

THE WAR AGAINST SOVIET COLONIALISM

The Strategy and Tactics of Anti-Communist Resistance

JONAS SAVIMBI

The age of European imperialism ended in 1975, when a military coup in Portugal led to independence for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal had been the last European power to maintain sizeable colonies overseas. Now that it was relinquishing its empire, the struggles for national liberation that swept Africa and Asia during the 1950s and 1960s finally appeared to be over. The former British, French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, and Portuguese colonies could now develop themselves free of imperial exploitation. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America could live at peace, for the anti-colonial guerrilla wars had at long last been won.

But this dream of peace and national self-determination could not yet be achieved. In country after country, struggles for national liberation were betrayed and hijacked, and new nations found themselves once again the victims of colonialism. This time they were assaulted by a new imperial power: the Soviet Union, acting directly or through its first overseas colony, Cuba. And so the nationalist struggles had to begin anew. Peoples tired of years of war and sacrifice were once again turned into soldiers; their nations became battlefields once more.

For eight years, the independence movement that I founded and lead, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), fought against Portuguese colonial rule. We expected to win the free elections that had been promised by the Portuguese in 1975, for we had strength in all Angola's tribes as well as overwhelming support among the Ovimbundu tribe, which accounts for 40 percent of the nation's population. By contrast, the other non-Communist independence group, the F.N.L.A. (Angolan National Liberation Front), was supported exclusively by the Bakongo people of northern Angola. And the Moscow-controlled M.P.L.A. (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) was supported only by urban leftists and portions of the Mbundu people living near the capital city of Luanda.

But suddenly in 1975, Luanda was seized by the Soviet-controlled M.P.L.A. and hundreds and then thousands of Cuban troops. Elections were called off, and Angola was recolonized. Today our land is occupied by 45,000 Cuban troops and colonial bureaucrats (at least 17,000 of whom

have taken Angolan citizenship), as well as by thousands of East Germans, Poles, Czechs, and North Koreans. The Soviets have sent \$2.5 billion in arms to maintain their imperialist rule.

And so for 10 years more, UNITA has had to continue its guerrilla war—this time against the Cubans and Soviets who have replaced the Portuguese as the foreign rulers and exploiters of our people and land. Today the peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are also waging wars of liberation against foreign troops and foreign secret police and the imposition of a foreign ideology on their nation. They are resisting tyrannical regimes that are kept in power only by the imperialist military force of the Soviet bloc.

This is a historic reversal of roles. For many decades, Communism was identified with nationalism in the Third World, and many Communist parties came to power playing on the nationalist sentiments of the people. But the experience of countries ranging from Afghanistan to Laos to Angola to Nicaragua shows clearly that Marxist-Leninist regimes have no respect for the traditions of a people or for the tribal customs and languages that strengthen a sense of community and of continuity with the past. True nationalists around the world are therefore rejecting the Marxist-Leninist path and taking up arms against regimes that impose this failed ideology.

The spread of anti-Communist revolutions is a historic reversal in yet another sense. Until recently, the language of revolution was written entirely by Communists. From Mao to Che Guevara to General Giap, the greatest theoreticians, practitioners, martyrs, and heroes of revolution were Communists. They wrote the texts and histories; they produced the weapons of guerrilla war. It was to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba that would-be guerrillas turned for money, arms, training, and political support.

I know, because I received my revolutionary education in China. In 1965, as I was preparing to found UNITA, I met Hua Hua, the Chinese ambassador to Nasser's Egypt. He invited me to Peking, where I met Mao Tse-tung and

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the other military and political leaders of the Chinese revolution. They advised me to return with 12 recruits, and late in 1965 we began a nine-month course in guerrilla warfare.

From Mao and the Communists, I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or a nation. Collectivist agriculture does not work. Peasants must be able to own their own land, their own houses, and their own cattle. People must be free to practice their religions, and observe their tribal traditions.

