gradual reform.

We should, for example, quietly press for further improvements in the status of Africans, Indians, and Coloureds in return for ending the arms embargo. There are of course good strategic reasons for taking this course. South Africa controls the Cape route vital to the West's oil tankers; it is a major, perhaps an indispensable reservoir of strategic minerals; and it forms the only available base area in the southern Indian Ocean provided with a network of ports, airports, supply depots, factories, and other military and civilian facilities which we cannot permit under Soviet influence or that of her surrogates.

Instead of calling for boycotts, we should practise that "softening up" diplomacy that liberals are wont to advocate in our dealings with the Soviet Union. We shall have more success in Pretoria than in Moscow, for South Africa, unlike the Soviet government, does not threaten our country in a military sense; neither does South Africa stand committed to exporting its social system to the rest of the globe through diplomacy, trade, subversion, and armed blackmail. We should therefore extend rather than diminish our investments in South Africa; by doing so, we shall create more jobs, better wages, and industrial promotion for blacks.

Industrialists, after all, have no natural preference for whites over blacks; they do not enjoy paying white workers statutory wages based merely on the color of their skins; they wish to promote efficient workers irrespective of race. Manufacturers, moreover, have a vested interest in developing mass markets that comprise black as well as white customers. (Indeed, one of South Africa's most striking developments has been the expansion of black purchasing power over the last two decades.) At the same time, the industrial color bar has begun to crack; the government—once committed to rigid separation—has at last accepted black urbanization as an inevitable and permanent

fact of life. These changes have come about — not through the impact of lectures and sermons on the part of “committed” scholars and clergymen, but as a result of an ever-increasing demand for skilled labor. It is in South Africa’s new industries, and in associated service occupations, that the wage gap between whites and blacks has at last begun to diminish — a process that we should encourage with all means at our disposal.

While encouraging American firms to invest in South Africa, we would naturally expect them to adhere to the so-called Sullivan principles (designed to achieve equal treatment for blacks and whites in American-owned firms). But the principle political point is that an expanding economy run by a white government that feels confident and secure is more likely to institute reforms than one that fears isolation or destruction. To some extent, industrial growth has already brought about a reallocation of income between the various racial groups. (The turning point came about 1970. Between 1970 and 1975 the white share of South Africa’s total purchasing power declined from 70.1 to 64.9 percent.) At the same time, Africans became increasingly important to the economy as purchasers of manufactured goods. According to Erich Leistner, a South African economist, the consumption by blacks at the end of the century will be twice that of South Africa’s total consumer market at present.

Politically, moreover, an expanding economy can produce a rapidly modernizing society. As people become more alike and share similar values and customs, language and religion, there is less reason for racist discrimination or restrictions on Africans. Furthermore, businessmen know that the largest untapped market for labor and consumers is among the blacks and thus have an interest in an end to apartheid. The case for disinvestment is further weakened by other facts. Companies cannot immediately withdraw their funds from South Africa; it takes about five years for a firm to get its money out, and it costs about 25 percent of the value of the stock because payment is made in so-called “offshore” rands. Furthermore, the plant and technology, the manager and workers, remain. Only ownership and some management personnel change.

U.S. investment has been decreasing in South Africa for several years, due to radical, church, and student pressure and to company fears about South Africa’s stability.<sup>7</sup> Most companies now only reinvest their profits, not new money. But some multinationals have been pulling out; for example, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Total western disinvestment totaled 315.7 million rands in 1979, a little less than was invested. This trend may be welcomed by

7. Ironically, after years of preaching disinvestment and pressuring governments and business, the anti-apartheid front has failed to shake businessmen’s confidence in South Africa. In 1981 South Africa ranked seventh in the world in creditworthiness and reliability, above even France and West Germany.



intellectuals in South Africa; it is one that appalls black labor-union members who want more work rather than less.

What should U.S. policy be toward South Africa? Our policy should be based overtly on our national interests and strategic requirements. The Administration, of course, has an obligation to point out to the American public what our interests are and how they should be safeguarded. It would be unwise to exaggerate South Africa's strategic importance in order to achieve a policy of rapprochement with that country for military reasons, to secure strategic minerals, and to counter the Soviet/Cuba threat. Advocacy of close U.S. defense contacts with South Africa is politically unrealistic at this time; it would both please our foes abroad and arouse bitter dissension at home. In the future, the United States should reconsider its policies in accordance with changing strategic needs.

The Carter administration and the commission believed that any form of cooperation with South Africa must be rejected because of the need to safeguard American relations with the independent black states of Africa and, indeed, with all the nations of the Third World. This argument states that it makes no sense, to endanger, say, our growing trade with Nigeria—a country important for its oil—for the sake of propping up an endangered white regime in South Africa. There is some merit in this. The trade of black Africa as a whole is more valuable to the leading Western powers than their commerce with South Africa alone. The United States and other Western powers, however, cannot reasonably be expected to align their trade to correspond with the political preferences of other powers. The United States successfully insists on having commercial intercourse alike with Israel and the Arab powers, China and the Soviet Union, Algeria, Morocco, and so forth. The United States likewise has the right to

8. For more detailed information regarding South African—Soviet cooperation in setting prices for a variety of commodities, including gold, diamonds, and various base minerals and for details on South African-Soviet collaboration with regard to the “orderly marketing” of such products and the exchange of technological and marketing information, see “How Moscow and Pretoria Carve up the Mineral Market,” *Guardian* [Great Britain], August 23, 1981. According to this article, Vladimir Bykov, Deputy Soviet Ambassador to London, admitted quite candidly to B.B.C. correspondents that the U.S.S.R. dealt with men such as Harry Oppenheimer (a South African mining magnate) not as a South African but “as a businessman.”