Lessons from Chairman Mao

Today we who fight for these freedoms are using the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare developed by the Communists. But we are using Communist military and propaganda principles in order to defeat the Soviets and their political ideology. UNITA is now in the third phase of Mao Tse-tung's classic description of a successful guerrilla war: we are waging widespread guerrilla conflict throughout our country. Our forces control one-third of the territory of Angola, and protect under our political influence some 60 percent of the 7 million Angolan people. Soon we shall liberate all Angola and bring peace, freedom, and true independence to all the Angolan people. We are achieving victory by following the five central principles of guerrilla warfare.

The first principle comes from Mao: a guerrilla must be one with the people. It is more important to win the support of the people in the countryside than to take and hold cities. In Angola, as in China, the great mass of the people are peasants living in small villages. Our first goal had to be to win their allegiance and confidence. Without the support of the people, our roads would be mined with informers. With it, we have an intelligence network alerting us to enemy troop movements out of the cities, and we do not need to carry all our food and supplies with us—critical to a guerrilla movement that has to travel thousands of kilometers by foot and possesses neither trucks nor access to rail travel.

When the people come to trust and support a guerrilla movement, they willingly share what they can. The guerrilla must therefore have strict discipline. To take food from villagers, to steal their land, to mistreat the people is to poison the waters in which the guerrilla army must swim. It is treason to the movement and is punished as such.

To gain the trust and support of the people, it is also important to establish schools and hospitals throughout liberated territory—if possible, even in areas where guerrillas operate but do not control. Today UNITA administers 6,951 primary schools with 7,127 teachers and 224,811 students. We run nine secondary schools with 80 teachers and 1,860 students. Though the main hospital in Jamba, our provisional capital, has only three doctors, the French medical group *Medecins sans Frontieres* has sent doctors and nurses to Angola to train our people and help administer inoculation programs. Every battalion has men assigned to treat and evacuate our wounded.

The second key to the success of a revolutionary movement is a clear political program. Soldiers cannot fight and the civilian population cannot endure the hardships of war unless the political program meets their daily concerns and



Jonas Savimbi: Fighting the Portuguese was easier than fighting the Cubans and Soviets.

is understood. We have political officers in every guerrilla unit and every village. The political program of UNITA is simple and clear. We fight for an independent Angola, free of all foreign troops. We believe that peasants, not the state, should own farm land. We favor democratic elections, freedom of religion, and respect for tribal customs and languages. We broadcast daily from a mobile radio station in Portuguese and local languages so that all Angolans know why we fight and what our goals are. The United States lost its war in Vietnam when the American people no longer understood why their sons were dying. No revolution or war can succeed unless the soldiers and their families know why they are fighting.

Unity is a third vital point in the success of any guerrilla movement. Guerrillas can only win if their military and political and propaganda efforts are all working in the same direction. Fidel Castro makes unity of command a precondition for Cuban support of guerrilla movements. We saw this in his insistence on a popular front in the struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua. Castro also insisted on unity among the guerrillas in El Salvador, withholding arms and even engineering a "suicide" or two to force the guerrillas to come together under a common command. Some anti-Communist freedom fighters have unfortunately hurt their effectiveness by a lack of coordination between guerrilla forces.

Fourth, it is essential that the guerrilla base of operations be within the territory of your own nation. This is to

ensure self-reliance, as well as closeness to your own people. Another Angolan guerrilla group, the F.N.L.A., was based in Zaire, and lost its base of operations when Zaire established relations with the M.P.L.A. UNITA had bases briefly in Zambia, but we were expelled after we sabotaged the Benguela railroad through occupied Angola, over which Zambian copper is exported. Never again will we rely on bases on foreign soil.

The Afghan freedom fighters are constantly threatened with losing their bases in Pakistan should Soviet pressure on President Zia increase. The Nicaraguan resistance will face similar problems, should Costa Rica or Honduras be pressured sufficiently by the Sandinistas or the Cubans or the Soviets. By contrast, a base within Angola—we now control a third of the land—allows our guerrillas a safe haven to rest. It gives us a place to train new recruits and it

provides safety for the families of our fighters. UNITA was able to survive and grow, even during years without international support, because we were self-reliant. We could grow our own food, repair weapons we captured, and strengthen our ties with the people.

The fifth challenge is to establish international political ties—to find allies who will give military, political, and propaganda support. Too often the West thinks only in terms of military support. But political support and international propaganda are just as important, as I learned from General Giap of North Vietnam when I met him in China. He said that the world must know why a guerrilla movement is fighting. A revolutionary movement's supporters around the world must know its successes.

The world must not be fooled into thinking that the M.P.L.A. truly represents the Angolan people or that it has



Support from the United States is vital to drive out foreign troops from Angola.

control of the nation. That is why UNITA has representatives in Washington, London, Paris, Munich, Geneva, Portugal, Morocco, and Senegal. It is why we regularly invite members of the international press to come to our capital to see our successes, and to interview our prisoners so they may know about the demoralization of the Cubans and the M.P.L.A. Some reporters have travelled with our guerrilla forces and can report to the world the truth of our claims to travel freely throughout Angola, enjoying popular support and winning victories against the supposedly invincible Cuban forces.

At first it was difficult to get the world's attention. Anti-Soviet resistance movements were supposed to be doomed. The West had not yet learned that truly nationalistic movements can use the guerrilla tactics of Mao and Fidel Castro successfully against the Soviets. Some of our first propaganda victories came when we captured Western technicians who worked in the diamond mines on behalf of the Cubans and the M.P.L.A. Finally the West was forced to realize that UNITA was not limited, as is so often said, to the southeast corner of Angola. Governments that refused to recognize us had to come and negotiate for the release of their nationals. And prisoners who were treated well and safely transported thousands of kilometers to our base camps could report to the world that we were not bandits and that we moved freely through most of Angola. Now it is unnecessary to prove these points and we do not take Westerners when we overrun mines and power stations. But we try to warn Westerners that the Cubans and M.P.L.A. cannot guarantee their safety, and we ask them to stay out of all Angola, for it is a war zone.

Guerrilla Strategy

The goals of UNITA are clear and open for the world to see. We will drive the Cubans and Soviets and Eastern-bloc personnel from Angola. We will work with all patriotic Angolans to establish an independent, democratic, and free Angola. We reject foreign ideologies that presuppose masses of industrial workers and men without souls.

Our strategy is to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and Soviets can no longer bear the burden. A combination of rising military, financial, and political costs will finally drive the imperialist forces from our shores. The French gave independence to Haiti, the first black republic, when Napoleon could no longer afford the financial costs of keeping the country enslaved. He had other uses for those resources. The United States won its revolution when the cost in lives and materiel led to divisions among the British about whether to continue the war. Similarly, America left Vietnam as the result of rising political costs at home. America was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; in fact, the North Vietnamese strategist, General Giap, told me he never expected to defeat the Americans in battle. The guerrilla does not have to win decisively to drive out the foreign occupiers of his land. He simply has to raise the price of colonialism.

A central element of this strategy is to deny the colonial forces the revenues that finance their occupation. Today the Soviets and Cubans exploit Angola with a rapacity unrivalled by the Portuguese. Soviet fishing fleets have

swept our coastlines, and fish has disappeared from the Angolan diet. Our diamonds, minerals, and oil from the Cabinda province are taken in "payment" for arms and for support of the Cuban troops. The M.P.L.A. government pays Castro \$1,000 per month for each Cuban soldier in Angola, for a total of \$480 million per year. These mercenaries can afford to stay in our nation only as long as they are paid. So UNITA attacks the diamond mines, sabotages the bridges, and destroys the industries that support the Cuban occupation. This policy does not harm our brothers in occupied Angola, for the wealth produced there does not go to them. It is taken by the Cubans and Soviets to pay for their repression here and to finance Cuban expeditions in other nations.

When enough Cuban officers are returned to Cuba in coffins, then Castro must face the wrath of his own people. Already we learn from Cuban prisoners of war that the war in Angola is unpopular in Cuba. The United States can help our cause by bringing the truth to the Cuban people on Radio Marti and Voice of America, and thus weakening Castro's already endangered rule.