The difficulties of applying morality to diplomacy are many. Few governments outside western Europe and North America are democratic. Few governments are moral or just, or rule for the benefit of their people. If we decide not to deal with Chile, we can hardly deal with any communist regime. If we boycott South Africa because of its racial policies, we must boycott over three quarters of the nations of the world who oppress their opposition, religious groups, or persons who own property. Similarly, in economic affairs, if nations have to pass a moral litmus test before you can trade with them, there would be very little trade indeed.

trade with South Africa. Western willingness to make concessions on its commerce with South Africa will not satisfy the censors of the West in the U.N.; on the contrary, such concessions may well encourage yet further demands for Western concessions in the political sphere. African statesmen have as keen a sense of *Realpolitik* as their opposite numbers in others parts of the globe; African states trade according to their notions of legitimate self-interest like everyone else. Zambia, for instance, imports mining machinery and food from South Africa — not because the Zambians admire Pretoria's racial policies, but because the Zambian mining economy depends on South African supplies. Mozambique sells power to South Africa, uses her technicians, and sends labor migrants to the Witwatersrand — not because FRELIMO approves of South Africa's political attitudes, but because Mozambique needs South African technical skills and South African gold. The Soviet bloc countries themselves do not hesitate to trade with South Africa in a covert manner (for instance in fixing prices for diamonds and other minerals<sup>8</sup>); so do many other African nations. Indeed, a whole new international service industry has grown up, an industry that specializes in falsifying bills of lading, altering labels, and publishing misleading statistics; it is this industry that enables regimes to reconcile militant rhetoric with economic facts.

George W. Ball in the *Atlantic Monthly* a few years ago put his finger on what has been wrong with U.S. policy towards South Africa: "Diplomacy, like politics, is the art of the possible, and if we use our leverage toward an unachievable end, we will create a mess!" A peaceful but imperfect solution for South Africa is preferable to trying to get a perfect solution by violent means.

The South African whites will dismantle apartheid. It is a restrictive, inefficient, and inhumane system. They will not, however, accept a western parliamentary system based on one man, one vote. Like African and Third World states, the South Africans seek for political solutions that will suit a multiracial and multi-ethnic society, one that is half in the Third World and half in the First World.

The South Africans accordingly have begun to experiment. The old faith in *apartheid* is on the wane; even the *regte Afrikaner*, the one-hundred-percent Afrikaner, no longer believes that the creation of African homelands alone can solve his country's problems. The government has considered the creation of separate Indian and Coloured parliaments, joined with the white parliament through a common link; such projects have as yet failed to find acceptance among Indians or Coloureds; nevertheless, they mark some advance in Afrikaner thinking. We ourselves would favor something like the solution that the Afrikaners have themselves introduced into Namibia where *apartheid* has been dismantled. In Namibia, the so-called Turnhalle Democratic Alliance represents an attempt to create a solution acceptable to all of Namibia's disparate ethnic communities, a solution designed also to safeguard the citizens' person and property, and to maintain a free enterprise economy. The road to peace in South Africa lies in appealing to the moderates.

What of the future? If the present system fails to work, the South

Africans may have to switch to a presidential system in which the powers of Parliament will be much reduced. A reforming presidency might be able to rely on the South African Defense Force whose senior officers tend to be *verlig* rather than *verkramp*—reformists rather than conservatives. The army is willing to fight a foreign enemy; the army understands, however, that guerrilla wars are political as much as military conflicts and cannot be won by guns alone.

We ourselves believe that a Consociational system would ultimately be South Africa's best hope. A consociational system would entail proportional representation for each ethnic group, a joint veto enabling each ethnic group to invalidate new legislation deleterious to its interests, and rule through ethnic elites in one parliament. Each group would enjoy local autonomy. Consociation implies continued social and ethnic diversity based on a policy of pragmatism and tempered by cooperation between the elites in each social group. The elites would act as brokers to limit conflict and to reach accommodation with a balance of power between their competing interests.

The commission's approach unfortunately is simplistic. The commissioners act as if all would be solved if the whites stopped being racists and established a new regime based on the principle of "one man-one vote." The experiences of other multi-ethnic societies in the so-called Third World do not, however, give support to the commissioners' optimism. Western democracies can allow power to pass from party to party; politics is not a zero-sum game. Ethnically and racially diverse societies, on the other hand, all too often play the political game by a different rule, on the principle of winner takes all; loser gives up all he has—his job, his farm, his bank account, perhaps even his life. Constitutional guarantees under those circumstances may mean little in the long run. As Hobbes once put it, "covenants without the sword are but words and are of no use to protect any man."

White South Africans act as they do, not because they are evil men or racists but because of their history of conflict with Black peoples, the multi-racial structures of their society, and the experience of so many other Third World minorities that have suffered expropriation or expulsion. These are the facts of life, and these the commission has failed to understand.

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