Our military strategy is designed to inflict casualties on Castro's troops and not, when possible, on the M.P.L.A. Some true Angolan nationalists have been forced by the Cubans to fight with the M.P.L.A. Not all German officers in World War II were crazed Nazis; so too in the M.P.L.A. there are Rommels and Von Stauffenbergs, nationalists who oppose the Cuban occupation. These kidnapped warriors are our brothers, and our goal is to treat them well when we capture them. Many M.P.L.A. prisoners now fight with UNITA. Every UNITA victory strengthens the hand of the nationalists with the M.P.L.A., and hastens the day when they will join with us in driving out the Cubans and Soviets.

Communist Strengths

UNITA's guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonialists was much easier than our struggle against the Soviets and Cubans. The Portuguese were perhaps better infantrymen than the Cubans, but by comparison with Angola's new colonialists, they suffered in both the quality and quantity of arms. The Portuguese used little armor and had no more than five helicopters, whereas the Cubans and Soviets will send 15 helicopters to a single battle. The Soviet Union may not be able to feed its people or build advanced computers, but it knows how to build weapons (in fact, UNITA fighters rely on the AK-47 Kalashnikov, a low-cost automatic rifle that withstands dust and water better than anything the United States offers at comparable prices). The Soviets also deliver arms in large quantities; in Angola during the last 18 months, they have unloaded \$2 billion worth of MIG 23 and MIG 21 jets, MI-24 helicopter gunships (the weapon used so effectively against the Afghan people), and T-62 and T-55 tanks, as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers.

Relative to the Soviets and Cubans, the Portuguese were as weak politically as they were militarily. They put almost no emphasis on the political side of waging war, and they had no international support. By contrast, the M.P.L.A. was winning endorsements and awards from Soviet-front groups long before it was a factor in the war against Portu-



"Unity is a vital point in the success of any guerrilla movement."

gal. Communist guerrillas and occupation forces benefit from an established worldwide propaganda network. And when the Cubans and Soviets seized power in Angola, sympathetic propaganda outlets immediately sprang into action in the Organization for African Unity, the United Nations, and front organizations around the world.

A third strength of the Communists in combating nationalist resistance movements is their ability to black out news coverage with surprisingly little complaint from the West. Little television footage gets out of Cambodia or Afghanistan. And although UNITA works hard to bring Western journalists to Free Angola, the Cubans do not permit newspaper or television coverage of their atrocities in areas they control.

Democratic v. Marxist Guerrillas

In countering these important advantages of Soviet and Cuban colonialists, the anti-Communist freedom fighter has some distinctive advantages of his own. The first is the religious faith and institutions of his country's people.

Marxism-Leninism is atheistic and materialistic. By definition it attempts to crush religious belief, and Communist governments demand a monopoly on the people's loyalty. But in deeply religious countries such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua and Angola, the suppression of religion has backfired and intensified the opposition to colonial regimes. The Constitution of the M.P.L.A. forbids member-

ship to anyone holding "any religious belief"; this is one reason why it is such a small political party, consisting of only 0.3 percent of the Angolan people. The majority of Angolans are animists, 27 percent are Catholics, and 12 percent are Protestants; all have suffered from persecution. Church property has been expropriated by the Cubans, atheism is constantly preached in hospitals, schools, and political meetings. The Cubans and Soviets taunt animists by flying to the sky with their helicopters and jets, and then telling the local population that they looked and found no God in the heavens. All this has resulted in strong opposition to the regime of occupied Angola. In August 1985, the Catholic Church of Angola endorsed UNITA's call for an end to the war and for a negotiated settlement.

The second weakness of the Communists is economic. The Soviets may provide enormous quantities of arms but they refuse economic aid. And while it is UNITA's goal to damage the export economy that finances the Cuban war against our people, the Soviets and Cubans are doing much of our work for us by nationalizing all industry and collectivizing agriculture. Around the world, Communist governments lower the standard of living, destroy chances to work, and impoverish the people in a way that guerrilla wars never do.

Once a food exporter, Angola now must import some 90 percent of its food. Diamond and gold mines that once made Angola a wealthy Portuguese colony are now actu-

ally losing money. Only the Communists could turn gold mining into a losing proposition. The economy is sustained, and the Cuban occupation is financed, only by the offshore oil produced by Gulf Oil, owned by Chevron, an American multinational corporation. Lenin said the capitalists would sell the rope with which to hang themselves. Today they are hanging the Angolan people. But tomorrow they come for you.

On the Battlefield

Between 1976 and the summer of 1985, UNITA was able to maintain its base securely, in spite of 10 major offensives launched against its territory by Cuban and M.P.L.A. troops. Usually we stopped these offensives within little more than a month—by going behind the lines and cutting off supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition to the advancing enemy.

The offensive of 1985, lasting from June until October, saw a change in tactics, weapons, and intensity. Prior to the offensive, the Soviet Union greatly increased both the quantity and the sophistication of weapons it was sending to Angola. And this time, the offensive was directly coordinated by Soviet officers, 15 to a brigade.

The first prong of the offensive was aimed at Cazombo, a town near the Angola-Zambia border. It appeared at first that the goal was political: to cut off UNITA's border with Zaire and Zambia, to increase the pressure on these two nations and prevent them from aiding UNITA. UNITA moved men and resources up to meet this advance and to defend Cazombo as we had successfully defended it before.

But the Soviet-Cuban strategy was a radical departure from past offensives. The Soviet, Cuban, and M.P.L.A. troops brought a much larger number of trucks and armored cars with them, and so they were able to carry much larger supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition. They were able to move faster and farther without leaving vulnerable supply lines in their wake.

For the first time, UNITA was forced to fight a conventional war, denied the ability to follow the guerrilla strategy of intercepting and cutting off supply lines. The occupation forces surrounded their "soft trucks" with armored trucks, so that we could not destroy their supplies, and then moved forward with armor in flanking moves attempting to surround our defensive positions.

Under Soviet commanders, MIG 21s and 23s and MI-24 helicopter gunships would arrive within 15 minutes of each engagement to provide air cover. Artillery shelling was also better coordinated and more accurate. It was a completely different war than we had fought in the offensives of 1982 through 1984. The Soviet troops always remained in armored cars and tanks, and their commanders stood behind three lines of M.P.L.A. and Cuban troops.

Throughout the offensive, the Soviets proved experts at using speed, maneuverability, and deception. On August 15, while the greater part of our commanders, resources, and troops were in Cazombo, 750 kilometers from Jamba, the Soviets unleashed what turned out to be the real thrust of their offensive—an assault on Mavinga, a town captured by UNITA in 1982 and located only 200 kilometers northwest of our capital. This was to be the final offensive

of the war, with Jamba as its goal. For should the airport at Mavinga have been captured, the Soviets would have had a strong base from which to attack our capital.

The Soviets drove toward Mavinga with four M.P.L.A. brigades, each 1,300 men strong and fully equipped with armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, and air cover. Defending Mavinga, UNITA had only one regular battalion of 1,100 men and two semi-regular battalions of 600 men each. Fighting to slow the Soviet offensive, we had to call our troops back from Cazombo, and we threw up deep defensive lines and dug in in front of the Soviet advance.

Forced to bring in units from throughout southern Angola, we surrounded that Soviet-Cuban-M.P.L.A. offensive. We outnumbered their four battalions by four to one, and with mortar and infantry fire we destroyed many of their trucks, tanks, and armored cars. We halted the advance 17 kilometers northwest of Mavinga.

**From Mao I learned how to fight
and win a guerrilla war. I also
learned how not to run a country.**

By October 3, the Soviet officers were airlifted out by helicopter. If we had had enough anti-aircraft missiles, we could have destroyed the entire Soviet high command. But they escaped by air, and the M.P.L.A. retreated, after leaving behind many tanks, Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and armored personnel carriers.

The offensive of 1985 was to have been the Soviets' final drive against UNITA. They will not give up after their defeat. It is now the rainy season in Angola, but the Soviets will come again next March or April when the ground hardens and the skies clear for their MIGs and helicopters. The next offensive, like this one, will rely on heavy armor, tanks, concentrated artillery, and airpower. We look to the West for the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that will allow us to stop the next attack, to continue to build our base among the people of Angola and move northward, to drive the Cubans and Soviets from Angola, and to win the true independence that was stolen from us 11 years ago.

Support from Abroad

The Soviets and Cubans and their friends around the world can be expected to continue their political and propaganda war against UNITA. Our success in defeating the offensive of 1985 will force them to redirect some of their propaganda. No longer can they claim that UNITA is weak, that we do not represent the popular will of the Angolan people. Too many journalists have travelled with our guerrillas and can testify to our support in the countryside. We have engaged the Cubans in virtually every province, and our support comes from every region and tribe in Angola.

A new tactic is to claim that UNITA is tied to the South African government. The Cuban troops, say the Commu-

nist propagandists, are in Angola to protect Angola from the South Africans. This claim may fool some in the West, but the nations of black Africa know the truth. They know that Nigeria offered to replace the Cuban and Soviet bloc troops with Nigerian troops. But the M.P.L.A. leadership refused, showing the whole world that their real fear is not the South Africans but UNITA, the Angolan people, and the nationalists within the M.P.L.A..

Yes, UNITA receives aid from the Republic of South Africa. We have also received support from China, Arab nations, and other black African countries, and much of that support has been shipped across the Namibian border. But it is hypocritical of the Soviets to claim that this means we somehow endorse the Pretoria government. We oppose apartheid. Fortunately, it is a dead ideology. It cannot be exported. Even everyone in South Africa talks about how to move away from the apartheid system.

The Lord did not ask our permission when he put Angola on the southwest coast of Africa. We need outside help, even if it has to come across the Namibian border. I would remind the Communists that Stalin's acceptance of war material from America and Britain during World War II did not constitute an endorsement of liberal democracy on Stalin's part. Nor did my acceptance of Chinese military training and aid—when no other nation would help me—make me a Maoist in economics or politics.

The Munich of Africa

Angola was the first nation to begin its guerrilla war against Soviet colonialism. But we are not alone. Today the brave peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia are fighting their own wars of national liberation. We fought and carried on while the West went through a crisis of faith, wondering if its traditions, values, and civilization were worth fighting and dying for. I think that the Third World, through these struggles, has helped to give the West the courage to oppose the Soviet Union—to provide a cure for what Solzhenitsyn calls the Western disease. Our struggle in Angola, the battle of other freedom fighters, is the battle for the West and its values.

We who fight these wars of national liberation see the unity of our cause and the common enemy we face—Soviet imperialism. As a result, representatives of the freedom fighters of Angola, Laos, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua met in Jamba on June 12, 1985 to sign the Jamba Accord and announce the formation of the Democratic International. We who fight the battle for Western values of democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to own one's home and some land, have joined together. Now we ask the West to join us.

We in UNITA call upon the West, and the United States

as the leader of the free world, to give us military and political support. The moral case is clear. UNITA is fighting for a free, independent, and democratic Angola. We are fighting the Cubans and Soviets who would deny us our nation.


The strategic case, the self-interest of the West and America, is equally compelling. Should massive Soviet air and armor attacks succeed in defeating UNITA when the dry season begins in March 1986, then 45,000 Cuban troops and advisers, thousands of Eastern-bloc "technicians," and an untold quantity of tanks, fighter planes, helicopters, and artillery will stand uncontested along the borders of Zaire, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana. Not UNITA alone, but all of central and southern Africa awaits the decision by the United States.

We were all encouraged by the decision of the United States Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which forbade U.S. assistance to the forces of freedom in Angola and left us for 10 years alone against the Cubans. Now the United States must take the next step and commit the military aid that will allow us to defeat the Cubans and Soviets in Angola—anti-aircraft weapons, the Red-eye missile and Stinger missile, and anti-tank weapons. With those arms we can protect our people from air and armor attacks and drive back the Cubans and Soviets through the continuation of the guerrilla war that we have waged for 11 years.

We ask also for your political and diplomatic support. We need you to insist at the United Nations and other international forums that the Cubans and Soviets leave Angola and that the promised elections be held. With your military and political support, other nations will follow your lead and give us aid. Do not underestimate the importance of your decision. For Angola is the Munich of Africa. Hesitation, the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and Soviets, will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938. Do not suppose that Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia will remain of the West when faced with an unopposed base in Angola. They will be forced to make their political accommodations with the Soviets just as most of Eastern Europe fell under Nazi political domination without a shot being fired. The loss of the sea route around the Cape and the loss of the strategic minerals found in central and southern Africa would be a crippling blow to the economy and defense of the West. That is why I say that UNITA is the key to Angola, Angola is the key to Africa, and Africa is the key to the West.

I am not alone in this assessment. The Soviets agree. 🐘

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
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SENATOR JESSE HELMS

It is always risky to mind somebody else's business. But that has not prevented the United States from telling Israel what to do. Perhaps it is because of our big stake in Israel, and longstanding ties of history, culture, and affections, that everyone in Washington has an opinion on how Israel ought to act.

Right now, the advice seems to be to negotiate. We are told that Jordan and the P.L.O. are committed to "the peace process." Peace, if not war, is right around the corner, so now is the time for negotiations.

This advice is coming from professional negotiators in the State Department who feel at loose ends if they do not have a negotiation or two in full swing. Sometimes, like gamblers, they seem more interested in the excitement of the action than in the outcome. And the outcome by no means is a sure thing.

But the rule seems to be: when in doubt, negotiate. Therefore, negotiations are urged without regard to the history of negotiations. That history is not reassuring. Unless one side in a negotiation has been utterly defeated, negotiations typically are dangerously destabilizing. In the past, we have found that there is more actual bloodshed during the negotiating period (as in Korea and Vietnam); or the other side uses the period to alter the geostrategic balance in its favor (as in SALT I and SALT II). Even the best that Camp David could bring about was a stalemate, rather than peace.

Negotiations usually are successful only if the dispute really isn't that important after all. When fundamental issues are at stake, such as the survivability of basic sovereignty and political independence, no piece of paper guarantees the peace. No semantic trick or artful diplomatic ambiguity is enough to prevent tragedy in the long run. Distasteful as it may seem in the hushed diplomatic salons where the negotiations take place, the final outcome will hold fast only if there is a practical equilibrium in the natural conditions of geography and military force.

Apparently such cautionary thoughts have not passed through the minds of our diplomats. Ever since the accord signed last February by King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat of the P.L.O., U.S. officials have been shuttling back and forth between Damascus, Amman, Cairo, and Jerusa-

lem. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has been to Washington to see President Reagan, followed a few weeks later by King Hussein. The King was promised U.S. approval for arms sales to beef up his military, purportedly because of the threat to Jordan from Syria, and also to reward him for being ready to take "steps towards peace."

Everything is apparently in gear, therefore, for the peace process to take over. Even the TWA 847 hijacking was not allowed to interfere; the result was, incredibly, that President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria was publicly praised for his supposed role in ending the crisis (although nothing was said about the roles of the clients of Syria and Iran in orchestrating the crisis).

Moreover, despite the fact that almost every member of the U.S. Senate thought it was unwise to propose the Jordanian arms deal before King Hussein was sitting at a table negotiating with Israel, the arms sale notification was marched up to the Senate anyway. Just as quickly, it marched back down again. As soon as it was clear that Jordan was not going to get the arms without real concessions, Jordan and Syria decided that they could get along together after all—and so the major justification announced for the sale faded.

What are these proposed negotiations all about? Perhaps there is an excuse here for a few personal recollections to put the subject in perspective. For me, Israel first came into focus on the day after I announced my intention in 1972 to run for the U.S. Senate from North Carolina, for that is the day that my wife, Dorothy, left me—not for good, of course. She was on her way to Israel on a long-planned trip to the Holy Land with her church group. In Jerusalem, Dorothy visited the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, and like so many pilgrims before her, she scrawled a prayer on a slip of paper and inserted it into the cracks of the venerable stones. I have never forgiven her for what she prayed for: that I would win.

That thought especially came home to me this past August, when I had a chance to make a private visit to Israel. It is not my custom to travel at the expense of the taxpayers.

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